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jI Constructive Survey of 
Vpanishadic CPhifosophy 

CBeing}l Systematic Introduction 
cr'o Indian 9deatpliysics 


(J). lJW,nade, 

(j)irector, JIcademy of (]Jhilosophy and 
pormerCy, Cl'rofessor of (]Jhilosophy, Pergusson Co{lege, (]Joona. 







R. D. RAN ADE M. A., 
Di,ector, Academy of Philosophy and Religion, 
Formerly, PWJfes$or of Philosophy, Fergusson College, Poona. 

Chis! of ] atnkhandi. 


Printed by K. R. GONDHALEKAR, Jagaddhitechu Press, 
Shanwar Peth, Poona City, 
Publishsd by Dr. N. G. SARDESAI, Manager, OrifJltal Book 
Agency, Poona, fa the Academy of Philosophy and Religion. 


1. The Occasion of the Work.-Ever since the 
nucleus of the following Survey of Upanishadic Phi- 
losophy was presented for the first time to the public 
of Bangalore and Mysore in a series of lectures in- 
augurated under the Presidentship of His Highness 
the Maharaja Gaekwar of Baroda at the time of the 
foundation of the Sanskrit Academy in Bangalorc 
in July 19 1 5, the author lIas been bestowing con- 
tinual attention on the substance of these lectures, 
and making them suitable for a thorougll-going phi- 
losophical survey of the Upanishads, in the firm hope 
that what may thus be presented by way of exposi- 
tion of Upamshadic philosophy will satisfy every 
seeker after Upanishadic truth by giving him in a 
brief, though in a very so1id, compass all the chief 
points of Upanishadic thought in their full philosophi- 
cal sequence. I must thank Pandit Mahabhagvat 
of Kurtkoti, now Shankaracl1arya of Rarvir, and 
Mr. V. Subrahmanya Iyer, B. A., Registrar of the 
University of Mysore, for having given me an op- 
portunity at that time of placing my thoughts on tIle 
Upanishads for the first time before the elite public 
of Bangalore and Mysore. It seems that the lec- 
tures were much appreciated in Bangalore at the 
time of their delivery, and His Highness the Maha- 
raja Gaekwar advised that 't the lectures be printed 
in English and the Vernaculars and distributed 
broad-cast, so that the knowledge imparted might 
be made widely available ". But what through 
stress of other work and what through unforeseen 
difficulties that beset the progress of any important 



undertaking, this volume could see the light of day 
only after the lapse of such a long period after the idea 
first sprang into my mind that the Upanishadic Phi- 
losophy was worth while presenting, and would serve 
as an incentive both to students of European and 
Indian thought alike. 

2. The Combination of Philosophy and Pht
Though I had begun my study of the Upanishads 
much earlier than 1915, it was in that year that I 
first conceived the idea of a presentation of Upani- 
shadic PhilosopllY in terms of modern thought, while 
a literary inspiration in tl1at direction came to me 
first from a 1ecture of the late Sir Ramkrishna Gopal 
Bhandarkar in February 1915. I t was not long be- 
fore I could discover that the Upanishads contained 
not one system of l)hilosophy, but systems of philo- 
sophy rising one oV"er another like Alps over Alps, 
and calminating in a view of Absolute Reality which 
was wortI1Y of the fullest consideration of our con- 
temporary Pl1ilosophers of the West. With that end 
in view and in order that the UpaI1ishadic phiiosopl1Y 
might be Inade intelligible to the Western mind, I 
boldly struck out tIle plan of presenting it according 
to tIle methods of Western thought, so as to make it 
understandable and appreciable by those who were 
trained to think according to tllose methods. It 
mig11t easily be seen by casting a glance at the con- 
tents of tIlls volume that the manner of presentation 
is strictly one which is amenable to tIle methods of 
Western philosophy. Anotller difficulty, however, 
stood in my wa)r. In trying to present the spirit of 
Upanishadic I)hilosopl1Y in tIle garb of European 
thOllght, it \vas incumbent on me not to do injustice 
to the letter of Upanishadic philosophy. It was 
thus that philological considerations weighed with 



me equally \vith philosophical considerations. I had 
seen in my study of Greek Philosophy ho\v much Dr. 
Burnet's Inethod of interpreting the Early Greek 
Philosophers by reference to the Original Sources 
had re,'olutionised the stucly of Greek Thinkers, and 
I thought a similar presentation of Upanishadic Phi- 
losophy according to that method was certainly one 
which was worth wllile attempting. It was hence 
that I culled out Sources from Upanis11adic literatt1re, 
classified tllem into grou!)s according to the va- 
rious departments of Upanishadic thoug11t, arranged 
them in philosophical sequence, and interpreted them 
with dlle regard to considerations of philology, 
taking care all the while that the philological interpre- 
tation of these 'I'exts would not become so crude and 
unintelligible as not to appeal to stt1dents of philoso- 
phical thought. It was this problem of the combi- 
nation of philology with philosophy that has made 
the task of an intelligent interpretation of the Upa- 
nishads in philosopl1ic sequence so taxing and formi- 
dable. I leave it to the stlldel1t of Upanishadic phi- 
losophy and philology to see how far I have stlcceeded 
in my attempt. 

3. The Place of the UPanish,ads 'in lnd'l'an Phi- 
losophy.-.The Upanishads indeed OCCtlPY a tlniqtle 
place in the dev"elopment of Indian thought. All 
the later Systems of Indian Philosophy, as we be- 
lieve has been shown in detail for the first time in 
the history of Upanishadic literature in the fOllrth 
Chapter of this work, have been rooted in the Upani- 
shads. The indebtedness of particlllar systems of 
Philosophy to the Upanishads has been partially" 
worked Ollt by a Garbe or an Oldenberg; but the 
entire problem of the relation of all the later S)istems 
of Philosophy to the Upanishads has been hither- 


to an unattempted task. Oldenberg has indeed 
fairly worked out both in his earlier volume on 
cc Buddha II as well as ill his later "Die Lehre der 
Upanishaden and die Anfange des Buddhismus I' 
how the U panisl1ads prepared the way for Buddhis- 
tic thought, and deserves praise for having attempted 
a hitherto unattempted task. Garbe in his "Sam- 
khya-Philosophie" has discussed how far we could 
legitimately trace the origin of Sarhkhya Philosophy 
to the Upanishads I and l1as come to the conclusion 
that the roots of the Sari1khya Philosophy cannot be 
traced to the oldest Upanishads (p. 27), but that 
the Samkhya ideas came into existence only during 
the interval elapsing between the older period of the 
Brfuadaral).yaka and the Chhandogya on the one 
hand I and the later period of the Katha, the Sveta- 
svatara, the Prasna, and the Maitri on the other. 
Garbe points out truly that the Ahamk ar a of Chh an - 
dogya VII. 25 is to be understood not as the egoism 
of Sarhkhya philosophy, but as the mystical ego, and 
there is much truth in what Garbe says. He simi- 
larly makes a discussion about such conceptions as 
those of Sambhfiti and Liilga OCCtlrring in the earlier 
Upanishads, and comes to the conclusion that even 
they have no Sarhkhyan connotation. So far so 
good. It is, however, when Garbe refuses altogether 
to find any traces of Sarhkhya doctrine in the older 
Upanishads that it becomes impossible for us to go 
with him. Indeed, in our fourth Chapter we have 
pointed out how the conception of the three colours 
in the Chhandogya nlust have led to the conception 
of the tri-coloured Prakpti in Sarilkhya Philosophy 
(pp. 182- 18 3), and as the Chhandogya is recognised to 
be an old Upanishad all round, a general statement 
luch as the one which Garbe makes that no traces 
whatever of Samkhya doctrine are to be found in 



the older Upanishads becomes hardly convincing. 
As regards the Vedanta, also, we have tried to work 
out systematically in what respects all the later Ve- 
dantic systems, the monistic, the qualified-monistic, 
and the dualistic, could be traced to the Upanishads 
as to a parent. Indeed, when we recognise that all 
the great commentators, Sankara, Ramanuja, and 
Madhva have made the Brahma-sutras the pivot for 
their philosophical speculations, and when we re- 
member also that tIle Brahma-sutras were an apho- 
ristic summary of the doctrines of the Upanishads, 
it would seem a little strange why we have not dis- 
cussed the arguments of these philosophers at even 
greater length than we have done. There are how- 
ever two reasons why we have not done so. In the 
first place, we wanted to take recourse to the objec- 
tive method of presentation, going to the Texts of 
the Upanishads themselves, unbiassed by any theo- 
logical interpretations of the Commentators whether 
on the Upanishads or the Brahma-su.tras. And, in 
the second place, it was thought desirable that a full 
discussion of all the theologico-philosophical points 
would best be reserved for a later volume on 
Ved an ta philosophy proper. Indeed the Vedanta 
Philosophy stands to the Upanishads almost in the 
same relation in which the Philosophy of the School- 
men stood to Aristotle. We might say about the 
theological disquisitions of these Commentators what 
Bacon said about the arguments of the Schoolmen, 
borrowing the idea from Ariston, that they" resemble 
more or less a spider's web, admirable for _the ingenuity 
of their structure, but of little substance and profit ": 
1\ L _ , , t, Jf 
 ' t\ \' "\. ' t' 
tV, ovoeJ' JA,fll XPfJtTcJJ.OV
 f\.to<JI 0' 
. This might be a little harsh judgment; but it 
shows how there is a fundamental difference in the 
methodologies of the Up al1ish ads and the Vedinta. 


In the one case, we have the intuitional method, in the 
other only the logical. We have no desire to exalt 
the inttlitional at the expense of the logical. The 
intuitional, we belie\re, is ]10t contradictory of the 
logical, but subsumpti\TC of it. It must be remem- 
bered that we are not speaking here about tIle stlb- 
relational intuitional met110d, but rather of the super- 
relational. Hence, even t110ugh we agree with 01- 
tramare in his judgment that the Upanisllads "regard 
the normal operations of Intellect as powerless to 
grasp Ultimate Reality" (p. 134), we differ from him 
when he says tllat " fearlessly and imperiously doth the 
Intuition of the Upanishadic Philosophers say fie to 
experience and give discharge to all demonstrations, 
while it does not even try to eliminate contradictions" 
( pp. 131-132). The relation of Intuition to Intellect 
raises a large philosopllical problem, and, as we have 
said at a later place in tIns volun1e (pp. 339-341), we 
cannot enter into a philosophical discussion about 
their comparative competence to solve the problem of 
reality in a work professedly <.lealing wit}} Orientalia. 

4. Examination of the Opinions of a few Orien- 
talists.-The work whicll has beel1 accomplished by 
Western Scholars upon Upanishadic literature has 
not been by any meal1S scanty. Though the volume 
of work turned out by them on Upanishadic litera- 
ture is neither so large nor so profound as that turned 
out on Vedic lIterature, it is lleit11er on the other hand 
either meagre or small. Towards the end of the 
present volume nlay be found a succint account of 
all the worl{ that has been done on Upanishadic li- 
terature by scholars like Weber, Roer, Max Muller, 
Bohtlingk, Whitney, Deussen, Oldenberg, Oltramare, 
Hertel, and Hillebrandt. Deussen's work on the 
Upanishads is a monument to his great scholar- 



ship, industry, and insight, and so is the work of 01- 
denberg and Oltramare. We do not wish to enter here 
into a detailed examination of the various opinions 
held on the subject of Upanishadic literature by early 
scholars, which have become the common property of 
all Upanishadic students; we only' wish to examine 
here a few of the latest utterances on the subject. 
When Hertel, for example, says in his brilliant, though 
somewhat one-sided, introduction to the Kenopanishad 
in his cc Die Weisheit der Upanishaden," that Brahman 
in that Upanishad is not to be understood as cc the 
World-Sotll in \vhich all tl1e inclividual Souls ultimately 
merge ", he forgets to notice the point that the aim 
of that Upanishad is simply to describe Brahman, 
in Wordsworthian fashion, as a power or a IJresence, 

tt Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean, and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man. " 
This must verily be the upshot of that Upanishad 
wherein we are asked to meclitatc on Brahman as the 
Reality in the world of Nature and in the world of 
Mind: tasyaisha ad eso yadetad vidyuto vyadyutadii itit.i 
nyamzmishadii ityadhidaivatam; athiidhyiitmam yade- 
tad gachchatzva cha mano a1'
ena chaitad upasmarat)la- 
bhzkshtpam samkalPalf (Kena IV. 29, 30 ). With all 
due deference to Hertel's favourite theme of the identi- 
fication of Brahman with Fire, we must say that we can- 
not accuse the Upanishad of not having considered a 
point which is not the point at issue. The 110int at issue 
being the spiritual description of Brahman as a presence 
or power, it would be an ignoratio elench,i on tIle part 
of that Upanishad to go into tIle description of the 
Brahman as a "World-Solll in which all the other 
souls ultimately merge." Then, secondly, when 
Hertel points out that the Kenopanishad dispenses 

with the necessity of a Spiritual Teacher for the pur-- 
pose of spiritual realization, that the Self must accord- 
ing to that Upanishad be regarded as capable of 
being realised simply by internal illumination, 
and that Uma in that Upanishad (loes in no way 
help lndra i11 rcalising the Absolute, he forgets 
entirely to notice the fact tllat the true role of a 
Spiritual Teac11er consists just in the office wl1ich 
Uma has been I)crformil1g, namely, like a lanlp-post on 
the Pathway to God, of simply (1irecting the benighted 
wanderer on the path of spiritual progress without 
herself going it. Dogmatic statements such as this 
about the teacllings of U])al1isllads come n1crely out of 
takil1g partial vie
1s about a suhject. Tl1is is also illus- 
trated in ()ltrarnare's acctlSatiol1 agail1st tIle U}1anishads 
in his (, I.., 'Histoire (Ie's Jdccs theosoplliques dans 
}'Indc" tllat (( ill affilming the id('ntit
! of tIle l1niversal 
and t11c Jndi,riclual Son], fron1 \\rhich follo\vs neces- 
saril)' tIle identity of all souls, tI1C lTpa11ishads have 
not drawn tIlC COJ1c]usion-l"'llo11 slla1t love tl1Y neigh- 
bour as thyself " (}). ]37). True that tIle Biblical 
expression It Thou shalt lo've thy ncigllbour as thy- 
self" is 110t to l)e found in tIle Upanishads; but it 
WOll1d l)c bold on tile I)art of al1)7 writer on 
Upanisl1adic PIliloso!)}l)' to affirm that the senti- 
ment is 110t preSC11! ill tIle lTpanishads. What else 
is the meaning of that UI)anis11adic dictum ."Jasmin 
sarvii1Ji bltutii'l
i iit111aiviiblzufl v'ijiil1at(t
, (tSa 7), except 
that a Sage, who 11as realised the Atn1an, must 
see the Atman in all human beings, must, in fact, 
regard all human beings as li\!ing in a Kingctom 
of Ends? Finally, \\'11Cl1 OIde11berg in his brilliant 
work on the lJI)anis}1ads U Die Lehre der Upani- 
shaden" tells tIS that the trl.1e parallel for 
Upanishadic Philosophy is to be found rather in 
the teachings of Plotinus, the Sufis, and the Chris- 



tian mystics like Eckhart than in the Philosophy of 
Kant, and when he therefore a little superciliously 
disposes of the teaching of the Upanishads by saying 
II Der eine der Weg der Mystik, der andre der Kants", 
we are tempted to sajT about Kant with a little va- 
riation tlpOn what Aristotle said about Plato, "let 
Kant be Ot1f friend, bllt let '[rutll be Otlr di\/inity". 
When Oldenberg con1mends Kant 11Y saying t11at 
the central principle of Ka11t's 1111ilosopllY is 
the It Formbegriff," \vllile tllat of IT 1)anis11aclic P11i- 
losophy is the "Forn11osigkcit," he is l)linding 11im- 
self to the fact t11at his C.ritiqlll' of P11re Reason 
was only the first })reIniss of a grand pllilosophical 
syllogism whose mi110r prel11iss and conclusion were 
respectively tIle CritiqtleS of Practical Reason and 
Judgment, wherein conceptions of Goodness ancl 
VallIe supplemented the considerations of Pure Rea- 
son, for, on the grounds of Pure Reason, what philoso- 
phy could there be about tl1e 11ltimate realities of 
human life, the Self, tIle World, and God, except a 
philosophy of paralogisms tl1at paralyse, antinomies 
that make one flollnder, and ideals wllicl1 can never 
be realised at all? The "Cognoscendo ignorari " 
of At1gustine, the It Neti Neti" of Yajfiavalkya, the 
II Weder dies noch das" of Eckhart, would be far 
more sure indexes of spiritual llumility, and conse- 
quent possession of reality, than the self-satisfied 
and half-halting dictates of an Agnosticism on the 
grounds of Pure Reasol1, which ffillSt destroy know- 
ledge in order to make room for faith. 

5. The Upanishads and Contemporary Thought.- 
The comparison of Upanishadic Philosophy with 
Kant suggests the parallelism, in a number of points, 
of the philosopllical thOllght of the Upanishads with 
the tendencies of Contemporary Thought. Time was 


when Upanishadic Philosophy was compared with 
the doctrine of Plato alld Parmenides ; time was yet 
again when it was conlpared with the philosophies of 
Kant and SCllOfJenhauer ; we, howe\Ter, WI10 li\re in 
the world of Contemporary Thoug11t can scarcely afford 
to neglect its paralle]i
ms witl1 the tendencies of the 
thinking \\'or1(1 ()f to-da)r. Anybody \\rho will take 
the trouble to read tllC argument of the present work 
will see how \rcry pro\'ocati\Te of thougllt it would be 
for one '\']10 is il1tcrcstcd in tIle tendencies of con- 
temporary })hilosopllY. Here, in the Upanishads, \\re 
have doctrines of Absolute l\fol1isnl, of Personalistic 
Iclcalism, of Pltlralism, of Solipsist11, of Self-realisation, 
of the relation of Il1tellect to Int11ition, and so forth,- 
doctrines \vhicll have divic1ed the pllilosopllic world 
of to-da}
. Had it not been for tIle fact tllat Com- 
})arative PlliloSOl)11y
, like a \lirgin consecrated to God, 
bears no fruit, tI1C 11arallclisnl ofUpanishadic Philosophy 
wit 11 the tel1drncies of Contemporary Thought ",.ould 
have even il1,rited a 'Tolumc on Comparati\"e Philosophy. 
Wllat \VC, 110WC\yer, \\'ould much ratl1er like to llave 
is a constructi,rc than a comparati\Te l)hilosophy. 
Witll the adv.ance of kno\vedge and witll the innumer- 
able means for commtlnication and interchange of 
thougllt, tIlC \vl1ole world is being made one, and 
the body of \\T estern philosophers could ill afford to 
neglect t11e s)Tstems of Indian philosoph)T, and more 
particularl)T the lJpanishads. The same problems 
which at tI1e 11rcsent day divide a Bradley" from a 
Bosanquet, a "'ard from a RO)TCe, a Pringle-Pattison 
from a McTaggart, also divided tIle Upanishadic philoso- 
phers of ancient times. Here we have the same con- 
flict of 'views abo'ut the relation between the Abso- 
lute and the Indi\ridual, the nature of Immortality, 
the problem of Appearance, and the Norm of human 
conduct. Th-e elan v£tal, urhicb, in Bergson, wears 



not much more than a p11ysiological aspect, appears 
in Aru:Q.i (Cllh. VI. II) as a great organic forcp, 
only muel1 more J)s
ychologise(1 ancl spirit tlalised. 
The pyran1idal clepictiol1 of Reality as on tIle basis 
of Space ancl rri111C ,yitll tile qtlalitativ.c emrrge11ce 
of Life and rvlilld a l1Cl Deit
r ill the course of 
e\1olution, '
l11icll \ve mpct witll il1 Alexander 
and Lloyd l\1org"a11, is l)resent in tl10se old Upani- 
shads onl)' ,vith a stress on t11e inverted process of 
Deity as tIle plimary existent, froin whicll came 
fortIl Mind and Life alld Space and 'filne in tIle Cotlrse 
of devolution. The very acut
 allal)Tsis of the epis- 
temology of Self-consciousl1ess, Wllicll "\"L' meet vvitll 
in the Upanishads, call easily llold its 0\Vl1 agail1st 
any similar doctri11e evel1 of tIlC tTIost adval1ced 
tllinker of to-day, thtlS nullif)ring once for all the in- 
fluence of that ill-concei\Tcd and llalf-thought-out 
bluster of an early European "vriter on tIle Upal1i- 
shads that " they are the work of a rude age, a de- 
teriorated race, and a barbaro11s al1d unprogressivf' 
communit)7." OUf presentation of the probJems of 
Upanishadic l)hilosopllY WOll1d ctlso la
T to rest al] tl1c 
charges that are made against it on the supposition 
that it is a block-philosop11Y and does not allow of 
any differentiation inside it. For is it not a familiar 
charge that we hear made against Il1dian philosop11Y, 
that it is all Pantheism, J)ctcrminism, Karmism, 
A-moralism) and Pessimism? It would be out of place 
here to answer each al1d all of the cllarges that l1ave 
been thus made against Indian PhilosopllY in general, and 
Upanishadic Philosophy in particlllar. If our present 
work brings to the notice of these critics the \7ariety 
and wealth of Upanishadic ideas on every conceiv- 
able subject in the domain of philosophy, it should 
have fulfilled its raison d' etre. ThllS, to sav that the 
Upallishads teach only" an unreal morality, or a mere 


Antinomianism ", would entire]y
 miss the mark, be- 
cause it would be a flank-attack and not directed 
against tIle main body of Upanishadic doctrine. 
Finally, to say that the Upanishads teach only a 
Pessimism is to entirely miss the tenor of Upanisha- 
die Philosophy. For the simple reason that there is 
a phase of Pessimisn1 i11 a certain jJortion of Upani- 
shadic teaclling, it does not follow that all Upanisha- 
dic teaclling is I)essimistic. I t has been cus- 
tomary \\,itll EllroJ)ean writers on I11dian subjects to 
suppose that all \vas })eSSilnisll1 and sorrow before the 
days of Tagorc il1 Il1dia, a11d tllat l'agore brought the 
eval1gel of j ()y allel bliss from the \,\1 est. I t is noth- 
ing of the kind_ 1
agorc'5 philosophy of joy and 
bliss is OIlly the crest-\va\'e of that great huge ocean of 
blissful existence depicted ill Upanishadic philosophy. 
If tilC present book points to any moral, it is the moral 
of the life of beatific ,rision enjoyed at all times by the 
Mystic. Wl1en Lord Ronalds}1a y 7, tllerefore, fixing him- 
self, amoIlg otl1er tl1ingS, on a passage of the Upani- 
shads, says in llis book on II India, a Bird's eye-view" 
that pessimisnl infects tIle wl10le physical and mtel- 
lectuallife of India, a11d tlIat tJ1e I11dlan Philosophers 
have ne\ter l)cen able to paint an}7 positive pic- 
ture of bliss (p. 313 ), \\rith all due deference to him 
we must ask lun1 to see if t11e final upshot of Upani- 
s11adic Pllilosopl1Y, as we have depicted it, would not 
enable lliln to revise his judgment. To the charge, 
finally, tllat e\yen supposing tl1at the Upanishads 
teach a doctrine of bliss, the bliss of the Indian is 
one thing and tllat of the Christian another, that 
the one is negative \\Thile the other is positive, 
( If Upanishads and Life" pp. 69, 70), we may say, 
as against Mr. Urquhart, in the first place, that 
we cannot conceive of any bliss being negative, for 
it would be a contradiction in terms, and in the 



second place, that this bliss is the same for all human 
beings whether they live in India or in Europe, 
for w11ere the same intellect and feeling and will have 
been ordained to mankind by God, He has also 
made provision for a like consummation in each 
case. Oldenberg indeed has the candidness to admit, 
which these critics have not, tllat the opposite view 
is at least equally tenable that it should be inconceiv- 
able how the world which is II pierced by Brahman 
through and through " should ever wear a pessimistic 
aspect (pp. 115"116). Let those, however, who wish 
to find sorrow in the Upanishads, find sorrow, and 
those who wish to find bliss, fin d bliss! 7r«V'T
V xPrJ

, II l1 
J.A.fT po" O<VC1 pW7rOr;. 

6. The three-fold purpose of the W ork.-As may 
have been noticed from Ollr previous discussion, the 
two chief of the Work with which we have 
been hitherto concerned are to put into the hands of 
the Orientalists a new method for treating the pro- 
blems of Indian Philosophy, and into tIle hands of 
European Philosophers a new material for exercising 
their intellects on. But these are not the only pur- 
poses with which the Work has been written. The 
ultimate purpose of the Work is the spiritual pl.lrpose. 
To that end, everything else is subservient. Time 
and oft have the Upanisllads compelled a spiritual ad- 
miration from all Oriental Scholars) both European 
and Indian. Dr. Goldstiicker said that the Upani- 
shads formed the basis of the enlightened faith of 
India. R. C. Dutt, when he read the Upanishads, 
felt a new emotion in his heart, and saw a new 
light before his eyes. Ram Mohan Roy felt his 
whole life transformed when he happened to read 
a page of the Isa Upanishad flying past 
him. Pratt regards the Upanishads as essentially 


a religious rather than a philosophical work. Geden 
acknowledges how all the attempts at religious 
reform in India ha\re taken their rIse from the study 
of the Upanis11ads. l\lea(l has gone to the length of 
calling t11e Upanisllads a \Vorld-Scripttlre. From 
these utterances it may l)e seen il1 \vhat 11igh spiri- 
tual esteem t11e Upa11ishads 11ave been lleld by Thin- 
kers, both of the East ancl the V\test. If we may say 
so without exaggeration, there is no J)iece of litera- 
ture in tIle wllole realm of Indian Philosoph)1, except 
possibly tJ1e Bhagavadglta, \vllich is so truly religious 
as t11c Upanishads, and denlanos from young India 
an intellectual justification of l1er faith in tl1e light of 
modern t110ught. Those \Vl10 11ave observed the 
course of the development of European thought 
during tIle last half century know ho,v very n1uch it 
owes its existence, its i11spiration, and its fulfilment 
to the establisll1nent of tIle Gifford J.Jecttlres. It is 
a good sign of the times tllat tIle University of Cal- 
cutta S110tlld llave risen to the occasion, and been a 
pioneer in cstablisl1i11g Lect11resllips by means of 
which a similar ambition migllt be f11lfilled in India. 
The lJpanishads well deserve to constitute a very 
important chapter in the World'5 Philosophy of 
Religion. I t will not be possible hurriedly to esti- 
mate the c.ol1tribution wI1ich tIle Upanishads are 
likely to make to the formation of tendencies in Con- 
temporary Tl10ught. T11e trend of the present vo- 
lume is to show 110W all the teachings of Upanishadic 
Philosophy con,rcrge to\vards tIle realisation of the 
mystical goal. \\Te do not \\'Ish to enter here into 
any philosophical disQl1isition about the nature and 
meaning of Mysticism; nor have we any desire to 
discuss how the Mystic criterion of reality compares 
with those of the Idealist, the Pragmatist, and the 
Realist. The veracity and the virility of any meta- 



taphysical theory is to be gauged by its power of 
making life more di\Tine, and therefore more worth 
while lIving. Readers of the last Chapter of this 
volume may feel that, after all, the consummation that 
the Upanishadic philosophy affords is the realisation of 
the divine in the Individual Soul, alld that it is not seen 
there working itself out in the social and political 
affairs of humallity. TIle practical application of 
the spiritual pllilosopllY was, ho\vever, to come later 
on !rom the Bhagvadglta, wl1ich tatlght a life of a 
disinterested activislTI 011 a spiritual basis, so that tIle 
divine purpose may come to be realised in tile affairs 
of men
 It cannot be del1icd that tIle Upani- 
shads StIppl)T tIle 1)11iloso!)11ic fOUlldation UpOll which 
the Bhagavadglta later 011 erects its t11eory of spiri- 
tual activism. In either case, 11owever, tIle mysti- 
cal motive has been most predomi11ant. It woul(l be 
a problem for the Philosophy of tIle Immediate Fu- 
ture to place Mysticism on a truly philosophical basis. 
Rational Mysticism, which lIas been hitherto regarded 
as a contradiction in terms, must now be a truism. 
The author shall feel his labours aml)ly rewarded if he 
finds tllat his exposition of the Upanishadic Philoso- 
phy makes a contribtltion, however small, to the 
realisation of this Ideal. 

7. The Academy of Philosophy and Religion and 
its Aims.--The present work is tIle first I)ublication 
of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion, an in- 
stitution which has been recently founded ill India 
with the purpose of bringing together all those who 
are interested in a philosophical investigation of the 
problem of God. This aim of the Academy is to be 
achieved primarily by Publications, embodying con.. 
tinued and sustained research in all tIle Philosophies 
and Religions of the world. There will also 


be a number of Lectures from time to time on 
behalf of the Academy at great educational centres 
in India, which might also help the propagation of 
the cause of the Academy. The present centres of 
the AcadenlY will be 1) 0 0 n a, B 0 m bay, and 
Nag p t1 f, and so on, while the work of the Acade- 
my will be extencled to otller centres also in course of 
time. TIle Academy is intended to be an All-India 
Body, tIle Personnel of wllose Council is drawn from 
representati\TeS of all the lJni\7ersities of India. For 
all those \\yho are interested in the work of the Aca- 
demy of PlliloSOI)hy and Religion, tllere ,viII be an 
Ashram at Nimbal, a Railway Station on the 
M. S. M. Railway in t11c District of Bijapur, wllich 
might be used as an i11tellectual and spiritual resort. . If 
Bacon's maxim may be requisitioned for our present 
purposes, \\'e may say that tIle Academy must take 
all p11ilosopllical and religious knowledge for its pro- 
vince, irrespecti\Te of differences of creed, caste, nation, 
or race. The uni\7ersal vision which must inspire 
the work of the Academy may be made apparent 
from the following quotation from the preamble of 
its Prospectus: "1'he l)roblem of finding the uni- 
versal in the midst of particulars, the unchanging in 
the midst of change, has attracted the attention of 
every man of 'Tision, \vhether he be Philosopher or 
Prince. Plato and Sankaracha,rya among Philosophers J 
ASoka and Akbar an10ng Princes arc illustrations of 
the way in wl1ich this t1niversal vision has been 
sought. Plato is known for nothing so much as for 
his synoptic vision of the universal among the parti- 
culars. Sankaracl1arya spent a lifetime in seeking to 
know that by knowing \v11ich everything else comes 
to be known. Aooka, in one of his Rock-Edicts, forbade 
the decrying of other people'
 faiths,-for in that way 
he said one was doing disservice to one's own faith,- 



and he taught the virtue of Concourse (Samavaya). 
Akbar sought after the universal vision by sum- 
moning a Council of Religion, for perchance, in that 
way, he thought that C that lock whose key had been 
lost mig11t be opened'. 1"'11ere is a far cry from the 
days of Plato and Sankaracharya, or of Akbar and 
Awka, to the present day. Knowledge has taken 
immense strides witll the growtll of time. Scientific 
inventions I1ave enorn10usly enricI1ed the patrimOn)T 
of man. The old order l1as changed, and a l1ew one 
has takell its l)lace. Ne\rcrtilciess, t11e goal of human 
life as well as tIle Ineans for its attaillment 11ave re- 
mained the saIne. lJnquestiollabl)7, tIle searell after 
God remaillstheiligllcstproblemc\.C11to-day. and 
a pllilosopllical jllstification of our sl)iritual life is 
as necessary to-da)T as it was llundreds of years ago. " 
More inforlnation about tIle Academy could be had 
from tIle Director of tIle Acadelny of PlliiosopI1Y and 
Religion, Poona Bra,ncll, Poolla, or, Nimbal, M. S. M. 
Railway, District Bijapur, India. 

8. Patrol
age for this V olu1tte.- I must express 
my heartfelt gratefulness to tIle late S11rimal1t Capt. 
Sir Parashllramrao Bllausaheb Patwardllan, K. C. I. E., 
Chief of Jamkhandi, to wllose kind patronage the 
preparation of tllis volume has been entirely due. 
It is impossible for me to express adequately how 
much I owe to IlilTI and to 11is State, in whicll I was 
born and educated, and from which I was sent out 
into the literary world. At a time when the idea of 
free Primary Education was not even mooted in 
British In(lia, Shrimant Appasalleb, tIle fatller of the 
late Chief, boldly conceived the idea of making even 
SecOndar)l Education free in his Native State. It 
was OIlly becoming i11 the generous successor of Shri- 
mant Appasaheb to ha,:re been so kind in his pa- 


tronage of letters as to even voluntarily offer to 
patronise this among a number of other projected 
publications. I t pains me all the more that Shri- 
mant BhatlSaheb did not live to see the publication 
of this volume which was brought out under his 
generous patronage. He met a hero'5 death in 
trying to educate a wild tusker, and it is all the more 
to be mourned that he did not live to see the fulfil- 
ment of tI-Ie projected series of works of which this 
is only the first. It is not too much to say that it 
was the" promise of patronage which I received from 
the late Chiefsahel> of ]am]<}1andi that impelled me 
and my friend Dr. S. K. Belvalkar to approach, 
among others, Lord Ronaldsllay, tIle late Governor 
of Bengal, who in a previous Convocation address 
had discoursed so ably on the aims of Indian Phi- 
losoph)7, for sympathy in the catlse of the History of 
Indian Philosophy, \vhich was then only recently 
projected. It was the encouragement that we re- 
ceived from Lord Ronaldshay, as well as the keen 
interest which Sir George Lloyd, the late Governor 
of our Presidency, took in Otlr work that enabled us 
to approacl1 the University of Bombay to extend 
their kind patronage to our projected scheme for a 
History of Indian Philosophy, and we are glad to 
point out that our University came forth, in the first 
instance, witll a generous grant for three Volumes 
in the Series, which will be brought out under their 
patronage in course of time. Two of these Volumes, 
out of a total ntlmbcr of sixteen that have been 
projected, are JlOW in the Press, and may see the 
light of day before long. 

9. The II Con,structive Sur1'ey" an,d the tI C1'eative 
Period ".-TIle mention of the grant of the Univer- 
sity of Bombay to three volumes in the History of 



Indian Philosophy makes it necessary for tIle present 
writer to say here a few words in regard to tIle rela- 
tion that subsists bet\veen the present voltlme on the 
"Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy" 
and the Volume on the U Creative Period of Indian 
Philosophy" in the H. I. P. Series, which latter, it 
is hoped, may be published before long. The" Crea- 
tive Period" discusses the contribution that was 
made by the Brahmat.las, the Aral.1yakas, the Upa- 
nishads, and the Post-Upanishadic period to the de- 
velopment of Indian Thought, and so far as the Upa- 
nishads are concerned, as befits a \rolume in the 
History of Indian Philosop11Y, undertakes a full dis- 
cussion of the Upanis11ads one after another in their 
chronological and stratificatory order, paying atten- 
tion to the analytical study of Upanishadic thought. 
The "Constructive Survey," on the other hand, 
focusses its attention only on the Upanishads, groups 
the various problems of Upanishadic thought under 
suitable headillgs, and takes a synoptic view of Upa- 
nishadic Philosophy. The one is an entirely analyti- 
cal study, the other a thoroughly synthetic one. 
The relation that exists between these volumes can 
be made clear, if we give a parallel from Greek philo- 
sophy. The c, Dialogues of Plato, JJ to which the 
Upanishads might best be compared, could be dis- 
cussed either analytically or synthetically; that is 
to say, we could either undertake an analytical in- 
vestigation of the various Dialogues one after another 
in their chronological and stratificatory arrangement, 
or else we might take a synoptic view of the philoso- 
phical doctrines of Plato as advanced in the various 
Dialogues together. There is the same relation be- 
tween the H Creative Period 11 and the "Construc- 
tive Survey ", as there is, for example, between Gom- 
perz 's analytical survey of Plato's Dialogues, and 


Zeller's synthetic presel1tation of Plato'5 philoso- 
phy, the 011e looking at t11c Dialogues seriatim, the 
other in toto. It is needless to add that for the stu- 
dent of Upanishadic thought, both the volumes are 
equally indispensable, the one only supplementing 
and not at all supplanting the other. 

10. The method followed i1t this Volme.-The 
method followed in this presentation of Upanishadic 
PhilosopllY is, as tIle name impJies, a method of con- 
struction tllfough a s)istematic eXI)osition of all the 
problems tllat emerge frOlTI the discussion of Upa- 
nishadic thought in tlleir manifold bearings. As 
the alternative title of tllis worl( suggests, it is 
also a systematic Introduction to tIle problems of 
Indian Metapllysics. We lla\TC already pointed out 
how a systematic stlldy of tIle Upal1ishads may serve 
as an excellellt introduction to the S)Tstems of Indian 
Philosoph)T. For long the necessity 11as been felt of 
an adequate text-book for introduction in the cur- 
ricula of our Indian Universities on the subject of 
Indian PhiIosopllY, and it is hoped tllat tllis work may 
supply the long-felt want. The aim of the present 
writer has been to group together all the different 
theories that 11ave been advanced in the Upanishads 
under suitable headings such as Cosmogony, Psy- 
chology, Metaphysics, Ethics, and Mysticism in their 
logical sequence, and to make an attempt at envi- 
saging Ius own point of view through a developmental 
exposition of these problems. The writer is only 
too aware of the ,raIue attaching to an objective pre- 
sentation of philosophical problems, and it is for this 
reason that his own point of view has ne,rer been de- 
liberately stated throughout the Volume; but anybody 
who will take the trouble of following the full se- 
quence of the logical argument of the volume will see 



what elements of constructive thought the writer has 
to offer. Such a method of presentation is not new 
to Western Scllolars, and has been ably illustrated 
in Pringle-Pattison's "Idea of God" published during 
recent years. The aim of the present writer, as may 
become apparent from a study of the work, has been 
to prepare the way for a deliberate formulatioll of his 
own thought on the problems of Metaphysics, which, 
God willing, he hopes to achieve in a forthcoming 
publication of the Academy on (( The Pathway to 
God ". 

11. Thanks.-To Dr. Brajendranath Seal, Vice- 
Chancellor of the University of Mysore, I must ex.. 
press my most heartfelt thanks for the very kind 
trouble he took in reading through the typescript 
of this volume at his uSltal lightning Sl)eed, and in 
making important suggestions. To Prof. K. N. 
Dravid, M. A., of the Willing don College, Sangli, I 
am most indebted for reading the whole volume 
with me before it was sent to the Press, as 
well as for suggesting improvements. Dr. S. K. 
Belvalkar has laid me under deep obligations by al- 
lowing me to quote in this work a passage or two 
from our joint Volume on the Creative Period of 
Indian Philosophy, as well as for help in other 
respects. I am also indebted to my friend Prof. R. 
Zimmermann, S. J., of St. Xavier's College, Bom- 
bay, for having looked through this Preface, as well 
as in having checked the Bibliographical Note 
which occurs at the end of the volume. I must 
express my most heartfelt thanks to my nephew, Prof. 
N. G. Damle, M. A., of Fergusson College, Poona, 
who has helped me much by looking through a larger 
part of the proofs of this volume. I must also thank 
my young friend, Mr. R. D. Wadekar, B. A., for his 


very conscientious help in discussing the Upanishadic 
Bibliography with me, as well as i11 looking through 
certain proofs of the "olume. Also, I must express 
my obligations to my fonner pupils, and now Pro- 
fessors, V. S. Gogate, M. A., and K. V. Gajendra- 
gadkar, M. A., of the Arts College, Nasik, for having 
helped nle in the General Index and the Upanishad 
Index respectively. Tl}e untiring efforts of my pupil 
and frielld, Mr. G. K. Sane, M. A., in the preparation 
and final disposition of the General Index deserve all 
commendation. The constant, day-to-day, cheerful 
help which my stenographer Mr. S. K. Dharmadhi- 
kari has extel1ded to me, as well as his indefatigable 
diligence and resolve to stick to his guns through 
thick and thin, can never be adequately praised. 
The zealous and constant interest which Dr. N. G. 
Sardesai, Manager of the Oriental Book Agency, 
Poona, has evinced in this work cannot be praised 
too higWy. Mr. Nanasaheb Gondhalekar, the Pro- 
prietor of the jagaddhitechu, Press, Poona, has 
not spared himself, his Press, and his men 
for turning out this Volume in the fashion in which 
it is offered to the public. There are also a few 
other persons to be thanked. But as their interest 
in this Volume is spiritual, it behoves me, in 
the manner of the Kenopanishad, to leave their 
names unmentioned. "To gild refined gold, to 
paint the lily, To throw a perfume 011 the violet. . . . 
Is wasteful and ridiculous excess". 



Preface . . .. . 
Table of Contents 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 
. . . . . . . . . . 23 

Chapter I. The Background of Upanishadic 
S peculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 
Chapter II. The Development of Upanishadic 
Chapter III . Varieties of Psychological Reflec- 
tion .. . . . . . . . . .. .. 113 
Chapter IV. Roots of Later Philosophies .. ..178 
Chapter V. The Problem of Ultimate Reality 
in the Upanishads .. . . . . . . . . 
Chapter VI. The Ethics of the Upanishads 
Chapter VII. Intimations of Self-Realisation 
General Index... . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Upanishad Index . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Bibliographical Note . . . . . . . . . . 


· · 24 6 
· · 28 7 
· · 325 
· · 363 
· · 405 
· · 421 



I. The Significancr of the Study of the Upanishads... 
2. l'hc U panishacls and the 
igveda. .. 
3. The l7panishads and the At.harvaveda. 
4. The lTpanishads and the Brahma
5. Meaning of Revelation. . . 
6. The lJpanishadic vic\v of Revelation. . . 
7. Chronological arrangclnent of the Upanishads. 
8. The l
rihadaral}yaka Upanishad. 
9. I'he Chhandogya lTpanishad. 
10. 'The Isa and the I\:rna t:panishads. 
II. The Aitarcya, th(
 1'aittirlya, and the I{aushitaki lTpani- 
12. The Katha, the Mut:1qaka, and the Svetasvatara Upani- 
shads.. . . . . . . . 
13. The Pragna, the Maitri, and the 
qiikya Upanishads:. . 
14. The 1\fethods of lipanishadic })hilosophy : 
( i) I'he enigmatic method. . . 
( ii) The aphoristic n1ethod. 
(iii) I'he ctYIDological method 
(iv) The Inythical method. 
( v) The analogical method. . . 
( vi) The dialectic method. 
(vii) The synthetic method. 
(viii) The monologic method. . . 
(ix) The ad hoc lucthod. . . 
( x) The regressi,.e method. . . . . 
15. The Poetry of the IT panish ads. . . 
16. The Philosophers of the lTpanishadic period. 
Mystical, Mora}, and other philosophers. .. 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 


. . 








. . 

3 6 
3 8 
3 8 
4 0 

. . 

. . 


18. Cosmological, and Psychological Philosophers. 
19. Metaphysical Philosophers: .. . . . . 
( i) Sal]q.ilya. . . 
(ii) Dadhyach. . . 
(iii) Sana tkumara. . . 
(iv) AruI}i... 
(v) Yajiiavalkya... 
20. General social condition: 
( i) Origin of Castes and Orders. 
(ii) The position of Women. 
(ill) The relation of Brahmins to Kshatriyas. . . 
21. The Problems of Upanishadic Philosophy. 
Sources I. 

. . 

. . 47 
. . 50 
. . 51 
. . 63 

. . 

. . 

. . 



I. Search after the Substratum. . . . . . . . . 73 
2. Progress 01 the Chapter . . . . . . . . 74 
I. Impersonallstic Theories of Cosmogony. 
3. Water .s the Substratum. . . . . . . . . 7 6 
4. Air. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8 
S. Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
6. Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 
7. Not-Being. . . . . . . . . 81 
8. Not-Being, and the Egg of the Universe. .. . . . . 83 
9. Being. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8S 
10. Pra
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
II. The Controversy between PraJ]a and the Organs of Sense 88 
12. PriJ}3., a bio-psycho-metaphysical conception. . . . . . . 9 1 
D. Personalistic Theories of Cosmogony. 

13. The idea of a Creator, and the Creation of mythological 
and philosophical dualities.. . . . ... . . 
14. The Atman, and the creation of the duality of sex. 

.... 93 



15. Creation by Atman through the Intermediary Person. .. 94 
16. Atman and the theory of Emanation. . · 97 
17. The Personal-Impersonal theory of Creation in MU1,1qaka. 99 
18. The Theistic theory of Creation in Svetasvatara. .. .. 100 
19. The Theory of Independent Parallelism as an explana- 
tion of the analogies of Upanishadic and Greek philo- 
sohpics. . . .. 101 
Sources J I. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 105 


I. Empirical, Abnormal, and Rational Psychology. .. 
I. Empirical Psychology. 

.. 113 

2. The relation of Mind to Alimentation. . . . . . . 113 
3. Attention involves suspension of breath. . . . . . . 114 
4. Analysis of fear. . . . . . . 115 
5. The claim of Will for primacy. . . . . . . . . 116 
6. The claim of Intellect for primacy. . . . . . . 117 
7. Classification of mentaJ states. . . . . . . 118 
8. Intellectualistic Psychology and Idealistic Metaphysics.. . 119 

II. Abnormal Psychology. 
9. The problem of Death in Chhandogya. . . . . . . 120 
10. The problem of Death in Katha. . . . . . . . . 121 
II. The problem of Sleep: the Fatigue and PurItat theories. 122 
12. The problen1 of Sleep:' the Pra1)a and Brahman theories. 124 
13. The Dream Problem.. . . . . . . . 126 
14. Early Psychical Research. . . . . . . . . 12 7 
IS. The Power of Thought.. . . . . . . . . . I28 
III. Rational Psychology. 

16, . No psychology ohnc Seele . . . . . . ... .'. 12 9 
17. The question of the seat of the soul. . . ... . . 130 
18. The heart and the brain as seats. . . ... ... . . 13 1 
19. The relation of the body and the soul. . . ... . . 133 



20. The history of the spatial extension of the soul. .. 
21. The sou], both infinitely large and infinitely small. 
22. Analysis of the states of consciousness. 
23. The microcosm and the macrocosm. 
24. The" sheaths" of the soul. 
25. Limitations of a modern interpretation. 
26. The problem of sheaths, at bottom the problem of sub- 
stance. .. 144 
27. The idea of Transmigration, an Aryan Idea. 145 
28. TransnIigration in the 
igveda: the Xth Ma1)qala. 147 
29. Transmigration in the 
igveda: the 1st Ma1!4al a . 149 
30. The ethno-psychologica] development of the idea of Trans- 
migration. 152 
31. Transmigration in the Upanishads: the Kathopanishad. 153 
32. Transmigration in the Upanishads: the Brihadarat:lyaka 
Upanishad. .. . . 
33. The destiny of the evil soul.. . 
34. Eschatology in the BrihadaraI?yaka. 
35. Eschatology in the Chhandogya: the t\\.o Paths. .. 
3 6 . The nI0ral backbone of Upanishadic eschatology. 
37. Upanishadic and Platonic eschatology 
3 8 . Variation in the conception of the Path of the Gods. 
39. Idea of Immortal Life. 
Sources I II. 

. . 

. . 

.. 134 
.. 139 

15 8 
16 3 
16 4 


I. Introductory... .. 17 8 
2. The Upanishads and Buddhism. .. · · · · .. 179 
3. Samkhya in the Chhandogya, Katha, and Pra
na Upani- 
shads. . . . . . . 182 
4. Samkhya in the Svetagvatara Upanishad. . . · · .. 185 
5. The Upanishads and Yoga. .. . . . . . . .. 18 7 
6. The Upanishads and Nyaya-VaiSeshika. .. .. .. 190 
7. The Upanishads and Munansa.. . . .-. ... .. 19 2 


8. The tJpanishads and Saivism. .. · .. 193 
9. ])hraseologiral and Ideological identities hetween the Upa- 
nishads and the Bhaga "adglt a. .. · · · · .. 195 
10. Development of the Bhagavadgita oyer the Upanishads. 196 
II. The A
vattha in the l:panishads and the BhagavadgIti. 198 
12. The }{rishJ:13. of the Chhandogya and the Krish
a of the 
Bhagavadgita . . .. . . 201 
13. The l7panishads and the Schools of the Vedanta. .. 205 
14. Madhvaisnl in 1 he IT panishads. · · . . . · 207 
15. The Triul1t A bsolute of Ramanuja. . · . . 2<>9 
16. God, the Soul of Nature. . . . . . . .. Z10 
17. God, the Soul of Souls.. . . . . . . . . . .. 212 
18. Ramanuja's Doctlinc of In1mortality. . . . . .. 213 
19. '[he fundamclltal propositions of Sankala's Philosophy. 215 
20. The Absolute, the only Reality. . . . . . . .. 216 
21. The negative-positive characterisation of the Absolute. .. 21 9 
22. Sankara's Doctrines of Identity, Creation, and Immorta- 
lity. .. . . . . . . .. 2ZI 
23. Three theories about the origin of the Doctrine of Maya. 223 
24. The Doctrine of Mfi ya in the Upanishads.. . . . .. 225 
25. Vicissitudes in the historical development of the Doctrine 
of Maya. . . . . . . . . .. 228 
Sources IV. · · · · . . . . . . .. 233 



I. The Supreme Philosophical Problem. . . . . .. 24 6 
2. The three Approaches to the Problem in the history of 
thought: cosmological, theological, psychological. .. 247 
I. The Cosmoloaical Approach. 
3. Regress from the cosmological to the physiological cate- 
gories. . · · · · · · · · · . . .. 249 
4. Regress from the cosmological and physiological to the 
psychological categories. · · .. .. .. 2S1 

5. The cosmological argument for the existence of God : 
is all-po\\gerful. . . . . . . . . 
6. God is supreme resplendence. . . . . . . 
7. God is the subtle essence underlying phenomenal exis- 
tence.. . . . 
8. The physico-theological argument. . . . . 
II. The Theological Approach. 
9. Regress from polytheism to monotheism. · . . · .. 258 
10. The theistic conception of God and His identification with 
the Self · · · · · · · · · · · .. 259 
II. The immanence-transcendence of God. . . . . .. 261 
III. The Psychological Approach. 
12. The conception of the Self reached by an analysis of the 
various physiological and psychological categories. .. 263 
13. The states of consciousness: waking consciousness, dream- 
consciousness, sleep-consciousness, Self-consciousness. .. 264 
14. The ontological 
rgument for tbe existence of the Self. .. 269 
IV . The Significance of Self-cODciouseness. 
IS. Self-consciousness: its epistemological and metaphysical 
significance contrasted with the mystical. . . .. 270 
16. The Epistemology of Self-consciousness. .. . . .. 271 
( i) The Self is unknowable in his essential nature. .. 27 2 
(ii) The Self is unknowable because he is the eternal 
subject of knowledge. . . . . . . . . 
(ill) The Self can still know himself : hence Self-con- 
sciousness is not only possible, but is alone real. 
1'1. The Metaphysics of Self-sonsciuusness. . . . . 
18. The Ladder of Spiritual Experience. . . . . 
SourI:es v. .. .. .. .. .. .. 




I. Metaphysics, Morality, and Mysticism. 
 of the Chapter. .. .. 

. . 

. . 

. . 



.. 252 


.. 27 2 

.. 213 
.. 275 
.. 27 6 
.. 27 8 

.. 287 


I. Theories of the Moral Standard. 
3. Heteronomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 9 
4. Theonorny. . . . . . . 29° 
5. Autonomy. . . . . . . . . . . 29 1 
II. Theories of the Moral Ideal. 

6. Anti-Hedonism. . . . . . . . . . . 292 
7. Pessimism. . . . . . . . . . . - . 294 
8. Asceticism, Satyagraha, and Quietism. . . . . . . 295 
9. Spiritual Activism. . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 6 
10. Phenomenal Activism. . . . . . . . . 297 
II. Eudremonism. .. . . . . . . . . 299 
12. Bea tificism. . . . . 3 00 
13. Self-rcalisation. . . . . . . . . 301 
14. The Ethical and Mystical sides of Self-realisation. . . 304 
IS. Super moralism. . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 
III. Practical Ethics. 

16. Virtues in the Brihadaral)yaka. lit .. 3°7 
. . . . 
17. Virtues and Vices in the Chhandogya. . . . . .. 3 08 
18. The hortatory precepts in the Taittir'iya. .. . . .. 3°9 
19. Truth, the Supreme Virtue. . . . . . . .. 3 11 
20. Freedom of the Will.. . . . . . . . .. 3 1 3 
21. The Ideal of the Sage. . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 5 
Sources VI. I . . . . . . . . . 9' 3 1 7 



I. Philosophy is to Mysticism as Knowledge is to Being. .. 325 
2. The Lower Knowledge and the Higher Knowledge. .. 326 
3. Qualifications for Self-realisation. .. . · · · .. 328 
4. Necessity of initiation by a Spiritual Teacher. · · .. 329 
5. The parable of the blind-folded man. . · · . .. 331 
6. Precautions to be observed in imparting spiritual wisdom. 332 
7. Meditation by means of Om, the wa.y to realisation. .. 333 

8. The Mal}q.tikyan exaltation of Om.... ... . . .. 335 
9. Practice of Yoga. . . . . .... ... . . .. 33 6 
10. Yoga doctrine in Svetasvatara. ... ... . . .. 33 8 
II. The Faculty of God--realisatioD. . . . . . . .. 339 
12. The thorough immanence of God. ... I . . . . . 34 1 
13. Types of mystical experience. . . . . I . .. 34 2 
14. The acme of mystic realisation. . . . . .. 345 
15. Reconciliation of contradictions in the Atman. .., ,. 34 6 
16. Effects of realisation on the mystic, . . I' 347 
17. Raptures of Inystic ecstasy. H ... . . ... .. 35° 
Sources VII. . . . . .... ... ... .... .... 353 



1. In the History of Indian Thought, every revi- 
val of tl1e study of the Up ani- 
Tbe Significance of shads has s\t'11chronised with a 
the Study of the Upa- g reat reli g io
s mo,rement. When , 
about two thousand four hundred 
years ago) the author of the Bhagavadglta tried for 
the first time to synthesise the truths of IJpanishadic 
philosophy in that immortal Celestial Poem, it was 
evidentl)l with the desire of giving a new impulse to 
religious thought and thus laying the foundations of a 
truly Inystical religioll which should prove the 
guiding light of all mystical activities for ages to 
come. Then, about twelve hundred years later, wheD 
for a second time the architectonic builders of Vec1antie 
philosopllY came to construct their Systems of Reality 
out of the material placed at their disposal by the 
Upanishadic Seers, there was again witnessed a phe- 
nomenon of a new religious revival, this time the 
religious revival taking the shape more of an intellect- 
ual than of a purely nlystical religion. In the 
twentieth century to-day,' after the lapse of another 
twelve hundred years, under the impact of Western 
ilisation aIld \\'estern culture, supported by the 
infil1ite progress of modern science and an all-round 
Stl1dy of the philosophies and religions of the world, 
we in India, WIlD are the inheritors of a great spiritual 
rast that has beeIt left to us b)70UI Upanishadic allces- 




tors, stand face to face with a very difficult problem, 
namely, that of reconciling mysticism with intellect- 
ualism in such a way that any thought-construction 
that we might put forth on the basis of the eternal 
truths of A tmanic experience suggested to us by the 
Upanishads, might harmoniously synthesise the claims 
of Science and Philosophy and Religion, so that our 
philosophical view of reality may not be disturbed 
but may only be supported by the advance of modern 
science, and both our scientific and philosophic views 
be made to redound in such a way to the glory of God 
that "the highest link of Nature's chanl may only 
be seen to be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair." 1'11e 
present writer believes that the Upanishads are capa- 
ble of giving us a view of reality which would !atisfy 
the scientific, the philosophic, as well as the religious 
aspirations of man; because they give us a view which 
may be seen to be supported by a direct, :first-hand, 
intuitive, mystical experience, \Vhich no science can 
impeach, which all philosophy may point to as the 
ultimate goal of its endeavour, and, which may be seen 
at once to be the immanent truth in the various forms 
of religion which only quarrel because they cannot 
2. It would be interesting to trace in a very brief 
outline the relatioll of these 
The Upanishads and II M y stical texts" called the Upa- 
tbe Riaveda. 
nishads to the earliest poetry of 
the Aryan race, namely the Rigveda, which must be 
regarded as having preceded them by a period of over 
a thousand years. In the first place, we must note 
that the Rigveda is a great hymnology to the personi- 
fied forces of nature, and thus represents the earliest 
phase ill the evolution of religious consciousness, 
namely, the objective phase of religion. The Upani- 
shads, on the other hand, mark tIle subjective phase 




of religion. There are no llymns to gods or goddesses 
of nattlre in the Upanishads, but on the contrary, 
they contain a scientific search for t11e Substratum 
underlying the phenomenal forces of nature. There are 
neither any offerings of prayers to gods in the Upa- 
nishads, nor is there visib]e, throughout the Upani- 
shadic period, any inordinate fear of the wrath of these 
natural forces personified as gods. In other words, 
we may say that as we go from the Vedic period to 
the Upanishadic period, there is visible at every stage 
the process of a transference of interest from God to 
Self. When the individual Self has become the uni- 
versal Self, when, in short, the A tman has been re- 
alised, whom and what may anybody fear? For 
whom and what may any offerings be made? For 
whom and what may anybody pray to divinity? In a 
word, we may say,_ that as we pass from the Vedas to 
the Upanishads, we pass from prayer to philosophy, 
from hymnology to reflection, from henotheistic poly- 
theism to monotheistic mysticism. Then, secondly, 
we must not fail to notice the progress that was 
already being made towards the conceptions of cos- 
mogony even i
 certain hymns of the Rigveda itself. 
If we just take into account such a hymn as Rigveda 
x. 88, where the s
er inquires what was the It hyle " 
out of which the heavens and the earth were built 
eternally firm and what it was upon ,vhich the Crea- 
tor stood when he upheld the worlds, or yet again 
hymns like x. 5 and x. 27, where the conceptions of 
Being and Not...being in a cosmological sense are being 
already broached, or even that famous agnostic hymn 
of creation x. 129, where the primal existent is 
declared as peing superior to botl1 Being and Not- 
being and where the cognisant activity of the Creator 
himself is called in question, we may say that a begin.. 
ning was made even at this Rigvedic period of tIlc 




real philosophical impulse which passing through the 
ic period was to gather force at the beginning 
of the Upanishadic period. Thirdly, from the psy- 
chological point of view, we may say that while the 
Rigveda may be regarded as a great work of emotion 
and imagination, the Upanishads may be regarded 
as a work of thought and reason. There are many 
passages in the Rigveda, especially in the hymns to 
VaruQa, which have a close analogy to the devotional 
psalms of the Bible both in point of language and 
ideas-passages which are rarely to be met with in 
the literature of the Upanishads; on the other hand, 
in the Upanishads, we have more or less the coolness 
of intellectual argument exllibiting itself in a system- 
atic search after the Ultimate Reality. Thus it hap- 
pens that while there are to be met with in the Rig\7eda 
many hymns which express the meek submission of 
the suppliant devotee asking for gracious forgiveness 
from a divinity which is the creation of his own imagi- 
nation, the Upanishads say in bold terms: II Seek not 
favour from 
y such divinity; reality is not the divi- 
nity which you are worshipping-nedam yad idam up a- 
sate; the guardian of order is not outside; natural 
and moral order does not come from without; it 
springs from the A tman, who is the synthesis of both 
outside and inside, who is veritably the ballast of 
nature, ,vho is the unshakable bund that prevents 
the stream of existence from flowing recklessly as 
it lists." 
3. When we pass from the age of the Rigveda to 
The Upanlsbads the age of the Atllarvaveda, we 
and the Atharvaveda. pass from the universe of l1ymns 
to the universe of incantations. Goblins, ghosts, sorcer- 
ers, ,\'itches, diseases and death, take the place of the 
god of thunder, the god of rain, the god of celestial and 
terrestrial fire, the 
od and 
oddess of li
ht. The 

9 3] 



Atharvaveda is veritably a store-house of the black 
art of the al'lcients. There is no 
oubt some relieving 
feature to the Mantrasastra of the Atharvaveda, 
when auspicious charms take the place of d
charms. But the general impression which the Athar- 
vaveda leaves upon our mind is that of the blood- 
sucking activity of the ghoulish demon whiGh saps the 
fountains of botll devotion and reason, and lea

es us 
in the arid wastes of witcheries and incantations. It 
is a far cry from the Atharvaveda to the Upanishads. 
The two are almost as poles apart. No doubt there 
can be found in the Athar,!aveda some sort of philo- 
sophical reflection as in the hymns to Kala xix. 53-54, 
nor can we say that the lTpanishads contain no trace 
whatsoever of the Atharvic inflUei1ce so far as incan- 
tations and charms are concerned, but the general 
distinction is quite clear, that when we pass from the 
Atharvaveda to the Upal1ishads, we pass from the 
domain of incantations to the domain of philosophy. 
We must not forget, however, to mention the few 
blemishes on Upanishadic thought that are to be 
found in the Brihadara
yaka and the Kal1shitaki, 
which show the influence of a degraded order of cus- 
toms even in the reign of philosophy. W'hen as in 
BrihadaraI}.yaka vi. 4 we read of helps towards secu- 
ring the love of a woman, or the destruction of the 
lover of a wife, or the fulfilment of tbe desire for pro- 
creation, or yet again when in KaushI1aki ii, we read 
of means for the magical obtainment of a lich treasure, 
or securing the love of any man or woman, or yet 
again of charms which may prevent the death of child- 
ren during one's life-time, or fillally of the CI Dai\'a 
Parimara" taught in that Upanishad by means of 
which the ellemies die round about us as the effect of 
the charms exercised against them, we have to re- 
meqlber that tbese are 
 the only specimens of blemishes 




on an age otherwise wholly devoted to philosophical 
and l11ystical reflectiol1, and that, as the poet express- 
es it, il1stead of marring the beauty of Upanisl1adic 
thOllg]lt, like spots on the face of tIle moon tlJey only 
heighten tIle beauty of the philosophic refiection- 
l1tali1ta 11'l, aPi hintlimsor lakshma laksh.m"im tanot1:. 
4. When ,ve come to the age of tl)e Bra.llmaI} as, 
\ve come to an age of ceremo
lism and ritualism. As the 
chief topic of the Atllarva- 
veda is il1cantation, silnilarJy tIle chief topic of the 
BraJl1na1)aS is sacrifice. It passes one's unders1anding 
IIO\V the original purity of the l1ymnoJogy of t11e 
Rigveda sllould l1ave been so much sullied it1 tIle age 
of the BrahmaJ;1as, whicll only try to foist a super- 
structtlre of nleaningless ceremonialisDl u!)on the 
hyml1010gy of tl1e Veda, and press into their service 
passages apd texts iroD1 the Vedas \vl1icll they utilise 
in suell a way as to sllpport the not-very-glorious life of 
the sacrificer. Curious indeed are t11e Wa)7S il1 '\vhich 
the Bral1mal)a passages mingle together legends, 
exegeses, dogmas, philological and philosOI)llical spe- 
culations so as to exhibit the efficacy of t11e Mantras 
for the l)ractical life of the sacrificer. It is a pitiful 
phenol11e110n to notice how at the time of the Bra,h- 
manas so much intellect should llave been wasted on 
the forn1ulation of the details of the various sacrifi- 
cial rites: it only reminds one of the wheels within 
wheels of tl1e scholastic interpretations of C11ristian 
dogma in the Middle Ages. The spirit of the Upa- 
nishads is, on the other hand, barring a fe\\" excep- 
tions 11ere and there.. 'entirely antagonsitic to the 
sacrificial doctrine of the BrahmaJ}.as. The llalting 
attitude of the M1IJ.14aka in regard to the efficacy of 
Brahll1a1.1ic ritualism is an exception to the general 
Upanishadic reactiol1 in favour of philosophic

The Upanishads 
and the Brnbmanas. 




gainst the barren and empty formalism of tile Brah- 
a literature. While, in one passage, the MUI)q.aka 
tells us that the only way towards securing the goal 
of' human life consists in blindly following tl1e routine 
of sacrificial and ritualistic works enjoined upon us 
by our ancestors (5. I. a), in anotl1er closely 
following upon the one which we are discussing, "ye 
are told that IlS acr ifices are like those tlTIstc2dy 
boats on the ocean of life whicl1 may take one at any 
time to the bottom of the sea. Tllose who regard 
sacrifices as the highest good of human life, go again 
and again from old age to death. Living in the 
midst of darkness, these soi disant wise n1fn mu\
about to and fro like blind mel1 led by the blind. 
They regard themselves as having reached the goal of 
their life even while living in the midst of ignorance. 
Full of desire, t
ey fall down from their places in the 
heavens as soon as their merit is exhausted. 1-hink- 
ing tllat sacrifice is the highest end of human life, they 
CaI1not imagine tllat there is any other end. Having 
enjoyed in the heavens the reward of tlleir good 
works, they descend down to this world, or to a 
lower world still. It is only those who practise pen- 
ance and faith in a forest, who tranquil their passions, 
lead the life of knowledge and live on alrns,-it is 
only these that go to the immortal Atmall b y T tIle 
door-way of the Sun" (5. I. b). 1
he Upanisl1ads 
which stand for knowledge as against the Braljmal}i- 
cal philosophy of works very rarely exhibit e\7€n tllis 
halting attitude towards ritualism to be met "ith in 
the MU:Q-Qaka. '[heir general tone is to try to find out 
tIle philosophical end of human life. E'ven so farl)' 
as at the time of the Chh811dogya, the efficac}y of tIle 
II inner sacrifice" had come to be definitely recogni- 
sed: "Our real sacrifice consists in making oblations 
to the PriQ.a within us. One. who does not know. 




this inner sacrifice, even if he were to go in for a formal 
sacrifice, throws oblations merely on ashes. On the 
other hand, he who knows this inner sacrifice is re- 
lieved of his sins as surely as wool is burat in a flame 
of fire. Knowing this inner sacrifice. even if a man 
were to do acts of charity for a Cha.QQala, he may 
verily be rega.rded as having sacrificed to the Univer- 
sal Soul " (S. 2. a). The Kaushltaki again tells us 
definitely, referring probably to the custom at the 
time of the AraQ.yakas to perform acts of mental 
sacrifice, that " the ancient sages did not go in for a 
formal sacrifice knowing that an endless sacrifice was 
going on all the while within themselves" (5. 2. b). 
We thus see how the Brahmanical idea of sacrifice 
comes to be modulated in the days of the Upanishads 
so as ultimately to be entirely transformed into a 
new conception of sacrifice altogether-that of a 
mental sacrifice-whicH is helpful to the process of 
the acquisition of spiritual knowledge. On the whole, 
it may not be untrue to say that the futility of works 
was definitely recognised at the time of the Upanishads 
which tried to substitute a philosophy of knowledge 
for the BrahmaQical philosophy of works. 
5. The Vedas, the BrahmaQas and the Upanishads 
M -.1- fR 1 t1 have all of them been recognised 
elDUU& 0 eve a ODe .. · 1 ' A . " 
from tImes ilnnlemorla as '
or Revelation. Let us try to find out what the real 
meaning of this expression is. It has been customary 
among all religion
 to regard their basal works as 
being revealed to them by God, Some regard their 
religious works as having been revealed to them in 
the midst of light and thunder, either from without 
or within. Others regard tllem as having been deliver- 
ed to them in the form of significant sot1nds. In this 
way have the Bible and the Koran, like the Vedas 
and the Upanishads, been regarded as revelations of 




.... . -.. 

God to man.' The real meaning of Revelation seems to 
the present writer to be not any external message 
delivered to nlan from without, but a divine afflatus 
springing from within, the result of inspiration through 
god-intoxication. It was for this reason that St. Paul 
said that it was not he but God that spoke -through 
him. It was for this reason that Jesus Christ advised 
his disciples to take no thought as to what they were 
going to speak, but that they should speak straight- 
way and then God would speak through them. It was 
for this reason likewise that Plato explained in his Ion 
the origin of poetical composition through the afflatus 
of god-intoxication: It The authors of those great 
poems do not attain to excellence through the rules of 
any art, but they utter their beautiful melodies of 
verse in a state of inspiration, and, as it were, pos- 
sessed by a spirit not their own. Thus the composers 
of lyrical poetry. create those admired songs of theirs 
in a state of divine insanity. . . . . . Thus every rhapsod- 
ist or poet.. . . . . is excellent in proportion to the extent 
of his participation in the divine influence, and the 
degree in which the Muse itself has descended on him. 
. . . . . . . . And thus it appears to me.... that these 
transcendent poems are not human, as the work of 
men, but divine, as coming from God." This pas- 
sage gives us a very good account of the way in which 
all poetrYJ and likewise, all philosopllY worthy of 
the name comes to be produced. It was in this way 
that we may say that the Vedic seers composed their 
hymns, and the U panishadic philosophers set forth 
intellectual arguments. I t is futile to discuss, as the 
Naiyayikas and the Mlmamsakas later discussed, as 
to whether the Vedas and the Upanishads are" apau- 
rusheya H or II paurusheya." The N aiyayikas main- 
tained that these works were U paurusheya", that is, 
composed by God. The Mimamsakas, on the other 




hand, believing in the eternity of sound, said that 
they were U apaurusheya", that is, they were com- 
posed neither by man nor by God, but that, in the form 
of soWlds in which they have come down to us, they 
existed from all eternity. As contrasted with both 
these schools, the Vedantins maintain that the Vedas 
and the Upanishads are It apaurusheya ", in the 
sense that they were inspired by God-purushapra- 
yatnam vinll prakatibhuta. This last meaning of the 
word II apaurusheya" comes quite close to- the mean- 
ing which we have tried to assign to the word Revela- 
tion; and thtlS we may see how the Vedas and the 
Upanishads must, like the basal literature of all other 
religions, be regarded as ha"ing been composed by 
seers in a state of god-intoxication. 
6. Let us see what the Upanishads themselves 
have got to say on the question 
of the meaning that we have 
assigned to the term Revelation. 
The Brihadara
yaka tells us that It the 
igveda, the 
Yajurveda, the S
maveda and the Atharvailgirasa 
have all of them been breathed forth by that great 
Primeval Being; likewise also have all history, all 
mythology, all sciences, all Upanishads, all poems l all 
aphorisms and all the commentaries thereon been 
breathed forth by that Great Divinity" (5. 3.). It is 
important to remember that this Upanishadic passage 
classes the Vedas and the Upanishads on the one 
hand, with History and Mythology on the other, as 
being breathed forth by God. Now nobody has re- 
garded the Histories and the Mythologies as II 5ruti" 
or Revelation, eveft though the Vedas and the t1pani- 
shads have been so regarded, and yet the Upanishadic 
passage classes tIle two together as being the result 
of the breathing forth of God. The only meaning, it 
seems to us, that we can aiSign to the above passage 

The t1panlahadlc 
vtew of Revelation. 




is that all these great works, whether we take the 
Vedas and the Upanishads on the one hand, or History 
and Mythology on the other, may be regarded as 
having been due to the inspirational activity of God 
in the minds of those who composed them. It was not 
the writers of these works that were the authors of 
them, but it was the Divinity within them that was 
responsible for their production. We thus have 
the U panishadic view of the Upanishads as the 
result of the inspirational activity of God, the 
philosophers to whom they are attributed having 
served merely as instrume11ts for the display 
of this activity. This is a sort of a new Upanishadic 
Occasionalism, where the Seer or the Sage serves merely 
as an occasion for the creative activity of God. Thus, 
when the sage Svetasvatara said, that the Upanishad, 
which is named after him, was revealed to him through 
the power of his penance and the grace of God (5. 4. a), - 
and yet agam when the sage Trisailku uttered his 
v edan uvachana, which expression might be understood 
to mean either a II post-illuminational" discourse, or 
one which was U in consonance witl1 his mystical 
illumiRation" (5. 4. b), they are supporting the view 
of the meaning of Revelation which we have taken 
above. There is yet again a second view which im- 
plies nlore or less a human participation in the trans- 
mission, if not in the composition, of these revealed 
texts, when, as in the Isa and the Kena Upanishads, 
we are made aware of a continuity of philosophical 
tradition which bad come down to the days of the 
Upanishads (S'. 5. a). In tIle 
hhandogya Upanishad, 
likewise, we are told that Sages of old were careful to 
learn spiritual wisdom from their Teachers, for fear 
that when these Teachers had departed, there would be 
nobody living who \\Tould tell them II what could not be 
otherwise heard, what could not be otherwise thought, 



what could not be otherwise kno\vn " (5. 5. b). Finally, 
we have in the Bphadara:Qyaka a strange view of 
the genesis of Revelation, when we are told that the 

igveda, the Yajurveda and the Samaveda were all 
of them produced by the God of Death, who having 
coupled himself with a wife of his own creation, 
namely Speech, produced the above-l11entioned Vedas 
along with all men and cattle from his union (5. 6)-a 
view which is qttixotic enough for philosophical pur- 
poses, tInless we understand it as having an anthropo- 
logic value, and as being the remnant of an old 
mythological way of thought which is to be found in 
plenty in most BrahmaI.1ical as well as in some Upani- 
shadic literature. On the whole, it may not be untrue 
to say that the Upanishads are regarded by the Upa- 
nishads tl1emselves as being the work of the inspira- 
tional activity of God in the lluman mind. 
7. Ha ving cleared the U panishadic view of reve- 
Chronological ar- lation, let us try to arrange in a 
rangement of the Upa- chronological order the Upani- 
DI.hada. shads which are going to be the 
subject-matter of the present Volume. It must be 
remembered at the outset that we must make a clear 
division between the Old Upanishads and the New 
Upanishads, tIle Old batch comprising the Thirteen 
Upanishads to be enumerated presently, while the 
New Upanishads contain such of the remaining Upa- 
nishads as can be proved to be atlthentic by higher 
literary criticism. The four Upanishads which Dr. 
Schrader has discovered recently, namely, the Bash- 
kala, the Chhagaleya, the A rsheya a

 the Saunaka 
will not concern us in tIle present Volume, because 
their authenticity has not yet been universally ac- 
cepted. The 
Iaha11arayaI}.opanishad has;. also been 
recently proved to be obviously of a later date, and 
hence it cannot be included in our Older batch of 




the Upanishads. '[he Thirteen Upanishads, which 
will be the subject-matter of the present Volume, 
may be arranged according to the order of the Muktika 
canon as Isa, Kena, Katha, Prasna, Mundaka, Man- 
,. . . . 
qukya, Taittirlya
 Aitareya, Chhandogya, Bphada- 
raQyaka, Svetasvatara, Kaushltaki and Maitri. This, 
however, is an order which does not take the chrono- 
logical scqtlence of the Upanishads into account, and 
it thus becomes necessary in the light of modern 
literary criticism and a historico-philologica.l e\"alua- 
tion of the Upanishads to arrange them in proper 
chronological perspective. The problem has been so 
thoroughly treated by us elsewhere that it would be re- 
dundant to go over once more into the problem of 
the chronological arrangement of these Upanishads. 
We shall merely content ourselves with mentioning the 
conCltlSions that have been arrived at. Considering 
the Upanishadic age to have been placed somewhere 
between 1200 B. C., and 600 B. C., it becomes necessary 
to distribute the {Jpanishadic literature into chronolo- 
gical periods within the general limits that have been 
so fixed. Various tests have been em'ployed as to the 
chronological arrangement of these Upanishads. (I) The 
language, the style, the vocabulary, the inflection and 
other grammatical peculiarities are one obvious test 
for determining the age of an Upanishad; but this 
cannot be a final test, because an old Upanishad may 
have been written in a fairly lucid style, while a newer 
Upanishad may have been composed in an almost 
archaic style. (2) Nor is the distinction between prose 
and verse a sufficIent criterion for the chronological 
arrangement of the Upanishads. It seems to have 
been taken for granted by critics like Deussen that 
the oldest of these Upanishads were written in prose, 
that others which followed them were written in 
verse, and that a few others that remained came to 


be written in prose again. This is a gratuitous 
assumption which in the light of modem criticism 
does not seem to hold much water. (3) A third test, 
namely that of a successive elaboration of detail, is a 
fairly good test though it is not absolutely conclusive. 
Thus it may not be entirely incorrect to find the 
chronological order of certain Upanishads according 
to the elaboration of detail of the story of the II \Var 
of the Senses " as found in them. This story occurs in 
the Chhandogya, the BphadaraQyaka, the Aitareya, 
the Kaushltaki and the Prasna Upanishads, and it 
must be legitimate to argue for the precedence or 
sequence of any of these Upanishads according to the 
elaboration of the detail of the story. (4) A fourth 
and a more difficult test, namely that of a regular 
ideological development, is not without its use. Thus, 
for example, the developn1ent of the idea of the rela- 
tion of the It 1'wo Souls," the Individual Soul and the 
Universal Soul, which occurs in the Ka.t1101)anishad, 
the MUQQakopanishad and the Svetasvataropani- 
shad could be regarded as a legitimate test for the 
chronological sequence of these Upanishads in that 
order, inasmuch as in the story of the Kathopanishad 
the two Souls are regarded as bein.g on a par with each 
other as enjoying equally the fruits of their action, 
while in the MUI}.Q.aka only one is described as tast- 
ing of the fruits of action, the other being de- 
scribed simply as an on-looker, while finally in the 
Svetasvatara an addition is made to the con- 
ception in the MUI.'lQaka, namely that of the unborn 
Pralqiti, consistil1g of the three qualities, the 
red, the white and the black, which the Individual 
Soul enjoys, but which the Universal Soul1
aves off 
(5. 7). (5) A fifth test, which is only a particular cas
of the last test, but which deserves seI)arate mention 
on account of the importance it has attained at the 




hands of certain modem writers, especially Prof. 
Keith, centres itself round the development of the idea 
of Translnigration in the Upanishads. Just as a 
similar attempt has been made in regard to the chro- 
nological arrangement of the Dialogues of Plato on 
the basis of the development of the doctrine of Ideas 
as found in them, similarly, an attempt is here 
made to find out the chronological sequence of the 
Upanishads on the basis of the development of the 
idea of Transmigration. It must be remembered, 
however, that this test comes very often to base itself 
upon negations, instead of positive assertions. Ab- 
sence of the idea of l"ransmigration does not neces- 
sarily prove the priority of an Upanishad, because, it 
may be, that the idea may not form the subject- 
matter of that Upanishad, while the Upanishad itself 
may not be amenable to the postulation of that idea. 
Prof. Keith has argued, and many others have fol- 
lowed him in saying, that the Aitareya AraQyaka, 
especially in its older portion, must be regarded as 
very old indeed, because the idea of Transmigration 
does not occur in it. These writers seem to argue in 
a circle, because they hold that the older portion of the 
AraI.J.yaka must be separated from the newer portion 
on account of the absence of the idea of Transmigra- 
tion in it, and then they say that the idea of Trans- 
migration must be regarded as late because it does not 
occur in the older portion. N ow even supposing that 
we can s11cceed in making a division between the 
. older portion and the newer portion of the Aitareya 
Ara:Qyaka, the absence of the idea of Transmigration 
in the older portion can be regarded as no argument 
fOl its chrnonological severance from the ne\\Ter por- 
tion; while it is necessary to remember that the Fifth 
Chapter of the Second Sect'on of the Aitareya A ra1}.ya.. 
ka does definitely assert the fact of Transmigration 

when it describes a man as veritably coming to life 
after death-a fact whicll it calls his (, third birth ". 
(6) Finally, the only test which may be regarded as 
being absolutely definite about the chronological 
arrangement of the Upanishads is that of inter-quota- 
tion. Thus we may say that the Taittiriya is definite- 
ly later than the Brihadara
yaka, inasmuch as the 
Taittirlya refers to the BphadaraJ;.1yaka in the very 
words in which this latter Upanishad states the doc- 
trine of Ie quintuple existence II (5. 8). But this test can 
have no universal significance because we find only few 
definite inter-quotations among the Upanishads. More- 
over, if we just take into account the different strata 
of composition in the various Upanishads, and divide 
each of the Upanishads according to the sub-units of 
which it may be composed, the problem of a general 
chronological arrangement of these sub-units becomes 
a hard one indeed; but if we make all the allowance 
that we can for the existence of these strata in the 
Upanishads, and judge of the Upanishads as a whole, 
we may say that the Thirteen Upanishads, which we 
have mentioned above and which will form the theme 
of our present Volume, may be classed together into 
the following five different groups :- 
I. Bri11adara
yaka and Chl1andogya. 
II. Isa and !{e11a. 
III. Aitare:ya, "raittirlya and I{aushltaki. 
IV. Katha, !\IuI)Qaka and Svetasvatara. 
v. Prasna, Maitri and MaQQukya. 
A study of the Bp11adaraQyaka and the Chhandogya 
may easily lead us to regard them as belonging to the 
oldest group of the Upanishads. Even though they 
may be seen to consist of several sub-units, on the 
whole we may say that they belong to the oldest 
group. The Upanishads in group II, namely lSa and 
Kena, it is customary to relegate to a comparatively 

f '1] 



late period; but the Janguage, the sentiment and the 
archaic tone of the Isa, especially the common ma- 
terial it has \vith the BrihadaraJ).yaka and the Kena, 
which latter Inay be placed almost in the same category 
with it, may be regarded as constituting the second 
group. Of group III, the Aitareya mllst be regarded 
as an old Upanishad, but not neceSSaril)1 as tIle oldest 
simply for the reason that has been adducecl, namely, 
that it belongs to tIle earliest Veda, the J.{igvcda. 
The '"faittirlyagoes in tI1e saIne grollp with the Aitareya, 
while the I(allshltaki, e'7en though it may be regarded 
as on the wllole all unoriginal lTpanishad, still in the 
parts which belong to it properly) may be classed 
along \vith the Aitareya and the Taittirlya to consti- 
tute grOt11) III. Group IV is qtlite definite. The 
Mtl1).Qaka comes after the Katha, and the Svetasva- 
tara comes after the MUl}.Qaka, and even though there 
is an evident archaism in the Svetasvatara and a clear 
sub-divisioll of it into the first chapter on the one 
hand, and the other chapters on the other, on the 
whole it may be said to bring up the rear among 
tliese great poetical Upanishads. Of group V, the 
Prasna which forms quite a pre-conceived unity 
entirely unlike the other Upanishads, must be re- 
garded as belonging to tIle latest group; the Maitri 
whose 'locabulary is quite peculiar to itself and which 
has evidently two or more definite strata in it, must, 
on account of its mythological and astronomical re- 
ferences, be regarded as coming quite near to the time 
when the Paura9ika tradition began; while the Mat;l- 
Q.ukya, which may be said to develop the thought of 
the Maitri itself in certain respects, namely, in postu- 
lating three and a half mora, while the Maitri postu- 
lates only three, of the symbol Om, as well as on ac- 
count of its aphoristie method of thought-presenta- 
tion, may be regarded as being the last of the Older 




batch of the Upanishads. It would be hard to determine 
the exact date of the composition of any of these 
Upanishads; but the upward and the lower limits of 
the whole Upanishadic period may be fixed without 
much difficulty as being between I200 and 600 B.C., 
and the later Upanishads of the above canon may be 
seen to be dovetailed into that next period of Indian 
Thought, when Buddhism was germinating in India, 
when the Samkhya and the Yoga were being syste- 
matised, and when the Bhagavadglta was being com- 
posed to finally hush the voice of the Irlaterialist 
and the atheist by synthesising the points of theistic 

ignificance in the Samkhya and the Yoga, and by 
gathering together the reel-letter pieces of Upanishadic 
philosophy and welding th.em all up together into a 
theistic-mystic poem-the pattern of many similar 
imitations in days to come. 
8. It would be necessary for 'lIS to review briefly 
the contents of the various Upani- 
The Brlhadaraoyaka h d d h I . all 
· s a s as arrange c rono OglC y 
in the abo\Te outline, and to set forth in a brief way the 
main points of interest in those Upanishads from the 
philosophical point of view. A full analysis of the. 
Upanishads is neither possible nor desirable in this 
place, but we refer our readers to our History of 
Indian Philosophy Vol. II. for a full account of the 
contents of them. In order, however, that our 
readers may understand and appreciate the problem- 
by-problem treatment of the Upanishads in the succeed- 
ing chapters of this work, it would be necessary for us 
to introduce them briefly to the contents of the various 
Upanishads. We may begin by an analysis of the 
Bpha da raI].yaka. This Upanishad contains six chap- 
ters, of which the second, the third and the fourth 
are alone of philosophical consequence, tllC others con- 
.philosophica1 matters interspersed with much 




miscellaneous reflection. In the first chapter" we have 
a good description of the Cosmic Person considered 
as a sacrificial llorse; tIlen we pass to the theory 
of Death as the It arche " of all things; and then we have 
a parable in proof of the supremacy of PraI}.a" which 
is followed by a number of creationist myths put 
together at random. Tn the second c11apter, we have 
the famous conversation between Gargya, the proud 
Brahmin, and Ajatasatru, the quiescent Kshatriya 
king. It is in t11is chapter likewise that we are intro- 
duced for the first tilne to the great sage Yaj:fiavalkya, 
who is making a partition of his estate between his 
wives, as well as to the sage Dadhyacll A tharv
whose philosophical teaching we shall consider at a 
later stage in this chapter. The sage Yajfiavalkya, to 
whom we are introduced in chapter two, becomes the 
prominent figure of chapters three and fOUf, and just 
as in chapter two we see him discoursing witll his 
wife MaitreyI, similarly in cl1apter three we see him 
discoursing with a number of philosophers in the court 
of king Janaka, and in chapter four with king Janaka 
himself. The philosophical teachings of Yajfiavalkya 
we shall consider somewhat later; but it would be 
necessary for us here to say sometlling about his per- 
sonality. An irascible philosopher by nature, as may 
be seen from the fate to which he subjects Sakalya 
who was disputing with him in the court of king 
J anaka, he seems nevertheless to possess the kindness 
of human feelings, especially ill his relations with his 
wife MaitreyI. Gi,Ten to bigamy, he nevertheless 
maintains a strict spiritual relation with MaitreyI, 
while KatyayanI, 11is other wife, he regards merely as 
a woman of the world and prizes accordingly. Ad- 
umbrating as he does his doctrine of immanence to 
Gargi when she torments l1im with question after 
question, an (1 wanting in chivalry as he seems" to us 



[9 8 

as he proceeds without much ceremony to check her 
philosophic impudence', he nevertheless appears to be 
a shrewd man, who, when pressed by the sage Jarat- 
k a raya to some deepest questions, takes him by the 
hand out of the assembly and discourses with him on 
the topic of Karman, and a prudent man likewise 
WIlO gives ad hoc answers to his controversialists, as 
may be seen from the way in which he ritllalistically 
disposes of the ritualistic questions of Asvala. A 
eudremonist by nature, who supposes that the accept- 
ance of presents is not incompatible with the im- 
parting of philosophical knowledge, and therein main- 
taining rather the Sophistic view of wisdom, than 
the Socratic view that a great spiritual teacher must 
never contaminate himself with the acceptance of 
presents, Yajiiavalkya is, undoubtedly, the greatest 
philosopher of the Upanishadic tin1es, who, by his 
consistent philosophical Idealism and by his thorough- 
going practical A tmanism, may give lessons to many 
a thinker of the present day. King Janaka, who 
seems to be an ardent lover of pllilosophical al1d spiri- 
tual wisdom, falls prostrate at the feet of this great 
philosopher, offering him his kingdom and his pos- 
sessions, which the philosopller scarcely a,rails himself 
of. This king Janaka figures largely in the tllird and 
fourth chapters of this Upanisllad, in the t11ird cllapter 
being only a spectator of the great controversy in his 
court, and in the fourth taking the liberty to learn per- 
sonally from Yajfiavalkya himself. It is this king 
likewise who is also illtroduced for a while in the fifth 
chapter of this Upanishad, which contains many other 
things besides, 'such as a number of miscellaneous re- 
flections on ethical, cosmological and escha tological 
matters; while the sixth and the final chapter of 
the Upanishad contains the celebrated parable of the 
senses, and we are introduced to the philosopher Pra- 




vahaJ}.a Jaivali whose celebrated doctrine of II Five 
Fires" we shall notice below. This last chapter, as has 
been pointed out above, ends with certain supersti- 
tious Brahm
ical practices, and contains, among other 
tl1i11gS, a statement of the genealogical tradition of the 
Upanishad which may be taken for what it is worth. 
9. The Chhandogya, which belongs like the Bp- 
yaka to our group I, is an 
Upanishad which does not rise 
to such high literary or philosophical eminence as 
the . BrihadaraJ).yaka, even though it is quoted and re- 
ferred to oftener by the later author of the Vedanta- 
sfitras. Chapters six, seven and eight alone are of 
philosophical importance, the others not coming up to 
that level at all. The first and the second chapters are 
merely a BrahmaI}.ism redivivus, and if we just 
want to point to portions of the Upanishads in 
which the BrahmaI.1icalliturgy and doctrine exercise 
the greatest amount of influence, \ve may point to 
the first and second chapters of this Upanishad. 
There is a smail cosmological argument here and 
a little philosophical disquisition there; on the wllole, 
these two chapters contain only such subjects as 
the significance of Om, the meaning, the kind and 
the na111es of Saman, and the genesis and function of 
Om. 'I'l1ere is, however, one very good satirical piece 
towards the end <;>£ the first chapter of this Upanishad 
which is worth remarking. It concerns the singing of the 
Mantras with a material end in view. We are told how, 
once upon a time, Baka Dalbhya, or as he was a]so 
called, Glava Maitreya, had gone to a retired place to 
recite his Veda, how. a white dog appeared before him, 
how anum ber of other dogs came to this dog and 
begged of it to chant certain hymns because they said 
they were hungry and by its chants the white dog 
might procure food for them, how the white dog told the 

The Chhandogya. 




other dogs that they might come to it the next morning, 
how Baka Dalbhya, who was intent upon seeing 
what this canine recitation of hymns would be like, 
waited next morning to watch the dogs meet together, 
how the dogs, as previously settled, came together 
the next morning, each holding the tail of another in 
its mouth, as the priests do when they walk in proces- 
sion at the time of sacrifice each holding the gown of 
the fore-going priest in his hand, how when they sat 
down, they began to sing" Hiil! Om, let us eat, Om, 
let us drink, Om, let the gods procure food for us, 
o Lord of food, bring food to us, Dring it to us, Om." 
This seems to us to be a ridicule poured upon the 
Mantra-singers who went in for their business with the 
desire of obtaining some material end. I t seems to us that 
this Canine Chant-the Sauva Udgltha as it has been 
called-may be regarded as a good invective against the 
BrahmaJ).ical belief in externalism, in the interest of the 
assertion of the supremacy of the spiritual end to any 
material end whatsoever. 1"'he third chapter of this 
Upanishad contains the famous description of the Sun as 
a great bee-hive hanging in space. It also contains a de- 
scription of the GayatrI Brahma
a-wise, the bon mots 
of SaQQilya., a description of the world as a huge 
chest, the all-too disconnected instruction of A ilgirasa 
to Krishl}.a who was the son of Devaki, and finally a 
piece of heliolatorYI with the myth of the emergence 
of the Sun out of a htlge egg. In the fourth chapter 
we have the philosophy of Raikva, the story of Satya- 
kama jabala and his mother, and the story of Upa- 
kosala who in his turn obtains philosophical wisdom from 
his teacher Satyakama jabala. The fifth chapter con- 
tains the eschatological teaching of J aivali, which is 
identical in substance with the account to be found 
in the BphadaraI.1yaka, while it also contain
famous synthesis of thought effected by Asvapati 




Kaikeya out of the six cosmological doctrines ad- 
vanced by the six philosophers who had gone to learn 
wisdom from him. The sixth chapter is evidently the 
best of all the chapters of the Chhandgoya, and we 
have here the highly-
trung It identitat " philosophy of 
AruI}.i, who establishes an absolute equation between 
indi,ridual and tlniversal spirit, for whom, in other 
words J there is no difference between the two at all. 
AruI}.i is the outstanding personality of the Chhan- 
dogya, as Yajiiavalkya is of t11e BrihadaraQ.yaka. 
The Satapatha BrahmaI}.a tells us that AruJ)i was a 
very renowned sage of anitiquity, and that Yajiia- 
valkya was a pupil of AruI).i. The philosophy which 
Aru1}.i advances in the 6th chapter of the Chhandogya 
does really entitle him to that position. So far so 
good: but it seems to us that when once the reputation 
of Aru
i as a great philosopher had been established, 
other Upanishads felt no scruple ill utilising him for the 
developmen t of their own doctrine and we find Ar
playing quite a subordinate and unimportant rt>le even 
in such an admittedly late Upanishad as the KaushI- 
taki. It is unfortunate that authors should feel the 
necessity of reviving the memory of a great man and 
turning it to bad account. A Falstaff reborn, as 
Shakespearian readers know, loses all the interest 
which he originally had when he first appeared. Even 
likewise with A ru
i. He did playa great part, indeed, in 
the Chhandogya; but later writers had no scruple in 
utilising llis name, as we have said above, for very unim- 
portant purposes. The seventh chapter of the Chhan- 
dogya contains the famous discourse between Narada 
and Sanatkumara, the main points of which we shall 
discuss at a later stage of this chapter. Finally, the 
eighth chapter of this Upanishad contains some very 
excellent hints for the practical realisation of the A tman, 
as well as the famous myth of Indra and Virochana 




which we shall have occasion duly to notice in a 
later chapter of this work. 
10. The Isa and the Kena Upanishads, which 
form our group II, are both named 
The ISB and the Kens after the initial words of these trea- 
tises, just as the ancient chronicles 
of Scandinavia are named Ie Heimskringla" after 
their opening words. The Jsopanishad is quite a small 
Upanishad, and yet it contains many hints which show 
an extraordinarily piercing insight. Within the short 
compass of 18 verses, it gives us a valuable mystical 
description of th,e Atman, a description of tl1e ideal Sage 
w110 stands unruffled in the midst of temptations and 
sorrows, an adumbration of the doctrine of Karmayoga 
as later formulated, and fin,ally a reconciliation of the 
claims of knowledge alld works. The most v
idea that lies at the root of the Upanishad is that of a 
logical synthesis which it attempts between the two 
opposites of knowledge and works, which are both re- 
quired according to that Upanishd to be annulled in a 
higher synthesis. It is this idea of tIle logical synthesis 
of opposites which is an unconscious contriblltion which 
the Sage of the Upanishad makes to the developlnent 
of Indian Thought. 
The Kenopanisllad which consists of four sec- 
tions, two balancing against two, the first two beil1g 
conlposed in verse, the last two in prose, exhibits also 
the division of the subjective and objective approach- 
es to the proof of A tman, namely, the l)sycho- 
logical and the cosmological. The verse part of the 
Upanishad gives us a psychological argument for the 
existence of A tman as the inspirer of the various 
sense-functions; it also breaks the idols, literally and 
metaphorically, in favour of the worship of Ultimate 
Reality conceived as A tman ; and finally it makes an 
,essay in spiritual agniology telling us in a paradoxical 

 11 ] 



fashion that those who know really do not know, and 
those who do not know may alone be said to know the 
tlltilnate realit
y. The prose part of the Upanishad 
gives us the famous myth of lndra and the Damsel 
and advances a cosmological argun1ent fo! the proof 
of the Immeasurable Po\\rer vvhiell lies at the baek of 
the forces of Nature. It teaclles us a lesson of humi- 
lity, inasmuch as it tells us tllat no man \-vho is not 
humble may hope to come into the I)resence of this 
Power; whi
e it lays the moral foundation for this 
"esoteric doctrine" when it tells us that austerity, 
restraint and action are its 7ruV lrTW, the Vedas its 
limbs, and Truth its shelter. TIle Upanishad also 
advises us to find the same reality in objecti\Te as well 
as subjective existence, in tIle flash of the lig11tning 
as in the motion of tIle mind. 
11. The Aitareya Upanishad, l)rOperly so-called, is 
The AltareY8 t the Tal.' (
nly a part of tIle larger Aitareya 
ttirtya t and the Kaushl- A raI}.)7'al{a beginning with the 
taJd Upanishads. fourt11 section of the second chap- 
ter of the A ral) yaka and going to the end of that 
chapter. There are t11ree chapters of the Upanishad 
itself, all of ,vhich are important. The first is given 
to a description of the creatio11 of the world by the 
primeval .A tman through the intermediary Viraj. 
The secolld COlltains tIle famous philosophy of "Three 
Births" probably belonging to the sage Vamadeva J a 
Vedic sage mentioned in 
igveda IV. 27. I, whose 
opinions are cited with approval in the present Upani- 
shad, and whose example is held up before the eyes of 
one who is desirous of gaining immortality. We shall 
discuss the philosophy of \7
madeva at a later stage in 
this chapter; but we calmot forbear from remarking 
here that the idea of life after death is definitely in- 
troduced in this chapter
- Finally, the last chapter of 
this Upanishad is a very bold statement of the funda- 

mental doctrine of idealistic philosophy that all psy- 
chical and cosmical existences must be regarded as 
the expression of a common principle, namely, intellect. 
The Taittinya is divided into three chapters. In 
the first chapter occurs the famous physiological 
description of the II nipple-like J, gland which hangs 
downwards in the brain, and which is regarded as 
the seat of the Immortal Being. In this chapter 
likewise occur two famous ethical descriptions, as well 
as the mystical 11tterances of Trisailku. The second 
chapter is a collection of miscellaneous points contain- 
ing, among other things, the first mention of the so- 
called II Doctrine of Sheaths", as well as a description 
of the Beatific Calculus. The third chapter takes up 
the question of the Sheaths from the second chapter 
and exhibits these as a ladder of metaphysical exist- 
ences, and ends with that famous mystical monologue 
in which subject and object and the subject-object 
lation are all described as being ultimately one. 
The Kausl1Itaki is divided i11tq four chapters, of 
which the first is merely an enlarged variant on the des- 
cription of the path of tIle Gods and the path of the 
Fathers, as occurring in the Chhandogya and the Briha- 
daraI}.yaka Upanishads, and the last is again a repetition 
of the story of Balaki and Ajatasatru as occurring in the 
Brihadar3.Qyaka. It is only tIle second and the third 
c11apters of this Upanishad which may be said to be- 
long to the KaushItaki proper. The second chapter is 
a collection of quite disconnected units and contains the 
doctrines of the four philosophers, namely, Kaushltaki 
WilO is described as It Sarvajit ", or an all-conquering 
sage, as well as PaiD.gya, Pratardana anq SushkabhriD.- 
gira. Moreover, it contains a description of a number 
of social customs of the time, which are superstitious 
and which ma)T therefore be regarded as irreligious. 
In the third chapter, Pratardana is described as 

f 12] 



imbibing the principles of philosophy from Indra. Now 
Indra is only a mythological name, a name of Vedic 
repute, and we may say that the points of phiiosop11Y 
contained in this chapter belong to Pratardana himself 
rather than to Indra. Nevertheless, we must consider 
the story as it is, and take into account the references 
that are freely made here to lndra's exploits as found in 
igveda. Indra tells Pratardana that tIle only 
good for mankind here below is to know Him; that 
He it was Wll0 had killed the three-headed son of 
Tvashtri; that He it was who had delivered over the 
. . 
mukhas to the jackals; that l1a\ring broken 
Inany a treaty, He it was who killed the sons of Pral- 
hada in the heaven, the Patllomas in the inter-mundane 
regions, and the Kalakafijas on earth; and that even 
though He had done these deeds, not a hair of His 
body was injured; and that finally anyone who under- 
stands lndra to be of this nature, and to have per- 
formed these exploits, never suffers, even though he 
may kill his mother or father, or go in _for a theft, 
or destroy an embryo ; nor does the bloom ever depart 
from his face. It is in this conversation also between 
Indra and Pratardana that Prana comes to be under- 
stood first as the principle of life, then as the principle 
of consciousness, and then is equated with Ultimate 
Reality, namely the A tman, and we are told that it 
is this A tman who is the cause of all good and evil 
actions in this world, and that all human beings are 
merely instruments in His llands. 
12. The Katha, the MUJ}.Qaka and the Svetasva- 
The Itatha t the MUD- tara Upanishads which form our 
daka, and the Sveta- fourth group are related to each 
Bvatara Upaniahada. other as no three of the other Upa- 
nishads are. They all aim at envisaging the highest 
philosophical truths in a poetic manner, and thus be- 
come the chief sources from which the vadglti 

and other philosophical poems later freely borrow, 
the only difference between the Upanisllads being that 
the Kathopanishad is more or less a metaphysical 
work, the Mundaka an emotional work, and the Sve- 
. . 
tasvatara a commixture of philosophy and mysticism. 
All tl1e three Upanishads seem, moreo\rer, to have been 
written at a time when the Sarilkhya and the Vedanta 
had not yet parted ways. Of these tIle Katha has its 
nattlral termination at the end of the first Arlhyaya, 
as may be 
cen from tIle repetition of words at the end 
of the Adhyaya, as \vell as the I( pl1alasruti " which is 
also given at the same place. The second Adhyaya 
thus seems to be tacked on to tJ1C original redaction 
of the Upanisl1ad, and even tllOtlgh this latter Ad11yaya 
see111S 10 furl1ish a sequel to tilc Nac11iketas-Death 
story as may be seen from the last verse of that 
Adhyaya, as well as from the repetition of words even 
here, still, as ma:y' be seen by reference to Kathopanishad 
II. 5. 6, Yama seems at this place just to be supplying 
an answer to the qtlery of Nachiketas in I. i. 29, which 
suggests that all the intervening portion is a later 
addition. The Katha, like the MUI}Qaka and the 
Svetasvatara, will be so of tell quoted in this work 
that it would be needless for us to discuss its contents 
at any lengtll. T\vo of the most prominent features 
of the Katha are the description of the H Chariot of the 
Body", and the death and dream approaches to the 
problem of reality. The whole of the Katha is sur- 
charged \vith lofty ideas about the Immortality of the 
Soul, as well as suggestions for the practical attain- 
ment of .A tman. In one passage, the Katha brings 
out a distinction regarding the realisation of A tman in 
the various \vorlds. While we are dwelling in this 
body on earth. we can visualise the .Atman only as in 
.a mirror, that is contrariwise, left being to the 
right and right being to the left. In the world of the 

f 12] 



fathers, we visu
lise the A tman as in a dream, the 
image leaving a psychical impression indeed, but 
being unreal. In the world of the Gandharvas, we 
are told, we see Him as one sees a pebble under water, 
the image being true but refracted. It is only in the 
Brahn1al1-world, we are told, tllat we can distinguish 
the At111an from tIle llon-Atman as light from sllade, 
that is, we can see tl1c A tman as in broad day-light. 
This is a \1alatlable contribution which the Kathopa- 
nis}lac1 makes to lJpanishadic thought. 
TIle MUI).Qakopanishad is, as the name implies, an 
H Upanishad addressed to Shavelings,Jt and may be 
classed according to its subject-matter along with the 
later Samnyasa Upanishads. Its eclecticism is apparent 
on the face. The position it takes in regard to 
ritualism is halting. I ts cosmology is suffused both 
by Sari1khya and Vedantic ideas. Its metaphysics is 
squarely based' on Vedic ideas and has a ritualistic 
tinge. While as a work which can incite to mystic 
thought, it has no parallel in the whole literature of 
the Upanishads. 
The Svetasvatara seems to have been written in 
the interests of Saivism. It seems to have had its 
natural termination at the close of the first chapter, as 
may be seen from the repetition of the words at the 
end of it. The other chapters seem to have been 
added at a later stage. In the first chapter, we have 
suggestions for a good criticism of contemporary doc- 
trines, including even A tmanism, in favour of a 
Saivite trinitarian monism. The second chapter con- 
tains a classical description of Yoga. The third, the 
fourth and the fifth chapters are devoted to a discuss- 
ion of Saivite and Siri1khya philosophies, and invite a 
discussion as to the meaning of the word If kapila " 
which has been mentioned in V. 2; while the last 
chapter is the only unsectarian portion of the Upani- 

shad which gives us a purely theistic view of the God- 
head, and introduces the idea of Bhakti to Guru as to 
God. As in the case of its compeer Upanishads, 
the Svetasvatara was written at a time when the 
SaIhkhya and the Vedanta were yet intermixed. 
II The Samkhya had not yet lost its God who is des- 
cribed as ruling the (VI. 10), while the 
Vedanta had not yet definitely l1ad its Ma ya , a mere 
metamorphosis of the Sarilkhya Pralqiti. The three 
GUl.las as in IV. 5 were yet the common property of 
both the Sari1khya and the Vedanta, having had their 
origin so far back as the Chhandogya VI. 4. Nor had 
the Sarilkhya yet laid an emphasis on the subjectivity 
of sense-perception, which was primarily responsible 
for the parting of the ways between the Sari1khya and 
the Vedanta. The doctrine of creation in the sense 
of evolution was mooted V. 5, but its full implications 
had not been yet thought out. The psychology and 
the metaphysics of the Sarilkl1)Ta were yet in the mak- 
ing, and had not yet been sundered from those of the 
Vedanta as with a hatchet. It is for all these reasons 
that we say that the Svetasvatara, in which lie 
embedded side by side the Sarhkhya and the Vedantic 
doctrines of cosmology, psychology and metaphysics, 
is a very valuable Upanishad for the genetic study of 
the parting of the ways between the two great sys- 
13. The Prasnopanishad, which evidently belongs 
to a very late date in the history 
The Preens, tbe Mal- of Upanishadic literature, is a 
trl and the Manduky. · d .. 
Upanishads. preCOnCeIVe systematIc unIty, as 
almost no other Upanishad is. The 
six Sages, who are mentioned as going to Pipp alad a to 
learn M.sdom, ask each of therl1 a question of Pippa- 
lada in such a way that the person last mentioned asks 
.his question first, and the order of their questions is 




such that they educe an evolving philosophy from 
Pippalada, which we shall consider later. The nature, 
the style and the manner of presentation of the argtl- 
ment in the Prasnopanishad are also comparatively 
The Maitri is a very important Upanishad in the 
l1istory of Upanishadic literature" inasmuch as its 
vocabulary and its many references are peculiar to 
itself. It can be divided il1tO two different strata, the 
first four chapters constittlting the first stratum, and 
the last three constituting the second. We may even 
say that the first four chapters of this Upanishad may 
be taken to be a comparatively early redaction, and, 
therefore, alone relevant for our purposes. The last 
three chapters contain refereI:1ces. to such astrological 
names as Sani, Rahu and Retu (VIII. 6), Brihaspati, 
the author of a heretical pllilosophy (VII. 9), and a. six- 
fold Yoga (VI. .18), which is the pattern of the later 
eight-fold Yoga. I "or the purposes of the present 
work \vhich considers only the old {Jpanishadic philo- 
sophy, therefore, ""\.e "i11ay even restrict our attention 
to the first four chapters of this Upanisllad. Under the 
spell of the Sarnkhya and Buddhistic doctrines, king" 
Brihadratha is introduced in this Upanishad as giving 
vent to a pessimistic mood, which is unusllal in lTpani- 
shadic literature. 'fbis king goes to Sakayanya and 
begs of him. to teach hIm the secret of philosophy. 
Sakayanya tells hi In ,vhat he has himself learnt from 
the sage Maitri, who may thus be regarded as the pro- 
mulgator of the doctrines of this Upanishad. The 
first point in his philosophy is a description of the pure 
noumenal Self "rho U arising from the body shines in 
his OW
 greatness," and the second is a description of 
the phenomenal Self called the Bhfit a tman who is 
subject to the influence of actIons good and bad, and 
who therefore undergoes transmigration. We do not 



know how far to regard the description of the Rajasa 
and the Tamasa qualities in this Upanishad as a har- 
binger of the later (loctrine of the Bhagava.dgIti on 
that head; but it is \\70rth while remarl{ing that this 
Upanishad mentions among Tamasa qualities such 
qualities as infatuation, fear, dejection, sleep, sloth, 
hurt, age, grief.. hunger, thirst, niggardliness, anger, 
atlleism, ignorance, jealousy, pitilessness, Loll),.., shame- 
lessness, roguery, haughtiness and changeability; and 
among Rajasa qualities such qualities as desire, affect- 
iOll, passion, covetOtlSness, injury, love, a longing eye, 
activity, rivalry, restlessness, fickleness, instability, 
greed, partiality to frienos, tIle stlpport of those WllO are 
round about us, aversion for the undesirable, and 
attacllment to the (lesirable (III. 5). It is interest- 
ing to note that while tIle pure noun1enal Self is re- 
garded as the Mover of the Body, under whose direct- 
tion the Bod)T goes round like a wheel driven by a 
potter, the sensory organs being the rein, the motor 
organs the horses, tIle body the chariot, the mind the 
cl1arioteer, and the temperament the whip (II. 9), 
the phenomellal Self is declared to be like a beast 
chained by t11e fetters of good and evil, bound like 
one in prison, subject to terror as 011e in the hands 
of death, deluded by pleasure like one intoxicated by 
liquor, rushing headlong like one possessed by an evil 
spirit, bitten bj
 adversity as by a great serpent, 
blin i
j by pl.,3ioa a3 by nigllt, filled by Maya as by 
sleight-of-hand, false like a dream, unsutstantiallike 
the pith of the Banana tree, changing its dress like 
an actor, and falsely delighting the mind like a painted 
wall (IV. 2). So far about the earlier portion of the 
Maitri. 111 the later portion we have a heliotheism 
bordering upon pantheism, a number of astronomical 
specu).ations (VI. 14-16), the doctrine of the Word 
and the non- Word, non-Word being even superior to 




Word, an exhortation to avoid the company of those 
who always li,re in a state of hilarity, those who beg, 
those WilO live on handicraft, those who perform sacri- 
fices for the unworthy, the Sudras who learn scriptures, 
the rogues who wear knotted hair, dancers, merce- 
naries, prize-fighters, mendicants, actors, those who have 
been dismissed from king's service, those who pretend 
to allay the evil influence of sprites and goblins, those 
who wear red-dress, ear-rings and skulls, and finally 
those who by their sophisms shake the faith of the 
people in tIle Vedas (VII. 8). We have also an adum- 
bration of the later Hathayoga practices such as those 
of pressing the tongue against the palate, aJ.ld con- 
veying the breath through the Sushumna (VI. 18-21), 
and finally a description of the seven mystical sounds 
which are heard in the process of contemplation.. 
namely, those of a river, a bell, a brazen vessel, a 
wheel, the croaking of frogs, the pattering of rain, and 
finally a voice which comes from a place of seclusion 
(VI. 22). 
The MaQQukya which is the last of the early great 
Upanishads-we may almost call it (( the Last of the 
Romans "-is noticeable as laying once for all the 
foundations of the later V-edantic philosophy. I t parti- 
tions the symbol Om in three different mortB and adds 
a fourth mora-less part, corresponding to which there 
are different states of consciousness, corresponding to 
which, again, are different kinds of Soul. The great 
originality of the MaI].Q.ukya consists in positing the 
four states of consciousIless, namely, wakefulness, 
dream, sleep, and a fourth un-nameable state of 
consciousness; while it teaclles that there is aJ.1 aspect 
of the G( dhead corresponding to these states of con- 
sciousness, the last alone being ultimately real. TIle 
Absolute of philosophy surpasses even such a theo- 
logical conception as tllat of God. 



[9 14 

14. After having taken a brief review of the contents 
Tbe Metbods of. Upa- of the Upanishads, we sha11 
nlshadic Philosophy. pass on to a discussion of the 
various methods that have beell employed by the Upa- 
nishadic philosophers. There is no
 one method alo11e 
which is adopted by the Upanishadic philosophers: 
various methods have been resorted to by them at 
different times according to the necessities of diSCtlSS- 
(i) In the first place, we must note the enigmatic 
method which occurs from time to time in these 
Upanishads. WIlen SaI)Q.ilya said tI-lat reality was 
II tajjalan," he \\tas adopting a cryptic ,;yay for saying 
how God could be regarded as the origin, the end, and 
the life of all things. When the philosopIler of tIle 
Isavasyopanishad illtroduced tIle Vidya and A vid)la, 
and the Sarhbhuti and Asarhbhuti triplets, he was 
also taking recourse to the same metllod, pointing to 
a synthesis of opposites underl
yillg the apparent 
contradictions involved in the formulation of the t,vo 
riddles. The best illustration, however, of the enig- 
matic method is to be fOll11Cl ill t11e Svetasv'ataropani- 
shad, where we are told t11at reality is like a great 
circumscribing feily, "r110se tyres are the three GuQ.a..s, 
whose ends are the sixteen Kalas, whose spokes are the 
fifty Bhavas or conditiorls of Sarhkllya pllilosophy, 
whose counter-spokes are the ten Sel1ses and tlleir 
ten Objects, whose six sets of eigllts are the eights such 
as "the Dhatus, the Gods, tIle eight-fold Prakriti and so 
on, whose single rope is t11e Cosmic Person, whose 
three paths are the Good, tIle Bad and tIle Indifferent, 
or yet again, the 1vloral, tIle Immoral, and the A-moral, 
and finally which causes the single i11fatuation of the 
Ignorance ot Self on account of t11e two causes, namely, 
Good and Bad wqrks (S. g. a). TIle pllilosopllcr of the 
Svetas\ratara - again tells us tllat lIe COlltemplates 




Nature. which is like a vast expanse of water contri- 
bllted to by tIle fiv"e different streams of the Senses, 
wll0se Sl)rings arc tIle five Elements Wllicll make it 
fierce and crooked, whose waves are the five Pranas 
. , 
whose fount is the Antal).kara1).apafichaka, whose 
whirl-pools arc the five Objects of sense which entangle 
a man into them, w110se five rapirl
 are the kinds of 
grief callsed by Generation, Existence, Transformatio11, 
Declination and Decay, which cliverts itself into the 
fifty channels of the Bhavas of Sarhkhya philosoph)', 
and finalfy, which has the five tides of periodic overflow 
namely, at Birth, in C.llildhood, in Manhood, in Old age 
ancl at Death (S. g. b). Pllilosophy would be arid and 
dry, if it did not occasionally c.ontain such enigmatic 
riddles. Even Plato describes how a man and no- 
man, seeing and not-seeing a bird and no-bird on a 
tree and not-tree, killed it and did not kill it, with a 
stone and no-stone. 
(ii) Then, there is the aPhoristic method as employ- 
eel ill t11e MaI)Q.l1kya, which is the pattern of the later 
Sutra literature of the variOtlS S)7stems of philosophy. 
This method has the adval1tage of compressing all the 
material of thought in s110rt pregnant sentences, ,
leaving the COffi'llentator to scratch his head as best 
11e iDay on the interpretation of them. It is for this 
reason probably that the same Vedanta-sutras, for 
example, cam
 to be interpreted in such different 
fashions by the various commentators on them. To 
translate from the Mal}.Qukya, we are told how "the 
syllable Om is verily all that exists. Under it is in- 
cluded all the past, the present and the future, as 
well as that which transcends time. Verily all 
this is Brahman. The A tman is Brahman. This 
A tman is four-footed. The first foot is the Vaisva- 
nara, who enjoys gross things...... in the state of 
wakefll1ness. The second foot is the Taijasa, who 




enjoys exquisite things...... in the state of dream. 
The third is the Prajfia, who enjoys bliss. . . . . .in the 
sta te of deep-sleep...... The fourtll is tIle A tman, 
. . . . who is alone, without a second, calm, holy and 
tranquil". This passage has been verily the basis upon 
which all the later systems of Vedantic philosophy 
have come to be built. 
(iii) We have next the etymological method which 
was adopted in many places by the Upanishadic seers 
under the spell of Brahmal!ism, which had not yet 
ceased to influence the formulation of thought. In 
the Chhandogya we are told how cc svapiti" means 
" sata sampanno bhavati," or ,t svamapito bhavati," 
that is, becomes one with himself; how " asisishati " 
means II apa eva tadasitam nayante," or water is . 
leading off all that is eaten; how l( pipasati U means 
H teja eva tatpltam nayate," that is how heat is 
drying up what is drunk (S. 10. a). The Brihadara- 

yaka tells us that II purusha " is really II purisaya", 
that is inhabiting the citadel of heart (5. 10. b). Final- 
ly even such a late Upanishad as the MaI)Qukya tells 
us that the first letter A of the syllable Om is equiva- 
lent to Apti or attainment, because it possesses the 
property of A dimattva or beginningness; the letter U 
means Utkarsha or exaltation, because it signifies 
Ubhayatva or intermediateness; and the third letter M 
means Miti or Apiti, because it signifies measurement or 
destruction (5. 10. c). But we may put it to the 
credit of the Upanishadic philosophers that such 
word-ptlZzles are to be met with only occasionally 
in Upanishadic literature. 
(iv) The fourth is what we may call the mythical 
method which is resorted to very often in the Upani- 
shads. This method is adopted in the first place for 
the purpose of conveying a moral lesson, as for exam- 
ple, in the Kenopanishad, where the parable of lndra 




aDd the Damsel is introduced to convey the lesson of 
l1umilit)7, to show, in other words, that nobody can 
attain Brahman unless he is humble at 11eart. In 
the second place, the myth introduced may have an 
aetiological Purl>ose, as for example, the myth of the 
Slln as coming out of the htlge World-egg, the myth 
1Jeing ser\7iccable here to mark the course of the 
generation of tIle world-system from a Primeval Egg, 
Wllich itself originally came from Beil1g, and Being 
from Not-Being. Thirdly, the transcendental myth 
itself is not \vanting, when, for example, \ve are told,. 
as in the Aitareya, how the Atman entered the htlman 
skull and became individualised as the human soul, 
from which place again he looked back at his origin, 
and convinced himself that he was the A tman. Or, 
finally, we may have a myth introduced even for the 
sake of parody, as for example, tIle G:anine Chant 
which we have already had the occasion to notice 
in a previous section of this chapter. 
(v) 1'hen, again, we have the analogical method, 
which is to be found employed in many places by the 
Upanishads. When, for example, the sage Yajiia- 
valkya introdl1ces the analogy of the drl1ffi, the conch 
or the lute in order to explain the process of the ap- 
prehension of the Self, or when again A ruI}.i introduces 
the analogy of the juices, which in constituting honey 
cease to be different frO
l it, or yet again of the rivers 
that flo'
v into the ocean and become merged in it, 
or of salt which becomes one with water when it is 
poured into it..-all these illustrations serving to sho\v 
the non-difference of the Individual Soul from the 
Universal Soul--we have the analogical method ',;'hich 
tries to envisage by images what cannot be explained 
by the rigour of logic. 
(vi) Then, sixthly, we have the dialectic method 
which is the stock-in-trade. of the Upanishadic argu- 

ment, and could be seen employed at every stage of 
the development of Upanishadic philosophy. We 
must take care -to understand the word It dialectic JJ 
here in its root sense, as the method of the dialogue, 
instead of in the Platonic. or the I-Iegelian sense in which 
it may otherwise be understood. The dialogue occa- 
sionally takes the form of a severe disputation as at 
the Symposium in king Janaka's court, which unfor- 
tunately became a tragedy on account of the impreca- 
tion uttered by Yajfiavalkya on his last disputant, 
namely, Sakalya. In short, unless the
 superiority of 
the leading philosopher is implicitly acknowledged, a 
discourse very often takes the form of wrangling, and 
ma)7 end tragically, as it did .at the Symposium we are 
referring to. 
(vii) As contrasted with the dialectic method, we have 
what we may call the sY1tthetic method of philosophy. 
Here an attempt is made not to destroy, but to fllifil, 
as may be seen by the synthesis of thought effected by 
Asvapati Kaikeya out of the doctrines of tIle six 
cosmological philosopJlers in the Chhandogya, or b)T 
Plppalada out of the six })sycho-metaphysical ques- 
tions propounded to him by the six seers ill the 
P(asnOl)anishad, or finally by Yajfiavalkya out of 
the six metaphysical points of view sugg
ted to 
him by King Janaka in BrihadaraI.1yaka IV. There 
is neither a ttt quoque argument here, nor any indiffer- 
ent and precise cutting of the knot, but a sympa- 
thetic inclusion of the points of view suggested by 
others in a higher synthesis. 
(viii) As against the dialectical and the synthetic 
methods, we have what we may call the monologic 
method, the method of soliloquy. The Upanishadic 
philosophers are 
enerally very chary of imparting 
spiritual wisdom; but it so happens occasionally that 
when they have g
ven the right answer to their ql1es- 

9 14 ] 



tioners' problem, they overhit themselves in their ex- 
position, and lose themselves in a soliloquy in the 
midst of nlany... Thus it was that Yajfiavalkya at the 
Symposium, after he had answered the question pro. 
pounded to him by Uddalaka, lost himself into a re- 
verie, and began to think aloud on the _ universal 
immanence of God in the famous passage which has 
been known as the Antaryami-Brallma
a. Thus was 
it also that Yajiiava]kya poured himself out in his 
conversation with Janaka on the immutable nature of 
A tman in tIle Brihadaral).yaka IV. 3-4. Finally, even 
though Yama, in the Katllopa11isllad, was unwilling to 
impart wisdom to N achiketas 011 the third question 
which was asked him by Nachiketas, when once he 
began to speak, lIe spoke in a philosop11ical monologue 
which absolutely overhit the bounds of tIle original 
question. TIle tru
h is, that in the case of these Upa- 
nishadic philosophers, it does not generally rain; but 
when it does rain, it pours profusely. 
(ix) We have next the ad hoc or temporising method 
which is also a noticeable feature of lJpanishadic philo- 
sophising. Very often the philosopIlers are absolutely 
pertinent, and never illuminate on any topic except the 
one whicl1 is immediately before them, and according to 
the capacity of the learner. In the celebrated lndra- 
\iirochana myth, their l)receptor Prajapati tells them 
the secret of philosopllY not all at once, but only 
when either of tlleni has prepared himself for recei,,
tIle wisdom to be imparted. It tllus l1appens tllat 
Virocllana is completely satisfied with the first a11swer 
of Prajapati, but Indra is not, and presses his Master 
again and again for tIle solution of llis difficulties, 
Prajapati disclosing the secret of llis philosopll)t only 
ultin1ately. It thus comes to pass that the Atman is 
successively proved to be no longer a n1ere bodily 
double l or as identical \vith the Self ill tIle states of 




dream or deep-sleep, but with the Self as-identical- 
with-itself. Prajapati only gives what his pupils need, 
and thus supplies us with an excellent example of. the 
ad hoc metllod employed in Upanishadic philosophy. 
(x) Finally, we have the regressive method which 
takes the form of many successive questions, every 
new qtlestion carrying us behind the answer to the 
I)reviotls question. Thus it was that when janaka 
asked Yajfiavalkya what was the light of man, Yajiia- 
valkya said it was tI1e Sun. J anaka went behind 
answer after answer, carrying Yajiiavalkya from 
the Sun to the MoOtl, from the Moon to the Fire, from 
the Fire. . . . . . to tIle A tman, which exists behind them 
all as the l
ight-ill-itself (Br i . IV. 3). Thus it was also 
110w GargI took Yajiia\:-alkya fron1 questiol1 to question, 
asking llim what was the support of \vater and Yajfia- 
valkya a11swcring it was air, asking again what was be- 
hind air an(} Yajiiavalkya answering it was the inter- 
Inundia, al1d so on, until from behind the intermundia, 
the world of t11e Sun, the world of the Moon, the world 
of tIlc Stars, the world of the Gods. . . . . . GargI carried 
Yajfta\7alkya to the region of Brahman. But when 
Gargi asked agaill what lay behind the world of Brah- 
man itself, she exl1iblted the inordinate curiosity of 
the feIl1ale kil1d, especially when given to phiJo- 
SOpIIY, which leads necessarily to a regress ad infini- 
tum, Yajfia v'alkya checking the progress of the ques- 
tion'l'taire in the only appropriate way-" Thy head 
shall fall off if thou inquirest a.gain " (5. II). 
15. There is a branch of tIle T.lpanishadic method of 
l)hilosophising which calls for treat- 
U T i he h P d oetry of the mellt Ul1der a. se p arate section. It 
pan 8 a s. 
is \vhat we may call the poetical 
Inethod of philosophy. This method does really stIffer 
from the defect, tllat what is suggested under the garb 
of poetry can never be regarded as the rigorous 




truth of philosophy. The poetical method is appli- 
cable to philosophy where an emotion is to be created 
about the nature of reality, or when this reality be- 
comes a fact of mystical apprehension. \\Then such 
is the case, the seer gives no heed to the principles of 
metrification, and the metre he employs is wild and 
irregular, though at the same time pleasing by its 
wildness. U Like tIle Corybantes, who lose all con- 
trol over their reason in the enthusiasm of the secret 
dance, and during this supernatura1 possession are 
excited to the rhythm alld harmony 
'hich they com- 
municate to men, these poets create their admired 
songs in a state of divine insanity." And tJ1US, as we 
may naturally expect, the Upanishadic poetry is mys- 
tical, moral, or metaphysical, rather thaI1 heroic, or 
lyrical, or given to the description of nature or love. 
It may be remembered that the moral tone of Upa- 
nishadic poetry is strictly subservicllt to its nleta- 
physical i
))plications, and it does not rise, as in the case 
of the hymn to Varu
a in 
igveda VII. 88, to an 
expression of the innermost feelings of the human 
heart, to a confession of sin, or to a prayer for gracious 
atonlnent to divinity. The poetry of the lsopanishad 
is a commixture of moral, mystical and metaphysical 
elements; that of the Kenopanishad is psycho-meta- 
physical; that of the Kathopanishad has as its chief 
topic the teaching about the Immortality of the Soul 
and the practical way to the realisation of 11 tman; the 
poetry of the Svetasvatara rises in the sixth chapter to 
a theistic description of God, and a representation of 
Him as causa sui; it is only in the MUQQaI{opanishad 
that we find the highest emotion of which the Upani- 
shads are capable. This of course is not yet of the 
highest order, but we may say that never elsewhere in 
the Upanishads do we find the stage of emotionalism 
that is reached in the M
Qaka. There are, however, 

a number of passages in the Upanishads which are 
couched in prose, and yet are highl,y poetic in 
sentiment. They are what a modem \vri ter has called 
II conflagrations of prose-poetry". Thus for example, 
as a piece of sustained imaginative composition in 
prose, we may take the passage from the Chhandogya 
which tells us that II the heaven must be regarded as 
the supporting beam from which the intermundane 
region hangs like a bee-hive. The Sun is the honey 
of the gods as preserved in this bee-Iliyc. The rays 
which the Stln spreads in different quarters, namely, 
the eastern, the Eouthern, the \\.estern, tIle northern 
and the upward directions are the different honey-cells 
looking in the various directions. The IlJ'111ns of the 
four Vedas are the bees which work on the bee...11ive 
from the various sides. The different colours of t11e 
Sun are the different kinds of nectar 011 wl1ich the 
various gods live", and, we are told, these gods live 
on them not by the ordinary processes of drinking or 
eating, but by merely" looking" at them (5. 12. a)- 
an expression which gives us an insight into the 
9EtlJpLG of the Upanishadic gods. As an example of 
allegory in the Upanishads, we may take the eschato-. 
logical passage from the Kaushltaki 
rhich sI:caks of 
" the river of agelessness, the 11 all of omnjpre
the couch of grandeur, the damsel of mind, th
maid of vision, the flowers of tIle worlds \Vllich these 
are intent on weaving, the passage of t11e Soul 111fough 
the river merely by the rr
otion of the mind, the haven 
of safety which it reaches by the assertion of its identi- 
fication with the highest Brahman-a fit concatena- 
tion of circumstances that befall the Soul ",
hich is 
described as the Child of the Seasons." \\'e l1ave 
said above that the Upanisl1ads do 110t contain 
either nat\lre-poetry or lo've-pcctry, a11d hence the 
beautiful does not 
uch fall within the 
cope of Upa- 




nishadic thOtlght; but the Upanishads deal neverthe- 
less with the sublime in nature, or with the sublime 
in the region of mind, or even in the transcendental 
sphere. As an example of the sublime in nature, we 
may take the passage from the Brihadir
yaka which 
tells us that ee by the command of the imperishable 
Brahman, the sun and the moon stand in their places; 
by the command of that Brahman, the heaven and the 
earth stand apart; by the command of that Brahman, 
the moments and the hours, the days and the nights. 
the half-months and the months, the seasons and the 
years, all stand apart; by the command of that Brah- 
man, some rivers flow out to the east from the White 
Mountains, and others to the west or some other 
quarter" (S. 12. b.). As an example of sublimity in 
the subjective sphere, \ve may quote the passage from 
the Chha11dogya in which we are told that the city 
within is exactly like the city without, that the heart 
is t]1e citadel of A tman as the universe itself is, that 
just as in the outer world there is that unending space 
\\,hich contains within it the heaven and the earth, the 
fire and the wind, the sun and the moon, the lightning 
and the stars, similarly, even here, within this little 
citadel, are they to be equally found (5. 12. c). 
Finally, as a11 example of sublimity in the transcenden- 
tal sphere, we have the passage from the Chhan- 
dog}7a which tells us that II Infinity alone is bliss. . . . . 
When one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, under- 
stands nothing else, that is the Infinite...... The 
Infinite is above, below, behind, before, to the right and 
to the left. . . . . . I am above, I am below, I am behind, 
I am before, I am to the right and to the left...... 
The Self is above, the Self is below, the Self is be- 
hind, the Self is before, the Self is to the right 
and to the left. .'He who knows this truly attains 
Swarajya II (5. 12. d). 

16. Let us now turn to a brief discussion of the 
doctrines of the great philosophers 
The Pbllo8opher8 of t hat lived and thou g ht in the 
the Upanhhadlc period. . 
Upanishadic period. We shall be 
considering the doctrines in detail in the later chap- 
ters of this work, where they would be found 

 4!?tnbuted according to problems. At this place, we 
have to content ourselves with merely a concise 
statement of them for fear of repetition of the material 
in the later chapters. I t is also necessary for us to 
introduce our readers to the names of the great philo- 
sophers, each of whom made some contribution to the 
development of Upanishadic thought, and, in the case 
of the metaphysical philosophers especially, to ex- 
hibit the logical link between their doctrines in order 
to indicate the lines for a fuller and systematic study 
of them. We shall severely exclude from our present 
conspectus the names of unhistorical or mythological 
personages. The dialogue between Indra, Virochana 
and Prajapati, for example, merely serves to bring out 
certain philosophical conceptions, without enabling us 
to attribute them to historical personages. Indra, Viro- 
chana and Prajapati are all of them mythological per- 
sonages, and hence we can attribute to neither of them 
the doctrines that have been advanced in that great 
story. It is unfortunate that the author of that story 
should have entirely hidden himself behind it. Simi- 
larly, in the dialogue between lndra and Pratardana 
in the Kaushltaki, between Bhrigu and VaruI.J.a in the 
Taittirlya, and between Nachiketas and Yama in the 
Katha, Indra, Va
a and Yama seem respecti\Tely to 
be unhistorical persons. Nachiketas may have been a 
historical personage; while there is not much ob- 
jection to regard Pratardana and Bhrigu as historical. 
Then, ag
n, it must be remembered, that many of the 
doctrines of the Upanishads are entirely untraceable 




to their authors. Thus, for example, the doctrines of 
the MUI).Qaka cannot be traced to any particular author. 
The author must have been a great eclectic indeed; 
but it is unfortunate that we cannot trace his person- 
ality. The doctrines of the Svetasvatara, on the other 
hand, could be definitely attributed to the sage Sveta- 

vatara, whose name has been mentioned towards the 
end of that Upanishad (VI. 21). While, therefore, we 
shall notice in the following short survey the names of 
the persons, which, without objection, may be regarded 
as historical, it is necessary to remember that there 
must have been many a philosopher who lived, and 
thought, and died llnknown. His work lIas remained, 
though his personality 11as been lost. 
17. Of tIle mystical philosophers, Trisailku seems in- 
deed to llave been a man of great 
Mystical, Moral and · · ht b f th 
other philosophers. . Inslg , as may e see11 rom e 
little scroll that he has bequeath- 
ed to us in the Taittirlya Upanishad. Nor must we 
forget that Maitri himself, the promulgator of the 
Maitri Upanishad, was a great God-realiser, as may be 
seen from his descriotion of "the A tman as realised " in 
that U panishacl. Rathltara, Paurusishti and Naka 
Maudgalya has each of them left to us the virtue 
which he regarded as of supreme importance, namely, 
Truth, Penance, and the Sttldy of the Vedas. Mahldisa 
Aitareya seems to have been a philosopher interested 
in eugenics. His problem was the prolongation of 
l1uman life, even thOllgh he tried to realise it ritualis- 
tically (S. 13. a). AruI).i must have \vitnessed, if not 
practised, the fasting philosophy of ancient times 
(S. 13. b). The sage KaushItaki was the inventor of the 
doctrine of Prana as Brahman. He seems to have been 
an ancient usatyagrahin," and to have practised the 
virtue of nO
1-begging. He was the author of the doc- 
trine of the "Three Meditations," namely on the SUD; 



[f 17 

the Full moon, and the New moon, for the fulfilment of 
some specific desires. Paingya 
eems to have been the 
henchman of Kaushltaki in his doctrine that Prana was 
the lord of the Senses as well as the Mind. Pratardana 
was a free-thinker of antiquity, disbelieving in the 
efficacy of external ritualism, advocating the doctrine 
of the inner sacrifice which is always going on within 
us, and contributing to thought, probably, the doc- 
trine of Prajfiatman, a bio-psycho-metaphysical con- 
ception. Sushkabhringara seems to have taught that 
if a man regarded the 
igveda as supreme, all beings 
would worship him (archante); if he regarded the 
Yajurveda as supreme, all would join (yujyante) to 
prove his supremacy; and that if he regarded the 
Samaveda as supreme, all would bow down to him 
(samnamante). This is a philologico-philosophical con- 
tribution of Sushkabhringara made under BrahmaQic 
influence. Finally, the sage Jaivali seems to have held 
that the Universe exhibits at every stage the principle 
of sacrifice. II When we cast our glance at the sky, 
he said, we see that the heaven is a great altar in which 
the sun is burning as fuel, his rays being the smoke, 
the day being tIle light of the sacrificial fire, the quar- 
ters the coals, and the intermediate quarters the 
sf;arks of the fire; from the oblation that is offered in 
this sacrifice, namely Sraddha, rises the Moon. If we 
look at the sl,y again, we see that Clparjanya" is the 
great altar in whicll the year is burning as fuel, the 
clouds being the smoke, the lightning being the light 
of the sacrificial fire, the thunderbolt the coals, and the 
rumbling of the clouds the sparks of the sacrificial 
fire; from the oblation offered in this sacrifice, namely 
the Moon, rises Rain. Then again, the whole world 
is a great altar in which the earth bums as fuel, fire 
being the smoke, night being the light, the moon being 

e coals, and the stars the sparks of the fire; from the 




oblation offered in this sacrifice, namely Rain, rises 
Food. FOltrthly, man himself is a great altar in which 
the opened mouth is the fuel, the breath the smoke, 
the tongue the light, the eyes the coals, the ears the 
sparks; from the oblation offered in his sacrifice, 
namely Food, rises Seed. Finally, woman herself is a 
great altar, in which Seed being offered as an oblation, 
rises Man. In this very peculiar way does Jaivali's 
philosophy c<?nnect the Sraddha libation with the 
Moon, the Moon with Rain, the Rain with Food, the 
Food with Seed, and finally the Seed with Man. This 
is llis celebrated Doctrine of Five Fires. Finally, when 
a Man is cremated, fr9m out of the fire of cremation 
Wllich serves as altar, a lustrous person arises, who 
goes either to the World of the Gods, or to the World 
of the Fathers, as his qualifications enable him to 
proceed ". 
18. Of the cosmological philosophers, a passage from 
C 1 " 1 J d the Chhandogya (V. II) tells \is 
oamo 0 6 ca a n 
Psycholoaical philo- that while Uddalaka held that the 
sophers . 
earth was the substratum of thmgs, 
Prachinasala held that it was the heaven which was so, 
while Bugila, Sarkarakshya, and Indradyumnaheld that 
water, space and air were respectively the substrata of 
things, and Satyayajfia said that the substratum was the 
Sun-the ce]estial fire. In this passage we have the 
names of the persons who held that the elements were 
the ultimate substrata of things, even though in many 
other Upanisllads these doctrines have been left un- 
traced to philosophers. R.aikva alone is elsewhere 
described as having held with Indradyumna that air 
was the substratum of all things. Asvapati Kaikeya, 
who adopts the synthetic method, is described in the 
Chhandogya as having incorporated these views into 
his doctrine of the Universal .Atman, the .Atman 
Vaisvanara" who is " p rad esamatra" and II abhivi- 


mana " --expressions whose meaning we shall deter- 
mine later on-the heaven constituting the head of 
the Atman, the sun his eye, the air his breath, space his 
body, water his bladder, and the earth his feet (Chhan. 
V. 18). A transition is made from cosmology to phy- 
siology wl1en Satyakama jabala teaches Upakosala 
that reality is to be found not in the SUD, or the moon, 
or the lightning, but in the person in the eye (Cllhan. 
IV), and from cosmology and physiology to psychology, 
when Gargya thinks that the physical categories such 
as the SUI1, the mOOI1, and the wind, and physiological 
categories s'llch as the eye are the 111timate reality, 
and Ajatasatru) his instructor, tells him that reality is to 
be found in the deep-sleep-consciousness (Bp. II). The 
very much greater interest tllat is taken in psychology 
rather than in cosmology by the Upanishadic pllilo- 
sophers is evident from the way in wllich they always 
ask questions about psychological matters. Of the 
interlocutors of PippalD,da in the Prasna Upanishad, 
the first, nan1ely, KabandhI Katyayana alone 
seems to be interested in cosmology when he asks- 
i;rOID what primal Being are all these things 
created? -while the others are interested in some 
kind of psychological question or other. Bhargava 
Vaidarbhi is interested in physiological psychology, 
and asks-What sense is the lord of all tIle 
ot11ers? I{ausalya Asvalayana is interested in the 
metaphysics of psychology, and asks the question- 
From what being Pral}.a, the lord of the senses, 
was born? Sauryay
i Gargya is an abnormal 
psychologist, taking interest in the problem of dreams. 
Saibya Satyakama is interested ill mysticism, and 
asks the question about the efficacy of meditatioi.1 on 
Om; while Sukesl Bhiradvaja is again interested 
in the metaphysics of psychology, when he asks 
uestion about the nature of the Person with 




Sixteen Parts. The philosophy of PlppalMa emerges 
in the answers that he gives to these seers. Pippa- 
IMa is a great psycho-metaphysician of antiquity, ad- 
vocating the doctrine of Rayi and Pral}a, which is 
equivalent to the Aristotelian doctrine of Matter and 
Form, as well as the doctrines of the supremacy of the 
vital breath above the senses and the primary emergence 
of the vital breath from the A tman. He regards the 
state of dream as one in which the mind of man has 
free play, bodying forth the forms of things inexpe- 
rienced as well as experienced, and the state of deep 
sleep as one in which the light of the man is over- 
powered by the light of the Self. Pippalada als
teaches that by meditation on Om till the time of 
death, one goes to the celestial regions where one learns 
from HiraI}yagarbha to see the all-pervading Person, 
wl1i1e in regard to the doctrine of the Person with 
Sixteen Parts, he prepares tIle way for the later 
Sarilkhya and Vedantic doctrine of the Liilga-sarlra. 
Bhujyu and lTddalaka, who are mentioned in the 
BrihadaraI.\yaka are both of them interested in psychi- 
cal research. The curious personality of Vamadeva 
which appears for the first time in 
igveda IV. 26, 27, 
is introduced again in the Brihadar
yaka I. 4. 10, 
where he declares himself as having been Manu and the 
Sun in a previous birth, as well as in the Aitareya 11.4, 
where the 'philosophy of II Three Births " is declared 
to have been in consonance with his teaching. This 
sage, who seems to have been intensely interested in 
the question of rebirt
, declares that II while yet in 
embryo he tried to know all the births of the gods. A 
hundred iron citadels tried to hold him ; but a hawk 
that he was, with swiftness he came down to the earth. 
In embryo indeed did Vamadeva speak in this manner." 
Vl.madeva seems to have held that there were three 
births of man: the first birth of a man occurs wJ.;1en 
. . 


the spermatozoon coml)ines with the ovum; his second 
birth occurs wl1en a child is born to him; his third 
birth takes place when 11e is himself reborn after death. 
Bhrig u , ,vho is mentioned in the Taittirlya, was a 
great metapllysical psychologist, who held that food, 
life-breatll, mind, intellect and bliss constituted, in 
tile order of gradation, the expressions of Atman. 
Fillally, we are introdtlCed in BrihadaraI.1yaka IV to 
the doctrines of certain psycho-metaphysicians, when 
we are told tllat Jitvan Sailini lleld t11at speech was 
the higllest reality; Udailka Saulbayana that breatll 
was tilc llighest reality; Varktl Varshl).a, Gardablli- 
viplta BI1arad'vaja, Satyakama ]abala and Vidagdha 
Sal{alya lleld resl1ectively tllat tIle eye, the ear, thE 
mind al1d the 11eart constituted the ultimate reality; 
wllilc Yafijav'alkya, following tIle synthetic method, 
found a place for each of these doctrines in his final 
19. Of the metap11ysical philosopllers, SaQgilya, 
Metaphysical philo- Dadhyach, Sanatkuma.ra, .AruJ:.1i 
sophers. and Yajf1avalkya are tIle most 
prominent, the last being the greatest of them all. 
(i) The complete philosophy of Sa1].4ilya is preserved 
for \1S in that small section of the Chhandogya, namely, 
III. 14, where Sat:lQ.ilya formulates for us the main 
doctrines of his philosophy. In 
the first place, 
he gives us the 
cosmological proof of the Absolute which he calls 
Ie Tajjalan ", that from which things are born, to which 
they repair and in which they live. Secondly, he 
teaches the doctrine of Karmanand says that fate 
alone betakes a man in the next world for which he 
has paved the way by his works in this life. In the 
third place, he gives us a characterisation of A.tman 
in thoroughly positive terms. This stands against the 
later negative theology of Yajfiavalkya. Fourthly, 


f19 ] 


. 51 

he tells us that the A tman is 
both great and small; 
greater than the great, and smaller than tIle small; 
infinite and infinitesimal. Lastly, he tells us that the 
end of human life consists in being merged in the 
A tman after death, a consummation, whicll, he is Sllre 
he will reach. 
(ii) The sage Dadhyach who, like Vamadeva, is a 
sage of Vedic repute, as referred 
to in 
ig\Teda I. 1I6. I2, is also 
a sage \v110 occupies a prominent place in Brihada- 
ra:gyal{a II. The (( Madhllvidya" referred to in the 

ig\reda is il1 tllis U pal1isllali eXpOtll1ded in great detail. 
As regar(ls 11is personal llistor
T, \,'e are told ill tIle 

igveda th,tt he kne,v tIle secret of tIle" Madlluvidya," 
and that he llad been enjoined upon b y Y lndra, on pain 
of capital punishment, not to disclose the secret to 
anybod)1. The .Asvins wanted to learn that wisdom 
from Dadhyach, and, because they were convinced 
that lnclra would fuliil llis threat, they first cut off 
the head of Dadllyacll t11elTIselves, and substituted on 
his trllnk the llead of a 11orse. DadllyacIl thereupon 
spoke by tIle 110rse's llead to the Asvil1S, and tatlght 
tllem the" Madlluvidya." lndra \vas very \\rrot11 to see 
that the secret had been im11arted by Dadhyacll, and 
so he cut Dff tIle head from the body of Dadhyach, 
upon which, the Asvins re-substituted tl1e original 
head, and Dadllyach became whole again! It \\ras 
this sage Dadhyach who is introduced in the Bri11a- 
darat:lyaka as having held the doctrine of the mutual 
interdependence of things, because all of tllem are in- 
dissolubly connected in and through the Self. To 
quote from the History of Indian Philosophy Volume 
II, 'I all things are in mutuunt c01nn
erc£um, because they 
are bound together by the same vinculum substantialc, 
namely, the Self. The earth, says Dadhyach, is the 
honey of all heings, and all beings are tlle honey of 



the earth, just becaus
 the same' lustrous,' I immortal ' 
Self ,inhabits them both. The fire is the essence of all 
things, and all things are the essence of :fire, just 
because the immortal self is the essence of both. Simi- 
larly, are the wind, the sun, the space, the moon, the 
lightning, the thunder, the ether, and even law, truth, 
and humanity tIle essence of all things whatsoever, 
and all things are the essence thereof, inasmuch as 
the same law, the same element, the same indissoluble 
bond connects them both. Finally, the indi\7idual 
Self is itself the essence of all things, and all things 
are the essence of tIle individual Self, inasmuch as 
both of them are held together by the same Universal 
Spirit. I t is this Universal Spirit whicl1 is the lord 
and ki
g of all things. As all the spokes are contained 
between the axle and felly of a wheel, all things and all 
selves are connected in and through the Supreme 
Self. It is on account of the Supreme Self, that all 
things stand related together. All things appear on 
the back-ground of this eternal curtain. ' Nothing 
exists that is not covered by the Supreme Self. He 
becomes like unto every form, and all the forms are 
only partial revelations of Him. TIle Lord appears 
many through his magic power'. Thus does Dadh- 
yach teach the doctrine of the supreme existence of 
the one, and the apparent existence of tIle many." 
(iii) The third philosopher who in,rites our attention 
is tIle sage Sanatktlmara of the 
Chhandogya, the preceptor of 
Nirada. Leaving aside his sorites of psychological, 
physical and metaphysical categories which is of 
little consequence for philosophy, let us note here 
the points of value in his philosophy. In the first 
place, Sanatkumira seems to teach a spiritual hedo- 
nism. Happiness-and. in Sanatkumira's hands, happi. 
Bess "becomes the equivalent of spiritual happiness--is 





the spring of all action; action is the cause of faith; 
faith, of belief; when a man believes, he thinks; when 
he thinks, he knows; and when he knows, he reaches 
,the truth. In this way, happiness, action, faith, 
belief, thought, knowledge and truth constitute, in 
Sanatkumara's hands, a moral ladder to realisation 
(VII. 17-22). Secondly, it is Sanatkumara ,"Tho teaches 
the doctrine of Bhtiman". "Bh1iman" is that infinite 
happiness which arises by the \7ision of the divinity 
all around. When anything else is seen, that is 
II Alpa." Thus all possessions in the shape of cows 
and horses, elephants and gold, ser\:'ants and wives, 
lands and palaces, are of little consequence as con- 
trasted with Bhtiman (VII. 23-24). Thirdly, the reali- 
sation of Bhtiman occurs when an experience such 
as is implied in the expressiol1 "Sohamatma" is 
attained (VII. 25). Lastly, Sanatkumara teaches that 
Atman is the source of all things whatsoever. From- 
A tman spring hOlJe and memory ; from A tman spring 
space, light and 
aters; from Atman everything 
unfolds, in Atman everything hides itself. Atman is 
the source of all power, all knowledge, all ecstasy 
(VII. 26). 
(iv) AruI)i, the greatest of the Ul)anis11adic philo- 
sophers, barring of course \
valkya, though he has been re- 
ported to be the latter's philosophical teacher-as may 
be seen also from a number of IJoints of resemblance 
between AruQi and Yajnavalkya, especially in regard 
to their theories of Sleep -and Dream on the one hand, 
and of Monistic Idealism and Doctrine of Appearance 
on the other-is a philosopher, who, like his other 
compeers of the Upanishadic period, is a great psycho- 
metaphysician. In regard to his psycl1ological theo- 
ries, \ve must reme;mber that he advances the "Fatigue" 
theory of sleep (VI. 8. 2), and tells us that in the state 


of sleep, the individual Self becomes one with the 
.Atman (VI. 8. I)-points which have become the 
current coin of Upanishadic thought. In regard 
to departing consciousness, he tcaches that, while a 
man is dying, his speech first becomes merged in the 
mind, then his mind becomes merged in breath, then 
breath. becomes merged in light, and finally light be- 
comes merged in the deity (VI. 15)-a theory which 
Yajiiavalkya later borrows and expatiates upon. In 
regard to his metaphysical doctrines, he \7iews Sub- 
stance from the cosmological point of ,'iew, regarding 
it as tIle final substratum of all thing<s, in fact as tile 
material cause of t11e universe, just as iron is the 
material cause of all iron-weapons, and gold of gold- 
ornaments (VI. I. 4-6). Secondly, lle tells us that 
this underlying Substance is H alone real", all else 
is merely a name. Aruni is an extreme nominalist 
- . 
who pa""es the way. for the Doctrine of Illtlsion (VI. I. 
4- 6 ). Thirdly, he tells us that what thl1S exists as 
the primal hypostasis cannot be regarded as Not- 
being, for from Not-Being nothing can come. Hence 
the llypostasis is Being (VI. 2. 1-2). This Being pro- from itself first fire, then water, then tIle earth, 
in that order (VI. 2. 3-4). Interpreted generally, the 
Sanskrit words he uses, l1amely Tejas, Ap, and Anna, 
could be interpreted as meaning respectively the 
energizing principle, liqtlid existence, and solid exist- 
ence. Fourtllly, all tl1ings that exist in ttlis world, 
animate as well as inanimate, are made up of these 
elements by the process of Trivritl{araI}.a, a doctrine 
which A ru
i first el111nciates. Things are unreal; 
the Elements alone are real; and more than the Ele- 
ments, Being, which is the root of them all (VI. 3-4). 
Next AruI)i teaches that it is this Being whic11 is also 
the Self in man. II That art Thou " is the recurring 
instruction of. ArU1
o. his son Svetaketu (VI. 8 ff). 




The spirit in nattlre is thus at the same time the Sl)irit 
in mall. It is interesting to note the parallel of Art1I)i's 
idea ,vith Green's. Cosmologically, this Being is the 
subtle essence which underlies phenomena, and which 
can be grasped only by faith (VI. I2), and by apt 
instruction from the teacher (VI. 14). Biologically, 
it is the supreme life-principle \vhich gives life to the 
universe. The branches may die and yet the tree 
lives; but when the tree dies, t11e branches die also. 
Similarly, the universe ma)l v'anisll, but God remains; 
but God cannot 'vanish, and hence the latter alterlla- 
tive is inlpossible (VI. II). Psychologically, it an- 
ni11ilates all individualities. Do not juices lose their 
indi\'iduality in honey, asl(s Art1J)i (VI. 9) ? Do not the 
rivers lose tlleir individuality in the ocean (VI. 10) ? 
Even likewise do all souls lose their individuality in 
the A tn1an. Viewed from the moral point of view, 
the Atman is truth. One who makes alliance with 
trutll, makes alliance. with A tman also (VI. 16). 
Metaphysica]ly, tIle A tman pervades all. As salt may 
pervade every particle of water into which it is put, 
the At
an fills every nook and cranny of the universe. 
There is nothing that does not live in Atman (VI. 13). 
We thus see how AruI.1i boldly postulates an idealistic 
monism in which there is no room for difference even 
from within. 
(v) y-ajiiavalkya , like his teacher AruIJ.i, is a great 
psycho-metaphysician. We shall 
consider the points of his meta- 
physics first, and then go all to the consideration of his 
psychological doctrines. In fact, Yajfiavalkya's l>hilo- 
sophy would be so much called upon in our later 
Chapters, that we can only indicate it here very briefly 
and for the purpose of giving a synoptic view of his 
philosophy. We shall not consider the points of Yijiia.. 
valkya"s philosophy in the orfIer i
h he ,aQswers 


the questions of his wife, and of the philosophers 
that meet him in King Janal{a's court, and of King 
J anaka himself in the second, third and fourth chap- 
ters respectively of the Brihad
raQyaka. We sllall con- 
sider them only logically. In Cha}Jter III of the Bfihada- 
ral}.yaka, he had, no doubt, a formidable number of 
intellectual adversaries to grapple with. Asvala and 
Sakalya were interested more or less in ritualism and 
theology, and so t11cy could be easily disposed of; but 
Jaratkarava, who was interested in eschatology 
Bhujyu, whom we l1ave already met with as a psychical 
researcher, Ushasta, who was interested in the 
nature of Ultimate Reality, Kahola, who wanted to 
know the practical ,vay to the realisation of A tman, 
Gargi and Uddalaka, who were both interested in the 
problem of immanence, the one dynamically, the other 
statically, were, in any case, a formidable list of oppo- 
nents. The philosophy of Yajiiavalkya which emerges 
in his conversation with these adversaries as well as 
l1is wife and king J anaka, may be briefly set 
down as follows. He teaches that all objects are 
centred in the Self, as all thoughts are centred in 
the mind, as all touches in the skin, as all waters in 
the ocean (II. 4. II). The Atman pervades all. 
Yajfiavalkya also uses the simile of the immanence of 
salt in water (II. 4. 12). borrowing it probably from 
his teacher Arul}i. Secondly, Yljiiavalkya teaches 
that all things exist for the Self ; if we do not so re- 
gard them. they would vanish for us (II. 4. 6). Third- 
ly. he tells us that all things are dear for the sake of 
the Self. In every act of mental affection. the A.tman is 
calling unto Atman. The realisation of Atman is the, 
end of all endeavour (II. 4. 5). Fourthly, Yajiiavalkya 
says that tllis A tman alone is real; all else is "irtam" 
-a mere tinsel-show (III. 4. 2 and III. 5. I). YAjiia- 
valkya' then proceeds to cMracterise the 4 tmaQ iq 

9 19 ] 



negative terms; the A.tman is neither large nor small, 
neither short nor long.; he is flavourless, eyeless, 
odourless, and quality-less (III. 8. 8). Contrast t1:).is 
negative theology of Yajfiavalkya with the posit- 
ive theology of SaI)qilya. As a proof of the exist- 
ence of Atman, Yajfiavalkya draws upon the argu- 
- " 
ment from order: Atman is the it bund " of all exis- 
tence: our very hours and days are measured by this 
A tman (III. 8. 9). The A tman is universally imma- 
nent. He is the inner controller of all things. We 
are merely like little dolls" and throw out our hanQs 
and feet according as the great Thread-puller, A tman, 
wishes to make us dance (III. 7). The A tman is the 
ultimat,e light of man; all other lights are lights by 
sufferance. When Atman is realised as the light of 
man, one reaches self-consciousness (IV. 3. 1-6). 
The A tman alone is the ultimate hearer, seer, thinker: 
there is no thinker beside Him (III. 4. 2). The A tman 
perceives himself. Only when there is a duality, 
then one may see another; but when One alone 
is, processes of perception and thought are alike im- 
possible, and we are reduced to a state of solipsism 
(II. 4. 14). But Yajiiavalkya takes care to say that 
the organs of perception of the percipient do not cease 
to function. That, from the epistemological side, is the 
relieving feature of his solipsism (IV. 3. 23-30). In 
psychology, Yajiiavalkya teaches.. like other Upa- 
nishadic philosophers, that when the state of dream 
occurs, the A tman spreads out his own light (IV. 3. 9). 
The A tman in this state moves out from his nest, 
guarding it nevertheless with breath (IV. 3. 12). It 
must be remembered, however, that the Atman only 
seems to move, or only seems to imagine in the state 
of dream, and does not really move or imagine (IV. 3.7). 
Yajfiavalkya advises that when a man is dreaming, 
let -no one wake him up suddenly, .for fear, appa.. 

rently, that the Soul may depart (IV. 3. 14). A father 
in that state is not a father; a mother, a mother; 
a thief a thief; a murderer, a murderer; a Ch
4aIa, a 
Chal}.Qala; and analogically, a Brahmin a Brahmin 
(IV.3. 22 ). As regards the state of sleep, he advocates, 
like AruI.1i, the fatigue theory (IV.3.19). He tells us, 

 furthermore, that sleep is a twilight condition, where 
one sees this world as well as the other world (IV.3.99). 
As regards departing consciousness, Yajfiavalkya 
tells the story of the process of death in such a realist- 
ic fashion that we cannot but regard him as an ex- 
ceedingly shrewd observer of nature. At the time of 
death, the corporeal self is mounted on by the intelli- 
gent self, the Sarlra A tmal1 by tIle Prajiia A tman, and 
it moves along groaning like a heavy-laden cart (IV. 3. 
35). Before death occurs, the person. in the eye first 
turns away (IV. 4. I). The end of the heart is lighted, 
and by that light, the soul departs either by the way 
of the eye, or the head, or any other part of the human 
body (IV. 4. 2). His u I{arman " alone accompanies 
him: it is the guardian of his destiny (IV. 4. 5). It is 
probably this doctrine of "Karman" that, we may say, 
Yajiiavalkya imparted to Jaratkarava in III. 2. 13, 
and tllUS silenced him. According to Yajiiavalkya, 
it seems that only when the Atman has prepared 
another abode for himself that he leaves the body. 
Not unless it finds another blade to. rest upon would 
a caterpillar leave its original blade (IV. 4. 3). Yi. 
jiiavalkya says also that the newer existence must be 
even a brighter existence: does not the goldsmith 
create from the old gold a newer and brighter form 
(IV. 4. 4)? If the Self has left any ,qesires in him 
while yet he liyes in his body, - he ret
ms frQm his 
sojourn to this existence again;. if.. no ,d
ires -be. left 
in him, he becomes one-with Brahman (
_ 4.---6). .At 
that time no consciousness r emain s. -CoB$Cio
pess -is 




merely a "fleeting" phenomenon due to tIle entry of 
the A tman in the elements which produce the bodily 
form (II. 4. 12). Yajfiavalkya's wife was really 
frightened at the pass to which Yajiiavalkya's philo- 
sophy liad led, but we, who understand Yajfiavalkya's 
absolute idealism may not wonder if, from that point 
of view, he regarded even transmigration as a delu- 
sion. If we may be allowed to use Yajfiavalkya's 
own manner of philosophising, we may well ask, 
when the Atman alone is, at all places and at all times, 
from what would he transmigrate, and to what? But 
all this is only implied in Yajiiavalkya. For fear of 
disturbing the ordinary routine of thought, of whicl1 
his wife supplies us with an illustration, Yajfiavalkya 
hastily excuses himself from the impasse to whicl1 
his doctrine had led him, by saying that sufficient for 
the nonce was the. wisdom he had imparted (II. 4. 13). 
20. Let us now examine somewhat the social con- 
General social con- di tion in which these philosophers 
ditlon. li,"ed and made their speculations. 
(i) It seems the castes did evidently exist at the time 
of the Upanishads. We have the forlnulation of the 
caste system so far back as at the time of the Purusha- 
sukta, which must be, in any case, considered anterior 
to the Upanishads. In the BrihadaraI).yaka, there is 
a very unorthodox theory about the origin of castes. 
This Upanishad does not argue, like the Bhaga\radgita 
at a later date, that the castes were created by God 
according to H qualities and works." On the other 
hand, we are told in the BphadaraJ)yaka that Brah- 
man was the first to exist; but because it was alone, it 
did not fare well, and therefore it produced a better 
form, namely Kshatriya-hood. It was thus that from 
the original Brahman were created stIch heavenly 
deities as Indra, Varu
a, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, 
Yama, Mptyu and Isa. These constitute the warrior 

caste in the heavenly kingdom. Furthermore, after 
having created even Kshatriya-hood, Brahman did 
not fare well; and therefore it created Vaisya-hood 
in the heave
ly kingdom, namely the Vasus, th
Rudras, the Adityas, the Maruts and the Visvedevas. 
But even then it thought it was deficient, and there- 
fore, it created the 5tidra order, represented in the 
heavenly kingdom by the god Pfishan. In order 
to give itself completeness, again, Brahman created 
Dharma or Law, which probably binds all these castes 
together. Finally, Brahman assumed the form of Agni 
who was the Brahmin of the gods, and then we are 
told that the castes on the earth were created after 
the pattern of the castes in the heaven (5. 14). In 
this unorthodox theory, we have the origin of the 
earthly caste system on the pattern of a heavenly 
oaste system almost in the manner in which the 
ectypes in Plato's theory of Ideas are merely replicas 
of the archetypes. Then, again, as regards the exis- 
tence of Asramas at the time of the Upanishads, we 
learn from the Taittirlya Upanishad that those of the 
student and the householder did definitely exist 
(S.lS- a) ; while we have to conclude from other passages 
where one is advised It to leave the world as soon as 
one becomes weary of it " that the order of the reclu- 
ses did also exist; and finally, from such Upanishads 
as the MUJ).Qaka as well as the mention of Sarhnyasa 
elsewhere, that the order of the Sarhnyasins came last 
and was the completion of the three previously 
mentioned. In the Cllhandogya we have all the four 
orders enumerated deliberately. The householders are 
advised to give themselves up to sacrifice, study and 
charity; the recluses to penance; and the students to 
a life of celibacy with the master and extreme emaci- 
ation in his service. All these verily reach the holy 
wor]ds after death; but :we are told that he alone who 




lives in Brahman, referring probably to the life of 
the Samnyasin, attains to immortality (5. 15. b). 
When we rearrange these orders, we find that the 
foundations of the future Asrama system are already 
to be found firmly laid even in such an old Upanishad 
like the. Chhandogya. So far about castes and orders 
at the time of the Old Upanishads. 
(ii) Now about the position of women in society in 
the Upanishadic times. In the Upanishads, we meet 
with three chief different types of women: KatyayanI, 
the woman of the world, who is only once mentioned 
in the BrihadaraJ.lyaka ; MaitreyI, the type of a spiri- 
tual woman, a fit consort to the philosopher Yajiia" 
valkya; and GargI, the Upanishadic suffragette, who, 
fully equipped in the art of intellectual warfare, dares 
to wrangle with Yajfi.avalkya even at the court af 
King J an aka where a number of great philosophers 
are assembled, and declares tl.1at she would send two 
missiles against her adversary, Yijiiavalkya, and that 
if he succeeds in shielding himself against those mis- 
siles, he may certainly be declared to be the greatest 
of the philosophers that had assembled. Bold and 
sturdy, she presses Yajiiavalkya to a regressus ad infi- 
nitum, and had not Yajfiavalkya checked her impu- 
dence by an appeal to the argumentum ad caput, 
she would have succeeded in nonplussing Yajfia- 
valkya. But, even though she was to all appearances 
vanquished, she appears again a second time with 
two more moderate questions, and elicits from Yajfia- 
valkya his doctrine of dynamic immanence (5. 16). 
(iii) As regards the relations of the Brahmins and 
the Kshatriyas, the Brihadaral.1yaka declares that a 
Brahmin ought to take his seat below a Kshatriya at 
the Rajasfiya sacrifice, thus giving him the honour that 
he deserves. On the other hand, the Kshatriya must 
remember that because Kshatrahood has been born 

from Brahminhood, tllerefore,. even though he may 
attain to the highest state, he must rest upon t11e 
Brahmin as his source, that is, must live under the 
control.and guidance of the Brahmins (5. 17.
 a). In 
the Chhindogya we are told by Jaivali that A ruJ.1i was 
the first man in the Brallmin circle to receive spiritual 
wisdom, and that therefore it . was the Kshatriya caste 
that reigned supreme (5. I7. b)
 In the Brihad ar a1.1- 
yaka, we are told that it was only when Arut;\i, went 
with the desire of living like a pupil to Jaivali, 
whom he r
garded as superior to himself, that Jaivali 
could be prevailed upon to impart to him his spiritual 
wisdom (5. 17. c); and yet again in the Kaushltaki 
King Chitra GirgyayaJ;l.i complimented A ruJ;li who had 
gone to him, fuel in hand, upon having approached 
him in an humble manner and therefore having been 
really worthy- of Brahminhood, whereupon he proceeds 
to instruct him in spiritual knowledge (5. 17. d). All 
these passages indicate both the earthly and the spiri- 
tual supremacy of Kshatriyahood to Brahminhood. 
On the other hand, in certain passages as in the Bri- 
yaka and Kaushltaki, where Gargya, the proud 
Brahmin, had gone to King Ajatasatru to learn wis- 
dom, we read that Ajatasatr1.1 told 11im that it was 
against the U usual practice " that a Kshatriya should 
instruct a Brahmin in spirituality, but that Ajatasatrn 
in .the course of his cOllversatio11 with Gargya felt his 
superiority so much that he could not be prevented 
from imparting his higher wisdom to Gargya, when, 
fuel in hand, the latter approached him in an hum- 
ble manner (5. 18). It vlould seem from the above 
passage that the Brahmins \vere usually superior to 
Kshatriyas in spiritual l{nowledge, but that occasion- 
ally a Kshatriya might be superior to a Brahmin in that 
respect. Finally, in certain passages from the Upa- 
nishads, especially in. the Bphadaral}.yaka and the 

i.21 ] 

- CH


Maitri, we find that certain Brahmin sages stood very 
much superior to Kshatriya kings, who learnt wisdom 
from their Brahmin masters. II Here, 0 Yajfiavalkya, 
is my kingdom," said King J anaka when he stood 
astonished at the great intellectual and spiritual wis- 
dom of the Sage, "and here am I at your service " 
(S. 19. a). In the Maitri Upanishad we read that 
Kil1g Bphadratha, filled with repentance 
and remorse, went to the Sage Sikayanya, and 
implored him to help him out of the world of existence, 
as one would help out a frog from a waterless well 
(5. 19. b). From these passages, it would seem that 
the Brahmins did very often maintain their intellec- 
tual and spiritual superiority. It must be remember- 
ed, however, that occasionally a Kshatriya, and occa- 
sionally a Brahmin, would be the - intellectual and 
spiritual head of his age according to his abilities and 
powers, and that no charter was given either to Brah- 
min-hood or Kashatriya-hood that it alone should be 
the repository of intellectual and spiritual wisdom, 
and that, therefore, it would be ridiculous to argue, on 
. the one hand, that the Brahmins alone, or on the 
other, that the Kshatriyas alone, were the custodians 
of spiritual culture, and thus, as in modern times, even 
a man belonging to the lowest order of society could, 
. i
 he possessed the necessary ab
lity and me
s, be in 
.. the vanguard of those who knew. 
,2J. It is only in the fitness of things t
t we sh

'Tbe Problema of close this int.r
ctory chap
Upanisbad!c pbllo.. with a . statement of the chief pro- 
sophy. . blemsthat emerge out of a con- 
sideration of the 40ctIines 'of the Upanishadic philo- 
. saphers, -as. welL as. e

.tion., Wpn- 

 der ,. as_Plato said,. was the. root of philQ
phy in - Gre
'. , . . .... . . . . -" . . . . .. - .... 
 . . 
. as in -

c v,P

ers, we: 

cea$8d to. unders
and..tbe forces of -< 
ature as 

certain heavenly deities before whom they had to bow 
down their heads in unconscious awe. From the 

igveda to the Upanishads we find the same transi- 
tion as we find in the History of Greek Philosophy 
from Homer and Hesiod to Thales and Anaximander. 
Natural forces cease to be personified, and a definite 
attitude comes to be taken which is worthy only of 
speculative thinkers. U What is that," asked the 
Upanishadic philosophers, II which being known, every- 
thing else becomes known" (5. 20)? In short, they 
wanted to know the It arche" of knowledge. They 
first tried to find this in the cosmological sphere; but 
having failed to find it therein, they began to search 
after it in the psychological domain. What is it, they 
asked, which persists when the body is dead? What 
is it, again, which lives and persistently creates, even 
though the body may go into a state of sleep (S. 21) ? 
Not without reason did Yajiiavalkya stand victorious 
in the intellectual are11a in Janaka's court when he 
appealed to the transmundane problem of the persis- 
tence of the Self after death. What is the real root, 
he asked, from which the tree of life springs again 
and again, even though knocked and cut down by 
that Dark Cutter, Death (5. 22)? We may well 
imagine how Janaka, who saw in the elephant, on 
which he was riding, a former sage, namely BuQila, 
must have been regarded as a very wise man of the 
day (5. 23). Eschatological knowledge was regarded 
as the most precious of all. But even then, the desire 
of man to know the Ultimate could not be finally 
quenched. He must know the answer to the most 
central problem-What is the Real, What is the 
Atman, What intellectual construction could he make 
about it? An a.ttempt to solve this problem would 
lead the Upanishadic philosopher into the very heart 
of metaphysics, and when a certain intenectual solu- 




tion was arrived at, the next problem would be how 
practically to attain to that knowledge, what should 
be the norm of conduct following which one may hope 
to It appropriate the God-head." As the culmination 
of this practical endeavour \vould come in the mystical 
attitude, which would complete the moral endeavour, 
which, without it, wotlld be like the Hamlet with 
Hamlet out. Mysticisn1 was the culmination' of Upa- 
nisl1adic philosophy, as it is the culmination of a]l 
philosophies, and one who does not understand that 
the cosmology and the psychology, the metaphysics 
and the ethics of the Upanishads are merely a propae- 
deutic to t11eir mystical doctrine can scarcely be 
said to have understood the spirit of Upanishadic 

I (a) 8




r 9((((Ifir I a,;:qt.
" fi:rq(j 

tr 'f: 
 II -i. I. 2. I. 
q- r at

nt if! 
q. 11«1- 

) qsfi1;t
vrq l+t.<i( 

J;f': m 
T: tf
lTm;r,: I p;q.. 
man: qftq


,;r,: qt.rl
,: II i1N" 
 ill\1T etdif(;r, CJtt 
(Jrqi {(qfi1"",f;(f ilml: I 



i CftR1:;

;& sr
: I ;f''''

 (T,,<R crT fir
i8 II 8'f:wi 

11"f:l1 jqi9t 

: I 

 ftmt,: !(qn?cr 


 IJRI-nm II 
i. I. 2. 7-11. 

 (a) $(IUlrq 
11:' I Qql;:ntt° I 
O I 
1if11.I0 I 
'" q 



qqnt I... I q

lIm it<i S(
a 1(1:('
( tT.a
" fttiI'
()Rr , 

RR1vfit ..,
,q)fqti !1
T(IIfir t'l1

I vi. V. 19- 2 4. 
(b) I1tn5: '3iq
;t !f1(I


 mtdt " tn'«StT

)ra RTui a
I c(1
: snfUrRf if 8T

 tt1161(8 111'; 
8 OfTIa1\11iA'fl 


 q qr it;
T 8ITla

" '{1i 
: I 

,. II. 5. 



q f;r:Jaft;t(l
T lI\i'1't: 

ra d8


ui Tel'll '3qfiiq
s Q'.u
r;r rfir 81

(f1f;r t=r
i1'Ut (;r:JaR:ralfit' , 
ill II. 4. 10. 
4 (a) aq-:

'1IJ If" t{ "(I"JCI(t
SQ "'m
: qui m!i" sinrrer {=I


\i'J{ u 
. ,a.. VI. 21. 
(b) q 'l\1

'" I 'fftffi: 'iU PRft'l I \!\
qftlit 'I'1

 . I !(f1fui 
If , 

\1T 81'iaT
((: I 

. I. 10. 
5 (a) Uituqr I rl8 g
" timor, it If" 

 n t.10. 


, U8 

(b) II:
"tt <ribf{=r "11: t


 in"q) ff(
q: I ut. VI. 4. 5. 
8T ('l'I:) S'6m'«l 
 I( 81RII' \i11
itrRr I 

 1...19 aqy ql-ett h &TIm ", 

 SW'J) q,f'( 
 I '[. I. 2. 4-5. 
. fq...Jt &P





r (f
 q.mQr if .. 
8': It 
"'. I. 3- I. 
iU '!

r;t 'I" q

ta ,

: rq.


t. III. I. I. 

wri 'lit: nfr: '(\WIIPri 
q{: I 

t{lI ruitS

",);:q: II 
i(8ft" dt
': I 

fVr I 
A at
) q"

m 8mllr I (

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q: I RTOIt 

m;r: I 
q: wfs( 
 (q'F I d 

m I 11:"- 

q i1( 

 .tll qf;t qr 

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I tie 1.7. 

 1(" 'ti
, q: 
: mt;: !
tt: q

"'. ,. I. 4. 17. 
9 (a) 

rfi1: I 

t'a( II 
,.. I. 4. 
 mt ir. 4t r"",=,i 


m ir:;q: 
qf q.T

i qraqClmim: II 
,a-. I. 5. 
10 (a) 


iUI ; 

ttCfr . 
qRI.-ri it 
;fi(tftf I da

 r.. ..A 
 r.. --::a. ' 
4lietl<l .
11I(ll tql-et
 a I ... .
tlt ...'qfl q'll
'€t '



8 i(q
 I ....
ra '1111 R

 I ute VI. 8. r-3, 
 '" ri 


ir" r

 ' Il. II. 5. 18. 
(c) "'1m:: st
, 11m 1t

TlJ 1...\!
lit {I:(ft'1T 
 , ...R"

nn'" fiRt

,. 9- 11 . 

I I 81'1 \;i qpff Ellwetln


qr(i .. ittt.. 

r q 81mTII siRrriftr 
'fPtr ",Ifffir I 
giT(fR sTt

citq qI'fffir I tf;

 eitmu ir8t- 

 'IT'fffir I 


rfffir I 


 wnrllJ mTi-ftr .I{
 ",aftfa I 'h
q .

(J''$r stRrt&I irmHfa ;f
qrq .,11f1ftf I 'fi1
q ....CJ) 'EI atr(ffB sffinwm- 

 qm'ffil , 


 ,,(;q!(0T'fiT ITTaTii sireralfa 
tTrdft I 


r'6T iRTa1R ir((1"

,1fff8 , "'

 Iit"T'" simr- 
 qn'fr mftrRI
m a 
\1\ if.A


rnwstl\f1ftf8 8m ( 
'111ft ;r'.

<111 I --!. III. 6. I. 
12 (a) 
 'IT 8TI



: !'1T: I 
 it srt.n 




8I1l8r 8t ,q
1 'IT 
 58.: 1...8Iq "S


 (IT Q6' 811q: I... 



: {:ItmPi.t'l 
a: 9t

 (II i1.m 
: ,...,,



) q;n


 (11 Qm 81N: I... iTV irs

 , u;'1
- q;rnl'il!Jlll 
m. !

, 8tJq': I... VI" (J(I 
 hI_m ill

1J 'tiT
: I if' aw If fiI
R ..

 {'Itff;r m ftl
,f\1N Qlilf8 I 
" ( 'II ,,
Rr {=I 'f;ft 1lf: 
q "'-f I m. III. I-II. 
q '" 

 Sltnr{:R rnfiT 


 'IT et
ilileir ITiifr 


 "'T a1

ir qJffl fIIq'l1 


't:lT J:lTeT 5ft8q: 

T {fa 

_ CfT Vf

leir qrifr 
SFQr 'tV: 
: q!iit'+-q: 

"' S;qf: I 
Il. III. 8. 9. 
(c) 't'1 q

J( "'It!

* ,,




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iRtr.mI'EI-u: fin 8


. _ · qlJ''I 

Q "''Jr
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f.f m

ftrcft at.
l'ta \!i{r'IfRs qT!a1 'lq'.

'!+r' t'r


f (R{

ra- I 
m. VIII. I. 1-3. 
(d) q) 
....q,.. '1T

i:fU1)Rr ifpq- 

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cr '1

mt9 \!q
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Ul8: 6 "


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mT '{a11CtTmT 
(lTq f(t{I 
tJt(t wnit. 

 crT q:q 
n 3I;:cn;y t(ei' 



¥I1rftr II ut. VII. 23-25. 
13 (a) 
erTer q.,.: I 

 1...1 8f
 qrfir 'lS

 qifq: 1...1 "" qpq

Tftflt_""'Ur <t'8tlt 


 it ;r 

1I,,;r ;r 
Mtnt , 
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a 8Nft- 

U ritlTa 
 q a:
 q'f I 
ut. III. 16. 
 \(.c) : 
: '
: I tmI;f": 
A1r I .,,)
: Sf Taft ;r fq1(<fT 

(f mr I 
m. VI. 7. I. 
14 qr 'IT 
qq (I
1f'"l1 (I
'!n "* 
 f(1.,.,{\A Q1 


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: itUPr tf8 . 
 h ar
!{1' 811
': Rr"
,: II
{fit I 9 h oq
 d\t "d'tt
 (f '{'TOt, {'t " 
'1"" {Q -W ri 
 ' ,,'" Rn11nl t1



 _t..orr q
, 'ttq;r 

: , 
it. I. 4, II-IS. 
15 (a) 
...i1T'11,"'q firq'lll- 

U(tit: , tt. I. II. I. 
(b) "q) d
1irI'itRr sr'-1
:, (N 

, .-''il Ncr.

a..'(" 11f- 

 I ri tdr 

QS) "" 
, qr- 
th ,"S'ia(

 I ut. II. 23. I. 
16 q,-" 
q) 1:(1 ,
 'It '!a

\N q \1s
-.r 'tf1llcrFO' 
qtfa,,' t
8 ii
' ri1


fti NT _'
Qj S1"..qt !lqP{
'-lj tb fr i1,m- I 
fl. III. 8. 2. 
17 (a) 
1 d
: "




._ a
TUufq ..,"', 

f q
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1. When Sir Henry Maine said that except the 
_Search after the blind forces of nature nothing 
Substratum. moves in this world \vhich is not 
Greek in its origin, he should have at 1east exclllded 
.from the scope of his assertion the Upanishadic philo- 
sophy, and more particularly, the Upanishadic cosmo- 
gony. The hey-day of Upanishadic philosophy \\i
that great millenium before ever the earliest Greek 
philosophers, Thales and Anaximander, began to specu- 
late, and as in Greek philosophy, so in Upanishadic 
philosophy, the primary impulse to thought came from 
cosmologic, and more particularly from cosmogonic, 
speculation. The starry heavens above, the regula- 
rities of the moving seasons, the roariDg of wind in the 
firmament, the conflagrations of the a11-powerful fire, 
the periodical inundations of waters, in general, the 
settled recurrence of all happenings in nature, must have 
filled the natural inquirer with an impulse to find out 
the real meaning of all these phenomena; and it is no 
wonder that as in Greek philosophy, so in Upanishadic 
philosophy, the primary search was after the qU<TI
of things. What is that which abides in the midst 
of changes? What is that, which as the Upanishad- 
puts it, may be called the tI Tajjal8n"? What is that 
from which all things spring, into which they are re- 
solved, and in which they Jive and have their being? 
(5. I. a) ? From the Taittiri
;opani5had \\"e ]€31n 1t!at 
"that alone migl1t be regarded as the l1]1imate 

'7 4 S
Reality of things, from whicll all these beings were 
born, by which they live when bon1, to which they 
repair and into which they are finally resolved II 
(S. I. b). 1'his is very muc11 like tIle \vay ill which 
Aristotle tells us the early Greek cosmologists con- 
ceived of their primary substance: f
p tUTU) 
, " , 'c ... r\' , ('I l)' "\. r" 

, 1(00t fit OU "YlYVETrx.t 7rpW'TOV I(O« ftS' 0 rpUEtp£70(L 7£I\EV'To<L()II.... 
'" "'"" .. r. JI Th 
'1"0117'0 trTOlXflOV I(O(L TO<VTrjV rxpxr;1J rpO«(TlV fLJIO(L TWIJ aVTWIl. en 
again, when the Sage of the Sveta,svataropanishad 
asks in wonder at the very beginning of his trea- 
tise, U From wllom are we born, in whom do \\7e live 
and have our being ?" (S. I. c), we are put in mind of 
a similar remark of Hesiod at the oIJening of his 
U Theogony JJ when he asks "Who made all tllis, and 
how did he make them?". 'fIle search after tIle 
ultimate cause of things, the substratum, the qA.'Ui
things, is as characteristic of the early Upanishadic 
cosmogony, as it is of the later Greek cosmogony; 
and even though, as we may see in the sequel of 
this chapter, there is no justification for saying that 
Greek cosmogony was derived from the U panishadic, 
still on account of the universally acknowledged, and 
definitely proved, priority of the Upanishadic spe- 
culation, he must be a bold man indeed who dares to 
say that all things except the blind forces of nature 
have come from Greece! 
2. Coming to the details of Upanishadic cosmo- 
ProAress of the gony, even though it may not be 
ClJapter. impossible for us to trace the pro- 
bable historical evolution of the different theories held 
on the subject of the genesis of the universe by the 
Upanishadic seers, based upon a more or less final 
chronological stratification of the different passages 
in the Upanishads,-a task which has been attempted 
by us elsewhere,-the necessities of methodology require 
that in a work like the present which professedly 





takes a synoptic view of the problems of Upanishadic 
thought, we should re-arrange the theories in such a 
way as to enable us to institute a comparison between 
those theories and the theories held on the subject in 
a country like Greece.We may thus at once proceed 
to divide the theories of Upanishadic cosmogony into 
two main groups: the irnpersonalistic and the person- 
alistic. Among the impersonalistic theories may be 
included the theories which regard either or all of the 
elements as the substratum of things, or eVel} suell 
abstract conceptions as not-Being, or Being, or Life-force 
as lying at the root of all things whatsoever. Among 
the personalistic theories are theories which try to ac- 
count for the origin of creation from the A tman or 
God, and insist in various ways either on the 
dualistic aspect of creation, or the emanatory, or even 
the higWy philosophic aspect implied in Theism proper. 
When the Upanishadic Sages regard the elements as 
the source of things, we mllst take them to mean 
what tlley say, and not, as certain later com- 
mentators under the spell of their theological idea have 
done, regard those elements as equivalent to deities. 
Thus for example, when it is said that either fire or 
water or air is the source of things, we have to under- 
stand tIle Upanishadic sages to imply that it is the 
elements that go by those names that are to be re- 
garded as responsible for the unfoldrnent of creation. 
All theological commentators on the Upanishads 
such as SaDkara and R8manuja have understood 
these elements as meaning deities and not the ele- 
ments proper. But if we just consider for a while the 
naivete with which the theories were ushered into 
being, it may seem impossible for us to doubt that the 
Upanishadic seers meant by the elements the elements 
proper I and not the deities corresponding to those ele- 
ments. It is true that the word II divinity" iS I on certain 



[fi 2 

occasions, used in the case of these elements, but it 
must be remembered that a similar word efO
used in the case of their elemental substrata even by 
Greek philosophers, and it is not without re
on that 
Aristophanes should call such apotheosisers of ele- 
ments by the name of :'8Eol. Then again, the idea 
of creation ex 1
ihilo seems to be generally repugnant 
t.P the Upanishadic mind, and as in Greece, so in India 
we llave the firm belief of the Upanishadic sages in the 
impossibility of the generation of anything from out of 
Nothingness, or Not-13eing. When, again, it seems to 
have been felt impossible by the Upanishadic seers 
that either the elements, or such abstract conceptions 
as Not-Being or Being could be held responsible 
for the explanation of creation, they felt the neces- 
sity of explaining that genesis from Life-force or 
Cosmic-force. Finally, when even this could not be 
regarded as a sufficient explanation of creation, they 
were obliged to take recourse to the idea of the Person, 
by whom the creation could be said to have been 
brought into being. We Inust also note that there is 
not much room for the idea of creation in an absolu- 
tistic system of metaphysics, which "tould try to 
explain away all creation as being only an illusion or 
appearance. We shall take this aspect of the problEm 
of creation also into account before we proceed, at the 
end of the Chapter, to say what the theistic idea of 
cre.ation in the Upanishads was., especially in t11€ 
acCount given by the Svetasvataropanishad. 

3. To begin with the elements as constituting the 
Water as the cpVc,.(
 of things, we have first to 
Substratum. take into account the theory in 
the Bp.hadaraJJyakopanishad which tells us almost 
in Thalesian fashion that water was the source of all 
things whatsoever: II In the beginning
 verily, the 




Waters alone existed; from the Waters was born 
Satya or Truth; Satya produced Brahman, Brahman 
gave birth to Prajapati, and from Prajapati were born 
the gods; these gods worship Satya alone U (5. 2. a). 
In this passage we are told not that the Atman or any 
personal Being existed originally, but that the waters 
were the first to exist, and that everything later came 
from them. It is curious to note also that Brah- 
man is here declared to have been created from Satya, 
which means that we have not to understand the word 
Brahman in the sense of primal reality as we under.. 
stand it later. Tllen, again, when it is said that Satya 
was born from Water, we have to understand by 
Satya the ultimate" concrete" existent. We are also 
told that the Sat yam consists of three syllables: the 
first is Sa, the second is Ti, and the third is Yam, 
the first and the last being real, and the second unreal 
(5. 2. b). Freely interpreted, this passage would mean 
that unreality is enclosed on both sides by reality: 
the present moment which is evanescent is enclosed 
on both sides by an eternity which is real: we move 
from eternity to eternity, halting for a short while 
in the caravansary of the present; and it is wonderful 
to notice that the whole of the If Sat yam " has been 
supposed to have corne out of the primeval waters. 
This is almost Thalesian, for Thales regarded \vater as 
the origin of all things and his philosophy did not 
need the hypothesis of a God as responsible for the 
creation of Water, unlike the Genesis which required 
the spirit of God to move upon the face of the prime- 
val waters, or unlike Manu who said that water was 
only the first existence that was created by God. The 
Bphadaral:1yakopanishad, like Tha1es, regards Water 
as the origin .of all things whatsoever, dispos- 
ing of a belief in God as the creator of the Water 


4. After water comes air. Raikva, who holds the 
theory of air as the final II ab- 
sorbent " of things, and therefore 
probably as the origin of them, has an interesting story 
connected with l1im. Once upon a time, we are told, 
king Janasruti was wandering in a forest when he 
happened to overhear the conversation between two 
swans. One of these swans said to the other, just as 
all the lower throws of dice merge in the highest 
throw, that is, pass to the winner, similarly all the 
good things that people do in the world pass to the sage 
Raikva, the philosopher with the car. NO\\7 Janasruti 
was so astonished at the conversation, that he at 
once sent his attendant to inquire and return to him 
with the knowledge as to where this sage Raikva 
dwelt. The attendant, after having visited different 
places, found out Raikva who was scratching his itch 
beneath a car, and then returned to his master 
to tell him th&.t he had found out Raikva. King 
Janasruti went to Raikva with a number of cows, a 
gold necklace and a chariot drawn by a she-mule, 
and prayed to the Sage to teach him what god 
he worshipped. The sage Raikva replied that he 
had no business with the cows, the necklace and the 
chariot of the Sl1dra king, and advised him to return. 
King Janasruti returned, but went back again to the 
Sage witll the cows, the golden necklace, the chariot, 
as well as his beautiful daughter; whereupon, the sage 
Raikva seemed to be satisfied, and having lifted the 
beautiful daughter's face towards himself, said, ItVerily, 
o Sudra, you are making me speak on account of this 
face," and then he imparted to the king the knowledge 
which he possessed, namely that be believed that the 
Air was the final absorbent of all things. U When 
fire is extinguished it goes to the air, when the sun 
sets it goes to the air, when the moon sets it goes to 





the air, when the waters dry up, they go to the air: 
thus verily is Air the final absorbent of all things 
whatsoever" (s. 3). In this way did the sage Raikva 
with his car, who reminds us singularly of Diogenes 
with his tub, tell king Janasruti that Air was the 
end of all things. The logical conclusion from such 
a position is that if air be the end of all things, it 
may also be regarded as the beginning of them. In 
fact, Raikva's philo
ophy is like that of Anaximenes, 
the Greek philosopher, who taught that air was both 
the beginning and the end of all things: only Raikva 
does not say definitely that air is the rpvcrt
" but 
only leaves us with the remark that air is the end of 
all things. This is indeed a very crude conception 
and has not much scientific value, because Raikva 
does not explain the actual process of the absorption 
of all things into air, as Anaximenes later explainecl 
both the origin and the end of all things in air by the 
processes of rarefaction and condensation. We must, 
however, praise Raikva for having had the boldness to 
regard Air as the final absorbent of all things, more par- 
ticularly, of both Water and Fire, which according to 
other philosophers of his time, were regarded as con- 
stituting the cpVCTL!; of all things whatsoever. 

5. The theory of fire as the origin of all things is not 
maintained very explicitly in the 
Upanishads; but there is a passage 
ill the Kathopanishad whcih tells us that Fire, 
having entered the universe assumed all forms 
(5. 4. a), which is almost equivalent to the Heracleitean 
formu]a that Fire is exchanged for all things and 
all things for Fire. On the other hand, in the 
Chhandogyopanishad, \\7e are told that Fire was the 
first to evolve from the primeval Being, and that from 
tire came water, and from water the earth (8. 4. b). It 





is interesting to note that in this passage the Hera- 
cleitean idea of the Way Up and the Way Down is also 
brought in, inasmuch as it is maintained that from 
:fire is born water and from water earth, while, 
counter-logically, at the time of dissolution, the earth 
may be dissolved in water, the water in fire, and the fire 
in the Primeval Being. It is rather difficult for any 
philosopher to hold the opinion that fire is the origin 
of all things, inasmuch as it seems evident that :fire 
bums up all, and is therefore a fit instrument for the 
process of a general flC.7rVPfitTl
, and it is not difficult 
to deduce from the theory advanced in the Chhandogyo- 
panishad the idea of a periodic conflagration of 
things. The difference, however, between the Chhan- 
dogyopanishad and Heracleitus is that while Heracleitus 
regards Fire as the very origin of all things, the 
Chhandogyopanishad makes Fire the first evolute from 
the primeval Being; while the Chhandogyopanishad 
does not insist upon the idea of change, of which Fire 
seems to be the very type to the change-loving mind 
of the Ephesian philosopher. 

6. When we come to Pravaha
a J aivali's doctrine of 
space as the origin of all things, we 
come to a much higher conception 
than has yet been reached in the schemes of the fore- 
going philosophers. Even in Greek philosophy, the con.. 
ception of space as the ee arche" of things came very 
late in the development of thought. With Thales, Anaxi. 
menes, Heracleitus and Empedocles we meet with the 
conceptions of water, air, fire, earth, either indivi- 
dually or collectively. It is only when we come to 
tIle time of Philolaus, that, according to Aristotle's evi- 
dence, we get to tIle notion of space as the tt arche " 
of all things. Fire, air, water and earth are .more or 
less tangible; but U space" to be regarded as the 


S 1] 



" arch!" of all things requires a higher philosophical 
imagination. When Prav n.h a I} a Jaivali was asked 
what was the final habitat of all things, he answered 
it was Space. II All these beings emerge from space 
and are 'finally absorbed in space; space is verily 
greater than any of these things; space is the final 
habitat " (5.5. a). This passage from the Chhfindogyo- 
panishad is corroborated by another passage from 
the same Upanishad in which we are told that (I space 
is really higher than fire. In space are both the sun and 
the moon, the lightning and the stars. I t is by space 
that man is able to call. . . . . . In space and after space 
are all things born. Meditate upon Space as the 
highest reality" (5. 5. b). According to these passa- 
ges from th
 Chhandogyopanishad, then, we must re- 
gard space as a higher entity than any of the concep- 
tions that have" been hitherto reached. 

7. There are certain passages in the Upanisbads 
which teach that Not-Being, TO 
was the primary existent. The 
Taittirlyopanis11ad tells us that U at the beginning of all 
things what existed was Not-Being. From it was born 
Being. Being shaped itself of its own accord. It is 
thus that it is called well-made or self-made II (5. 6). 
Commentators on this passage who do not want a 
privative conception like not-Being to be the " arche" 
of all things, rightly understand this passage to signify 
that at the very beginning of things it was II as if II 
nothing existed and not that not-Being was verily 
the first concrete existent, and that it was from such 
a semblance of non-existence that Being was created. 
We could very well conceive how philosophers like 
Sai1karacharya who believe in an Ultimate Being would 
explain such a passage; but it must be remembered 
that in this agnostic coJ;1ception of a primal non... 






existent, the Taittirlyopanishad is anticipated by that 
famous 5ukta in the 
igveda, which is called after its 
opening words, the Nasadlya Sukta, which tells us 
that at tIle beginning of all things, there was neither 
Being nor not-Being, but that what existed was only 
an ocean of Night (RV. X. I29). It must be remem- 
bered that the 'conception of a primary Void or Night 
is to be met with even in Greek philosophy in the 
theory of Epimenides. A passage from the Bfiha- 
daraI.1yakopanis11ad also tells us that U in the' begin- 
ning of all things, verily nothing was existent but 
that everything was covered by Death or Hunger, for 
Hunger is verily Death. Death made up his mind, 
let me have a Self, and thus worshipping, he began to 
move. From his worship were born the waters. The 
froth of the waters solidified, and became the earth. 
Death toiled on the earth, and as a result of his toil, 
fire was produced" (5. 7). Here we have the origin 
of the clements \\rater, earth, and fire from primeval 
Not-Being, call it either Death or Hunger, or equate it, 
if you please, with the Void or Night of Greek philo- 
sophy. In any case, it seems to be implied in such 
passages that there is a stage in the development of 
human thougllt, when finding it impossible to grapple 
with any concrete existence, it is compelled to take 
recourse to' a privative logical conception like Not- 
Being, from w11ic11 even positive -Being comes to be 
later explained. Even in suc
' highly." d'ev
systen1S of philosophy as those of Plato and Aristotle, 
we have the recognition of a Not-Being, and it can- 
not be gainsaid that at least for the purposes of logic 
the existence of Not-Being has to be taken account 
of even i11 positive constructions of phi.Iosopby. 
When. 011 the other hal1d, philoso.phers like 'Gorgias try 
.to prove that there' is a real Not-Being as '.'contrast- 
ed with the Befng of Parmenides, we must sllppose 




that they are doing so merely for the purposes of 
eristic;, for by what . other name shall we call that 
process by wl1ich from the - equational fact of No.t- 
Being being Not-Being, they deduce the existence of 
Not-Being, from which, contrariwise, t11ey try to prove 
that Being does not exist ? We need not be con- 
cerned with such an eristic philosophy like that of 
Gorgias, but we must net ds take i11tO aCCotlnt the 
recognition of Not-Being in philosophies of positive 
construction like those of Plato and Aristotle. It was 
in this sense, it seems to us, that tIle passages from the 
Taittirlyopanishad and the Bril1adaraI))7akopanishad 
are to be explained, aI1d by Not-Being \\e nlust under- 
stand not absolute Not-Being but only relative Not- 
Being, tIle primal semblance of existence as contrast- 
ed \vith later concrete existence. 

8, T11cre is however, an interesting side to the 
Not-Being and tb"e Egg theory of Not-Being as the. uarche" 
of tbe Universe. of all things. TIle Chhandogyopani- 
shad connects the philosopllyof Not-Being with the 
myth of the Universal Egg. We are told in the 
Upanishad that "what existed in the beginning was 
Not..Being. It then converted itself into Being. It 
grew and became a vast egg. It lay in tllat position 
for the period of a year, and then it broke open. Its 
two parts were, one of gold and the other of 
silver. The silvery part became the earth, and the 
golden part became the heaven. The thick membrane 
of the egg became the mountains; the thin membrane 
became the clouds; the arteries of the egg became 
the rivers of the world; the fluid in its interior 
became the ocea11 ; while what came out of the egg 
was the Sun. When the Sun was born, shouts of 
hurral1 arose" (5. 8). Readers of comparative 
mythology need scarcely be reminded as to how 



[S 8 

similar the myth fronl the Chh
ndogyopaDishad is 
to conesponding my1hs in Babylonian, Egyptian, 
PhC2nician, Persian, and Greek mythologies. In Greece, 
we know, how in the Orphic cosmogony J Cbronos 
and Adra.stea producrd a gigantic egg which divicled 
in the midst, and with its upper haJf formed the sky, 
and \\ith the ]o".er the fartb, and :hew out of the 
egg came Phanes, the shining God, containing.. within 
bimse1f the germs of a11 the other gods. It is interest- 
-ing to note that behind Cllronos and Adrastea
 as we 
have them in this myth, are ideas of time and neces
ity respectively. The \vord A&p.:ctTTflOf. occurs in Greek 
literature so far back as the 8th century B.C. ; 
and it is customary to deri\ye it from &a&p:.cnc.> and 
take it as signifying "that which is not inclined to 
run away." May we venture to make a suggestion 
that the word Adrastea seems very much to be the 
Greek counterpart of the Sanskrit "Adpshta" which 
also signifies necessity? One does not know how, but it 
seems probable that, the idea of Adpshta ,vas conveyed 
to the Greek people at a time when the Greek and 
the Indian Aryans lived together. To return to our 
argument, however, the myth of the Sun coming out 
of the egg has parallels in the mythologies of many 
ancient peoples; but the creation of this egg from a 
primeval Non-existent seems to be peculiar to the 
Indian myth as we have it in the Chhandogyopa- 
nishad. We must notice also tllat just as the universe 
was regarded by the Upanishadic sages as a huge egg, 
similarly it also came to be regarded as .. a huge chest 
with the earth as its bottom and the }leavens as its 
upper lid, the sky as its inside and the quarters as 
its corners, containing in its inside a rich treasure" 
(5. 9). We are noting here this alternative concelJ- 
tion of the universe regarded as a huge cubical chest 
merely for the purpose of contrasting it with the 




universe regarded as a great spherical egg, though it 
has got nothing to do with the philosophy of Not. 

9. After the conception of Not-Being as the "arch
of things we come to the con- 
ception of Being. A passage from 
the Chhlndogyopanishad tells us directly that Being 
alone existed at the beginning of things. It takes 
to task those who suppose that the primeval Existent 
must be regarded as Not-Being, and that Being 
mtlst be regarded as having been produced therefrom. 
II How could it possibly be so," asks the Upanishad, 
" how could Being come Ollt of Not-Being, existence 
from non-existence? It is necessary for us to suppose 
that at the beginning verily all this was Being, and 
it was alone and without a second. This Primeval 
Being reflected, let me be many, let me produce; 
having bethought thus to itself, it produced fire. Fire 
thought, let me be many, let me produce; and it pro. 
duced water. Water thought, let me be many, let me 
produce; and it produced the Earth (food or matter) I' 
(5. 10. a). " The Primeval Being then thought, 
verily I am now these three deities. Let me enter 
into them by my Self, and unfold both Name and 
Form. Let me make each of them three-fold and 
three-fold II (5. 10. b). II It thus comes about that 
what we call the red colour in a flame belongs really 
to fire. Its white colour is that of water and its black 
COlO\lr belongs to the earth. Thus does vanish the 
flame-ness of a flame. The flame is indeed only a 
word, a modification and a name, while what really 
exists is the three colours. What we call the red 
colour in the Sun, is really the colour of fire, its white 
colour is the colour of water, its black colour is the 
colour of the earth. Thus verily vanishes the sun- 





ness of the Sun. The Sun is only a word, a modifica- 
tion and. a name. What really exists is the three 
colours. Thus likewise does depart the moon-ness of 
the moon, and t]le lightning-ness of the lightning. What 
really exists is the three colours only H (5. 10. c). It 
is interesting to note in these passages, in the first 
place, that the prilneval existent is regarded as Being, 
and is described as being one without a second. In 
. the second place, we see how from tllis primeval 
Being is produced the three-fold Prakpti which we 
might call It tejobannatmika n Prakpti, that is con- 
sisting of fire, \vater, and earth. Then, thirdly, it 
must be noted that the Chhandogyopanishad teaches 
us definitely the doctrine of cc trivfitkaraQa" which 
is the Upanishadic prototype of t.he (, paiichikaraQa " 
of later Vedanta. Just as in the Vedantic theory of 
pafichik ara1) a , Ollt of the five origil1al elements, fire, 
air, ,vater, eartll, and space, llalf of each element was 
regarded as being kept intact, wl1ile t11e other half 
was regarded as being divided into four equal differ- 
ent parts, fOllr such parts from the different elements 
one after another gOillg to mal{e up a balf, which 
in combination with the half of the original element 
made up one tral1sformed evolute of the original 
element, sin1ilarly, in the case of the Upanishadic trivpt- 
kara1}.a each of the three original elements namely 
fire, water and earth is to be regarded as being divided 
into two equal portions, one half being kept intact, 
while tIle otller half is di'1ided into two equal portions, 
the t\VO quarters of the two other elements in combi- 
nation \vith the one-half of the original element 
making up a transfolmed evolute of the original ele- 
ment. This idea of the mixture of the elements in 
the Upanishads is a very interesting one from the 
point of view of its analogy with a similar idea in 
the philosophy of Anaxagoras who taught that there 




was a portion of everything in everything, and thus 
that the elements came to be mixed with each other 
and gave rise to transformed products. Then, fourthly, 
we must remember that the Chhandogyopanisl1ad tells 
us that there are three different colours belonging to 
the three different_elements namel)' the red, the white 
and the black, which it must be noted were 
later borrowed b)T the Sarilkllya p11ilosophy and made 
to constitute the tl1ree different colours corresponding 
to the three different qualities of the Sa:ri1khya Pra- 
kpti. Finally, the Chhandogyopanishad tells us that 
what really exists is the three different colours, or the 
three different elements, while all such objects of 
nature as, tIle sun, the moon, and the lightning, which 
aTe constituted out of t11e three origina
or colours are merely words or names or modi- 
ficatory appearances of the original elements. In the 
spirit of an extreme nominalism, the Chhandogyo- 
panishad tries to reduce all later products to mere 
semblance or appearance, while it keeps the door open 
for the real existence of the three elements alone, all 
of them having been born from the Primeval Being- 
a sort of a philosophical trinitarian monisnl ! 
10. When we come to the conception of PraJ}.a as 
 of things, we rise to 
a higher conception than was 
ached in Greek p11ilosophy. PraQa originally meant 
ath; al1d as breath seemed to constitute the life 
of man, 'Pral).a came to signify the life-principle; and 
just as the life-principle in man came to be called 
a, similarly the life-principle in the universe came 
also to be designated Pra
a. By PraQa is thus 
ineant either life-force or cosmic-force. When Ushasti 
'Chakraya:I}.a \vas asked in the C11handogyopanishad 
'what" might be 'regarded as the ultimate substratunl of 
all things, he said it was Pra
a : for II verily it is into 





PrAt}a that all these beings enter and it is from Prl1}a 
that they originally spring" (5. II. a). Of the same 
import is the doctrine of Raikva in the Chhando- 
gyopanishad when lIe tries to bring out a correspond- 
ence between the macrocosm and the microcosm, and 
when he says that just as air is tIle life-principle of 
the tlniverse-a theory which we have already noticed- 
similarly breath. is the life-principle in man. .1 PriJJ.a 
is .verily the final absorbent; for when man sleeps, his 
speech is reduced into Pra
aJ his eye and his ear 
and his mind are all absorbed in Prana. It is Prana 
'. . 
which is the final absorbent of all these things" 
 II. b). " We may thus say," says Raikva, II that 
there are these two absorbents; one in the macrocosm 
and the other in the microcosm, the one being Air, 
and the other being PriJJ.a" (S. II. c). Having re- 
cognised this supremacy of PraQa, the Chhandogyo- 
panishad, in the doctrine which Sanatkumara imparts 
to Nirada, has no difficulty in maintaining that, II just 
as all the spokes of a. wheel are centred in its navel, 
similarly all these beings, and in fact, everything that 
exists is centred in PraJJ.a" (5. 12. a). Pr 
 a may 
thus be regarded as the very navel of existence. The 
philosopher Kaushitaki tells us that It P r
 a is the 
ultimate Reality, the mnId being its messenger, the 
eye the protector, the ear the informant, and the 
speech the tire-woman. To this PriJ}a as the Ultimate 
Reality, all these beings make offerings, without Prl\1a 
having ever sought them" (5. 12. b). We thus see in a 
general way how Pr
a comes to be recognised as supe- 
rior to all the organs of sense in the human system. 
11. There are, however, one or two classical pas- 
Tile Controversy bet- sag
 in the Upanishads which tell 
w.... Praaa and tbe US m the language of myth the 
Or... of 8eDH. f P - It 
supremacy 0 fat}a. was once 
· reeolved. we are told in the Cbhi.ndogyopanisbad, by 

! ".1 

Cot_ eon 


die 1taS es. of man to decide which of 
. was. 
supreme, and for t11at reason they went to ffa. 
jipati, their Creator. The Creator" replied that tll- 
geIJlt! nd.ght be regarded as the soverign of tltem Ill, 
 after deputing leaves' the- body 

ia a. pitiabie condition, upon which the senses r_ged 
tg tan the race for supremacy. Speed1. 
 tbe ftrst. 
to' P GUt of the body
 and having: lit1ed oatside _ . 
year, came b
k' and wondered how the body could 
exist in spite of its, absence. It was told that tIler body 
lived like a dumb man not speaking, but breathiDg 
with the breath, seei11g with the eye, hearing with t
ear. and thinking with the mind, upon which speech 
returned. Then the organ of vision departed. and 
havu1g lived outside for a year, came back and won
how the body could live. in spite of. its absen
.. It 
\ftS. told that the body lived like. a blind mall. not 
seeing, but breathing with t11& breath, speaking with 
the moutlJ , hearing with the ear, and thiDldng with 
the mi"d, upon which the eye. r
ered. tJw1. 
the organ of audition departed, and ba.ving lived 0ut- 
side for a year, came back and wondered how tha bo4y 
could still exist in spite of its absence. It was told 
thai the body lived like a deaf man not hearing, but 
brea..thing with the breath, speaking with the moutl1. 
seeing with the eye, and thinking with the snisd, 
upm wbich the ear returned. then the lI'iad 
at, and aviDslived outside for 
 ycar t ret\UIItG aM 
WUZldeted how the body could still eaiat in &pita oi ita 
abseDce. It wu told that the b
y lived like a cIdW,". 
witI&ont mind, but breathing with the breatht s
ing'. with the mouth, seeing with the eye, and heasiaf 
with the ear, up"on which the mind re-enteted9 TheD, 
fulaUy, when the breath was on t.he point of. depal:t.- 
in(; it tore up the other S eDieS as a we)l4>
d. 00* .. 
miIbt t.r 1Ip. the ,ep to which. it. i, tethwod. thfa. 



ll.:11 : 

the.: organ
. of. sense' assembled together and said 
Pfiipt, '.;Sir, thou art our lord 
 depart not from 
and 1he tongue.
aid to. tIle Pr a:J5a , , if I aIt1 richest,.it is. 
t.11bu. tllat' "H.1
t richest 
.; aJ1d .tll
" 'cye :said;' c'.if: 1- 
ain..the 5Uppo

, -
. really thou' t
W:t '.art'..the- 'St1ppQrt.

ear :said; ',!
 if.l.ail}" wealth.) -if is'. really'.fhou,
, . 
,)vealth-':;"" and ..the mind -sai'c1.l" . ( if'.' I -. am' {he -:fina
" . 

,-}t.:is reaii}T :Jhou ".,thai a::t:'t 
 fIle'" final abode:.'';' 
It.: 'is
.. fC!ir 
reaso.ri ,that'. people. 11ave' 'dec]ar.ed, ;the- 
acy "not of tne 'organs
 of se11se
"of -the spee
11,: or -the 
or.the'ear) .or tile mind, bui. 01 breatl1. . For. the. 
breatli is verily all t11cse:' (S. 13. a). T11is passage' in 
111andogyopaJlisllad is probabl
y the earliest anc1 
the' most classical as'illustraiiDg" tIle contro'gersy, .be- 
en tIlc orgalls 01 sellse Ci11d l
raIfa, .a11(1 tlie rCbul
sqpremacy of KlaQa O\lCr tllt
 orgallS. Witl} a li:it.k 
va:riation, tIle.. ,SaInc .story - OCCUl5 ill tIle Ka.usllitaki- 
Up.ani a1&O (II. 14), WlliclJ, bci11g so nlu(.:ll the. 
later, .
.e arc. not m\1
ll C011CCl11CO \yitll. as .merely re:-' 
peatipg for. us tilC Stol:Y of t11c Cl} hanuogy QPal1i,s11ad:.' 
But there arc one or two pOil1t
} in the story of t}lC' 
ntroversy .of, tIle Sel1StS and 1-6rhJJ.a in tilC Pras11opa- 
niShad Wl1icll we 'cannot lEavt
 Ull110iiced. 1"'11ere,- in 
t. place, tIle clt
ments 11al11ely space, \vind, fire,; 
water, and eart11 j
in llallds \vitll the orga11s 01' sense,' 
namely, speech, mj.Ild, eye a11d ear i11 the COl1troversy 
with'.-PraQa. In the. second 'place, we. n1ust .Iiote...the 
two" similies. employed' in. tI1c'." r;ras110pal1ishad.- . The: 
body .is .tl}ere called BiQa,' wIlle,I),. as. lVlax Muller. .Js. ug ..' 
gestS, ma.y"'
ell .be taken to nieal1- a'llarp, and tlle'-ele
ment well: as the organs 'of sense contend that.-tliriy. 
UJve..the power to uphold tllis 11arp and' to moduia
 Incidentally, it is interesting to notice the descri
tion, of the. body in tIle Prasnopariisllad'as a harp,' 
w1Uch is almost'"Pythagorean or Platonic.: . 1'hen agcqn' 
f :wants. to" go 'out, it.. ij 'com.pared. 'to: tbe-" 




queen.JJee. ,\\1hrch,: 'wh'en it goes Q\1.t. is
bees.that move.aftet'jt, and which

S ',back
. is ,like\\rise followed' by the b
v . 
L "£o
thwith. .Thirdly, there is a.n .almost henotbei
-tic." \\'O,rSl1ip of Pra1;ra :by .1he o,rgans. of.
 €I\!ie :jn..

nopanishad 'A'here it is regarded,as 
the sovereign of the organs of sense, but a]Eo as the 
:soveteign of the'deittes of the univerE'e', It is....thus 
, ",.II , 
"that Pr.ana comes. t.o be ,identified with A
ni) ,,'ith 

 wit1iPar.jiiri'Yii", with'Vltyu, Wit'f\:t3


 Not-Being ;. an'o, in the' 
pirit" of fh
.. ;<?,

iJd"'llle' ChbandQgyoprt-Iiisbed, 'here a]50 the Pr

a is 
, - , ...." 't 
.requested not to m'ove" ouf
 'as it t
' .PtftJ;Ja.: wbith 
informs, a.fid'.' is '-immanent. in, fb"e: . organs' . of. -.sense, 
 as:: S:Pee
h and 
,lle'aring' 'and' Vision,. 'as
 h):.. ' . ' 

.. -. ,
2". ;., 'In the a.ccount of Pra1;la whicn. we find ,.-in .
';Pi-.aDa;. bto-psyc!\ti- . I{atJshlt
ki.' T.Tpaniwad:, th
re. ale 
"'eta p h Y $fcaJ cQnc
n- '. .' bJ f . t... · .' h 
', '.; J' certaIn notlcea e' ratuTfS"WIJ1C 
dt) rio
oocur either in tbe' Ch}iaIidog
hac1'or. the 
Pratnopanishad. · In 'the fl
t pJace, Pral]a is directly 
rith life (AYl1
). This 1'5' as' mttcb -as to 

ay ,t.b a f lif
 so' Ion g 
 as' pJ:at).a exists' arid life 

a's . soon as PraJ}a df'parts. . Then''; Pr!,
 identified with"consci'01.1sn'e
s (Prajfifi,). - It is interf'st- 
ing. to:note th
t c()nsCiou
nes's 'is here distinguished. frorft 
.tire' as' the" bi
h"er . categoijl -'of -
xiste}jce. There 
 formS. '01 ]if
' ,v!thtjut "c6n
s; bvt wb
isl constiou.st1
ss' .'...there :must.. b
: life' ;, 'and 
a:ki' Upatiish
d ::

tns, 1:"6 tectr
1se this
Rnd "'describes' .Pttt:tn nbt 'rneretf: 

s . the :prlfldp1e 
'6f .oi)n
neSs :a
l1iifdtYi o .
"'Vpan.j's.b3;d fdehtifl

", Prtl) a , 
.Aiff1 ,rtJ:fe 
i -- 



igr: aP1- 
.ti · ntJinortal, - whith
ase,.: ::'

 1'alI-OSO'II.Y tt
___ __ diminish by bad aWons (i. 14). It -1l& 
-.-_ Uout 
tbat .PrIoa is life :koJn ihe biclaP:&1 
,.. of ..." cOJ1$cioutme8S frOJn the pe,cbolasDl 
.,-t of view, and !tman ',from the . metaphyairJ\ 
1'iIftt of -Wwv. Thi5 
is verily a 'pbtlosophica1epotm.o. 
. 9f 
tl. W
 'l\ow:QOJne to -pemon a1ietic t heaW d. 
,creation. 'Hitherto we ha- .Qi.5. 
Jr" '

 theo.ries whiCh regard either 

 all of the elements. flame1y_. 
· . aJ.f, wat
r J earth and :epaGe, or fJ\Wl 
tiQnS as Not
Being or 
er .
h, or ev
 such 'an abstftlct 

1)6tI)tion as J3eing,.w finally the.highly 
loped bio-psycho-metaphysical conceptioD of Fdea.. 
as the 
cr of tl1ings. 'Ve must note that in all 
dIese theories of ttea tion, t10 creat()r \\itb a personal 
_s tat« is brought in (or the .pu rpDOeS -of 
We haye a more or less naturalistic account of COSJl¥). 
genesis. On the other hand, in the t-heories which we 

re now about to discuss, we shall ha\t'e to take 
of the personal element in creation. In the pmeno. 
panisbad we are ti)ld by Pippalida that at the begin. 
niDg of ereation, the creator became desirQus -of creat. 
ine, and, with that 
nd in view J praetised penece , 
.. after haying practised penan()r, firs
ted . 
.pair ,namely Rayi and Pr
, correspoJld
 ftftd s"irit, with the int__ of 
.ea tiltl aU existence wbat$O!'Ver frcIp them. WbJle WI 
__ g
it (e PippilMla f« 
¥iJlg t'OIIaM¥ed 
Ute ttOtioa of il. c1ua1ity of prima ry 
ten*, Rayi 
"" Flip, _est m t'he 
pirit of A.ristotle's !tkttter 
_ '-.n, * ..a
t_ wbieb Pipptllda __ 
., __ t
 ,...,. Is ..titer eJI)UIing. The __ 
_ ' -*r, . -rs, w
 the - fUll is ttirit; *" 




path .. -the .fafhers is matter, 'whUe 1be patb #1 die 
cod& ... spirit; the dark half of the month ,is 
wJUle the bright half is spirit; night is matta-, 
while day is spirit. It was in this way that the 
Creator was able to create all the dual exis tAmce what. 
SGeYer in the world (5. 15. a). In a simi1a.r spirit 
cIoes the Taittirtyopanishad tell us that Ie the Creator 
M the beginning of things practised ppn8n ce, aDd 
having practised penance, created all thiD@s that 
 , "- 
and having created them entered into them, and 
ing eJrere d int-o them, became himself both the Jft-m- 
fest and the umnanifest, the defined and the 
the m1pported and the 1D1supported, the c.' aDd 
t:Q.e unconscious, the true and the false " 
S. 15. b). 
Though the Taittirtyopanishad agrees with the 
T"Qi.. had in p,ositing a Creator who at the 
of things 
 required to practise peJ111fJee , still it 
,ciiIers from it in substituting the philosopbical dua1ity 
of the defined and the undefined, the' conseious aDd 
the unconscious, the true and the false, insteld of 
the m
.thological duality of the Pramopanishad, 
namely, the dark half of the month and the bright 
half of the month, the path of the fathers and the 
path of the gods, night and day, the moon and the 
sun, and the rest. But it is evident that in the 
two passages we ha,'e been r.onsidering, we have the 
idea of a Creator introdu
ed, which enables us to say 
that th
 passages logica1l
r mark an adva.nce 0IfIef 
the earlier ones whieh give merely an impersanalistic 
account of creation. 

14. Another explanation of the duality of existeftCe, 
.,... ."''' ' uuI tile this t
e 'Of the. duality of sex, 
..tAla or till daaIIt)' QCeurs In the Bf1hadara
or ... nishad, where we are told that 
H.t1le ltmaft a10De existed in the 

and :he.. ha:d -the ',-form of.' man 
".He. firSt :said.- tQ 
himself. I am' He, and it' ,vas. Jor this reasoll that he 
came to be called I. I t is .'for this reason also ..tliat 
when a man is as.ked, who 'he'is, hc'first repljes it .is"J, 
and then. he gives out his name... . : . . This Atman ,wa.s 
afraid; it is for th'at reason that V\;.hen a man'.is :alone, 
he fears.. Then,' "the Atman. began
' t.o ".reflect. '\Thy 
should.l .fear if thr're is nothing existing beside me,.o.f 
whfch I .Jnight .be 'a:fraid ; 'it \\7as thtlS that all, feat 'de- 
parted .from liim'
.': .'
 ..It is said 
.erily .thaJ fear pro- 
t:ettds onl)7 Jrom a 
' But the Atmcitr tould not 
i]l find satisfgction ;, for that re-aEon it is tha.t \\'11en 'a;.he'does not 'find satisfaction: Th
.tnerefore "rishea for a 
econd, . . . . 
 . and hct\'ing divided 
-himseH ..into. two halve5
 .1)fCame: both thc' '11u
ilIid 'the'" wife, .'man r15. \\'f]l as woman.' The \\' 
beA-an to reflect,. 'ho
' ha
rjng gen(-Jrated m
r from him- 

elf:,' 'he' seeks in' \\'ith me?' 'Let me, hide 
myself,', she said, 'and so she became a cow; the Atman, 
however, became a'bul1 and 11ad intercourse with l1er. 
.. . '..: . . She became a n1are, \\
11ile 11e became a horse. 
She' became. a she-ass, al1d the other became a he- 
s and l1ad intercOl1rse ,\\,ith her. It \'\'as thus' fhat 
both the male and the female 'cr{'atilres V\'ere 'created 
by the Atman tlp'to the 'Yer
;" ClTltS. .AI] th
s'e ,,,ere 
created 'by'
him JJ (5. I6).... If ffitlst be noted, 
s .we 
have pointed Ot1t above', that this pas
3f!e "gi,res us an 
e:"p1anation of. the gen
ati6n' of- th
,. '
f : sex the organic worl
,' but it yetl 
the inorganic generation entirely unexplaine<i.- 

:. : 
.' '.15;' :':A' ',\"ery::mrich..'ni.ore elabotate exPlatlatiott
:CreatJDn I 
he gc:ner
tion o!. 



. In the an.1verse -IS ..offereG m.l;tae 

 P_SOD.. _A - t ' .,. h d h . h .. JL.... 
a ;::

. ......,.. 
':. '.' "
 . n1. 
pams a ,\\Y lC "ye mlgrit 
! .Well Tegar4-::as If.givmg: u
 . the.

fu11est ,


. . .. 
, .. 
.. .. . 


...",.. ....' 
.. q .. 


the.:,J-act of. creation "in.,the .Upams11ads. .' We are .told 
there , that in tIre- beg i11nipg: 

fhe ! trow. alone ,existed, 

nd .:that. tllere .\vas 11
 otJ)er .bl

.lling ..
ever. T11c Atmal1 thought. t,o. hiItfselfJ 
e .

.; .,vl1cr
. I1f c
a1.ed. t11c. four worlds, 
}Ose'.Qf .'tJjC SUpci:
ial'region 9.r'W.
teti; the 
e'lis ,vitll tlleir'cel€stialligllts, the '11101't5.i eartli, and 
. . . .. . ., 
r'a:iieai1- reg'jf)n of \Yale
rs. · It. was thus....that 
r .. .. . 
tIle hcaveil 'aricl tIIC'- eartl1 :',verc encolnpassed ....on the 
UPI)er an
 tIle n.etl1er sides by regions of water. 

 '\vorlds. \vere' created, 1.11c Atmari pr6.
ceedeu to ci
('ale first - a \\r or ld-!)crsOll-!TI inter
l11cdiate cntit)l stlt;sisting bet\veen tIle Atn
an, the 
!Jrilnary reaJity, anti t.lle UllivEfSC, tIlC object of later 
Greafio11-- ,\"110111 l!e Iu
ctl out ().f wat('ls, and 
breathc(1 into Ids' 110si riJs tIle brcatll oJ 1ife. I t is 
, . 
esting to note ill passing tl1at t
lis is tIle only 
analogue ill 1 he {Jpa11islladic cosmogonies to 1 lIe con- 
ception 'of 'l
ogos in (;re('l{ or Cllristian plliJosophYi but" 
it inust be ren1emberrd that tllis I
ogos ill tl1c Upani- 
sha<.lic philosoplljt I-lID )T
) qllitc a subser\-ifl1t and se- 
condary'part to tilc Atrnall. 'fhe Atmal1 tllcn brood- 
eel tlpOn tllis \\'orld-Persoll,' a11d as a l"('sult of llis 
oroodi11g, created first .llis .\;aliuu

 org'ans of sense,', 
n tIle func1iollS COfTcsvon(ling to tllelll, and' 
tbe deities or tIle worlcJ -gU\terl1U) 5 c
spoI:1diIlg' to suc.h 
fUnctions in the Cosmos." . . . . 
-firs't created tile Mouth .from Wllich pr

pee(;h, ri
. . 

:He. created:. t)1e ,
ostrils. f
om wI-ii,c
. .. :J3reath
 and .frqm Breatll, Air. - . ... . 

,.-He' :'created tIle . Eyes from which proceeded Sight; 
:' . and from Sig11t, tIle Sun. - .' .. 
· .He created the Ears from which proceeded .Hearing,- 
'and ftom"Hearing, the Quart'ers.'
'.' ", ,.' 

He created 
 the Skin from which proceeded Hair., 
a1Id UMll Hair, the Herb
 and Trees. 
He created the Heart from which proceeded Mind, 
arl'd from Mind, the Moon. 
He created the Navel from which 'proceeded the 
Down-Breath, and from Down-Breath, Death. 
I:inaUy, be created tIle Generative Organ from whid1 
ptOceed.ed Semen, and frOD1 Semen, Water." 
It is interesting to note that in this explanation of 
the creatio11 of various categories of existence, the 
function always follows the structure in the microcosm 
of the intermediary Person, but always precedes it 
in the macrocosm of the Universe. Thus the organs 
of sense, such as the mouth, the nostrils. the eye and 
the ear were created in the Person before theit 
v 1 t\c tions namely, speec11, breath). sight, and hearing, 
which having been created 
'ere the cause of the ctea. 
tion of objective existences such as fire, air, the sun 
and the quarters in tIle macrocosm of the Universe. 
The .Atman thereup'on attacked the Person with 
Hunger and Thirst) which, in the Aitareyan cosmogony, 
r emin ds us of Love and Hate in Ernpedoklean cosm
logy. Hunger and Thirst said to the Atman, find us 
places in this creation. The.A tman replied tD them 
that he would find them places in the deities them.. 
selves, and thus he made them co-partners with tbem. 
It is for this reason that \vhenever an}" offerings are 
made to a deity, Hunger and Thirst are always allot- 
ted a share in' those offerings. After the creation in 
this fashion of the Worlds, the Cosmic Person, the 
Wodd-govemors, and Hunger and Thirst, the Itman 
next proceeded to create Matter as food for them an.. 
. .' . . ...mch being created, the Atman 
y pro- 
ceeded to create the Soul in the human hoQy. 'How, 

S 16] 



shall this body live without me ?', he thought to him- 
self, 'but how may I enter this?' Having thus be- 
thought himself, he ren.t open the place where the hair 
are made to part, and entered by that door. .This is 
called the II door of division". This also is the " place 
of rejoicing". It is at that place that women part 
their hair. It is at that place that on the skulls of 
children we see a hole. It is on that spot that when 
a Samnyasin dies, a cocoanllt is broken with t11e 
purpose of releasing his pent-up Soul. To come to 
our argument, when the A tman entered the body by 
the door of division, and was so born as the individual 
Soul, he began to be subject, so the Aitareyopanishad 
tells us, to the three states of consciousness, namely, 
the waking, the dreaming and the deep-sleep state of 
consciousness. After having been born, the indivi- 
dual Soul began to look about himself at all things to 
see whether they proclaimed a tTEPOf;, but to his 
great astonishment only saw the supreme Brahman 
spread everywhere. It is for the reason that the 
individual Soul saw (dra) the Brahman (Idam) spread 
everywhere that he is called Idandra, which by con- 
traction has become Indra, a mysterious name given 
to the Godhead by the mystery-loving gods (5. 17). 
We thus see how the individual Soul was the last 
object to be created by the A tman and how ultimately 
there is a metaphysical identity between the indi- 
vidual Soul and the supreme SOttl. 
16. So far we have had more. or less mythological 
explanations of the creation of 
AtmaD and the theory ob ] . ects from the P rimeval Atman 
of E
atlOD. · 
We have said at the beginning of 
the chapter that there are a few descriptions in the 
Upanishads which come very near to full-fledged 
theories of creation. But before we proceed to 
these accounts, we must consider briefly how in the 




Taittrtyopanishad we have an emantaory theory of 
cc>smogony where \ve are told that II from the Atn1an, 
ill the fir!\t instance, proceeded space, from space air, 
'from air. fire, from fire water, and from ,vater 111e 

'-'rtl1 ,t (5. 18). This is a complete cnurnrration of the 
Jive different F:l€mrnts \\'11ich are dEscribEd as l1a,.ing 
vroceeded one after anotl1
r from the primc,.al 11 t rr:an, 
\\,ho, to all intents and purposes, is described in the 
passage as not pI3
.ing any very acti\1c part in 
creation. It is important to remember that the 
expression that is used in t11e IJassage to designate 
tIle fact of emanation is Sambhutih. From the 
Atman emanated Space, and from Space itl the 
course of progressive generation the rest of tl1f Ele- 
ments. \Ve are not told that the Atman " created" 
S!)ace, and from Space created Air, and so on. I t is 
also important to notice in t11is passage tIle o8o
and t11c o
 KtXTro. At t11e time of tIle origin of the 
universe, from t11e Atman proceeded 
pace, and from 
space air, from air fire, from fire ,vater and, from 
\\'ater the eartJ1 : this i
 the \Vay Do\,.n. At the tiree 
of destruction, count(r-logically, the rart!1 \yct:](1 t,e 
resolved irl \\'atcr, \vater ill fire, fire in air, air in space, 
an(l space in tIle eternal Atman: this is the \\iay Up. 
In general, we may S
lY that tIle I)assagc fron1 tIle 
Tait tiri}'opanis11ad \\yl1icl} ,ve are discllssing is '
significant for us, first, as rnumfratin
 most def!nite1y 
for t he first till1e in tIle \,,1101c f{jgion of UI)anislladic Ii trra- 
ture t11e fi".c different EleJnents ; second])'", for lla'1ing 
introduccr} the Heracleit<?3n conception of tLc \'"a)' 
Up and t lic \ ,. a)' DO'''11; t bire 11)' I for t l:e t 1:( (
' of cn-. 21
tion as apposed to crraticJ1 imp1i(cl in it ; ar:d ]a
for tIle realistic trcl1d of its arg\
n1( n t ,,,bic}l Las tc (n'" a 
standing crux to all absol\ltistic interpreters of l
nislladic philoSOI)h)', \\1ho \vould try to reduce c\'cry- 
thing except tbe Atman to an appearance or illusion. 




17: TIle MU1}4akopanishad offers a connecting link 
Th P 1 I between such an emanator\1 theor y 
e er50na - mper- ... 
sonal theory of creation of creation and a tlleistic tllcory 
in Mundaka. · h t!-.A. · 
as In t e 
vatara whIch \ve 
shall presently discuss by suggesting a per!\onal-im- 
personal theory of the origin of the W1i verse and tell- 
ing us that "at the beginning of creation, there 
existed a heavenly Formless Person who was un- 
born, without a mind, Itlstrous, and super-immut- 
able. From him were born life, mind, senses, 
space, air, light, water, and earth, whicll last is the 
basis of the universe...... From him also were born 
gods of various descriptions, angels. men, beasts, 
and birds. From l1im were born rice and barley, 
penance and faitl1. truth, celibacy, and religious law 
. . . . . . He was likewise the source of all the oceans 
and mountains. the rivers \vhich run to and fro, the 
herbs and trees,. and the essence which runs thrO\lgh 
them. bv Wl1ich verily the inner Soul holds tllem all 
together JJ (5. 19). In this way were all earthly al1d 
celestial existences, all organic and inorganic nature, 
all moral and psychological qualities born from tIle pri- 
meval Person, who is yet described as formless and 
be)TOnd even \vhat we call the immutable. Even this 
accotmt of t11e origin of the universe from the primeval 
Person is not entirely untainted by mytIlological con- 
siderations; but it stands n1uch higher than any of 
tIle afore-discussed theories, and approaches the truly 
tllcistic theory of creation wllicl1 accounts for the crea- 
tion of all sorts of existences by the primeval Person. 
TIle truly theistic tinge, however, is yet lacking, because 
the passage from the MUI].Qakopanishad which we are 
discussing describes the Person as impersonal and 
speaks of emanation (Syandante) or generation (J
instead of creation proper, 

18. This entirely personal setting for the supreme 
The Theistic theory Godhead is to be found in the 
of Creation In Svetal- A 
"'"etasvataropanishad. It is true 
that the Svetasvataropanishad was written in the 
interest of a Saivite theory of theism; but if we just 
divest our minds of this sectarian aspect and equate 
the god Siva of the Svetasvataropanishad with the 
supreme Godhead, which has, in fact, been done in many 
places by the Svetasvataropanishad itself, \\re may see 
how the Svetasvataropanishad tries philosophically to 
account for the creation of the world by the Godhead 
by the method of construction throug11 criticism of the 
various extant opinions on the subj ect of the origin of the 
world. The passage from the Svetasvataropanishad I. 2 
makes a classical enumeration of the various opinions 
held at the time of the Upanishad on tIle subject of 
the origin of the world. If Some people say ", says the 
Upanishad, CI that it is Time, otllers Nature, others 
Necessity, others Chance, others the Elements, others 
yet the Person, still others the Combination of these, 
and yet a few others the A.tman, which is the cause of 
all things whatsoever JJ (5. 20. a). The Svetasvataro- 
panishad in the course of its chapters criticises all 
these theories and puts forth a constructive. programme 
of Saivite theism in explanation of the origin of the 
universe. We cannot say, says the Svetasvat aro- 
panishad, that Time is the origin of all things, for, 
is not God, it asks, the very Time of Tin1e, or as an- 
other Upanishad puts it, Death to the very God of 
Death? (5. 20. b). We cannot try to explain the 
origin of the world from Nature, says the Svetasvataro.. 
 ; for is not Nature itself brought to maturity 
by the presence of God inside it? (5. 20. c). Nor 
'can we say that Necessity and Chance are the origin of 
things: they are either too fatalistic or too unphiloso- 
phical ways for the explanation of creation. The Ele- 

! 19] 



ments cannot be regaded as the ., arch
 II of things, 
for the elements are merely the garment of God. and 
it is due to His supreme skill in work that earth, water, 
fire, air and space were created (5. 20. d). Nor can 
we say that the Combination of all these elements is 
a veritable &C arche," because for these to be 
we must have an eternal Being who is the primal cause 
of their combination (5. 20. e). Nor can we finally say 
.that either the Purusha of the Sarhkhyas, who is too 
free from creation to be ever regarded as responsible for 
it, or the A tnlan of the Vedantins, who is really a power.. 
less Being if \\
e just consider tha.t he is the cause of 
happiness as well as of sorrow. can be regarded as 
responsible for creation. Rudra alone who rules the 
world by his powers
 \vho stands before every being 
at the time of destruction, and creates the universe 
at the time of its origin, can be regarded as the Creator 
of all things that exist. He is the supreme Godhead,. 
to whose power is due the whirling round of the wheel 
of the universe (5. 20. f). He is the supreme cause, 
the lord of all Souls; of him there is neither generator 
nor protector; he is the self-subsisting mover of the 
unmoving manifold, and causes the one primal seed 
to sprout in infinite ways (S. 20. g). In this manner 
does the Svetasvataropanishad advance a truly philo.- 
sophic theory of creation, in which all power is ulti- 
mately due to a personal Godhead who causes the 
whole universe to move round his :finger-Ie 1m Kreis 
das All am Finger laufen liesse." 
19. We have hitherto considered both the imper- 
Tbe Theory of Inde.. sonalistic and the personalistic 
pendent ParaUelilm .8 h · f t . · t . t 
an explanation of the t eones 0 crea lOn, porn Ing on 
analol1les of UpaDieha- incidentall y the analo g ies which 
die and Greek philo- ' 
8ophle.. subsist between the Upanishadic 

d th
eek theories of cosmo80
Y. Even tho

however, the similarities l1ave been pointed out, they 
have not }1et been explained. The problem of the rela- 
tion of Greek and Indian cosmogonies, and in gcr:rra], 
of Greek and Indian philosophies, is a ,.ery intcres1iIlg 
problem, and it may just be wort}l our \"hile to at- 
tempt a brief solution of it. The problem of tile rela- 
tion of the two pllilosophies is only a branch of the 
general Grreco-Indian problem of the relation of tl1e 
two cultures. In an analysis of the two cultures ill 
the variolls departments, we may say that there are 
three theories which can be advanced to explain 
their extraordinary similarities. (1) The Th(ory of 
BOITowal either by Greect from India or by India 
from Greece could find historical justification onlj' after 
the date of Alexander. Just as Greece Ieft a nlark 
upon Indian progress in the departments of scuJpture 
and numismatics after Alexander's invasion, similarly, 
India left a deep impression upon the Platoni
ts of 
Alexandria a
 seen especiaIJy in the all-to \r ogic 
ecsatasy of the Neo-Platonists, and their borro\\'al 
of the three qualities 1rJlt
o(TtICO:' ,uV)(uc:ot V
rilkhya philosophy. But the far more important 
question in the general Grreco-Indian problem i
the two cultures were related before the invasion of 
Alexander. Diogenes, the biographer of Greek phi- 
losophers, and Jamblichus, the Neo-platonist, narrate 
to us stories of the visit to Brahmins of earlv Greek 
philosophers, among them phi1osophers like- Thalcs 
and Pythagoras. But this fact has yet to be 
historically proved. The absence of a single reference 
in Plato to Indian philosophy forbids the truth of 
such a statement. (2) Thus, in order to explain the 
many analogies of Comparative Mythology alld Com- 
parative Philology, we have to take recourse to a 
second theory, namely tIle Theory of Common Origin. 
The stol}' for example. of the Universal 

! 19) 



egg-like spl1ere, and Phanes, the shining god, coming 
out of its two lids, namely, the earth and the sky; 
tl1e })i-partition of the primc,'al Atman into t\VO por- 
, the man and the wo-man, \vith its analogy in 
Hebre,v literature; and the similar descriptions of the 
'Asvatt11a in the Kat1}.opanishad <lnd tl1e Igdrasil in 
ian mytllology, may all be traced to a time 
wIlen t11e European and the Indian Aryans lived to- 
getl1cr. Similarly, about Comparative Philology. The 
present \vriter has proved in his essay 011 "the Campa- 
rativ'e Study of Greek and Sanskrit II that the many 
great analogies of the entire grammatica
 structure of 
the t\VO languages could llardly be explained except on 
the tlleor
10r a contiIlued stay together of the two peoples, 
tllU5 reinforcing from an altogether different point 
of view the truth of the Theor)7 of Comn10n Origin in 
certai11 departments of the two Clllttlres.(3}FiI1a11y, tllere 
is tIle l'lleory of wllat we may call Independent Parallel- 
isn1, ,vl1icll is of especial value to us in explaining the 
analogics of p11ilosophical concel)ts. We 11ave already 
noticecl ho\v the definitions of the primary substance 
it1 tIle two philosophies are identical: ho\v tIle query 
of Hesiod at the beginning of his work corresponds 
almost exactly to the query at the beginning of the 
Svet asvataropanisl1ad; how the conception of water 
as tl1e .. arclle " in the Bri11adaraQyakopanishad has its 
counterpart in the theory of Tllales ; 110w the doctrine 
of air as the final absorbent in the C11bandog);"a l1as its 
analogue il1 the theory of Anaximenes ; ho\\
 tIle Hera- 
cl()itcan conception of the exchange of fire for all 
s is to be nlet with in the Katl101Janishad; how 
the earth as the basis of the cosn10S as \ve find it in 
t11c l\ll":1)Q.:lkopanishad is echoed in Hesiod; 110w the 
COllCPI)tion of Spac_e as the fifth element recognised in 
the 'faittillyopanishad has its parallel in the theory 
of Philolaos; how the conceptions of Not-Being and 

Being in the Taittirtya and the Chhandogya Upanishads 
have their parallels in the theories of Gorgias and 
Parmenides; how the Way Up and the Way Down in 
Taittirtyopanishad are repeated in the theory of Hera- 
cleitus; how, finally, the conception of Trivritkara
in the Chhindogya Upanishad has its analogue in the 
Anaxagorian doctrine of there being a portion of 
everything in everything. So far about the cos- 
mological resemblances proper. Nor are the extra- 
cosmological resemblances of the two philosophies less 
interesting. The Pythagorean doctrine of Transmi- 
gration and 
 its Indian analogue dating so far back as 
the days of the 
igveda, the Phaedrus myth of the 
Charioteer and the Horses and an exactly similar myth 
in the Kathopanishad, the representation of the idea 
of the Good in Plato as the Sun of the world of ideas 
having its counterpart in the description in the 
Kathopanishad of tile A.tman as verily the Sun who il 
the eye of the world and is free from all imperfections, 
the p.
II. of Plato corresponding phonetically, philo- 
logically and e'len philosophically to the Maya of 
the Vedanta, Parmeides's attack in Plato against the 
Universality of the Idea represented to a word 
in the famous criticism by Sankara of the Naiyayika 
idea of the Universal, tIle analogy of the Vik in 
l.Ugveda to the Logos in Heracleitus, the Stoics, 
and Greek philosophy generally-all these could 
not be said to be less interesting specimens of 
the analogies of Greek and Indian Thotlght. How 
may we explain these. cosmological, and extra- 
cosmological, analogies? Not by the Theory of Bor- 
rowal, for this cannot be historically proved. N or by 
the Theory of Common Origin, because, in spite of the 
similarities, the philosophical concepts of the two 
lands are placed in a setting all their own, the Pytha- 
gorean theory of Numbers and the Platonic theory of 

S 19] 



Ideas being as peculiar to Greek thought, as the 
Upanishadic doctrine of the Turlya and the Miman- 
saka doctrine of the Sphota are peculiar to Indian 
thought. We must needs take the help of the Theory 
of the Independent Parallelism of Thought, where no 
borrowing or common origin could be historically 
proved. The Gita conceptiol1 of God as the A of the 
Indian alphabet and the Gospel conception of God as the 
Alpha and Omega of things, and the Kalidasian descrip- 
tion of the stream of love as raging all the more on aCCOtlnt 
of hindrances in its path finding its echo in the Shakes- 
pearean description of love in the "Two Gentlemen," are 
instances how imagination may work absolutely alike 
in regions of poetry or philosophy. There is nothing 
to prevent the flights of genius from achieving 
the same ends wherever it may be placed. Neptune 
might be discovered by Adams and Leverrier at the 
same time. Darwin and Wallace might simultaneously 
discover the principle of Natural Selection. Scott and 
Amundsen might reach the North -Pole at the same 
moment. What nlight prevent Philosophers from grasp- 
ing the same point of view, even though separated by 
Time and Place ? 

I (a) 88i!tTf'rftr tl\
 I m. III. 14. I. 
(b) q8r 'IT 

 tq.(\ , 
;r .,mfir .tF8, 

(Jfq ;cqr.t9f'l
 (1 &ftf_I
.ra- I 

. III. I. 
qT" iF;;y if) . 
srnmT: I 
q.. I. I. 
2 (a) ;fA' d


;:a-, gp.f If"', 



Rr .. SRn
tWl.I €I 
'f': 9
ircn,"o I 
,. v. 5. I. 

-.R . -9(CIm ta I 
1{ I 


 I SI1fatrri' 8T

Stiat{ I 
pqa: m;r q'it:'ltni 

,. v. 5. I. 

T 'IT 11
IJqRt Cl,!iJ'EI't



qr.qRt q

 ,..., 0 ,......... r.. 
 tfl" ( 8 II 
 II Qqttl' 
'Ei'Qt;:8 ""!
craq: II 
ut. IV. 3. 1-2. 
4 .(a) wflrlf
er;f srm) .q-." J1f(l
q) "\l
'6. II. 5. 

;q .n giT;nliTl{
=;;iJ, :m
9);q glr;r 

u, 8'119T 

i5lriRrqJ I 9
c.-) r: 
r: ;e
r: R
r: gqr- 
",Girl : 
: II 
 ui. VI. 8. 4. 
5 (a) 8f
 '5T rrRrft(f.lmu (fa 
1'f'" I 
 'l8rPQ T'5TUT

 I WT'filUt f( 11:'1" 

q) \Tqlql
 I ;q'T'6TU: 
q' (r.."11{ I ut. I. 9. I. 
(b) wmUt 'Rq 8"'
qTi{ I an'51U " 

: I &t'
I \1;r,

l q8 I i11'fmD

ftr I 
ut. VII. 12. I. 


 I 8m , 9
,q(f I 8C{T«ITii 


tt" 'i(t I « 

 'i a@
qa d8' I 



. II. 7. 


 I 81t{tilr- 
qqr '8tu;rrQ, f( 
'5: I (f
8' I 81Ttq;'i'T 


 I CI'tC4ltti CI "",rS\1I1Qt:(r ,... I 


« RKI I {:IT 'lft.


T fiA:"(t
rftr: I 
'{. I. 2. 1-2. 




: ' a

I...f( I 

 I (1
If"qtt I tt

h I 
I+1flTqt{ I afiR{
'it(f I a 
IVC - 
<t .. 
" .n1 "
1l I 

 I q

 Ui '3T .ft: , q.
 T! 8 
: I qR 9 
: I qy 'CI
 ilU: I 


: I "'1 q

TS'3T'l1ftt'.l: I <t \1(1


ute III. I9. 1-3. 

 ,'itpr' If a

(lq) th


I '3' 11:. 
m' Cf
ute III. 15. I. 
IO (a) 


R 81

 , (R[ 


C:f_t '«f I 

!I {W9 

 (NPl - 

(t : 
ma I 


ql'{ ,
f :.t
Ii{ idtr I a
S ({
d I 8
. a.
a t(t.

...I (IT 
:... ot"'+I

P(l 1 
ut. VI. 2. 1-4. 

, . 

;nm ;

fir I "lei fq(t 

f '6
enaf1ffr I ute VI. 3. 2-3. 
ft(f d 

{'t, q
, q


fi«et, 1fT.
ro ;mr
1I1 q,""

. qti
(I)o I ut. VI. 4- 1-4. 

II (a) sam 
8fa I snar sJaIN'. u'f.It{ar ('I' 

Tf;r srTUlhl'fi1
ftrfdfit, S1r
f8P' uf.I.II.5 
(b) iT
T-arTm srTUtT 'IN .,,,: g 
fqftr snarh 

q'Cqfir, snu\' q:, snai' Wt
, snu\' A:, snub' .uhf. 
 I ute IV. 3. 3. 


(c) m 'IT t(tft 
 ... q1S
1:I "' snar: snq I 
ut. IV. 3. 4' 
12 (a) 8f'-l 'IT et
r if'. ""
r q:
Ut ri a- 
Rtnt I ut. VII. 15. 1- 
(b) snarr QrRr" ( 
: I ft

 '[8, '8\If1'
, "'t 

 I m '-11 
 SlTullq Rttt1J( q:m: 
itcrm i141'fi1"1...,

. II. I- 
13 (a) 8tt.t W srtUIT Q

q_ "tllife 

 I ?r t snort: 

Iq fit 

;y: q ua 81P8:Tcr", 
tf .. q \J (


 'I: Q 
f8 I 91' 




. . 

QT 'M5T Ott:l'1.f.(t :, 
 : )l1 
ul , 'E qlq
18ShIIt (I

ql. "'

, ",,,'tq..(f :, 
IUIt"(f : "1
" , q
.df"''''I , 
,!Gtt..d : 

d' , \'1I11P8t 

 w: ..: I 




,uia : Rtit;r,

:at, q
 , 'QI'


.... I q;ft W".
j... 8

 Jit1q qihqnn-. 

 '-"II 'ITl'n 
 :, $tluli\(1 : 
' 'l

.(1 :

 _ 1IiI; , '1'1 '( snar 


4 - 

 t't;r: WlTsRI 
 I "" tit 
.sftIr N i!meit
'l t1t 

 f'i <mrRr


 '" 8\IQa9l.. 91ftr l;r" 
'IT'll, ;f 
 if "'

 II .t. V. I. 6-15. 
(b) WIIft..t4 er
: S11ri 

"': !i...(...t 'IfQr 
l1ln t 
 ".w..iMtI : WIt.,,, 

'1I ffte4I,ctIJl : , (IITAf- 
ftv: snar 
qlra m it(mQ"'Itt "'OtQ.... ,tll11t 

fI'.'q f'r 
mtfir &s "__
'"11: , 


 n u SIft.

 I au", 

f-(f 91R 

 WlQ Slftfprit 91Ii 
" srftr
'I1_ ;rq: 111*.. a sitm: mat 


" d""" "

I i\'I' er

.. 'l (. .. '-It'( 1...1 '"'I ft 
... srfMIm 
QT wTW tit. 
 1 qr.. ""
 {4(1(11 RNf at 
: I sr. II. 1-12. 
: S4rar: 
Iua en it'!: 1...1 
 '" sn oltwrj 
ftrfa I 

qltit , 


ttq,lU , mftr IIWTSqm 'I11JdF( q1tq'JI : I 
'-" " snot: \.=IT QT, qf 'II Q" 

(1 :1 

 (t': . ... " QIQ

a : 
) Pf
 mr fd8

lq((".. : 

"If : qt.tlq
, srrUt

I : I ... 8VVI" 

Rm, ;rT¥Im' 


t'J(T; Sl1It
1 '"
R 8t:: II _I"I
' : 
snVrsRm: I l=r 
. mar 
 SllI1mt _'{r.m)s 

) if 
, dun 

I.... "fitr, eI' 1t'""

 I "". III. 2-g. 
15 (a) 
 ( 'IT un: 1RfT: JAltq;:(f 

ql. I SI
r. ,ir " nnqRf: I 
Q( , 
 , diI .. smQ' tinit_ 
'It'QT SArT: 1(ift:wr d8 , 
(q) t , snait 

:... .a

t " SAlt'tftf: ,,
IIirtR . ... 
: -r: 
IITII:... ttl
qr I:t'I dft: !Pi: mar:.... WIT- 



\TJI1 "RSlqftf: 
 (fir: I 
st. I. 3- 1 3 
(b) 8tS'6TIN
i:tf8 I 
 (N) SdQld I 




;q (q

 ntcn[ I tif

 CQ I fir
q;f :;rrfireq;t .. I fQ1;t .rfQ1;i 
.. I m 
d " I 
. II. 6. 


\1:..... I '3)(

 I amsti(Tm'¥l




q ' 

.... I 6Ts 
.:r fir
Ri I 6 
i:ers6- q;:JI
mfif (f(f 

N. · · · 

ti: +rir 
fW I 9 
CJ {" 


a , 6 ma'itl il

tl. .. I 
'(( - 
(I : 'tfa1Q \f(iff :;:jMCRnI{.... I 

ri S 
I('JI" I{'q 
, {{t:(( 




.... I 
QcC1T ':
JCI'lq' w:aU 11f
f 'J"
. · · .1 ,at
;:a q:qitq 
I,« ft-. 

: q:, (lrt1

(1' I fl. I. 4. 1-4. 
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1. If we were to consider the date at which the 
E I I I Ab 0 I U panishadic seers lived in India, 
mp r c:a , D rma 
atloD.1 Pay- we would be surprised to find that 
c:holoey. they could have to their credit such 
an amount of psychological reflection. The Upanishad- 
ic seers were foremost in their age in philosophical 
reflection in general, and psychological reflection in 
particular. The three departments of their speculation 
in the field of Psychology may be classified as the 
Empirical, the Abnormal, and the Rational; and even 
though their Empirical Psychology was less develop.. 
ed than tIle Abnormal, and the Abnormal less than 
the Rational, we would have to take account of their 
speculation in all these fields before we could adjudge 
the value of their psychological reflection as a whole. 
2. We must, however, bear in mind that Empiri- 
cal Psychology is a science 
Tbe relation 0' f t th d th 
Mlad to AUmeat.tloa. 0 recen grow ,an us we 
must not expect to find a full-fledg- 
ed empirical investigation of mental science in the days 
of the Upanishads. We n)ust, on the CQut{aJY, be CO{1tent 
with what little information is supplied to us under 
that head in the various Upanishads. The Upani- 
shadic philosophers believed that the mind for its 
formation was dependent upon alimentation. The mind 
was supposed to be manufactured out of the food 
t we take (S. I. a). II The food that we eat" I 




says a passage, I' is transformed in three differ- 
ent ways: the heaviest part of it becomes the 
excrement, that of medium density is transformed 
into :8esh, and the subtlest part goes to form the 
mind I' (S.I.b). " Just as in the churning of curds, the 
subtlest part rises up and is transformed into butter, 
so w!1en food is eaten, the subtlest part rises 
up and is transformed into mind U (5. I. c). Later, 
even in the days of the Bhagavadglti, we find that 
the three different mental temperaments, the Sattvika, 
the Ri.jasa, and the Timasa were supposed to be due 
to the different kinds of food that we eat (XVII.8-IO). 
When once ,it was believed that the qualities of the 
food con
umed formed the quality of the mind of 
the consumer, it was natural to insist, in the interest 
of the highest morality, upon a kind of katharsis in 
alimentation. " When the food is pure," says a pas- 
sage (5. 2), 

 the whole nature becomes pure; when 
the nature becomes pure, memory becomes firm; and 
when a man is in possession of a firm memory, 
all the bonds which tie a man down to the world 
become unloosed. It was because he (Narada) had 
his impurity destroyed, that the venerable Sanat.. 
kumira pointed out to him the way beyond dark- 
ness". The way which leads us beyond darkness, 
therefore, must be sought for in purity of alimenta- 
tion, wbich involves in its train the purity of mind. 
3. One of the acute observations which these 
anCIent seers made concerns the 
Attelltloa IDvolve. f · 
.......10. of breatb. act that In the process of at- 
. tention we always hold our breath, 
and seem neither to breathe out nor to breathe in 
. . 
When we speak, we neither expire nor inspire 
(5. 3. a). When we do an action which involves 
voluntary ef!ort. as l for example, "producing fire 




by rubbing two sticks together, or -running a race. 
or bending a bow and stringing it, we neither exhale, 
Dor inhale" (5. 3. b). Our attention in such acts 
is concentrated on the action itself, and it cannot 
be diverted to such subsidiary processes as those of 
breathing out and breathing in. This is what in 
the Kaushttaki Upanishad is called the It inner 
sacrifice", which goes after the name of its discoverer, 
the sage Prat ardan a, and is called the Pritardana 
sacrifice. Pratardana said, that while a man is 
speaking, he is not able to breathe, and therefore 
may be said to sacrifice his breath in his speech; on 
the contrary, while a man is breathing, he is not 
able to speak, and may be said to sacrifice his 
speech in his breath. CI These two endless and im- 
mortal oblations," said Pratardana, IC man offers 
always, waking or sleeping. All other obIa- 
. tions have an end, for they consist of works. Know- 
ing this, the ancient sages did not offer the 
ordinary sacrifice" (5. 3. c). In this passage, a 
justification is found for not performing the ordinary 
sacrifice when one knows that an inner sacrifice 
is ever going on inside him. 

4. Another curious observation which these seers 
made may be mentioned in pass- 
ing. This concerns' the analysis 
of the emotion of fear. I t is only when a feeling of 
otherness gains lodgment in us (5. 4. a) t1iat we come 
to entertain the emotion of fear. . The primeval 
Atman feared, as he was alone; but II on finding out 
that there w
s no other per
on. whom he should fear, 
he became fearless; for it is only from (the idea or 
existence of) a second that fear proceeds" (5. 4. b). 
It is in this way that all feeling of fear departs from 
a man who reco
ises his owp. true Self, because 

ADal)'ll. of fear. 



[i 4 

this recognition implies tbat beside his own true Self 
there is. no other entity. which might cause fear. 
 Another very important point in connec... 
tion with the psychology of the 
Tbe claim of Will U p anishads is the conflict mani- 
fer prlm.
fested itl the Chhandogya Upa- 
nishad be\veen the respective claims for pri- 
macy of the Will or the Intellect. Here we 
have in brief the indication of a future quarrel 
between Voluntarism and Intellectualism. The fol- 
lowing passage most eloquently describes the stress 
which the seer first lays on Will as the primary rea- 
lity: " All these therefore. . . . . . centre in will, con- 
sist of will, abide in will. Heaven and earth willed, 
air and ether willed, water and fire willed. Through 
the will of heaven and earth, rain falls; throu
h the 
will of rain, food wills; through the will of food J ' 
the vital airs will; through the will of the vital ai
the sacred hymns will; through the will of the sacred 
hymns, the sacrifices will; through the will of the sa- 
crifices, the world wills; through the will of the world, 
every thing wills. This is Will. Meditate on Will. 
He who meditates on Will as Brahman..... .he is, 
as it were, lord and master as far as Will reaches- 
he who meditates on Will as Brahman II (5. 5). The 
seer of tm.s Upanishad is evidently imbued with the 
all-pervading power of Will. I t seems that this 
.passage among others must have influenced the philo- 
sophy of that admirer of the Upanishads, Schopen- 
hauer, who laid so much stress on Will as the Ding" 
an-sic!t. We may compare the following passage from 
The World as Will and Idea (Book I). "If we observe 
-the strong and unceasing impulse with which the 
. 'Yaters hmry to the ocean, the persistency with which 
net turns ever to the north pole! the readj- 




ness with which iron flies to the magnet, the 
ness with which the electric poles seek to be reunited, 
and wbich, like human desire, is increased byobsta- 
cles ; if we see the crystal quickly take form with 
such wonderful regularity of construction,......if we 
observe the choice with which bodies repel and 
attract each other.... ...if we observe all this, I say, it 
will require no great effort of the imagination to re- 
cognize, even at so great a distance, our own nature. 
That. which in us pursues its ends by the light of 
knowledge, but here, in the weakest of its manifesta.. 
tlons, only strives blindly and dumbly in a one-sided 
and unchangeable manner, must yet in both cases 
come under the name of Will." According to the 
doctrine which is common to this Upanishad and 
Schopenhauer, the whole world seems to be filled 
with the force of will; and "what appears as motif!a- 
tion in human beings is the same as what appears 
as stimulation in the vpgeta tive life and as mechanical 
process in the inorganic world "-motivation, stimnla.. 
tion, and mechanical process being different manifest- 
ations of the same force of Will. 

6. As against this primacy of Will, the seer of 
the Chhandogya Upanishad goes 
Tbe claim of I atellect 
for primae)'. on in the very J next section of 
that work to .
rm the primacy 
of Intellect. The affirmation of-Will is the thesis, to 
which the seer opposes the affirmation of Intellect 
as the antithesis: "Intellect is better than Will, 
For it is only when a man thinks that he wills. . · 
All these centre in Intellect, consist of Intellect, 
abide in Intellect. Therefore, if a man does not 
think, even if he knows much, people say of him, he 
is nothing.... ...But if a man thinks, even though he 
knows. little, people indeed desire to listen to him. 



(S 6 

Intellect" is the centre, Intellect is the self,' Intellect 
is the support of all these. Meditate on Intellect. 
He who meditates on Intellect as Brahman ......... 
be is, as it were, lord and master as far as Intellect 
reaches-he who meditates on Intellect as Brahman" 
(5. 6. a). The seer of this Upanishad is here defini- 
tely asserting the supremacy of Intellect over Will: 
Voluntarism here makes way for Intellectualism. 
This conclusion is supported by another passage from 
the Maitri Upanishad, where the writer speaks of the 
mind in its reflective aspect a
 being the fount and 
source of all mental modifications whatsoever: "He 
(man) sees by the mind alone; he hears by the 
mind; and all that we call desire, will, doubt, belief, 
disbelief, resolution, irresolution, shame, thought, 
and fear,-all this is but mind itself" (5. 6. b). 
7. This intellectualistic way of thought finds its 
culmination in the Aitareya Upa- 
nishad, where, by a bold stroke 
of genius, the seer of that Upani- 
shad makes a noteworthy classification of the various 
mental functions, at the basis of which, he says, lies 
Intellection. T11is passage is remarkable as being the 
ear1iest contribution to a classification of mental 
states: "Sensation, perception, ideation, conception, 
understanding, insight, resolution, opinion, imagina- 
tion, feeling, memory, volition, conation, the will-to- 
live, desire, and self-control, all these are different 
names of Intellection" (5. 7). It is remarkable 
that the seer not merely mentions the different levels 
of intellectual experience such as sensation, percep- 
tion, ideation, and concept; on, as different from one 
another, but also recognises the other two characte- 
ristic forms of experience, feeling and volition; makes 
a distinction between volition which need not inVQlve 

Classification of 
mental states. 




the idea of activity, and conation which does; 
as well as recognises the processes of imagination 
and memory. Finally, the intellectualistic trend 
of thought in the seer is apparent from the way in 
which he makes Intellect the fount and source of all 
mental activity whatsoever. 
8. It is no wonder if this intellectualistic ps

logy makes room for an idealis- 
Intellectualistic Pay- tic metaphysics. The intellect- 
cbology and Ideallstle .. . 
MetapbY8lca. UalistlC seer of the Aitareya Upa- 
nishad is an idealist as well. In 
the very section that follows the one we have quo- 
ted, the author goes on to point out how Intellect is 
the backbone, not merely of psychical functions, 
but of reality itself: "This god Brahm
, and this 
god Indra, ... ... ... these five great elements (earth, air, 
ether, water, . fire),... ... ...creatures born from the egg, 
from the womb, and from perspiration, sprouting 
plants. horses, cows. men, elephants, whatsoever 
breathes whether moving or flying, and in addition 
whatsoever is immovable-all this is led by Intellect 
and is supported on Intellect. The world is led by 
Intellect. Intellect is the support. Intellect is the 
final reality" (5. 8. a). This is as outspoken an Idealism 
as Idealism can be. The author says that all the mova- 
ble and immovable objects in this ",.orld, all those crea- 
tures which walk or fly, all the elements and gods 
exist by virtue of intellect and in intellect. This is in 
the very spirit of Berkeley who says in l1is " Treatise," 
I. All the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, 
in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty 
frame of the world ha\'e not any subsistence with- 
out a mind; that their being is to be perceived or 
known; that consequently so long' as they are not 
actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind 



[ 18 


or that of any other created spirit, they must either 
have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind 
of some Eternal Spirit :-it being perfectly unintelli- 
gible and involving all the absurdity of abstrac- 
tion to attribute to any single part of them 
an existence independent of a Spirit". Of like 
import is the passage from the Maitri Upanishad 
which tells us that it is the inner self which 
governs "external" existence, that, in short, the in- 
ner Prlna is the source of the existence of the Sun- 
a knowledge, which, the passage says, is given only 
to a few (5. 8. b). 


9. We now pass on to consider the aspects 
of Abnormal Psychology as 

::,fdeatb developed in the Upanishads. 
The question as to what 
es of a man's soul after the death of the 
body recurs time after time in the Upanishads.. Not. 
content with a discussion of man's life here below.. 
the seers of the Upanishads make the eschatological 
question assume quite an extraordinary importance
The question is very often asked-what must be 
considered the root of human life? II The tree, if hewn 
down, sp
gs anew from the previous root; what 

qst be the root of a man's life in order that it 
JgJ,y sming up a,gain, even though hewn down 
by (tAo greqt cutter) Death H (S. 9. a). It is 'sup- 
poaed, D)or-eover, that eschatological k.nowledge is 
tne highest ]rind of knowledge. Let 11 obody 
call himself wise unless he knows what becomes 
of a man after death. It was thus that the 
Sage Jaivali accosted SvetaketU:I the son 'of Aru9i, 
and proved to. him that even though he reckoned 




.himself wise, he was after all merely an ignor- 
amus :- 
II Boy, has your father instructed you? JJ U Yes, Sir." 
II Do you know where all the creatures go to from 
hence?" "No, Sir. " 
"Do you know ho\v they return again ?" "No, Sir." 
. If Do you know where the path of the gods and the 
path of the fathers diverge?" "No, Sir. " 
It Do you know why that (tIle other) world never 
becomes too full ?" Ie No, Sir." 
II Then, why did YOtl say that you had beel1 instructed? 
How can a man, ,vho does not kno,v these (simple) 
things, say that lIe has been instructed? " (5.9. b). 

10. The most ilnportant passage, ho\\"ever, where 
eschatological knowledge is re- 
The problem of death g arded as the It hi g hest g ood" 
In Katha. 
occurs in t11e celebrated dialogue 
in the Katha Upanishad between Nachiketas and 
Yama, the God of death, where Nachiketas, being 
offered t]lree boons b}1 Yama, al1d having chosel1 t\VO 
already, declines to choose for the third boon al1Y- 
thing short of the know1edge of tIle soul's existence 
after the death of the human body:- 
N: It There is this doubt in tIle case of a dead 
man; some say that he is, others say he is not. I 
would like to be instructed by thee il1 tllis matter. 
This do I choose for my third boon." 
Y: II Even t11e gods have formerly entertained 
doubt about this matter. N or is this matter easy of 
comprehension, being a subtle one. Choose another 
boon, 0 Nachiketas, press me not, and let me alone 
on this point." 
N: tI Verily, tIle gods themselves have entertain- 
ed doubt about thi
 matter; and thou hast thyself 

said that this matter passes comprehension. It is. 
impossible for me to find another instructor in that 
subject beside thyself, nor do I find that any other 
boon would be eq ual to this." 
Y: II All those desires which are impossible to be 
satisfied in this world of mortals, ask me for them if 
you so wish: these damsels with chariots and ml1sical 
instruments, such as are indeed impossible for Inen 
to obtain-be waited upon by these, which I shall 
present to you; but, Nachiketas, do not ask me about 
N: II All these, 0 God of death, are but ephelner- 
at objects, and wear out the vigour of the senses. 
Moreover, life itself would be short (for tbcir full 
enjoyment); keep them unto thyself.--these horses} 
these dances, and these sOllgS. What Inortal would 
deligllt in a long life, after he has contemplated the 
pleasures whicl1 beauty arid enjoyment afford? No. 
That which has become a n1atter of doubt anti in- 
quiry, 0 Death, speak to me about that grea t Here- 
after. N achiketas cllooses no other boon tllan t11at 
whicll concerns this great secret." (5. 9. c). 
11. After the question of the nature of death, 
The problem of Sleep: comes the question of the n
 turc of 
the Fatigue and Purl- Eleep, which is only a palliated 
tat theories. f f d h 0 h ' b . 
arm a eat. n t IS St1 Jl'ct 
we find very interesting t11eories advanced by those 
ers of antiquity. One passage proclaims unmistaka- 
bly an expJanation of the nature of sleep given by 
modern physiology-the I Fatigue' theory of sleep: 
I' As a falcon or any other bird, after having -flown 
in the sky, becomes tired
 and foJding his wings re- 
pairs to his nest, so does this person hasten to tllat 
state where, when asleep, he desires no more desires, 
aDd: dreams no, more dreams:' (S. 10). But beyond 

 11 ] 



this proper physiological explanation of sleep, 
we find very curious theories held on this point 
l)y the sages of tIle Upanishads. The seer of the 
Prasna Upanishad holns that sleep is caused by the 
senses being absorbed in that highest 'sensorium,' 
the mind: "as all the rays of the Sun, 0 Gargya,: 
become collected into the bright disc at tIle time 
of sunset, and emerge again from it at the time of 
sunrise, so do all the senses become collecte(l into 
that highest sensorium-the mind: that is the 
reason why (in deep sleep) man is not able to hear, 
110r to see, nor to smell. People say about him that 
he has slept." {Sf II. a). This same seer qualifies his 
statement a little further, and says that the reasor. 
of the deep sleep is that the mind is merged into 
an ocean of light: 'I and ,,
hen he is overpowered 
l)y light, then does this god (Soul) see no dreams
and at that tinle great happiness arises in the body." 
(5. II. b). Another theory which is advanced in the 
Chhandogya Upanishad is, that sleep is caused by 
the s ;ul getting lodgment in the arteries: II When a 
Inan is fast asleep, and being happy knows no 
dreams, then his soul has moved in the arteries." 
(5. II. c). This same idea is elaborated in the Bp- 
hadaraQyaka Upanishad, where a physiological ex- 
planation, which in the light of modem science 
appears almost a mythological explanation) is offer- 
ed according to the ancient ideas. It was imagined 
that the heart sent forth about 72,000 arteries 
to the 'Purltat J, which Deussen translates as (peri- 
kardi urn J , and which Max Mtiller, following the 
commentator, wrongly translates by I the surrounding 
body' . This Purltat corresponds to the pineal gland 
of Descartes, so far as function is concerned; but 
it differs from it in its anatomical location. Tbe Pu- 
I1tat must be "COnsidered":as meaning a kind of mem- 


braneous sac round the heart. It was imagined by 
those ancient seers. that in deep 
leep the soul 
moved from the heart by means of the arteries and 
got lodgment inside the PurItat, whence 
leep follow- 
ed. This same idea was later deve10ped in the 
Nyaya philosophy where s]eelJ was explained as be- 
ing due to the moving of the soul right inside the 
Purltat, the state of dream being explained as due 
to the soul's position just on the threshold of the 
Purltat-the soul knocking for entrance inside it,-while 
it was in1agined that during the waking state the 
sou1 kept moving from the lleart to the Purltat. 
The origin of this doctrine in t11e N yaya philosophy 
is to be traced to the passage in the BrihadaraIJyaka 
which we are at present discussing: .. When a man is 
fast asleep and when he is not conscious of anything, 
his soul moves by means of the arteries, called Hital}., 
which are 72,000 in number, and which are spread 
from the heart to the Purltat; there he sleeps like 
a youth, or a great king, or a great Brahmin who 
has reclched the summit vf happines
." (S. II. d). 
12. Another explanation of the phenomenon of 
sleep is offered by the seer of the 
The problem of sleep: Cllhando gy a U p anishad when he 
the Prana and Brah- 
man theories. says that sleep occurs when the 
mind is merged in PraQa, that is 
breatll or energy: II As a. bird when tied by a string 
flies first in every direction, and finding no rest any- 
where. settles down at last on the very spot wllere 
it is faste
ed, exactly in the same manner, my 
Son, tile mInd, after fl)7ing in every direction l and 
finding no rest anywhere. settles down on breath · 
for indeed, my Son, mind is fastened to breath " 
(5. II. e). The next explanation of sleep occurs in 
the Bphadi.raJ}yaka Upanishad where we are told 




that sleep occurs when the soul goes to rest in the 
'space' inside the heart. In order to prove this to 
Gargya an experimental inquiry was undertaken by 
Ajatasatru. He took Gargya by the hand and came 
to a place where a man was sleeping. He then 
called Ollt to him by these names, " Thou, Great one, 
clad ill \vhite raiment, Soma, King of all ", and (yet) 
he did 110t rise. Then he rubbed him with his hand, 
(struck him with a stick-Kau.,) and lIe got up. 
Then said Ajatasatru U when this man was asleep, 
where then was this Person full of intelligence, 
and from whence did lIe return?" Gargya did not 
know the answer. Thereupon, Ajatasatru said 
"when tllis man was asleep, then t11e Person full of 
intelligence (i.e. the Soul) lay in the space Wllich 
is in the heart." {S. II. f). The last explanation 
offered of th
 phenomenon of sleep is the very curi- 
ous explanation, that, in deep sleep, the Soul is at 
one with Brahman! This is like saying that when one 
has no explanation to give, one might excuse himself 
with the Absoltlte! A passage from the Prasna U pani.. 
shad, again, tells us that in deep sleep "the mind, which 
is the sacrificer, is carried every day to Brahman, 'I 
which is corroborated by another passage from 
the Chhandogya, which says II when a man sleeps, 
then, my dear son, he becomes united with the True, 
he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say, 
I svapiti " pe sleeps, because he is gone (aplta) to his 
own (sva).'" (5. II. g)4> The idea was that in deep sleep 
the Soul ,vas at one with Brahman, and thus deep sleep 
was likened to the state of ecstasy. There is, in fact, 
as much likeness. or as little, between sleep and 
ecstasy, as there is, as Spinoza would have said. between 
God and Dog: the same letters, but what an important 
difference! I t seems that this difference was later 
appreciated even in the Upanishads when it was said 

that even though the soul was at one with Brahman 
in deep sleep, it still did not know this, was not 
cognisant of it: It as people, who do not know a 
field, walk again and again over a golden treasure 
that is hidden somewhere in the earth, and yet 
are not able to discover it, thus do all these creatures 
day after day become merged in Brahman, and 
yet do not discover it, because they are carried away 
by untruth." (5. II. h). 

13. The next question to consider is the analysis 
Tb D P bl which the U panishadic philo- 
e ream ro em. 
sophers ma}{e of the dream-state of 
conscioUS11ess in reference to the state of sleep. A 
famous passage in the BrihadarWJ.yaka Upanishad 
tells us how, at the end of sleep, the soul II moves 
a\vay from his nest" wherever he likes; "guarding with 
breath the lower nest, the immortal one moves away 
from his nest, to where he can roam at wi11-..That 
golden person, the lovely bird I Going hither and 
thither at the end of sleel), tIle God creates n1anifold 
forms for him elf, either rejoicing with women, or 
eating, or seeing terrible sights." (S. 12. a). The same 
passage tells us how the states of sleep and dream 
constitute an intermediate s1 ate between consciousness 
and unconsciousness: ,. there are two states f
r that 
person, the one here in this world, the other in the 
other world, and there is an intermediate third state 
(which we may call the twilight state of consciousness), 
consisting of the states of dream and sleep; remain- 
ing in this third state, he sees both those states which 
belong to this and tl1c other world." Weare also 
told how the soul in this state resembles a fish 
moving from bank to bank: c, as a large fish moves 
along both the banks, the nearer and the farther, so 
does tllis person move along both these states, the 




state of sleeping and the state of waking." And it is 
also said how the soul puts forth a great deal of 
creative activity in this state: II And there are no 
chariots, nor horses, nor any roads, but he himself 
creates the chariots and the horses and the roads; 
there are no joys, nor pleasures, nor any blessings, 
but he creates the joys and the pleasures and the 
blessings; there are no ponds, or lakes, or rivers, but he 
creates the ponds and the lakes and the rivers-because 
he is indeed the Maker." We see here what a great 
stress is laid on the constructive activity of the soul 
in the state of dream. Finally, we are told in a passage 
of the Prasna Upanishad, how dreams, even though 
they are usually a mere replica of actual waking ex- 
perience, also occasionally in,.olve absolutely novel 
construction; " There that god experiences greatness 
in sleep. What is seen over and over again.. l1c 
once more (in the dream); what is lleard over and 
over again, he hears once again (in the dream)...... 
... What is seen and not seen, what is heard and 
not heard.. what is enjoyed and not enjoyed, he ex- 
periences all, because lIe is tIle All." (S. 12. b). Tllis 
must indeed be regarded as cl very s\lbtle analysis 
of dream-experience

14. As the Upanisharlic philosophers made tllis 
acute study of tIle sleeping :tn(l 

 psychical re- dreaming states of consciousness, 
they \vere not slo
T to take into 
account the aberrations of consciousness as manifested 
especially in the pllenomena of mediumships and 
possessions. If we might say so, they conducted their 
own psyc11ical research, however rudimentary, and 
however noiseless, it migllt IJave been. We have a 
definite illustration of this kiIld to show that tJ.le 
problem of psychioal researcl1 had attracted their 


attention even in those ",old days. For example, we are 
informed in a passage of the BrihadaraQyaka Upani- 
shad (8. 13) how the sage Bhujyu, the son of 
Lahyayana, in his student days, went to tIle Madra 
country and came to the house of Patafichala, the 
son of Kapi. This Patanchala had a daughter who 
was possessed by a Gandharva, an aerial spirit, and 
who tl1us served as a medium. Bhujyu asked the 
spirit who he (the spirit) was, and received the answer 
that he was Sudhan van, the son of Ajlgiras. On know- 
ing this, Bhujyu asked the spirit two more questions: 
one was as to the actual extent of the world, and the 
other as to where the sons of Parlkshit were, who, 
by the bye, at that time, must have been regarded 
as historical personages. What answer Bhujyu received 
to these questions we are not told: but we see definite- 
ly how Bhujyu must, on account of these questions, 
be regarded as an occultist Wll0 worked according to 
his own lights in llis days on the lines of modern 
Psychical Research. 

15. Finally, we must notice the very great stress 
T P fTh ht that is laid in various passages 
he ower 0 oug. . 
of the UpanIshads 011 what the 
New PSYCl1010gy calls ., Thought-power". U He who 
knows an.d meditates on the foot of Brahman, 
consisting of tIle four quarters as resplende11t, becomes 
(himself) endowed with splendour in tllis world;" 
H he who meditates on the Brahman as lustre oecomes 
llimself illustrious. reaches tile illustrious and bright 
\vorlds ;" U when the SlIn \\'as born, all sorts of shouts 
rose round about him......; lIe w 110 knows this, and 
meditates on the Sun as Brahman, him shall reach 
pleasant shouts from all sides, and shall continue.. yea, 
shall continue;" If if one meditates on Brahman as 

upport, he himself will find support; if as greatness, 




he himself will become great; if as mind, he himself 
will receive honour ; if as the parimaru, of Brahman, 
round about (pari) him shall die (Wtf2') all the enemiEs 
who hate him"; and lastly II he who meditates on 
Brahman as Not-Being, shall himself cease to exist; 
he, on the other hand, who will meditate on Brahnlan 
as Being shall (always) exist; this is what they know" 
(S. 14). We recommend these passages to all those 
who believe in the thaumaturgy of thought. 


16. Modem writers on Psycl10logy give no atten- 
tion to Rational Psychology; they 

Y "ohoe consider it either useless or meta- 
physical. As Prof. James \\"ard 
points out, modern psychologists vie "itll each ot11er 
in writing a psychology ohne See/e. 'I he ancitnt 
conception of Soul has evaporated, and in its place 
we find a self" which is regarded as a II centre of 
interest," and which is supposed to be generated \\Then 
a new interest springs up and destroyed as soon as 
the interest terminates. TIle t
nlpasse into V\Thich such 
a view brings tl1c Psychologists may be realised at a 
glance when "te consider t11at some of them have 
been forced to recognise tIle COlltinua11ce of such a 
bloodless self even after the death of tIle body, and in 
place of the old-world view of an immortal Soul \ve find 
the idea of a tt centre of interest IJ which surVi\leS (I) 
after the death of the body when the interest is not 
fulfilled in the person's life-time. The old-world \liew, 
as in Plato so in the Upanjshads, planted itself squarely 
on the recognition of the Soul as an entity which was 
free to take on a body, as it was also free to go away 
and transmigrate. Whatever the limitatIons of such 
a view, it was a view which one could at least 


stand ; but the modem notion of an anremic Ie -centre 
of interest," which could continue to exist after the 
death of the body, passes absolutely beyond the com. 
prehension of anybody except a metaphysician who 
makes such concessions to naturalism as to make an 
entire farrago of his philosophical ideas. 
17. The first question with which a Rational Psy- 
chology may be concerned is the 
The question of the · f h f h u1 
seat of the soul. qtlestlon 0 t e seat 0 t e so · 
And when this question is asked, it 
is not unusual to answer it by taking a spatial view of 
the habitation of the soul. I t is likely to be ignored 
that the soul is an unextended entity, and that as 
such it is bereft of all spatial connotation. And yet, 
Rational Psychology has concerned itself with a dis- 
cussion of the part or parts of the body with Wl1ich the 
soul comes m9re directly into contact. Prof. James 
says: II In some manner our consciousness is present 
to everything with which it is in relation. I am cogni- 
tively present to Orion whenever I perceive that. constel- 
lation, but I am not dynamically present there, I work 
no effects. To my brain, however, I am dynamically 
present, inasmuch as my thoughts and feelings seem 
to react upon the processes thereof. If, then, by the 
seat of the mind is meant nothing more than the 
locality with which it stands in immediate dynamic 
relations, we are certain to be right in saying that its 
seat is somewhere in the cortex of the brain. HI The 
views that have been held in regard to this question 
have been many and various. I. H. Fichte, as we 
know, supposed that the soul was a space-filling prin- 
ciple. Descartes imagined that the seat of the soul 
was the pineal g]and, while Lotze maintained that the 
,oul must be located somewhere in the U stru.ctureless 
I P';'tJ&i;lu oj PS1,.loU 1. 21.. 

S 18] 



, of the anatomical brain-elements, at which 
point. . . . all nerve-currents may cross and combine." 
We have already seen the opinion of Prof. James that 
if the soul's activity is to be referred to one part of 
the body more than to any other, it ought to be referred 
to the cortex of the brain. Aristotle supposed that the 
seat of the soul was in the heart; and he came to this 
conclusion by observing II (I) that the diseases of the 
heart are the most rapidly and certainly fatal, (2) that 
psychical affections, such as fear, sorrow, and joy cause 
an immediate -disturbance of the heart, {3) and that 
the heart is the part wl1ich is the first to be formed in 
the embryo."I The Upanishadic psychology agrees 
with the Aristotelian in locating the soul in the heart. 
We have already seen how important a part the" peri- 
cardium" plays in the Upanishadic psychology of sleep. 
The Upanishadic pllilosophers felt no difficulty in loca- 
ting the soul in the heart; and it is not till we reach a 
later era in the e\rolution of Indian thought that we find 
that the seat of consciousness is transferred from the 
heart to tIle brain. It is only in the Yogic and the 
Tantric books 2 that the cerebra-spinal s
7stem comes to 
be recognised, and it is there that consciousness comes 
to be referred to the brain instead of to the heart. 

18. In one important Upanishadic passage, however, 
we already find an incipient tran- 
The heart and the sit ion from the one view to the 
brain as seats. 
other. Though in the Upanishads 
as a whole we find that the heart is regarded as the 
seat of the soul, in a passage of the Taittirlya Upani- 
shad, in a very cryptic style and with a good deal of 
prophetic insight, the Upanishad-seer gives his reflec- 
tions as to the way in which the soul in the heart 

I Hammond, Aristotle's Psychology p, xxiii. 
2 Vide Seal's PositivI S,i,nus 01 llu A.""",, Hi"tlfU PP. 21'-219. 

es by a passage through the bones of the palate 
right up to the skull where the hairs are made to 
part, and on the way greets the Brahman who is 
his lord and master. It is important to remember 
that while the soul in the heart is characterised as 
the manom.Q.ya purusha, the Brahman that resides in 
the brain is called manasaspati, the soul's overlord. 
"What we know as the space inside the heart, 
therein is this immortal golden being, namely mind 
(or soul). What we know as hanging like a nipple 
between the bones of the palate, through it is the 
entrance to the LordI on the passage right up to the 
skull where the hairs are made to part. BhulJ. . 
Bh1t1 J a!z. . . . Suva!J. . . . . . M aha?t-when these (mystic) 
\\'orris are uttered, tl1e soul moves right up to 
Rral1n1an. T11e soul gains autonomy, joins the Ruler 
of mind (or soul), becomes the lord of speech, the 
lord of sight, the lord of hearing, the lord of know- 
ledge, brcom(
s (in short) the Brahman \vho bodies 
himsflf forth in sI)aCe" (5. IS). A great deal of difficulty 
has been experienced in the interpretation of this 
passage. The rJassage no doubt tells us that the sense- 
centres as ,veIl as the intc11ect-centre are to be referred 
to the brain, inasmuch as it says that the soul can 
obtain master}? o\
er these only by moving to the brain 
from the 11c3.rt; }'ct, tIle actual path which has been 
inclicate(l ill the a
ove passage cannot be traced with- 
out difficult
r. ""hat is the II nipple-like" appearance of 
\vhich the l'fpanisharl speaks? Is it the uvula, or the 
raituitary bod)1? Deusscn and Max Muller have both 
detstoo(1 it to be the uvula. Are we then to under- 
stand that tIle Upanishad-p11ilosopher was so struck 

J Indra, e1sewher
 paraphrased as Idandra. breAkin, '"'OfII. 'il ,It..,': ct. 
.lf t 
 ;Jrq 6rq
 6:trllfJ: t;
\tar q ij <arJr qr {Ir f{ 

: I 
. 1. 3-14- 

S 19] 



by the inexplicably hanging uvula that he regarded 
it to be the door to the overlord of soul, and are we 
to understand that Deu
sen and Max Miiller took into 
account the experiences of the mystic \\rho regards the 
uvula as the medium by which he comes to taste the 
nectar \vhich oozes in the state of ecstasy from the 
ventricles of the brain into the pharynx? Or, are we 
to suppose that the Upanishad-philosopher was so 
fortunate as to witness a skull dissected open and to 
observe that the pituitary body is situated just above 
the pair of bones of the hard palate, and then to be 
able to suppose that the sou] in the heart could travel 
along the course of the sympathetic nerves to the 
pituitary body, and through it move further to its over- 
lord in the lateral ventricle, around which, in the .grey 
matter, are sittlated the various special sense-centres? 
The latter interpretation is not improhable: but one 
does not know' whether the Upanishad-philosopher 
knew anatomy enough to trace the actual path, or 
was interested in occultism enough to see the path 
with his mental eye! 

19. llowever this may be on the physiological side, 
\\1e IT1ay say that the U pallis}ladic 
The relation of the I . 1 h d fi . 1 · d h 
body and the soul. P }) O;;Ol1 ers e nltc y raIse t e 
psychologica1 question of the rela- 
tion bet\veen body and soul. The !\iaitri Upanishad, 
tllOUgh it is a late U l'anishad, raises the question of an 
efficient canse, and in Platonic fashion endows the soul 
with tIle power of motion. I t tells us that there were 
certain sages in ancient times cal1erl the Valakhi1}73.s who 
went to the Prajapati Kratu and asked him who was tile 
driver of th
 chariot of the body: U The body, vene. 
rable Sir, is verily like an unmoving cart; may your 
Honour be pleased to tell us if )'OU know who is the 
mover of it." And the U p a'1ish ad tells us that the 

answer which they elicited from the PrajDrpati was 
that the mover of the body-chariot was the soul, 
"the pure tranquil, imperishable, unborn entity who 
stands independently in his own greatness" (5. 16. a). 
Moreover, the Kaushitaki Upanishad tells us that the 
soul must be regarded as the master of all bodily 
faculties, the lord of all sense-functions: " As a razor 
is placed in the razor-case, or fire in the fire-hearth, 
similarly does this conscious self pervade the body up 
to the very hairs and nails. These senses depend 
upon the soul as the relatives upon the rich man. As 
the rich man feeds with his kinsmen, and as the kinsmen 
feed on the rich man, even so does this conscious self 
feed with the senses and the senses feed on the self" 
(S. r6. b). Thi
 passage tells us how the various bodily 
senses are dependent on the self and how the self is 
immanent in the whole body. 
20. The passage quoted above leads to the view 
T that the soul fills the whole of the 
he history of the .. . 
8patial extension oftbe body, a doctnne whIch IS not un- 
BOul. likely to have led to the Jaina 
doctrine that as large as the body is, even so large 
is the soul,-that the soul of the elephant is as large as 
the body of the elephant, while the soul of the ant is 

nly as large as the body of the ant-" hastiPudgalam 
pr apy a hastiPudgalo bhavati, piPzlik ap udgalam pr apy a 
piPilikapudgalo bhavati." This is the reductio ad absur. 
dum of a belief in the extended nature of soul, 
which will not allow us to think of the soul except 
under spatial limitations. The history of the doctrine 
of the space-filling nature of the soul as advanced in 
the Upanishads is a very interesting one. In the 
BrfuadaraQyaka Upanishad we are told that II the 
intelligent luminous self in the heart is as small as 
a grain of rice or barley, and yet it is the ruler 0 




all and lord of all, overruling all this and whatsoever 
else exists" (5. 17. a). In a passage of the Katha 
Upanishad, as well as elsewhere, we find that the soul is 
no longer conceived as of the size of a mere grain of rice 
or barley, but is thought to be of the size of a thumb 
-an idea which plays a very important part in the 
Upanishads: II The soul, who is the lord of all things 
that have been and that are to be, and is therefore 
over-a\ved by none of them, is of the measure of a thumb 
and dwells in the midpart of the body (that is, in the 
heart) " (S. 17. b). In a passage of the Chha,ndogya 
Upanishad, the soul is understood as not of the size 
of a thumb, but of the measure of a span (5. 17. c). 
The soul is here called U pradesamatra" and II abhi- 
vimana." These words have occasioned a very great 
difficulty to tl
e commentators. Sankaracha,rya, who 
understands the soul as all-pervading, cannot bring 
himself to be reconciled to the statement that the 
soul should be merely a span long, pradeSamatra. I 
Now the word pradesa is really an important word. 
In the Amaral{osha,2 it is understood as meaning a 
span, as also in the lVledinlkosha. 3 Sailkaracharya 
himself knew that the word pradesa was " elsewhere " 
used in the sense of a span, 4 whicl1 his scholiast A nan- 
dagiri explains as being the meani11g of the word in 
jabalasruti. According to Sankara, the \\
ord pradesa 
elsewhere signified not merely a span's length btlt 
I This is the reason why he explains the expression as 


!iTi6 ];fr

2 1tT

 aa I II. 6. 83. The Commenta- 
tor explains Jf1C:{t by saying that it means a

atgg: I 
3 srr
tl4il _ 
16,;ra I 
:u\.C(i(J' SI 
fag '{f6 sr
 ctact'tq{a- I « ; 

 I C. OD i1i V. 18. x. 

the .span's length from the forehead to the chin. ' This 
is a very significant fact as we shall presently see. 
In the Mahabharata, I Bhimasena has been described 
as being a span's length tal1
r than his younger brother 
Arjuna. In the Maitri Upanishad; 2 the word pra- 
deSa has manifestly the same meaning. Under these 
circumstances it is but nattlral that tbe word pradesa 
in the passage which we are discussing may be taken 
to mean a span, especia]]y, as Sankara points out, 
the span's length between the forehead and the chin. 
The word II abhi'iimana " has a
so caused a great deal 
of difficulty. The interpretation which Sankaracharya 
has put upon it, and with which Deussen, Max Mii11er 
and Rajendralal Mitra l1ave alJ agreed, seems after all 
to be an unnattlral intcrpretatioll. Thus Sai11{ara 3 ex- 
plains the word as meaning one \vho knows l1imself- 
the Kantian "! am I" -an interpretation which does not 
come out of the expression II abllivimana." I)eussen 4 
translates the whole passage in a \\ray whicll ollly sup- 
ports the meaning of Sankara so far as t11e word 
U abhivimana " is concerned: ., Wer aper diesen A tman 
Vaisvanara so [zeigend] als eine Spanne gross auf sich 
selbst (abhi) bezogen (vint a na) verehrt, der isst die 
N ahrung in alIen Welten, in alIen Wesen, in alIen 
Iax Miilier s translates (I abllivimana" as, 
(( identical with himself," while Rajendralal Mitra 6 
says it means H the principal object indjcated by the 
pronoun I.'" All these interpretations err in under- 
I sprrutrr 
'l6;:r: srr


 I Ii. 
r. v. 51. 19. 
: 1R
at l1
fa ) 
VI. 38. 
3 sr
f1ffl uqf
fCltlI;r:, C. on ute 
V. 18. I. 
4 Sechzig Upanishad's pp. 1.5°-151. 
5 Sacred Books (If the East Vol. I. p. 88 
6 Twelve Princi1'8. 1 Upanishads. by Tuk8.l'Am Tatya p. $7 8 , 

! 21 ] 



standing too much by the preposition abhi. By no 
manipulation, however clever, could the meaning of 
It self" be extracted out of it as Deussen and others 
have tried to do. Wauld it not be much more natural 
to understand" abhivimana " as meaning simply It mea- 
suring"? The expression "pradesamatram abhivi- 
man am " could then be understood as equivalent 
to It measuring the span's length from the forehead to 
the chin," and the interpretation of the whole pas- 
sage becomes easy: "He who worships the Self as 
measuring the span's length from the foreheac1 to the 
chin, and as existing in all men, he enjoys food in all 
worlds, in all beings, and in all selves." In fact, we 
are asked in this passage to worship the Soul \v110 re- 
sides in the span's distance bet"veen tIle fore11ead 
and the chin, and who is therefore the master of 
the head, which by a consensus of opinion is recognis- 
ed in Hindu thought as the " uttamanga " or the best 
part of the body. No wonder that Prof. James could 
trace the feeling of Self in certain cephalic movements 
of his, and say that II tIle Self of sel\res, wIlen care- 
fully examined, is found to consist mainly of the col- 
lection of tllcse peculiar motions in the head, or bet- 
ween the head a11d tIle throat."I 

21. We have llitllerto seen some of the stages in the 
logical, 110t necessarily historical, 
The soul, both infini- . . 
tely large and infinitely evolutIon of the idea of the extension 
small. of the soul. Being first regarded 
as merely of tilC size of a grain of rice or barle)t, it \vas 
then regarded as of the size of a thumb, and later of tile 
size of a span, wllilc we have also seen that tIle I
taki Upanishad speaks of the soul as filling the whole 
extent 0-£ the body and being hidden in it as the razor 
is hidden in a razor-case. We now come to treat of 

I Principles of Psychology I. 301. 


the idea of the soul as not being restricted to any 
part of the body, but being verily iBfinite and 
occupying all space. The MU:QQaka Upanishad speaks 
of the "eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, subtle, 
and imperishable Soul who is the origin of all beings, 
and whom the wise alone can perceive," and the 
Katha Upanishad lends its support to this statement 
by saying that C'the wise man ceases to grieve 
when he has known this great all-pervading Soul" 
(5. 17. d). The Maitri Upanishad, not being able to 
choose between the rival theories about the size of the 
soul, offers an easy eclecticism by combining all of them 
together in a promiscuous statement. It tells us that 
a man cc reaches the supreme state by meditating on 
the soul, who is smaller than an aton1, or else of the 
size of the thumb, or of a span, or of tIle whole body" 
(5. 17. e). In this promiscuous stateme11t it is difficult 
to make out whicll theory this Upanishad advocates. 
An alternative interpretation of the passage can also 
be offered, as it has been offered by Cowell and Max 
Miiller, folloWing the commentator Ramatlrtlla, but to 
say as Ramatirtlla says tllat the soul is II of the size 
of a thumb in the span-sized heart ill the body" does 
not lessen diffic.tl1ties. 1
hat the Upanishadic philoso- 
phers felt the necessity of reconciling such contrary 
statelnents as tllat the soul is only of the s
ze of a 
grain of rice or barle)T, and t11at it is all-pervading and 
omnipresent, may be seen from a passage in the Katha 
Upanishad which asks us to believe the contradiction 
that It the soul of the living being is subtler than the 
subtle, and yet greater than the great, and is placed in 
the cavity of t.he heart," -a statement which, with 
equal seeming contradiction, is corroborated by the 
philosopher of the Chhandogya .Upanishad who says: 
II My soul in the heart is smaller than a grain of rice 
or barley, or a mustard or a canary seed ; and yet my 




soul, which is pent up in the heart, is greater than the 
earth, greater than the sky, greater than the heaven, 
greater than all these worlds" (S. 17. f). The Nemesis 
of the theory which attributes a spatial extension to 
the soul lies just in these contradictions, and there is 
no way out of tile difficulty except on the supposition 
that the soul transcends all spatial limitations. 
22. And yet, so far as the soul comes to inhabit the 
body, it must be recognised as 
Analysis of the 8ta tes. .. 
of consciousness. passIng through certaIn psychIcal 
states; and the analysis which the 
MitI.1Qukya Upallishad makes of the four states of con.. 
sciousness must be regarded as \rery acute, and consider- 
ing the date of its prodllction, wholly extraordinary. 
The credit which a modern psychologist gives to Swami 
Vivekanallda for having introduced the conception of 
the at superconscious" in psychology must be rightfully 
given to the author of the Ma1].qukya Upanishad. 
There are not merely the three obvious states of con- 
sciousness, says the philosopher of this Upanishad, but 
a fourth must also be recognised, which correspond
to what is usually called the ,. superconscious." But 
the word superconscious in our opinion is an unhappy 
word to designate this fourth state: to speak of a 
.f' superconscious state of consciousness" is to utter 
a solecism. And so, we here propose to use the word 
U self-conscious" to designate this fourth state. The 
soul, then, according to the Upanishad, experiences 
four chief states, namely, those of wakefulness, dream J 
deep sleep, and pure self-consciousness: "This soul 
is four-footed (that is, has four conditions). The 
first condition is that of wakefulness, when the soul is 
conscious only of external objects and enjoys the gross 
things, and then it is to be called Vaisvanara. The 
second condition is that of dreaming, when the soul 


is conscious of internal objects and enjoys the subtle 
things, and then it is called Taijasa. When the 
person in slecI) desires no desires, and dreams no 
dreams, that state is to be called the state of sound 
sleep. Thus, the third condition of the soul is that of 
sounel sleep, when being centred in itself and being 
full of knowledge and bliss, it feeds on bliss: it is then 
called Pra,jfia. The fOllrth state of the soul is that 
of pure self-consciousness, when there is no know- 
ledge of internal objects nor of external ones, nor of 
the two togetJler ; when the soul is not a mass of in-' 
telligence, transcending as it does both consciousness 
and unconsciousness; "'when it is invisible, uncommu- 
nicable, incomprehensible, indefinable; when it is 
beyond thought and beyond the possibility of any 
indication, being virtually the quintessence of self- 
intuition, in which all the five kinds of sensation are 
finally resolved; when it is tranquil and full of auspi- 
ciousness and without a second: it is then to be called 
Atman" (5. 18). 

23. This recognition of the four chief states of in- 
dividual consciousl1ess, the waking, 
The microcosm and the dreaming the sleeping and the 
the macrocosm. . ' , 
self-conscIous, as well as the names 
which are assigned to the soul in these states, namely 
those of Vaisvanara, Taijasa, Prajfia, and Atman, have 
played a very large part in the later more systematized 
Vedanta. This is the reason why the M3¥Qukya Upani. 
shad has been regarded as a late Upanishad. But 
it is to be noted that the Upanishad does not make 
mention of the corresponding four stateS of the con- 
sciousness of the Cosmic Self. In later Vedanta, the 
Cosmic Self as it passes through its four states 
comes to be called the Viraj, HiraI}.yagarbha, ISa and 
Brahman respectively. Corresponding to the foUt 

 24 ] 



aspects of the microcosm, there come to be recognised 
the four aspects of the "makranthropos," a decidedly 
better word to use thaI1 (, macrocosm ". TIle Cosmic 
consciousness comes to be regarded as corresponding 
state by state to the Individual consciousness, and 
what is in the Individual comes to be fOtlnd also in the 
World. Evell though this idea is not fully brought 
out in the Upanishads, we already trace in them 
an incipient tendency towards that view. Leib- 
nitz's theory of representation is already present in 
the Chhandogya Upanishad: "Within tllis city of 
Brahman (this body), there is a small lotus-like place 
(the heart), and within it a small internal space; 
that which is within this small space is worthy of 
search and understanding.... Of tIle very kind as 
this outer space is, of the same kind is this internal 
space inside the heart; both heaven and earth are 
contained within it, both fire and air, both the sun and 
the mOOD, both the lightning and the stars" (5. 19). 
Here we see the root of the theory that the individual 
is to be regarded as the world in miniature, and the 
world only the individual writ large, and that the indi- 
vidual object serves as a mirror in which the whole 
of reality is reflected-a theory to which Leibnitz gives 
expression when he says: " In the smallest particle of 
matter, there is a world of creatures, living beings, 
animals, entelechies, souls. Each portion of matter 
may be conceived as like. . . .a pond full of fishes."I 

24. Another interesting problem in connection with 
the Upanishadic psychology is the 
The "sheaths II of problem of the so-called sheaths 
the soul. d " f h I W all 
or bo les 0 t e sou. e 
know what imp9rtance has been attached to the con- 
ception of these II bodies of man II by modem Theoso- 
I Konadolol7 61-67. 

phists. Corresponding to these bodies, they have also 
recognised seven different planes, on which, according 
to them, the several bodies of man keep functioning. 
Thus, the various planes which they recognise may be 
said to be respectively the physical, the astral, the 
mental, the intuitional, the spiritual, the monadic, and 
the divine. Let us see what justification there can be 
for such a \Tiew in the light of the theory which the 
Upanishads advance. In fact, the only Upanishad 
where we find mention of a theory of tIns kind is the 
Taittiriya Upanishad. In the second chapter of this 
Upanishad, we are told that (t within this physical 
body which is made up of food, is another body which 
is made up of vital air ; the former is filled with the 
latter, whicll is also like the shape of man. More 
internal than the body which is made up of vital air is 
another body which consists of mind; the former is 
filled with the latter, wl1ich is again like unto the shape 
of man. More inten1aI still t11an the mental body is 
another body which is full of intelligence; the former 
is filled with tl1e latter, which is again like unto the 
'shape of man. Finally, still more internal than this 
body of intellIgence is another body consi
ting of bliss; 
the former is filled with the latter, which still is like 
the shape of man" (5. 20. a). Here we are told that 
various bodies are pent up within this physical body,- 
as if the physical body were like a Pandora's box,- 
that the wise man is he who knows that there are 
what may be called by sufferance the physical, astral, 
mental, intuitional, and beatific · t bodIes U of man, 
that every internal body is enclosed within an external 
one, and, finally, that all these bodies have the shape 
of man. It was possibly such a passage as this which 
has been responsible for spreading such a notion as 
that of the "paficha-koSas" or the five bodies of 
mst.n . 

25 ] 



25. Among modem Theosophists, tllis theory has 
assumed quite an extraordinary 
Limitations of a. t Th th . d bi 
modern interpretation. ImpOr anee. e e enc OU e, 
they say, is exactly like the shape 
of the 11uman body) that it lingers a few days after 
the death of the physical body, that the etheric 
double of a child lingers only for three days after its 
death but that in the case of an adult it may linger for 
a sufficiently long til11C to allow for the penod of 
mourning, that in dreams \vhile we are haviQg the 
curious experience of flying like a bird in mId-air 
or swimming like a fisll in the seas I it is our etheric 
doub]e which by a I{ind of endosmosis is transmitting its 
experience into tile physical body, that the scheme of 
the five bodies mentioned in t11c Upanisllads is only a 
description of the" manifest" bodies of man, and that 
over and above these, there are two more "unmanifest" 
bodies which may be called tl1e Monadic and the Divine, 
the Anupadaka and the Adi, or in Buddhistic termino- 
logy, the Parinirval)a and the MahaparinirvaI)a. So far 
as we apprehend it, the general mistake of this theory 
consists in taking words for t11ings, in refusing to see 
that what arc by sufferance called the "bodies" of 
man in the Upanishads are nothing more tllan mere 
allegorical representations of certain psycllological 
conceptions. Man is made up of a physical body, of 
"ital air, of mind and intellect, and of the faculty 
\vhich enables him to enjoy an ecstatic 9€t.t)p
0l. Tllis 
only is what is meant by the passage in question. 
To ignore its mere psychological aspect and to })[o- 
ceed to erect an occultist philosophy upon the doc- 
trine is hardly justifiable. The great Sankara did 
recognise tl1e "kosas," bl1t he understood them as 
having merely an ideal existence. We have to dis- 

I The Spencerians would explain these experiences as being due to a renl- 
nant of racial experience that may have been transmitted to the individual, 

criminate in thought (viveka), I he sa)Ts the five differ- 
ent kosas, and to find our true Self beyond the physical 
body, beyond the "'vx
 or vital principle, beyond the 
mind and intellect, and beyond even our beatific 
consciousness. He wavers, 2 however, in deciding as 
to whether we should identify the Brahman with 
beatific consciousness, or whether we should even 
penetrate beyond it to find the Brahman; but in any 
case, he insists that the koSas or sheaths have no real 
existence, and that a theory which is built upon the 
conception of the sheaths is a theory which is U built 
. . " 
upon Ignorance. 

26. That the words it anna, pra1.1 a , manas, vijfiana, 
Th bl f and ananda " are not to be under- 
e pro em 0 .. 
Sheaths, at bottom tbe stood as meanIng verItable sheaths 
problem of Substance. 
may be seen by reference to a 
celebrated passage in the third chapter of the same 
Taittirlya lTpanishad, where the author is discussing 
what should be regarded as the cP
 of things; and 
he rules out of order the theories that "matter," Hlife," 
I. mind," or tt intellect" could be regarded as the prin
ciple of tllings, and comes to the conclusion that 
" intuitive bliss" alone deserves to be regarded as the 
source of reality. The seer of that Upanisllad makes 
Bhrigu approach his father VaruI).a, and ask him about 
the nature of ultimate reality. The father directs 
t aJiTSffOf Jti{)
l{fQr "r;t
rm;rrJt I 

l.f aT

2 Contrast his C. on TaittirIya. III. 6 
l tJlr (




 aq-\ct vt

!I: with C. on TaittirIya 
II. 2 

q etl.t,it lfta

(f(air im' 
: urwlf 

<i tR'5)urq;rzR;r 








him to practise penance and learn the truth for him... 
self; he only gives him the hint that the ultimate prin- 
ciple should be one It from \vhich things spring, in 
which they live, and into which they are finally re- 
solved." The boy after practising penance returns 
.to his father and tells him that food (or matter) may 
be regarded as the principle of things. The father is 
not satisfied, and asks hin1 to practise penance again. 
The son conles back with the answer that vita1 air 
may be regarded as the principle, and so on. The 
father is not satisfied with the successive al1swers 
which his son brings him, namel)7, that the ultimate 
reality may be regarcled as \
ital air, mind, or intellect, 
and \vhen the son finally brings the answer that it may 
be beatific consciousness which may be regarded as the 
source of all things whatsoever, the lTpanishad breaks 
off, and we have no means of knowing \\7hether the 
father was satisficd with the final answer. We are 
on1y told that t11is l)iece of l\:nowledge shall be forever 
mysteriously known as the Bha.rgavI VanlQY Vidyl 
and that tl1is is "exalted in the highest heaven" 
(5. 20. b), meaning thereby that it is honoured even 
amongst the gods. 

27. \Ve now pass on to di
cuss the question of 
Th Id f T Transmigration in the U p anishads , 
e ea 0 rans- 
mlQratioD, an Ar).an but \ve cannot tlnderstand its full 
Idea. · . fi 1 · 
sIgnl cance un ess we see It on 
its backgrotlnrl, namel)' the form Wl1ich it takes in 
pre-Upanishadic literature. The question of Trans.. 
migration may fitly be regarded as the crux of 
Early Indian P11ilosophy. \\7e l1a\'e been often told 
that the ic1ea of Transmigration is of a very- late 
origin in Indian thought, that it did not exist at 
the time of the 
igvYeda, that it was an un-Aryan Idea, 
that, as Professor Macdonell puts it, "it seems mort 

probable that the Aryan- settlers received the first jm-
pulse in this direction from the aboriginal inhabitants 
of India,"I that even though II the Aryan Indians bor- 
rowed the idea from the aborigines, they certainly 
deserve the credit of having elaborated out of it the 
theory of an unbroken chain of existences, intimately 
connected with the moral principle of requital." 
Having said that the idea of Transmigration is of un- 
Aryan origin and that it was received from the abori- 
gines by the Indian Aryans, Professor Macdonell is 
obliged to account for the appearance of the same idea 
in Pythagoras by saying that the ct dependence of 
Pythagoras on Indian philosophy and science certainly 
seems to have a high degree of probability. . . . . . The 
doctrine of metempsychosis in the case of Pythagoras 
appears without any connection or explanatory back- 
ground, and was regarded by the Greeks as of foreign 
origin. He could not have deriv'ed it from Egypt, as 
it was not known to the ancient Egyptians."2 Since 
the app
arance of Herr Rohde's book en Psyche, Seelen- 
kult and U nsterblichkeitsglaube der Griee/zen in 1894, we 
have come to see that the real source of a belief in 
transmigration among any people, under certain cir- 
cumstances, lies in their own ethno-psycl10logical de- 
velopment, and not in an unproven or unprovable 
inter-influence from one cotU1try to another. It is 
upon this fruitful hypothesis that we can see the 
upspringing and the continuance of the idea of trans- 
gration among the Greeks fron1 Homer downwards 
through Orpheus to Pythagoras in their own native 
t i
 :upon the same hypothesis that we can see. 

 _ QevelopJIlent of the same idea among the Indian 

 fro11;1 the I.Ogveda through the Brahma
as to 
e - Ppanishads, without invoking the aid of any 

I - 

- I History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 387. 
.3, Loc. cit. p. 422. 




unwarrantable influence from the ab
rigines of I
And thus, the idea of transmigration, so far from 

eing merely an un-Aryan importation in Aryan 
thought, appears clearly to devlop stage by- stage in 
Aryan thought itself. 
28. It is q\lite true that in the major part of the 
ration in 
igveda, the idea of Transmigra- 
the Rfiveda: the Xtb tion seems conspicuous by its ab- 
Mandala. h f 1 d . 
sence. The c eer u an JOYous 
attitude of the Indian Aryans made it impossible' for 
them to think too much of the life after death. They 
believed in the world of the gods, and they believed in 
the world of the fathers, and they (lid not care to be- 
lieve in a11ything else. I twas sl1fficient for them to 
know that the g'odly men went to a Heaven which 
overflowed with honey, I and that the commonalty 
went to a world where Yama had the privilege first to 
go and to gather a number of men about him,
a not 
uncovetable place, it seems, II of which it was impossi... 
hIe that anybody could be robbed."2 Even though, 
then, we grant that tIle idea of Transmigration is not 
very conspicuous in the greater portion of the 
it remains at the same time equally true that, in cer- 
tain other places, an approach is being made to the 
idea of Transmigration. The first stage in the evo1u- 
tion of this idea consists in taking an animistic or 
hylozoistic view of the world. In a verse of the 16th 
hymn of the tenth MaI}.q.ala which is devoted to the des- 
cription of a funeral occasion, the eye of the dead man. 
I '(ff{

t ;rU 

(f I 

UI): q"( q{il Jl\CJ 31«,: II SIt. 
- i. 154. S. 
sa .


crr a- t ' 

 6mTijf: qarr 
: II 
.. I . . .. . 
x. 14. 2. 

Aas bet». Siked by the Seer r to move back to the Sun 
which b its analogue in the makranthroposl the a1z1
to th
 wind which is its analogue, and the animus has 
been di.rected to go to the hea,'en or to the earth accord- 
ing to its qualities (dharma), or else tQ move even to 
the waters or the plants if it so st1ited it. 1 This ,Terse 
instead of expressing tran
migration proper may be 
&aid to be putting forth certain hints towards an ani- 
mistic or hvlozoi
tic ".iew of the world; 11ut the word 
dharma which It introduces is a ver
l significant word. 
It is the earliest trace of a theor)7 of, especially 
as the soul is asked to go to heaven or to earth accord- 
ing to its qt1alit i es. But a still more definite passage 
is found in another hymn of tl1e tenth Mat)Qala of the 
I.Ugveda, where a hylozoism is advocated wit11 e\ycn 
greater stress. There \ve definitely ]{now that the 
whole hymn 2 is addresseel to a dCI)artcd spirit, and the 
poet says that he is going to recall the departed soul 
in order that it may return again and live. The poct 
says that the spirit Wllich I-las gone far a\vay to the 
world of death he will recall and make live once more. 
The spirit, he continues, It ,vhich may bav"e gone to 
heaven or earth or to the four-cornered globe" \VhlCh 
may have been diffused in the various quarters or have 
taken resort in the waves of the sea or the beams of the 
light, which may 11ave enso111ed the waters or the herbs, 
or gone to the StIn or the dawn, or rested on tIle moun- 
tains, or which may ha\:'c spread through the \vhole 
universe and become identical ,vitIl tl1e past and the 
future " -that sou1, says tl1e poet, he \vill recall by 
means of his song, and mal
e it take on a tenement. 
t ,-q 
T 'li 
 'lltt::t1 :q 

Ufr , 
- em 
rt Q'I {{ i((j aUttcfr3 Sliafair {ltl': II 
6. ,. 

s Iti..... x.,'.I-aa!' 




Too great a belief in the power of song I But the fact 
remains that the whole hymn breathes an atmosphere 
of hylozoism, and the poet makes us feel that a soul 
is not wholl
T lost after bodily death, being mixed with 

- he elements. 

29. But is hylozoism the final word of the I.Ugveda? 
°rran.mlgratlon In By no means. We have one very 
tbe Rigveda: the 1st characteristic hymn of the R . ig- 
veda which, ,ve fear, has not been 
noticed with e,ren a tithe of the attention which it 
reall)7 deser\Tes. The meaning which Roth.. and Boht- 
lingk and Geldner have fOtlnd in at least two verses of 
the hymn has been strangely o\rerlooked, and it is 
wonderful that people keep sa)7ing that the idea of 
Transmigration is not to be found in the J.Qgveda. 
The hymn we refer to is the great riddle-hymn of the 

igveda, i. 164. It consists of fifty-two verses 
breathes throughout a sceptico-mystica1 atmosphere. 
It says that He who made all this does not himself 
probably know its real nature, I and it sets such a 
high price on the mystical kno,vledge which it glori- 
fies that anyone who comes to be in possession of this 
knowledge:- so tile hymn proclaims.. may be said to be 
his father's father. 2 It is no doubt true that even 
though the hymn occurs in the first MaI}.Qa1a of the 

ig\?eda, it IS not for that reason to be understood 
as belonging to the oldest part of the 
igveda. For 
example, it advocates a facile unity of godhood,3 which 
is only a later development of thought. It quotes the 
3: tf f 

)$(q it
 , SK. I. 164. 3 2 . 
a i6fcN: i
: \J i
r f:qi6a <;Jar 
3t(;rr({ v jq

tl , 
",. L 164. r6. 
 vfPr fl!tfl 
 JlRfR IiTt1R'J : " iJr. 
1. 164. 46. 

very' same' verse I : - which we find in .the celebrated 
Purushasukta, wl1ich 'has been rightly recognise
one of the late productions of the Vedic 
riod. It 
even contains the famous verse 2 on the U Two Birds " 
which later plays such an important -part in the 
MUQQaka Upanishad. All these things point unmista- 
kably to the fact that the hymn of the 
igveda which 
we are considering must be regarded as a late hymn of 
igveda, even though it has the privilege of being 
included in the canon of the first Mandala. Never- 
. . 
theless, the fact remains that the very important re- 
velations which it makes on the subject of the idea of 
transmigration have been strangely neglected. In 
spite of the Herakleitean style in which the whole hymn 
has been composed, in spite of the fact that it contains 
allusions to such various conceptions as those of the 
Fire, the Cow and the Calf, and the First-born of the 
Law, a psychological vein is ever present through the 
whole hymn, and among other things, the reference to 
the Ie Two Birds," namely the individual soul and the 
universal S0111, makes it unmistakable that the poet is 
darkly expressing, in his own metaphorical way, his 
ideas about the nature of soul and the relation 
between the individual and universal souls. For ex- 
ample, the poet asks us, who has ever seen the precise 
mode in which the boneless soul, the very life-blood 
and informing spirit of the earth, comes to inhabit a 
bony tenement? And if a man did not know this 
himself, who has ever moved out of himself and gone 
to the wise man to receive illumination on it?a Then 
I d;r 

(1)r srtmfHt
 I $ft. I. 16 4. 59- 
2 IJ gqorf 


" q-


Ia't l{;r 


 II 9ft. I. 16 4. 17. 
3 'lit 



 cit ftrtiqq1Jf
 II 'It. 
L I6




the seer says categorically that this breathing, spe'ed- 
ful, moving life-principle is firmly established inside 
these tenements of clay. I Moreover he tells us that 
the _ immortal principle, conjoined with the mortal 
one, moves Backwards and forwards by virtue qf 
its natural power; but the wonder of it is, the poet 
goes on to say, that the mortal and immortal elements 
keep moving ceaselessly in opposite directions, with 
the result that people are al)le to see the one, but are 
unable to see the other. 2 These two last. versec; .were 
regarded by Roth and.Bohtlin
 and Geldner as against 
Oldenberg to have supplied sufficient evidence as to 
the proof of tIle existence of tIle idea of transmigration 
in the 
igveda, as they rightly thought that the 
verses tell us that the soul is a lTIo\ring, speedfullife- 
principle which comes and goes, nl0ves backwards 
and forwards, comes in contact with the body and tllen 
moves from it in the opposite direction. Oldenberg 15 
evidently \vrong when he understands verse 38 to- re- 
fer to the morning and eve11ing stars, as he must ac- 
knowledge that the '
erse speaks of tIle n10rtal a11d 
immortal principles. But tIle culminating point 01 
the whole doctrine is reached when the poet tells us 
that he himself saw (probablj' ,vitI1 his mind's eye) 
the guardian of the body, moving unerringly by back- 
ward and forward paths, clothed ill collected and 
diffusive splendour, and that it kept on ,eturl,ti1tg inside the mundane regions. 3 That this 
 guardiall" is no other than the soul may be seen 
qTg \;tfq+r
 "\({ au q

 I =:ft. I. 164. 30. 
f6 'q
r ;z

rsJJflif JT

n';r: I 


6T ;:
;{ f;:rI

iL II ==R:. 
I. 16 4. 38. 
. 'itcrr"
r :q qU 'tf 
..rorJI. I 
JtMt: " 
akfr;r 8fT If(}


f(ftf II 
. . 
, . . I. 164. 3 1 . 


 the way in which verse 31 follows immediately 
on verse 3 0 which mentions the " breathing, speed
moving life-principle "; moreover, the frequentatlve 
(var;varli) tells us the frequency of the so
l's ret
m t.o 
tbis world. It was with this idea uppermost In hIS 
mind that the poet talks, in Herakleitean fashion, of 
those who come hither as those who are moving away, 
and those who are moving back as already returning 
hither U as Herakleitos should tall{ of the gods being 
I , 
mortals and the men immortals. 
30. We have been 6bliged to make this long sur- 
Tbe ethno-psycho- vey of the Vedic idea of life after development of death onl y in order to P rove that 
the Idea of Transmigra- 
tiOD. the three chief moments in the 
idea of Transmigration, namely the passage of the soul 
from the body, its habitation in other forms of exis- 
tence like t11e plants or the waters, and even its re- 
turn to the human form, are all implicitly found even 
so far back as the times of the 
igvYeda; and wIlen 
these are coupled with the incipient idea of the quality 
of action (dltar1na) which determines a future exis- 
tence, we see that there is no reason why we should 
persist in saying that the idea of Transmigraticll is an 
un-Aryan idea, that the Indians borroV\Ted it from the 
lan aborigines of India, and that in son1e in- 
explicable way t11e idea found el1tranc.e in other 
countries and cults beyond India. On the principles 
of ethnic psychology, almost e\
ery nation contam
within it the possibility of arriving at the idea of 
Transmigration from within its own proper psychologi- 
cal development; and there is no more reason why 
we should say that Greece borrowed the idea of Trans- 
migration from India than we might say that Egypt 
I itS«l

' 0 '«I'- 
rFf Iilus.
ar 3" 8fqf
 8frl: II !It. 
L 16+ 19- 




herself borrowed it from India. If Prof. Keith l 
acknowledges that the Egyptians themselves belie\Ted 
in the possibility of a dead man It returning to wander 
on earth, visiting the places he had loved in life, or 
again changing himself into a heron, a swallow, a 
snake, a crocodile or a girl," there is no justification 
for saying, as he does, that It this is indeed transmigra- 
tion, but a different transmigration from eit1)er that 
of Greece or India." Whenever there is recognised 
the possibility of the soul coming to inhabit a body as 
a god-like principle from without, wherever it is sup- 
posed that the soul could likewise part from the body 
as it came, wherever it is thought that the soul 
after partIng from the body cotl1d lead a life ()f disem- 
bodied existence, a11d vvhere"\rer it is supposed to re- 
turn again to the eartl} and inllabit any fOfl11 of exis- 
tence whatsoeyer, there is a kind of life con- 
ceived for the soul from which the step to actual Trans.. 
migration is not very far removed; while the cro\vning 
idea in transmigra tion J namel y 
 that of ;'vd<#vr;(Tl
 is a 
product of very late gro\vth, and even though it is 
found in py..thagoras and Plato and the Indian s
of Yoga, we have no reason to attribute it definitely 
to the VedIc seers or to the Upanishadic philo.sophers, 
unless perhaps ,ve scent it in the rather unconscious 
utterance of the 
age Vamade,ra that he ,vas in a formeI 
life U Manu or tIle Sun:'2 

31. We now come to (leal with the question of the 
T I i idea of T ransmigra tion in the U pa- 
ransm grat on In . 
the Upanishads: the nishads themseI\"es. \\:e ha've al- 
Kathopanlshad. ready tried to pro\'{> that the idea 
of Transmigration has been adumbrated in the great 

1 R. A. S. Journal Ig09 p. 5 6 9 seq: .. Pythagorag and transmigration:; 


 , i{. I. 4. 10. 

riddle-hymn of the 
igveda. In the Upanishads, on 
the other hand, the idea has been most explicitly ad- 
vanced. When the father of Nachiketas told him that 
he had made him over to the God of Death, Nachi- 
ketas replied by saying that it was no uncommon fate 
that was befalling him: f( I indeed go at the head of 
many to the other world; but I also go in the midst of 
many. What is the God of Death going to do to me ? 
Look back at our predecessors (who have already gone) ; 
look also at those who have succeeded them. Man ripens 
like com, and like corn he is born again" (5. 21. a). 
Nachiketas is anticipatil1g the gospel, and saying more 
than the gospel of St. John: U Except a com of wheat 
fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it 
die, it bringeth forth ITluch fruit." I Tl1e gospel never says 
that the com of wheat is reborn; but Nachiketas says 
that just as a com of grain ripens and perishes and is 
born again, so does a man live and die to be born again. 

32. The locus classicus J however J of the idea of 
Transmiaratlon in Transmigration is to be found in 
the Upanishads: tbe th B . h d - k ( T · h d 
Br1hadaranyaka Upa- e :p. a ara
ya a panlS a , 
ulabad. which goes into great details over 
the manner in which a man dies and is born a.gain. 
We are first told how at the time of birth all the ele- 
ments wait . upon the approaching soul, their lord and 
king; and then we are told, how these wait again upon 
the soul to give him a send-off when he is about to 
depart: II And as on the approach of a king, the police- 
men, magistrates, charioteers, and governors of towns 
wait upon him with food, and dlink, and tents, saying 
I he comes, he approaches,' similarly do all these ele- 
ments wait on the COl1scious self, sayi11g this Brahman 
comes, this Brahman approaches; and again, as at the 

I St. JOhn. 12.24. 

32 ] 



time of the king's departure, the policemen, magis- 
trates, charioteers, and governors of towns gather 
round him, similarly do all vital airs gather round the 
soul at the time of death" (5. 21. b). Then follows a 
very realistic description of the actual manner of 
death: II When the vital airs are gathered around him, 
the Self collecting together all the portions of light 
moves down into the heart; and when the (person in 
the eye' has turned away, then he ceases to know any 
forms. He becomes concentrated in himself, that 
is the reason why they say he is not able to see; he 
becomes at one with himself, that is the reason why 
they say he is not able to speak, or hear, or know. 
Then the tip of llis heart is filled with light, and J 
through that lig11t the soul nlo
es cut either by the 
way of the eye, or the head, or any other part of the 
body. As the Self moves out, life moves after it ; 
and as the life moves, the various vital airs depart 
after it. Him follow I his knowledge, his works J and 
his former consciousness" (S. 21. c). It is important 
to notice that in this last sentence a doctrine of 
karman is being advanced, which becomes still more 
explicit almost immediatel)t; ., And as a caterpillar. 
after reaching the end of a blade of grass, finds an- 
other place of support and then draws itself towards 
it, similarly this Self, after reachh1g the end of this 
body, finds another place of support, and then draws 
himself towards it. And as a goldsmith, after taking a 
piece of gold, gives it another newer and more beauti- 
ful shape, similarly does this Self, after having thrown 
off this body and dispelled ignorance, take on an- 
other, newer, and more beautiful fonn, whether it be 

1 The verb anfJarab1a is understood by Mu Muller and Deussen as 
meaning · take hold of", ,.g., Deussen translates .. Dann nehmen ihn 
das Wissen und die Werke bei der Hand und seine \forma1ige Erfab.. 
rei') -S,elui, Upanishad's p. 473- 

of one of the Manes, or Demi-gods, or Gods, or of 
Prajapati, or Brahman, or of any other beings. This 
Self" then, as his COllduct and behaviour has been, so 
does he become. He whose works have been good be- 
comes good; he whose works have been evil becomes 
evil. By holy works, he becomes holy; by sinful 
works, sinful. It is for this reason that they say that 
a person consists merely of desires; as his desire is 
so is his will; as his will, so his work; as his work, so 
his evolution" (5. 21. d). This passage is important 
from various points of view. It tells t1S in the first 
place that a Soul finds out its future body before it 
leaves its former one: in fact, it seems that the pa.ssage 
calls in q1.1estion a (I disembodied " existence. Then 
again, it tells us that the Soul is a creati\Te entity, and 
in Aristotelian fashion, creates a body as a goldsmith 
creates an ornament of gold. Then again, the passage 
says that tI1e Soul is like a Phcenix wl1ich at e,rery 
change of body takes on a newer and more beautiful 
fonn. Next, it regards the Soul as amenable at every 
remove to the law of karman, and tells us that it re- 
ceives a holy body if its actions have been good, and 
a sinful body if its actions have been bad. Further, 
the same passage tells us that II as to th
 man who 
has no desires left in him, who is desireless because he 
has all his desires fulfilled, his desires being centred 
only in the Self, the vital airs do not depart : such a 
man being Brahman (while he lived) goes to Brahman 
(after death). Of that import is tllis verse: 1 when 
a man becomes free of all desires that are in his heart, 
mortal as he is" he nevertheless becomes immortal 
and obtains Brahman.' And as the slough of a snake 
might lie on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, even so 
does his body lie. Being verily bodiless he becomes 
immortal; his vital spirits are (merged in) Brahman
and become pure light'" (5. 21. e). 

33 ] 



33. Of this immortal existence, however, we shall 
have occasion to speak presently. 
estIDY of the Before we do this, we must ex- 
plain what was supposed by the 
Upanishadic philosophers to be the fate of the ordi- 
nary soul, and especially of the bad soul. To speak of 
the latter first, there are various passages in the Upani- 
shads, for example, in the Brihadara
yaka, T sa, and 
Katha Upanishads, which tell us that the Upanishadic 
philosophers believed that the wicked soul 
.as destined 
to go to a It joyless" It demonic" region which was 
II enveloped in darkness." This conception-the be- 
lief in a Hades-the Upanishadic philosophers share 
with many other branches of the Aryan race. There 
is however, nothing on record in the "C"panishads to 
show whether these bad souls had to suffer eternal 
damnation in this sunless region, or whether their stay' 
in that region was only temporary. "Joyless indeed 
are the regions " says the Brihadara1)yaka Upanishad 
"and also enveloped in pitchy darkness where igno- 
rant and runenlightened men go after death." "De- 
monic I are the regions" says the Isa Upanishad (C and 
also en,reloped in pitchy darkness, where those who 
have destroyed their souls are obliged to go." This 
same Upanishad adds that II those who worship what 
is not real knowledge enter into gloomy darkness," 
which idea is also elesewhere expressed by the Briha- 
daraI.1yaka Upanishad. While the Katha Upanishad 
tells us that II those who make a gift of barren cows 
which have drunk water and eaten hay and given 
their milk, themselves go to the joyless regions" 
(5. 22). These passages show us that the Upanishadic 
I Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar in an important article in the B. B. R. A. S. 
Journal makes the following interesting suggestion. · The Sanskrit 
equivalent of the word demonic viz. II Asurya" may here refer to the 
Assyrian COUDtry, U Assyrian" and "Asuryan" being philologica1l)' 
identical, the, and the .. being interchangeable as in Greek. 

philosophers believed in a s11nless region where the 
ignorant, the unenligl1tened, the self-murdering, and 
the pseudo-charitable were obliged to go after death. 

34. As regards the other souls, a pa
sage in tl1e 
BrihadaraI.1yaka Upanishad, which 
Eschatology In the seems to be the oldest of its kind , 
tells us that a soul after death 
ascends through the regions of the wind and the sun 
and the moon, and comes at last to a region which is 
like tIle Platonic "Isles of the Blessed" and which is 
free fronl grief and snow, and there dwells through eter- 
nity: It When a man goes away from this world, he 
comes to the \\rind. There the wind opens for him a 
llole as large as the hole of a chariot-w11eel. Through 
it he moves upward and comes to the sun. There the 
sun opens for him a hole as large as the hole of a 
, Lambara '. Through it lIe moves upward an(l comes 
to the mOOII. There the moon opens for hin1 a hole as 
large as the hole of a drum. Through it he ascends 
and comes to a \\1orld whicll is sorrowless and snowless 
and there remains for aye" (S. 23). This passage 
must be regarded as one of the oldest of eschatological 
passages in the Upanisllads. In the first place, the 
passage, in itself or in its context, does not make it 
clear whether such a fate is reserved for all souls or for 
the good souls only: it speaks of souls without distinc- 
tion. The eschatological passages in the Chhandogya. 
Upanishad, which we shall quote presently, must be 
regarded as of a later date, because that Upanishad 
goes into very great details over the respective fates 
of the ascetic or the householder, and consigns the one 
to the war of the Gods, and the other to the way of 
the Fathers. In fact, we find in that Upanishad a 
differel1tial elaboration of tIle eschatological idea which 
is advanced in the passage from the Bfihadira.qyaka 

35 ] 



which we have already quoted. Secondly, it is re- 
markable that, as in the Upanishads generally, so in 
this Upanishad, the world of the moon is regarded as 
situated at a greater distance from us than the world 
of the sun. Thirdly, it is to be noticed that the Region 
of the Blessed of which the passage speaks is a. region 
II without snow." Does this mean that the 
shadic philosopher was tormented by too mtlch cold 
in the region where he lived? And finally, the idea 
of " eternity" is already introduced in that important 
passage, and we are told that such a sot111ives in these 
blessed regions for ever and ever. 
35. In the Chhandogya Upanishad, on the other 
y In the hand, as we have pointed Ollt, 
Cbbandoaya: the Two the eschatological idea undergoes 
Patha. a deal of transformation. There 
we are told. that there are two ways open to _ the 
mortals, the bright way and the dark way, the It archir- 
marga" and the Hdhfima-marga.," the .. devayana" and 
the U pitpyaI}.a," the Way of the Go.ds, and the Way 
of the Fathers. It is tl1ese t
,.o I)aths which \\Tere 
later immortalised in t11e Bfiagavadgita 1 as they are 
already adumbrated in the hymns of the 
igveda It. 
I Of

: u: 
J:lT«r d
({1Jif If
(fT iT
 ;m iiI1f
T: II 




1tft ltTQI f;{
 \ \ 

<4 Tsq
: " +{. 1'11. VIII. 24-26. 
2 The which is mentioned in Rigveda X. 19. 1 has the lame 
meamng as iD the Upanishads: 

 ir'tt lI

f;Jffl:. , 
The path which in the above verse is regarded as "different from" 
the Way of the Gods must be only the Way of the Fathers-Pitriylt)a. 
The word Pi triyl. \la, however, in the Rigveda IS often used 'With a 
sacrificial instead of a funeral connotation: of: 

Jr V
f{ I SIt. X. 2. 7. 

As regards those who practise penance and faith 
in a forest, says the Upanishad, whether after their 
death people perform their obsequies or not, their 
souls enter the path of light, and they move suc- 
cessively II from light to day, from day to the 
bright half of the month, from the bright half of 
the month to the six months during which the sun 
moves to the north, from these months to the year, 
from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, 
and from the moon to the lightning. There is a per- 
son not-human who carries them to Brahman. 'fhis 
path is known as the path of the Gods, or the path of 
Brahman. Those who proceed on this path never 
return to the cycle of human existences, yea never 
return" (5. 24. a). Over against this path, there is 
according to the same Upanishad another path re- 
served for those, who, hving in t 0\\1£15 , lead a life of 
charitable deeds and perform works of public utility. 
Such people do not indeed travel by the path of the 
Gods which is reserved only for the penance-perform- 
ing ascetics of the forest. 
f11ey travel by tIle path of 
smoke, "from smoke ihey go to night, from the 
. night to tIle dark half of the month, from the dark half 
of tIle month to the six months during whicl1 the sun 
moves to the south, but they do 110t reacll the year. 
FroIl1 these months they go to the world of tlle fathers, 
fronl the world of the fathers to the sky, from the sky 
to the mOOD. There they dwell till the time comes for 
them to fall down. Thence they descend by this road : 
from the moon they come down to the sky, from the 
sky to the wind. Having become wind they become 
smoke; having become smoke they become mist: 
having become mist they become a cloud; having 
become a cloud they rain down. Then they are bom 
as either rice or barley, herbs or trees, sesamum or 
beans. At this stage, verily the. path is difficult to 




follow. Whoever eats the food or discharges the 
seed, like unto him do they become" (5. 24. b). 
36. It is not difficult to understand that these 50- 
Th 1 b kb called paths are merel y ima g ina ry 
e mora ae one 
of Upanishadic escha- ways in which the primeval mind 
tology. tried to express itself in regard 
to the eschatological idea; but they were not so 
understood for a great length of time, and dogmatic 
systematisers tried to justify them in one way or 
another, the most reasonable of these jtlstifications 
being that the Sun ancl the Moon and the Smoke and 
the Night were regarded as presiding deities, and 
therefore t11e soul was understood as being gi,ren over 
in the charge of these deities who sent him whither he 
deserved. It is not difficult to see that the two paths 
which are spoken of in the above passage are merely 
mythological explanations of an insoluble problem. "The 
great Ramadasa, the patron saint of tIle Deccan, said in 
his Dasabodha that one does not need to believe in the 
two paths. I What becomes of t11e soul after death it is 
not given to man to u11derstand; and if any credit is to 
be given to the author of tIle UpaIlishadic passage, it 
is not for having solved tl1e problem but for having 
attempted the solution. Philosophically speaking, \ve 
are not much concerned with the actual stages of the 
ascent or descent of the soul, but only with the idea of 
ascent and descent. And looking at tIle problem in 
this way, one i
 filled with a great deal of surprise and 
admiration when one sees that the ideas of ascent or 
descen t were placed on no less than a moral founda- 

;:Y 6 

 , {T ir

 6T nt:



ur I 'l
q r
qT IRVf 


 I qat Cf;r

 't II {ai ;r
ilftrlfr€T I aT 


 I fao5tsctr t{,q
r , r
 II t 
VII. 10. 13-I5- 


tion. ct According as a man's works are, so does he 
become." It is this moral backbone of the Upani- 
shadic eschatology that gi,res it a great philosophical 
value. In the passage of the Cl1handogya Upanishad 
just next to the Olle we llave discussed, we are told 
that those \\rho have been of a {( beautiful" character 
quickly attain to a covetable birth, t11at of a BrahmaQa 
or Kshatriya or Vaisya, and those who have been of an 
., ugly n character speedily attain to a miserable birth, 
as that of a dog or swine or pariah (S. 24. c), which 
statement is made still more definite in the Kaush'itaki 
Upanishad where tIle la,v of kar1na11, is explicitly men- 
tioned, and a soul is said to take on the body of II a 
worm or a moth, a fish or a bird, a leopard or a lion, 
a serpent or a man, or any of these ot11er creatures, 
according to 11is karm,a1t and knowledge" (S. 24. d.) 

37. We have seen l1itllerto tllat the pl1ilosophers of 
the Upanishads believed in a re- 
Upanlshadic and PIa- g ion like the Platonic Hades in 
tonic eschatology. 
wl1icll the incurables \\lere possibly 
confined for ever; we have seen tl1at they believed in a 
region like the Islands of t11e Blest, differing however 
from Plato inasmucll as they regarded life in this region 
as absolutely eternal; \\re ha\?c see11 that they believed 
in t11e Patll of tIle Gods whicll led stage by stage to the 
world of Brahman, whel1ce tlley supposed there was no 
back-turning; while they also believed in the Path 
of the Fathers, which led the soul to supramundane 
regions where it lived so long as its merit was not ex- 
hausted, but ,vIlell this came to an end, the soul had 
to descend in the shape of rain-drops and take on a 
body according to the remnant of its works. On the 
other hand, we do not find that anytlling like the con- 
ception of the Tartarus of Plato or the Purgatory of 
:Dante ,\\ras present to the mind of the Upanishadic 

38 J 



philosophers. This could be explained on the simple 
hypothesis that to tIle Upanishadic seers, as to the 
later Indian philosophers" the world itself was a grand 
purgatory where the effects of sin were to be wiped 
out by good action. On the other hand, we find that 
creatures low in the scale of evolution were ct sundered 
as with a hatchet" from the rest of creation; to them 
the Chhandogya Upanishad denies the right to enter 
on the path of liberation, ordaining that they must 
for ever be fixed in the round of births and deaths. 
Neither on the path of the Gods, nor on the path of 
the Fathers, are these base creatures allowed to tread. 
They must keep up the round of coming and going: 
their rule is not H die to live" bllt "live to die." 
And it is wonderful t11at the Upanisllad includes even 
" a tiger or a lion, a wolf or a boar," in the same cate- 
gory with ct a worm or a moth, a gnat or a mosquito" 
(5. 24. e). - - 

38. There is, however, a later phase in the develop- 
V lati in b ment of tl1e c011ception of the 
ar on t e con- 
cepdon of the Path of path of the Gods which \rve must 
the Gods. f . 1 . Th K h - t ki 
not al to notIce. e aus 1 a 
Upanishad makes a curious development in the con.. 
ception of the Path of the Gods. It tells us that when 
a soul comes to the Patl1 of the Gods, "he first goes 
to the world of Fire, then to the world of Wind, then 
to the world of V aruI).a, then to the world of the Sun, 
then to the world of lndra, then to the world of Praja- 
pati, and finally to the world of Brahman." It does 
away with the relays recognised in the Brihadara
Upanishad or the Chhandog)Ta Upanishad and Sllbsti- 
tutes new ones. Instead of such unmeaning concep- 
tions as the " world of day," or II the world of the 
bright half of the month," or I' the world of the six 
months during which the sun is moving towards the 


summer solstice," or finally " the world of the year," 
it substitutes "the worlds of deities" which are 
recognised as properly deities. Then it tells us, 
that II when such a sou1 has reached the ",.orld of 
Brahman, Brahman directs his attendants to run 
towards the soul and receive him with all tIle glory 
which is due to himself a]one. He says that as the 
sout has reached the Ageless ri,'er, l1e can never be- 
come old. Upon the command, five hundred celes- 
tial damsels move to\vards t11e sotl1-a l1undred with 
fruits, a hundred with ointments, a hundred witll gar- 
lands, a hundred \vith clot11es, and a hundred with 
perfumes; and they decorate the soul ,vith all the orna- 
ments which are due to Brahman. Being so (lccorat- 
ed, the soul knov;'ing Bra11man, mo\rcs to,\'ards 
Brahman. He comes to the Ageless ri\'er ,vhich he 
crosses mere)y by the motion of the minel. He then 
shakes off 1115 good deeds as ,yell as 11is }Jad deeds. 
His beloved relati'tcs parta]{e of the good deeds, and 
unbe10vcd of the bacl deeds. And as a man driving 
fast in a chariot looks down on the revol\ring wheels, 
so rlnp
 fh" r'"".,' l 1"'Alr ()i".rl
{"'\l t;\r-rl 1 a J """ 1 \CJ' n " t ' ....;c g "A.r1_'11"\r1 had 
_ _ __ ...
 .:»Uu IvvJ.... al Ud.r all\.. J. 15 , VVu u..U
 "\! ., 
and all the contrary pairs. Being free from good and 
free from evil, kno\ving Brahman, he moves towards 
Brahman" (5. 24. f). 

39. The culminating point, however, of tl1e Upani- 
shadic psychology is reached when 
ea of Immortal we come to the treatment of the 
idea of Immortal Life. This is one 
of the crucial points in the interpretation of Upani- 
shadic doctrine, and expert opinion has been divided 
on this point for the simple reason that e"'ery dogmatic 
philosopher has wished to find nothing but his own 
doctrine in the Upanishads. We, \vho stand for no 
dogma in particular. know how to understand the 

139 ] 



Upanishadic passages on this head, because we want 
to take a merely historical survey of the doctrine, and 
not to press the passages into the service of any parti- 
cular view to which we may be committed. Looking 
at the Upanishads from this point of view, we see that 
there is a systematic evolution that could be traced 
through them of the ideas that were held on the sub- 
ject of Immortality. We are told in a passage of the 
Chhandogya Upanishad that the best kind of eternal 
life that may be conceived for anybody is that he 
should be II lifted to the region of the deity" whom he 
has loved and worshipped during life, and that he should 
partake of all the happiness that is possible in that 
region (S. 25. a). Another passage from the MUI)Qaka 
Upanishad tells us that the best kind of eternal life 
should be regarded rather as the U companionship" 
of the higllest God with whom the soul should be libe- 
rated at th
 time of the great end (5. 25. b). _Not 
satisfied with a mere companionship, another passage 
declares that eternal life consists in attaining to an 
absolute II likeness" to God and enjoying life of per- 
sonal immortality, a view which plays so large a part in 
the theology of Ramanuja (5. 25. c). On the other hand 
Sankaracharya would be satisfied with nothing short of 
an II absorption in divinity" and a life of impersonal 
immortality. As rivers which flow into the sea disap- 
pear in the mighty waters and lose their name and 
form, even so does the wise soul become absorbed in 
the transcendent Person and lose its name and form. 
As when honey is prepared by the collection of various 
juices, the juices cannot discriminate from which tree 
they came, even so when the souls are merged in the 
Real they cannot discriminate from which bodies they 
came (5.25. d). This is nothing short of a doctrine of 
impersonal immortality. Finally, an important p assa ge _. 
from the MUQQaka Upanishad tells us that the soul of 


a .man WllO has come to self-consciousness become5 
mingled after death "Titl1 tIle ,vllole Universe (S. 25. e). 
Such a soul becomes a great difftlSive power, whose 
voice is on tIle rolling air and who stands in the rising 
sun, and who may be seen in star or flower or where- 
ver the eye may be castl. Or else to express it in the 
words of a poet of rare imagination : 
" He is made one with Nature: there is heard 
His voice in all her music, from the moan 
Of thunder to the song of the nigllt's sweet bird; 
He is a presence to be felt and known 
in darkness and in light, from herb and stone, 
Spreading itself where'er that Power may move 
Which has withdrawn his being to its own; 
Which weilds the world with never wearied love, 
Sustains it from beneath, and kindles it above "2. 

I (a) et......4 
: I wi. VI. 5. 4- 
(b) 8TW
 I a

, q)s
; I 
vi. VI. 5. I. 
(c) crar: 
ut. VI. 6. 1:-1. 


.n;ri RrS(..(
 : , 


 : I 
uf. VII. 26. 2. 
3 (a) (I

QqI1l.....ia I ut. t. 3. 3. 
(b) I1<iT 
- - 

I Tenny
on, 1ft M
mo,.iam CXXX. 
2 Shelley, A Ilona,s XLII. 


Qi Ci
 \1S'1' "lq....,..MIUI..... q't;t
51. I. 3. 5. 
(c) ,,




, if 81q(( sr,{iJr
 ftT'f9I)fa, RTGi 
' ",tv 
t)f8 I 
,,: SitfUrRr" if atq'" 
.nfa', en. a
r !11
)ftr I 
it 8Iii.i 

til:1 e;8tf 
tTm I iT
iTRfT 8lT


J:ltti) It .."fa, <t;a: 

(((l 'lit N;:
 if ,,!'qi=a
: I 
'f;'. II. 5. 
4 (a) q'{T iI
'{ '«f'

Q (1

 , ft. II. 7. 
(t a


r fiI
f8 qf:JI


T' (i(
 (RI' q:

. r".. 
+I1l +l'crf(f I i. I. 4. 2. 
5 aTfir 
 en '«Irfir 


 I(ilCh1 fi\-J 
qq. srfafBmfill 9



'6;qa 8tT1:fBJ 

)fia, " 
iI'T. 'lII. 4. 2. 
6 (a) T.'8 ct,,", 

q, IiqT 

 I ... I (t
;rtvuftr qJer
"''ar ilClm ;JTqJl

;n:r,,: ,... l;tQ t.I
 , N;i ir\

liJm«lT, fca'li" R

 f(J I m. VII. 5. I. 
(b) ;r;ym iter q
;:r'ilr fquitfR, 

, qTSat
'J ,


. VI. 30. 
7 fty;t Gtl1(llwt 
"'" Sl"'" 11\11 w:
Rt: 11(8: 
: 9'fi;Q: q: 

: '5m: q: 

1f if1at
1fit riftl' I 

. III. 2 
8 (a) 
:"f (
rf;t .. q. Q
.rfi\- .. .
ftr .. 
-,fit .. "fi\.I


WltCfT, 'IN:" 
r, t
 SlT{itr .IT

" s(_T
ir I 
: qr $lias, I Sf_,ii 1&81' I 
it. III. 3. 
(b) fllVT'IT t('t 8IlmTii fII

q If: Rtai.. 
m:TT 'IT 

) ;t

lmT, 1t(l 
'(JI' SlTutlSm tn'{- 

 rt'leflll IPq' S.(1
qa qmRtqej lIlt I 
 q: 'i1,&
Rru8{T ,.'d
 '1(Qt Gli{um;ft 

a .naR:

 IJTt I 
. VI. I. 
9 (a) 
 1["1 'l:tuO' 
: I 

: ftq
' Tf1JI: 

f<\' II 
'[. III. 9. 28. 
(b) "
q tT

 ; q
yqi (=(

Tq a- 



m I 
qq {ftr I 

 !Nit: sr;
, if 
tRt I 

UT !J;f,m;:(T riff, if 
ra- I 

 C:tlTq;j;ry \ Rr, if +r;JCI 
U8 I 
) WI 

ira {fi:r 
 +{lfq- (fa I 
iT (Tmtif if 
fttir I
fa' I 
m. v. 3. 1-4. 
(c) qq its 

fi6R;T ,,


it I 


fq1Ut 'f
rurtirq' 'R
qaTtr: II 


ftr Rr

u if f

,{ d': I 

 crt ;:r
enm 'lufi
 m mq

 It f(
'Rftr NT
rt68 f
 fCt iii 

 (CtI-a...qT if
) i(tr.:{) 

 II q it 'tim' pm 

4l14k 'lIT1ri
q(r : sn

m: {=f

WI "'(

;ft1n II
: I 8rTfir
(S1161fir: 11
: I JitS



qRt 9: I ;rfq-;at '5fifiRr. 




lr.4(It : 

: srwr
 I atf'

qil q J\
id . 
m!fIT Uta II 

 q t
lq Q11J 


 fq ) il"ft:tT 
" r
r 'latta II 

. Ir I. 20- 2 9. 
i() en 
q1Itl err 

('q WPCr: 


qq tW.ta u:
: '«RJIT 

m if 

 Cfn1t '6' rftq
 I i[. IV. 3- 19- 
II (a) qqr 
s t
a : 



+1qRt at: 
€fq(l: i4'e1(

q11J I a;:r d
"alunta' , if q
ttM , ;r f
6 I 
sr. IV. 2- 

ar ...erm ath 


sr. IV. 6. 

crst if 
I...,Rt , 

r a:rqfff I ut. VIII. 6. 3. 
(d) w'-t 


, if 'E 


, f{crT;mr 

m'm: srtiter

afu iJ
, g 
QT plU en 
) en ;t
Tilmruit crT 


a I if. II. I. I9. 


qRkt it

 I.... U 



UI st

qr iI


 gr;fl 8
) ft(

"q' snvriNTqWq
;i ft 
 mr: I 
ut. VI. 8. I, 2. 
(f) g iN,:aT"'Ta-:tl!: Sl1

 Rijf ir fl
ilr "q{qtqt
Rt, a 
( "Tnt ) qTVtTqyC{Tq '318
tJ' (f

a lJ:
!:4q frq
 II 4[


-\ " d8, 
dt, (j 


( D. l. q'fl firfiir\1tT-""O ) 
-tr I 
ql"" - 

1(1'lI?{ :q
q : 
 ( ;r JPr ",;q: I Q 
 "'''.'1..(1 : 

:. · · .



. II. 15- 1 7. 
(g) IPfr ( 'IN f.4
"I ;r: I 
;r:, 6 

 4.tlqf8 I sr. IV. 4. 

fqf8 if'
;q 8trT 

, (I

m. VI. 8. I. 
(h) q",(ir tt

q fih
"1II :s-q5'tR: ij:;r(it if 

i: SNIT 
, J.
 : t«i qr- 

* " 

dCT It SRq.-r: I m. VIII.3.2. 
 (a) (I
 'I' 1«1
q I 
'«t {f( .. q


qy;t., pat 


tUir q

.. q

 . I. .iI 
8!i1' t:'1T if 
qqJqT;:r 'CpQTilr 



 ,;r (I 
I"'..q ' 
: R

A. ijcr: srij'{: 'Pa-, it (I
 'mT;:crr: !'tif

P(q) +tq.

q . dt : 'Pa 

 It m I.. · · snUi;:r {f(1"'fi: 






 : II 

d qfit I "acr 

( it


'ir q
 II .. I · aVt.lI ql l1
m\' ti .m: 

RTPir.. S
 . I II. I\r. 3. 9-18. 
(b) riq 

Q "it1II
'i 'I:.
'tTtqm , 

. · · · ri IiJlq 

ci =iF, 

, ri 
ia", ri: 

 I sr. IV. 5 
13 .
: qsr
1'Cl Ci'f

 .<16, : q2t,,
,'t &- q(J_



cidtm mlT'UPI '5)



.ql s 
, (( 
 f5 qi(f\«n 


 aI+tq - 
fiRftf I fl- III. 3. I. 
14 (a) 6 q 
* qpt A
OI : )t"I
lq, . 
fiK !".
ute IV. 5. 3. 


, 9 d

d) aT

Gf8 I ute VII. II. 2. 
(b) atQ' q

'q"'I'; Vrfr

S ;rod
(1 . · ..

 8IT .. 
.. firiit: 

ute III. 19. 4. 
(c) ffi
 I a...


 ' (1...9t 
 m ilql

 AttfUI : 

t'-n : , ,. III. 10. 3-4. 
(d) ..

cr 9 


 i{ m fq: U 
. II. 6. 

sP(tm 8IT .I
' : I m
 JI;iMq: I 

ttd' f(
"...q : I i6t.-a(,UI (11


tO+4SId I 
)fir : I 

,Jt 'tt.1..d\ 
qdd I 

qn} I 
...Q rla' 
q'(.'\JqI{ ' 

: I : I "'(I
Ot ...",,1 ....rrt q I 

. I. 6. 1-2. 
16 (a) snr 


, snr q nI


. .. · 
 'IT Of
'1'11. fnR:r (1\ 
 ,. ft'tf8 I 81'1\ 
 t fit w q 
nr; "(\

 .' srfQrtiRt I 

 , ire II. 


(b) (fUtn 

 en Rr 



: I 
(I1'.Tmrr;f '«I S1l( "'I
r s ..qq

: I avUT iTBT 

 lIQT '-IT 
: WfU;i 


(lf4t mPr 
 I ". IV.20. 
17 (a) 1I.?I..


4 qtn 


 : tt14

 I !. V. 6. 1. 
ftr I kr,
dftQq - 

;r m

. 11.2.12. 
(c) trl . l\N 



SIJ1JrnQ' q

m "




 , m. V. 18. 1. 
+i (lC\oqq 

: I !i. I. 1. 6. 
mrr;f "'t
r ,fm;r !U):af8 I 
. I. 2. 21. 


 ql(q1 8«1';

tri 11- 
qftr I ire VI. 38. 


lI \it8TfMtm Utt- 

. I. 2. 20. 

...- 'S

 Sutiq Twt. iJu:qj 

qlil t"ia vl
r BJ, 11:'-' 
 It' t ",,



+lI : I m. III. 14. 3. 

"'T ;rft:q: 

 : $fq-II: 
: II 



: I 
 iI ft:q;r 'I\Pt 


qR "


 : QT

ctrq: qJtf: II ... · · n ill.-a :q if' ;dt:srt;:it foIq a :q 
If sm;nr;t" SIt 




li S(


d qf 

 6 If'(
r II 

m. 2-7. 
19 att.tq 



it (tu


 (tIN ftIfir. 
nt , .... .qrqr
 en 8fqJl11El
lq(.i .S. 
it orf

f1:a ,,
tqflrs 'fT9,!Q 
tt 9

llUt I 
m. VIII. I. 1-3. 
20 (a) a

 8tmIT RIUlttq ; 

: , 9 crT 

 tJ:q 1..1 (I 
laJ t«f- 

JI" (:.t(UI 


: I ah 
: I 

q'ftrq tJ:q 1...1 t1
'" '" ......
(J:I' Tq
q: I
;rt TJI:' 
eN q:t( 1...1 (1'tttlaJ 
l( ",""S- 

((...' SS Wl
 : I 
 tdr: I t:r err 
13:'1 I 
. II. 2-5. 
 CTT'fiTUr: q
ai ft«R 

Qtfa I (I
(I(st1ql-.:l 1.....1 


,qd , qif 



 , (=I ((q) S(1
a 9 (I'4

' WJlT

, q 
;tint , mftN 
ui fq


 Qrfa' I if 


QtRt I a rn 5
a u (1

ql snarr 
I - 

1......19 (I't

qf ffI,1it Qrnr Qq 
I"'I({ I...1 


I"'IQ.. 1......1 h 
cfr qlfa..ft 
sriaf8aT I 
')f. III 1-6. 

21 (a) q;nitfJr srtlir 

 : , 

qq1(q q1:lT 
't RId '4 ttf4 (fqT q1: I 



: '4'Qqd' 

: II 
"'. I. 1. 5-6. 
(b) (I€t'll 

...ft r
: sr
: 't

 : srRrm
 Sq"'l q l
d (f( .t!llql 
I'ii stfa'fq4T 
: I(
 : 'taS4lff\lq) S- 

...Jlr (m ".t(t
.i '3'1- SI(ull 
fVa' I I. IV. 3. 37-38. 
 rs s'l

, '3 t«n
m-rJ1T: n+q
f6' , 
i1SI' cer'W': 
: q
fW if 
'a- if 


Rt if 

 if RI

I R 



Itt ftr 
) 'fT 

1'" 16 , SJTQ1
 ri snorT 

.... if 


 :;sr I ,. IV. 4. 1-2. 
(I) (l'UQ1' <!u'

' 9;
r t"ul
qin "'(qIS
r - 
m;r !r'

q'q"'I("'-1 {Cf 
ft'SIh...m' Sh 

 I (RltTT 
*ti qra:Tq T"i",q(l

 m(ttl {Cf 

 ( CI, s;q aaq(l
CftQqlulti t: 
 err lTNi err tit en SIT

 Cff mflt cn
 'IT CJt
'1l m' 
ena f3"
'11'4.'('( qNf 



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Q-II : 
 U8 9 
lI<4lfih nit 

, q


'l. IV. 4. 3-5. 
(e) II ql
l..q"f," qrsllmit 
'Jl ¥ltQ' 
ftr . 



'" fr
 fWm: , 




,qf(1 , 
irq u(yt: iras\T 
: Riot, i1
U:'f I ,. I V. 4, 9-7. 
 im w\t;( «;J6T'{at: t 
d ?t


: II ,.IV.4.11. 
Gt\1q\ ;rm a- 
" (I
e Tt[a1: I 

Rr q ifi' ;gTm(;(r \Wilr: u t. 3. 
· · -c. .'" ..... 
 ,..,. t 

lra qSlq 'iAl!i'tI
(1 I 
i.g. and ,. IV. 4. 10. 
r... .... " 

T: I 
..... ..... 

 ;rm a 

mt=r m 
'E. I. 1. 3. 








 (f!{ mstf€r 
· .... 
 .... c.. 

 (iii 9 


 "'-" .... ..... 
 (PI' IQI -:l6,Rf 1I't1T 






m m

,: I ,. V'. 10. 1. 
24 (a) att.t 

 :q WI,

" , 
..... 0. . .... .. 

 I(1 Jlm'mn







'1I S"'-I"q : 
 ,'itUI' 'tJfq 

r iI1J- 
.... ...Q . 

 t«Iif )tl (t

 m;r, {;r " l..q
 fC«t W1IQ('lP(f ;m{- 
a;:& I m. I\l. 15. 5-6. 
(b) (tV 
ir s
Qq qT (N 
t{ma aS1.'i- 

. · · · · · 
 q ITJlq

qlif : 
q;:tn ua I 
 tmI m

'mIa- 8 

.... . 
'" t\1'l1\1U(1 IIT

, ;Ja- 
"' '''I+l JtI 


m, atf
I'lf_'1I: 1ftf 

.... · 

 'hctc: 9 QT(f!l f't(CfT 
Q 1«Iht\

, q t(1"'I


, 'f'r 
TSt .,qM, att 
erT srer
) (f tW Eftft
f(' ait

r ria \1(11(;:85a) tr 


\l t=ri: 
5I'tI"fa' tit 
: r
.m (I'
 ....rnr I 
0r. V. 10. 1-6. 
(c) 8'1 {( 

OT' :at
rlr w 

f q1f;r- 


TfiT CfT 



) { 



r;.. en 
qrA 'IT I 
m. V. 10. 7. 
(d) q'



q a-ri 


...' : I a- q m

d q q:;I 

 aRr& 'lf
' q
(d , 
'lftit en 
) en if

T R:ttt 
'IT \11:'8TW( 'IT 

" Qt1T
. I. 2. 

): 'q'UTwt iftcr
:eti( m;(mrfil' 
B:t "qeii 
mfir +1m I 




(f 1 m. V.lO.8. 
(I n- Q
Rr en 
() qT 'l
 CfT e((Ttt crr 
it 'IT 

) en 

Iil 'IT q

 Eim 8
rrim I 
ute VI. 9. 3. 
qr;{ q ttl...JtI

..... ... . ,......, ...... . 




@f atT

(.tT, fq

i qrit;r
 snq?(,;r qJsi{ 
anfffir I 6 ir -etit'(1{..q 

t srR.

. . . . ..... . 


o r:. -:tTo 
(f q({2tI t{
d . . "" .
 . ..... 
(l1' :...(1' Qmf
t( on
qlfJ I '3 itmra f!hI..,Ulr - 

(1) q 
9J-l QI1'fu\
r iJl "\'J 

;r(t aT "if
Rt, ffi


s& I a
1(11(1'-1 : 

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S 16j 



 '" m


. a) qr 

+(irRr I ,,
. 1.4. 
25 (a) 9 q 
"ijt'd: siltt f(

 ".f8 t 
UT. II. 20. 2. 
(b) q

 f;rfn,qi: «t-q,

 TV(fq: 'tl1.

a- qcitq q-da-m 
 T'lar : 
!i. III. 2. 6. 
q: q

8 'i"


'r ."q)1iI

vqm- Rr


. III. I. 3. 
(d) IJ(fT: tMn: q
qrB ri 

q(11'd I 

q!Q :w{T
f11 tit SOqq ri 

,ar " ;rv: 

 J{';fr : 



 ftr(yq I 
\fT la




. III. 2. 7.-8. 

: ;m: 
m;n: a


t Sfi
.f8 fi1 

; m
i ;nJt1i

::...-. ,......,....... . 
T: '-i1

sna.m8 I1
itiJ at
t." ,,
T +1qfa , Sf. ''"I. 5. 
qtn 9t:RI 

'li(;) fir
ffi ilt;{t
tn;ri ,
, . . ."..... ,......... . 

(1 T 


{C{ (\ 
QT (;
 i( TqqCl\' 



itr5U1Tt 'l'.1

 ..... ..... 
 ",. ,....., 

qt: s(
qv ;; 

 ria,... .
T: fit;tt;m: 

 q IQT




 ¥ItIfW (II l( a

rn- , 
m. \71. 6. 10. 
 tt'q) ""\'l9T: ti (fr
 ;rT tlreulTr: sroior: I 


d e1\w: "'tq \'fm 


. III. 2. 5. 




1. It has been customary among commentators of 
Upanishadic Philosophy to regard 
the variegated philosophical texts 
of the l11)anishads as constituting one systematic whole. 
Thus the many grea.t commentators on the Upanishads, 
such as those belonging to the schools of Pluralism, 
Qualified Monism, 1\ionism, Pure Monism and others, 
have tried to utilise even those passages, whose import is 
manifestly against the particular doctrines which they 
are holding, as authoritative texts to prop up their own 
particular dogmas. The primary cause of such a hand- 
ling of the Upanishads is a mistaken notion of the mean- 
ing of revelation. The Upanishads, like the 
having been regarded as a revelation from God, it 
seems impossible to tllese commentators that such a. 
revelation should contain texts which are contra- 
dictory of eacl1 other. A second reason for the manifest 
attempt to press all the Upanishadic texts into the 
service of the particular dogma to whicll these philo- 
sophers are cOlnmitted is the lack of a historico-critical 
spirit ,,'hi ell reftlSes to see in the Upanishads the bub.. 
bling up of t11e tllOUghts of nun1erOtlS sages of anti- 
quity, each of whom tried to express as naively, as 
simply, and as directly as possible the thoughts which 
\vere uppermost in his mind.. and which he regarded 
as fully descriptive of the view of reality which cons.. 
ciously or tmconsciousl
1 had sprung up within him. As 
we shall see in the course of the chapter.. the Upani- 
shads supply us with various principles of thought, and 
may thus be called the Berecynthia of all the later Bye.. 

Introductory . 

terns of Indian Philosophy. Just like a mountain 
which from its various sides gives birtll to rivers which 
run in different directions, similarly the Upanishads con- 
stitute that lofty eminence of philosophy, which from 
its various sides gives birth to rivulets of thought, 
which, as they progress onwards towards the sea of 
life, gather strength by the inflow of innumerable tri- 
butaries of speculation which intermittently join these 
rivulets, so as to make a huge expanse of waters at 
the place where they meet the ocean of life. It is 
thus that we see in the Upanishads roots of BuddhIstic 
as well as Jain Philosophy, of Sarhkhya as well as 
Yoga, of Mlmansa as well as Saivism, of the theistic-my- 
stic philosophy of the Bhagavadglta, of the Dvaita, the 
VIsishtadvaita as well as the Advaita systems. Let 
no man stand up and say that the Upanishads advo- 
cate only one single doctrine. .A careful study of 
the Upanishq,ds, supplemented by a critico-historical 
spirit engendered by the study of Western thought, 
will soon reduce to nought all such frivolous notions 
that there is only one system of thought to be found 
in the Upanishads. For long the personal equation 
of philosophers has weighed with them in determining 
the interpretation of texts so as to suit their o\vn parti- 
cular dogmas. As against these, it shall be our busi- 
ness in the course of this chapter to point 01lt how from 
the Upanishads spring various streams of thought, 
whicIl gradually become more and more systematised 
into the architectonic systems of later Indian Philo- 

2. We shall begin by a consideration of the sources 
of Buddhism as found in Upani- 
The Upanishads and d . Ii I b 
Buddhism. sha IC terature. t may e re- 
membered that the end of the 
Upanishadic period and the beginning of the Bud.. 


histic period are contemporaneous, and that the one 
gradually and imperceptibly merges into the other. 
When the Chhandogyopanishad said that in the be- 
ginning verily Not-Being alone existed, and that it was 
later that Being was born from it (S. I. a), we have to 
understand that a reference was made here to a doc- 
trine which was to become full-fledged in the later 
denial of existence and the maintenance of a void in 
Buddhistic literature. When in his commentary on 
the abo,re passage, Sa:i11{arachaI} r a states that this 
T refer to the doctrine of the Buddhists, who said 
that "sadabl1a,ra" alone existed before the creation 
of anything, he is right in referring it to the doctrine 
of the Buddhists. The metaphysical maintenance of 
Not-Being has its psychological counterpart in the main. 
tenance of the theory of the denial of Soul. When 
the Kathopanishad said, that when a man is dead, 
various people think variously about the spirit that 
inspired him, some saying that it still lives, others 
saying that it lIas ceased to exist (5. I. b), we have 
in embryo the n anatta-vada " of the Buddhists, the 
theory of a denial of Soul, a theory which the Bud. 
dl1ists probably held in common with the Charvakas 
wit11 whom there was 110 soul except the body. Then 
again, the cry of N achiketas-.that everything that exists 
exists only for the nonce and never for the morrow, that 
objects of sensual enjoyment only wear away the vigour 
of the senses, tllat life is only as short as a: dream, 
tl1at he who contemplates the delights issuing from 
attachment to colour and sex may never crave for 
longevity (5. I. c)-all t11is may be taken to be equally 
well the cry of Buddllism, which is almost contempo- 
raneous with the tllOUghts put into the mouth of 
Nachiketas, that everything in this world is full of 
sorrow, cc sarvam duJ:lkham dUQkham," that every 
thing that exists is fleeting and evanescent, " sarvam 


sha,pkam kshaQikam." The injunction given in 
the BphadaraQyaka that a man who thus becomes dis- 
gusted with the world should rise from desires for pro.. 
geny or wealth, and take to the life of a mendicant 
(S. I. d) is only too prophetic of the order of Bhikkus 
in Buddhism as well as J ainism. When again, the 
Aitareyopanishad said that all the existence in this 
world-the five great elements, all the beings that are 
born from the egg or the embryo or owe their exis- 
tence to perspiration or germination from the earth, all 
horses and cattle an<i men, and finally everything that 
breathes or mo,res or :flies or is stationary-all t11ese are 
known by intellect and are based in intellect (So I. e), 
we have here enuncIated for us the root-pr;nciple 
of the metaphysics and the epistemology of the Vijiia.. 
navadins, when we remember that there is only an easy 
passage from the word ,. prajiiana " which is actually 
used in the q
otationJ to the word U vijfiana," ,vhich 
the Vijiianavadins use. Finally, when in the conversa- 
tion between Jaratkarava and Yajfiavalkya in the 
Bphadaral).yaka, Jaratkarava pressed Yajfiavalkya to 
the deepest issue" Yajiiavalk)Ta said that it behoved 
them to retire to a private place and disctlSS the merits 
of the question he had asked only in private, and we are 
told that what passed between Jaratkara'va and Yajii.a- 
valkya was only a conversation abOtlt the nature of 
Karman, and that they together came to the conclu- 
sion that a man becomes holy by holy actions and 
sinful by sinful actions (5. I. f.)-a thought which was 
probably later reiterated in the Kathopanishad where 
\ve are told that the souls take on a new body in 
inorganic or live matter according to their works and 
wisdom (S. I. g)-a passage where we have once for 
all laid down for us the principle of Karman which 
became the inspiration of Buddhistic as well as other 
systems of philosophy in India, but which appears 

with a peculiar moral force in Buddhistic as in no 
other system of philosophy. Thus we see that all the 
main rudiments of Buddhism are present in embryo 
in the Upanishads: the doctrine of Not-Being, the 
doctrine of Denial of Soul, a contempt of sense- 
pleasure bordering upon pessimism, the order of men- 
dicants, the idealistic theory of knowledge, and finally 
the doctrine of Karman. It is true that with these 
rudiments Buddhism constnlcted a philosophy which 
seems to be fundamentally different from the philoso- 
phy of the Upanishads, but which as we have seen, 
found sufficient inspiration from them to be traceable 
to them as to a parent. 

3. Like Buddhism, Sarhkhya was also a system of 
Samkhya in the Chha- philosophy which was very early 
ndoAya, Katha and to come into existence. Its origin 
Prasna Upanisbads. ma)! certainly be traced to Upa- 
nishadic literature if not even earlier. It is true that 
the Sari1khya, along with its compeer system the Yoga, 
is mentioned by name only in such a late Upanishad 
as the Svetasvatara (5. 2. a) ; but the root-ideas of 
Sarhkhya are to be found mtlch earlier in Upanishadic 
literature. When in the Chhandogya we are told that 
behind all things, there are really three primary colours, 
namely the red, the white, and the black, and that it is 
only these three colours which may really be said to 
exist, while all other things that are constituted out 
of them are merely a word, a modification and a name, 
we have the rudiments of the theory of three Gu1}.as 
of the later Sarhkhya philosophy-a fact which was 
made use of in the description of the original Prakpti, 
made up of tlle red, the white and the dark colours by 
the Svetasvataropanishad (S. 2. b). We must re- 
member, therefore, that for the origin of the three Gu
in the Samkhya philosophy we have to go to the concep. 

tion of the three colours in the Chhandogyopanishad 
as repeated also in the Svetasvataropanishad. Then 
again, we have an interesting specimen of how SaIhkhya 
philosophy was yet in the making at the time of the 
Kathopanishad. When we are told in that Upani- 
shad that above the Mind is Buddhi, above the 
Buddhi is the Mahat Atman, above the Mahat Atman 
is the A vyakta, above the A vyakta is the Purusha, 
and that beyond and above the Puru
ha there is 
nothing else (5. 3. a), and yet again, when we are 
told, just a little after the verse which we hav( 
considered above, that the Mind must be merged Uj 
the ]fiana Atman, the .Jfiana Atman in the Mahat 
A tman, and the Mahat Atman in the Santa Atman 
(5. 3. b), we have evidently to equate the Buddhi of 
the one passage with the jfiana Atman of the other, 
the Mahat A tman of the one with the Mahat Atman of 
the other, and'the Purusha of the one ",ith the Santa 
Atman of the other, only the A vyakta of the first 
passage which comes in between the Mahat Atman and 
the Purusha having been elided in the second scheme 
for the sake of convenience, or e'ven for the sake of 
metre. In any case it stands to reason that \\.e may 
suppose that in these two passages \ve have 
enunciated tor tIS Mind and Intellect, the Mahat, the 
Avyakta, and the Purusha,-categories which play such 
an important part in the later Sarhkhya philosophy. 
Then also we have to note that the conception of the 
Linga-sarlra in the later Samkhya philosophy is already 
adumbrated for us in the Prasnopanishad, which re- 
iterates from time to time the l1ature of the Purusha 
with sixteen parts. In this body verily is that Being 
who is made up of sixteen parts, says one passage 
(5. 4. a) ; another goes on to enumerate the constitu- 
ents of this Person. which are breath, faith, space, air, 
hght, water, earth, the seD&es, mind, food, power, 

vidual Soul, is described as bound in the chains 
forged for him by the Universal Soul (5.6. b). In 
this way we get a theistic description of the God- 
head, who is endowed with all activity, and the 
power of creation and government. On the other 
hand. there are other passages where God is described 
as living apart from Pralqi.ti in a transcendent spher
while the Individual Soul in the blindfoldment of his 
ignorance lies by the Prakpti and is caught in the 
meshes of her love (5. 7. a). In a true deistic spirit 
God is described as only the spectator of actions, as 
being absolutely free from the influence of qualitie3 
and as thus living apart from contamination with 
Prakpti (s. 7. b). We need not point too often that 
the Svetaivatara was written at the time of the part- 
ing of the ways between the Vedantic, the Samkhya 
and the Yoga Schools of Thought, which explains 
why we have not in the Svetasvatar.t cut..and-dry doc- 
trines about Nature and God and their inter-relation 
That the Sirhkhya and the Vedanta were merged 
together at the time of the Svetasvatara could als) 
be proved by the way in which the Upanishad describes 
the tawny-colourcd being (Kapila) as first created by 
the Godhead, who is described as looking upon him 
while he was being born (5. 8. a). Much controversy 
has arisen about the interpretation of the word uKapila" 
in the above passage and doctrinaires are not wanting 
who hold that the Kapila referred to in the above 
passage was no other than the originator of the Sam.. 
khya < Philosophy. It need not be denied that the 
author of the Svetasvatara had no idea whatsoever at 
the back of his mind about the existence of Kapila, 
the originator of the S a rhkhya Pllilosophy, but ,.it is 
evident from the way in whicl1 two other passages 
from the same Upanishad tell us that the Kapila of 
the above passage is merely the equivalent of Hira.9ya- 

15 ] CUAYI'ER IV: ROOTS 0' PRlLOSOP1I11t9 187 
garbha, the Intermediary PersoD, the Logos of 
Indian Philosophy, \vho was the first to be created 
by God, and who was endowed by him with 
all powers (5. 8. b); while what doubt may still be 
lurking about such a Vedantlc interpretation of the 
word Kapila, which the author of the Upanis 
must have had in mind, may finally be set at rest 
by the consideration of a last passage from the Svetasva- 
tara, where we are told that it was Brahm a , the 
Creator, who was first created by the Godbead as in- 
termediary between himself and creation (5. 8. c), 
thus placing beyond the shadow of a doubt the identity 
of the Kapila J.Oshi of Svettivatara \'. 2 with the 
HiraQyagarbha of Svetasvatara III. 4 and IV. 12, as 
we]} as the Brahm
, the Creator, of SvetiSvatara 
VI. lB. 

5. As for the roots of the Yoga system, we must 
also turn to the Svet!Svatara J 
The UpaDlsbads aod hi h . · ts l cla . Th 
Yoaa. W C 15 lOCUS ssscus. ere 
is a passage of a very peculiar in- 
terest in the second chapter of the Svetasvatara 
which gives us the rudiments of the practice and 
philosophy of the Yoga doctrine as later formu- 
lated. It may be seen that in the first place 
it calls our attention to the posture of the body 
at the time of practising the Yoga. Anticipating 
the Bhagavadglta., it tells us that we should hold 
the trunk, the neck, and the head in a straight line at 
the time of meditation. No elaborate scheme of 
Asanas is yet furnished, which was to form the principal 
theme of the New Upanishads, especially those pertain- 
ing to Yoga which brought Rijayoga into line witl1 
Hathayoga. Then, secondly, we are advised to con- 
trol our senses by means of mind, a process equivalent 
to the later PratyahAra. Thirdly, we are told to re. 

gulate our breath, implying that it should be made 
rhythmical.. which practice may be called the precursor 
of the later Pri9-iyDma. Fourthly, we are told that the 
environment in which one should practise meditation 
should be pure, and free from sand and fire, as wen as 
sounds and water-pools, and that as far as possible, the 
meditation should be practised in the recesses of a 
cave. Fifthly, we are informed of the harbingers of a 
spiritul day-light to come, namely the fonns of mist 
and smoke, the sun and the fire, as well as other appear- 
ances which will be discussed in the last chapter of 
this work. Sixthly, we are led into the secret of the 
physiological effects produced by the "fire of Yoga ". 
We are told that one who practises Yoga becomes age- 
less and immortal; and that he feels his body to be 
light and completely healthy. Lastly, the Svetasva- 
tara immediately carries us to the highest result secur- 
ed by the practice of Yoga, namely, to the state of 
Samidhi, where the Individual Soul sees the Univer- 
sal Soul and becomes one with him (5. 9. a), a fact 
adumbrated in the famous Y oga-Stitra-tad a d,ash- 
ItIlJ SfJ4,ilP, afJasthiinam. The process of DharaJ;l& and as preparatory to Samidhi are not separately 
mentioned in this Upanishad for the reason that both 
of them may be seen to be parts of.. and thus capable of 
being incorporated in, the highest state, namely, that 
of Samadbi. The Kathopanishad, however, makes 
mention of Dhirana and tells us that this consists 
in a continued equanimity of the senses, mind, 
and intellect, and calls it the highest state of Yoga 
(5. 9. b) ; while the Dhyana is also mentioned in the 

vetasvatara I. 14, where we are asked to meditate 
upon the Godhead and to bring him out of the recess 
of our heart (S. 9. c). We thus see that if we just add 
the. Yama and the Niyama of later Yogic philosophy 

 the various elements of Yoga as mentioned ill 

the old Upanishads, namely, the !sana, the Pra9ayima, 
the Pratyahara, the DharaQa and the Dhyana, all 
as preparatory to Samadhi, we have the ftill-fledged 
eight-fold scheme of the Y oga J or the Way to Spiritual 
Realisation. Moreover, the deistic conception of God 
as advanced in the Y oga-Stitras, especially in a Sfitra 
like klesakarmaviPakasayailJ, apa, am rishf;alJ, p",usha- 
visesha IsvaralJ, is already present in the Upamshads 
when, as in the MUQQaka, we are told that the Uni- 
versal Soul merely looks OD, while the Individual Soul 
is engaged in the enjoyment of Prakriti, or, as in the 
Katha, the Godhead is described as being beyond the 
reach of the sorrows of the world, just as the Sun, who 
is the eye of the world, is beyond the reach of the de- 
fects of vision (5. 9. d). Finally, the physiological 
basis of Yoga was being already discussed in the days 
of the KaushItaki and the Maitri, when it seems 
an impetus was being given to physiological thought, 
which, as later advanced by the embryological and 
other discussions in the Garbhopanishad, was to pave 
the way for a physiology which was to be at the root 
of the systems propounded by Charaka, AgniveSa and 
others. Thus in the Maitri Upanishad an enumera- 
tion is made of the seven Dhatus: bone, skin, muscle, 
marrow, flesb, semen and blood; of the four Malas. 
namely, mucus, tears, freees, and urine; and of the 
three Doshas, namely, wind, bile, and phlegm (S. 9. e); 
and in the Kaushltaki Upanishad we are told that 
the blood-vessels that go from the heart to the 
Purltat are as small as a hair divided thousand-fold, 
and that they are either tawny-coloured, or white,or 
dark, or yellow, or red (5. 9. f). With a little variation 
these blood-vessels were described, before the time of 
the KaushItaki, in the Chhandogya, as being tawny, 
white, blue, yellow and red (S. 9. g), and in the Briha- 
yaka as white, blue, tawny, green and red 

(8. 9. h). Whatever we may say about the II white II 
blood-vessels or U yellow 11 blood-vessels and the rest, 
it is evident that the authors of these passages knew 
at least the distinction between the blue and the red 
blood-vessels" a fa.ct of great physiological importance. 
I t was the study of Yoga which was the cause of the 
rise of physiological science which was the precursor of 
the later full-fledged systems of medicine. 
6. The mention of blood-vessels and the PurItat 
takes us to another subject, namely, 
The Upanishads and the source of certain N ya ya-Vai- 
Nyaya-Vaiseshika. , hik d . f d . th 
ses a octnnes as oun In e 
Upanishads. It may easily be seen that the Upani- 
shads are in a sense entirely different in their tenor and 
argument from the systems that go under the names 
of N y ay a- Vaiseshika. While the business of the Vaise- 
shika philosophy is to make a catalogue of ultimate 
existences in Nature, and of Nyaya philosophy to 
discuss the nature of dialectic and its aberrations, the 
Upanishads aim at stating as simply as possible the 
metaphysical doctrine of A tman. The only point 
of contact, it seems, between the N yay a- V ai Seshik a 
on the one hand and the Upanishads on the other, so 
far as their metaphysics is concerned, is the concep- 
tion of the Summum Bonum or Moksha which the 
Nyaya-Vaiseshika systems derive from the Upanishads. 
Moreover the N yaya- VaiSeshika systems of philosophy 
require a highly developed stage of logical thought 
which would care more for the instrument of know- 
ledge than for knowledge itself. Hence we do not 
find many traces of the N yay a-VaiSeshika doctrine in 
the Upanishads. But the doctrine of the Purltat as 
advanced in the Upanishads has been bodily taken by 
the Nyaya and VaiSeshika systems of philosophy, and a 
change for the better has been also introduced in that 

doctrine by those systems. While the BphadaraJ}.ya- 
kopanishad tells us, probably for the first time in 
the history of UpanishadicThought, that at the time 
of sleep, the Soul moves by the NiiQis to the Puritat, in 
which it takes lodgment and causes the physiological 
action of sleep (S. 10. a), the Nyaya philosophy takes 
up this idea from the BphadaraI)yaka J only substitu- 
tes Mind for Soul, and says that it is the Mind which 
thus moves through the arteries to the Purltat, and it 
is only when the 
iind is lodged in the Purltat that 
sleep occurs. TIle principal reason for the change 
thus introduced by the N yaya Philosophy seems to be, 
probably, that one could easily predicate sleep about 
the Mind, but could never predicate it about the 
Soul, which must be regarded as al\\.a)ys un-sleeping! 
Secondly, the Vaiseshika philosophy itself, particularly 
in its enumeration of the Drav)"as, namely the 
five different Elements along \\ Kala, Manas- and 
A tman, the Dik being included in the Akasa, is in- 
debted to many passages from the Upanishads \vhere 
the five Elements are mentioned along \vith other 
conceptions, as for example, to the passage in the 
Svetasvatara where \ve are told that the Atman is the 
Time of Time, and that the Elements, namel}., 
earth, water, fire, air and ether are merely his handi- 
work (5. 10. b). Finally, when the Chhandogya Upa- 
nishad says that it is the A kaSa or ether which is the 
carrier of sound,-forwe are told, it is by that man 
calls, it is by Ak aS a that man hears, it is by Akasa 
that man is able to hear the echo of a sound (5. 10. c),- 
we are introduced to a conception which later played 
such an important part in the Naiyayika philosophy 
when it defined AkaSa by its principal mark, namely, 
that of being the carrier of sound. TIle Mim8nsa 
doctrine, on the other hand, it may be remembered 
by the bye, is more sci
tifically correct than the 

Upanishadic-Naiyiyika doctrine when it tells us 
that it is the air which is the canier of sound 
and not ether - a fact corroborated by modern 

7. The Mlmlnsl. school of thought,. by the very 
nature of its ritualistic problems, 
The UpaDilhads and has not much in common with 

bn8D'.. . 
Upanishadic philosophy, whose 
business it is to consider the nature of the Ultimate. 
But there is one very important philosophical doctrine 
of the Mlmansakas which has been advocated by the 
Isavisyopanishad. This Upanishad tells us that It those 
who walk on the path of ignorance, namely, that of 
works, go to pitchy darkness; while those who walk on 
the path of knowledge go to greater darkness still. 
Ignorance leads to the one result, while knowledge leads 
to the other. This is what we have heard from the Sages. 
who have told us about the nature of ignorance and 
knowledge. But he, who knows both the path of ignor- 
ance and the path of knowledge together, by his know- 
ledge of the one is able to cross the bund of death, and 
by his knowledge of the other to attain to immortality " 
(S.II). This very important quotation from the ISfi,vlsyo- 
panishad tells us the way of synthesis out of the conflict 
ing claims of works and knowledge. On the one hand, 
mere works are insufficient, on the other, mere know- 
ledge is insufficient. The Pfirva MImlnsa which 
advocates the one and the Uttara MIminsl, which 
advocates the other may both be said to take partial 
views. As against both these the ISivlsyopanishad 
tens us that he who knows how to reconcile the claims 
of both works and knowledge is able to extricate "him- 
self from the evils inherent in either and to enjoy the 
advantages of both by going beyond both of them. 
We know how in later times there was a very ,reat con. 

flict between the schools of Prabhakara, Kumarilabhatta 
and Sailkara, the first maintaining that absolution 
could be attained only by means of works,-and know. 
ledge itself he regarded as work,-the second main- 
taining that absolution could be attained only by a 
combination of knowledge and works, and the third 
maintaining that absolution must be attained only 
by knowledge. The Isavasyopanishad puts forth an 
idea which supports neither the doctrine of Prabha- 
kara on the one hand, nor the doctrine of Sailkara on 
the other, but only the doctrine of.Kumarilabhatta that 
absolution is to be obtained by a combination of know- 
ledge and works, while it even goes be)IOnd KumariIa- 
bhatta in asserting that both knowledge and works 
are to be negated in the higher synthesis of rea1isa- 
tion. As Kumarilabhatta said a bird could not fly 
in the heaven merely by one \ving, but only by m 
of both wings together, similarly, says the Isavasya, 
man must reconcile the claims of both knowledge and 
works to be able to soar in the regions of the Infinite, 
the synthesis of soaring being even superior to the 
fact of equipoise. We thus see how the Is
shad puts forth a theory \vhich later became the pivot 
of the doctrine of the moderate MIm!nsakas, support. 
ing as it does neither the doctrine of the ultra-MI- 
nsakas, nor that of the ultra-Vedantists. 
8. As for the roots of Saivism in the Upanishads, we 
must turn again to the Svetasva.. 
The Upanishads and E b h U - 
Salvl.m. tara. v'en t oug ma as a 
heavenly damsel is mentioned so 
far back as the Kenopanishad, still, for a detailed 
and systematic philosophy of Sai'\tism, we must neces- 
sarily turn to the Svetasvatara. It is true that 
the conception of Rudra-Siva was being developed 
since the days of the 
veda and the Atharvaveda; 


. 1 


but it is only when we come to the time of Sveta- 

vatara that we find the doctrine of Siva placed 
on a more or less philosophical foundation. v.,Te 
are told in this Upanishad that II it is the God 
Ita who supports both the mlltable and the im- 
mutable, the manifest and the unmanifest. As con- 
trasted witl1 Him is the powerless A tman, who is 
bound on account of his being the enjoyer of the fruits 
of action; but that, when this Atman knows tIle 
ISa, he is relieved of his bonds, namely, tIle Pasas " 
(5. 12. a). TIle pllilosophy of Pasu, Pati, and Pasa is 
thus to be already seen in an embryonic stage III the 
Svetasvatara. It Rudra is the only Lord God. The}
do not maintain another God. He who rules these 
worlds by means of his powers, standing before every 
man's face, and destroying the created world in anger 
at the time of the Great End (S. 12. b)-He is the 
Lord Siva, who, hidden in all beings, is the sole enve- 
loper of the uni\7erse, who is like the very subtle film at 
the top of ghee.. by the knowledge of whon1 alone comes 
freedom from the meshes of ignorance" (S. 12. c). 
tt Verily does the God spread manifold the meshes in 
his hands, and move on the surface of this globe. 
He creates and recreates and maintains his sove- 
reignty over all the worlds" (S. 12. d). In this 
fashion is tl1e God Rudra, who is identified with Siva 
or lSa, magnified in tl1e Svetasvatara as the only Lord 
God who is the Supreme Soul of Souls and WllO is the 
Governor of the universe, by the knowledge of whom 
alone the individual Soul, WI10 is bound down in the 
meshes of ignorance, can attain absolution. This was 
the manner in which the Svetasvatara paved the way 
for later Saivism, its theistic way of glorification, 
,suffused with a trinitarian monism, becoming the pivot 
.of the doctrines of Ka.smir Saivism and Southern 
SiUvism . 


9. When we come to discuss the relation between 
the Upanishads and the Bhaga- 
PbraseoloAical and 
Ideological Identities vadglta, we must observe at the 
between the Upanishads outset that a. full discussion of 
and the Bhagavadgita. 
this problem cannot be attempted 
at the short space at our disposal in this chapter. 
The problem is so interesting and so wide that a full 
discussion of it could be attempted only in a sepa- 
rate treatise. It is necessary for us nevertheless to indi- 
cate the main lines of the relation between the Upani. 
shads and the Bhagavadglta at this place. Tl1ere is an 
amount of truth in the famous verse which tells us 
that II the Upanishads are like a cow, KpshI}a like a 
milk-man, Arjuna like the calf that is sent to the udders 
of the cow before milking, and the Bhagavadglta like 
the milk-nectar that is churned from the udders of the 
cow." As illustrations of the way in which - the 
Bhagavadglta borrows ideas, phrases and even senten- 
ces from the Upanishads, we have to note how the 
verse from the Ka thopanishad which tells us that 
.f the Atman is never born nor is ever killed, he neve 
comes from an)tthing.l nor becomes anything, he is 
unborn, imperishab1e, eternal, has existed from all 
eternity, and is not killed even when the body is killed" 
(5. 13. a) is reproduced almost word for word in 
Bhagavadgita II. 20 ; as well as that other verse from 
the Katha which tells us that II when a killer thinks 
he is killing and when the killed thinks he is being 
killed, neither of them verily knows, for the Atman is 
neither killed nor ever kills," (5. 13. b) is reproduced 
in those very words in Bhagavadglta II. 19. Then 
again we see how a verse from the Ka thopanishad 
which tells us that Ie the A tman is not even so much 
as heard of by many, that even hearing Him -people 
do not know Him, that the speaker of the Atman is a 
miracle, that the obtainer of Him must have exceed- 

iDg insight, that he who comes to know him after 
being instructed by such a wise man is himself a mira- 
cle" (5. 13. c) is paraphrased and adopted in Bhaga- 
vadgIta II. 29; while another verse from the same 
Upanishad "What word the Vedas declare, what 
word the penances busy themselves about, what word 
inspires the life of spiritual discipleship, that word, 
briefly I tell thee, is Om " (5. I3. d) is also reproduced al- 
most word for word in Bhagavadglta VIII. 13. Finally, 
the conception of Devayana and Pitriya
a, the path 
of the Gods and the path of the Fathers (5. 13. e), 
which the Upanishads, as we have seen, themsel"yes 
borrowed from the V edas, was handed over by them 
to the Bhagavadglta, which, in a very crisp descrip- 
tion of the two paths (VIII. 24-25), tells us, in the very 
same strain as the Upanishads, that those who move 
by the path of the Gods move towards Brahman, while 
those who go by the path of the Fathers return by the 
path by which they have gone. 

10. So far we have considered the passages from 
Development of the the Bhagavadglta and the Upani- 
Bhaiavadl1ita over the shads which are substantially 
Upanishads. idenical from the point of view of 
either phraseology or ideology . We shall now consi- 
der those passages and ideas from the Upanishads 
which the Bhagavadglta has borrowed, transformed, 
and developed, so as to suit its 0\\"11 particular philo- 
sophy. The verse from the Isavasyopanishad which 
tells us in a spirit of apparent contradiction that II a 
man should spend his life-time only in doing actions, 
for it is only thus that he may hope to be untainted 
by action I' (5. 14. a), has supplied the BhagavadgItl 
with an idea so prolific of consequences that the 
Bhagavadgita has deemed it fit to erect a whole philo-- 
phy of Karmayoga upon it. As we may also poiDt 

out in the chapter on the Ethics of the Upanishads, 
this passage supplies us with the means as well as the 
goal of moral life, without giving us the connecting 
link between them. As we shall see later, the prin- 
cipal theme of the Bhagavadglta is to teach a life of 
activity coupled with the effects of actionlessness 
through the intermediate linkage of un-attachment to 
and indifference to the fruits of action. Secondly, 
when in the MUQQakopanishad we find the descrip- 
tion of the Cosmic Person with fire as his head, the 
sun and the moon as his eyes, t11e quarters as his ears, 
the Vedas as his speech, air as his PraI)a, the universe 
as his heart, and the earth as his feet (5. 14. b), we have 
in embryo a description of the Visvarupa which later 
became the theme of the famous Eleventh Chapter 
of the Bhagavadglta on the transfigured personality 
of Krishna. It is true at the same time that the 
. . 
Qakopanishad probably borrows the idea from the 
Purushasukta, but it is equally true to say that it 
supplies the Bhagavadglta with a text upon which 
the latter enlarges, and evolves the conception of the 
Cosmic Person, who fills all, who is all-powerful, to 
whom the past and the future are like an eternal now, 
submission to whom and assimilation to whom consti- 
tute the ends of mortal endeavour. Then, thirdly, 
while the Kathopanishad gives us a scheme of psycho- 
logical and metaphysical existences mixed together 
in a famous passage where it declares that beyond 
the senses are the objects, beyond the objects is 
mind, beyond the mind is intellect, beyond the 
intellect is Mahat, beyond the Mahat is the A vyakta, 
and finally beyond the Avyakta is the Purusha, 
beyond whom and o1.1tside whom there is nothing 
else (5. 14- c), the Bhagavadglta simplifies the scheme 
very much by retaining only the psychological 
categories and doing away with the metaphysical. 

for the simple reason that it understands the passage 
to have a psychological rather than a metaphysical 
significance. Thus, "7hen the Bhaga\Tadglta in III. 4
tells us that beyond the senses is mind, that beyond 
the mind is intellect, and that beyond intellect is the 
Purusha, it drop
 out altogether the categories of the 
objective world,-the Mahat and the Avyakta,-retains 
only the psychological categories and simplifies 
the scheme immenseI)7. Finally, the devotional im- 
pulse which beats in the heart of Narada when he im- 
plores Sanatkumara to initiate him into spiritual wis- 
dom (5. 15. a), as well as the equally fervent emotional 
attitude of Bphadratha when he requests Sakayanya 
to lift him out of the mire of existence like a frog from 
a waterless well (5. 15. b) ,-which emotional attitudes 
may be seen to be strangely in contrast with the 
otherwise generally dry intellectual argumentation of 
,the Upanishads,-become later almost the founda- 
tion-stone for the theistic-mystic philosophy of the 
Bhagavadglta, in which the dry intellectualism and 
the speculative construction of the Upanishads dis- 
appear, and we have the rare combination of poetry and 
philosophy which makes the (C U !)asana. " of the 
Svetasvatara (5. I5
 c), or " Bhakti" to God as 
to Guru (5. IS. d) t11e sine qua non of a truly mystic 
life, whose end is the realisation of God. 

11. In one important respect, ho\\pever, the Bha- 
The Aavattha In the ga\radg'ita takes a position almost 
Upanishads and the antagonistic to the position ad.. 
Bhagavadglta. vanced in t11e Upanishads. In the 
Kathopanishad, we have the description of II the eter- 
nal Asvattha tree with its root up,vards and branches 
,downwards, \\'hich is the pure immortal Brahman, in 
,which all these worlds are situated, and beyond which 
tbere is nothing else " (S. 16). In this passage we are 

told that the As,rattha tree is the Brahman itself, and 
that it is imperishable. On the other hand, the Bha- 
gavadglta, at the opening of its 15th Chapter, tells 
us that tl the Asvattha tree has its root upwards and 
branches downwards. Its leaves are the Vedas. It 
sends out its branches both downwards and up\vards, 
whicl1 are Ilourishcd by tIle GUl)as. The sel1sual 
objects are its foliage. Yet again, its infinite roots 
spread downwards in the forn1 of action in the human 
world. It is not possible to have a glimpse of that 
tree here in this fashion. It llas neit11er end, nor be- 
ginning, nor any statiol1ariness ,",'hatsoever. After 
having cut off this AS\Tattha tree, whicll has very strong 
roots, by the forceful weal)on of unattachment, we 
should then seek a.fter tllat celestial abode from 
\\?hich there is no ret11rn, al1d reac11 the prin1eval 
Person, from whom all existencE"' has sprung of 
old" (XV. I-:4), V-le are not concerned here to dis- 
cuss the merits or demerits of t11is description of the 
Asvattha tree i11 the BhagavadgYta.. We shall not 
consider the contradictions that are introdllced in this 
description, btlt we are concernell l1ere 0111)7 10 find 
how far this description from the Bhagavadglta agrees 
with the description in the Kathopanisllacl. It may 
be noted at 011ce that there is an agreeme11t be... 
tween the Upanishad and t11e Bhagavadglta so far as 
the Asvattha tree is regarded as having its root llpwards 
and its branc11cs downwards. But, while tIle Upani- 
shad teaches that tIle Asvattha tree is rea], and iden... 
tical with Brallman, and therefore impossible of l>eing 
cut off, the Bllagavadglta teaches that the Asvattha 
tree must be regarded as unreal, and as identical with 
existence, and therefore tllat it is necessary to cut off this 
tree of existence by the potent weapon of 11011-attacll- 
mente The two descriptions seem to be almost at 
daggers drawn. It may be noticed by students of 

comparative mythology that the descriptions of the 
Asvattha tree in the Upanishad and in the Bhagavadglta 
have an analogue in the description of the tree 19drasil 
in Scandinavian mythology. It is important to notice 
also that the description of tIle Igdrasil agrees with 
that of the Upanishads in making the tree identical 
with Reality, al1d therefore having a real concrete ex- 
istence. On the other hand.. it a.grees with the Bha- 
gavadgita in making the actions, tIle motives, and the 
histories of mankind the boughs a11d branches of this 
tree of existence. We can110t do better thall quote 
in this place Carlyle's famous description of tIle tree 
Igdrasil: (I All Life is figured by them as a Tree. 
Igdrasil, the Ash-tree of Existe11ce, lIas its roots deep 
down in the kingdoms of Hela or Death; its trunk 
reaches up heaven-lligll, spreads its bOllg11S o,rer the 
whole Universe; it is tIle 'I'ree of Existencr. At the 
foot of it, in tIle Death-kirlgdol11, sit Tllree nOr1tas 
Fates..-the Past, Present, Future; watering its root 
from the Sacred Well. Its IbougllS,' \\yith their bud- 
dings and disleafings,-ev'ents, t11ings suffered, things 
done, catastrophes,-stretch througll all lands and 
times. Is not every leaf of it a biograph:
r, c,'ery fibre 
there an act or word? I ts boughs are Histories of 
Nations. The rustle of it is the noise of HUlnan Ex- 
istence.. onwards from of old. It grows there, the 
breath of Humall Passion rustling" through it ;-or 
storm-tost, tIle storm\vind howling tllrough it like 
the voice of all the gods. It is Igdrasil, the Tree of 
Existence. It is the past, the presrl1t a.nd the future; 
what was done, \vl1at is doing, wllat \\Till be done; the 
infinite conjugatioll of the v"'erb To do. n It is unfortu- 
nate tllat the Scandilla\7ian description should have 
placed the roots of tIle Ash tree deep down in the 
kingdoms of Hela or Death, and even though its trunk 
is described as reaching up hea,,"en-high, it were much 

to be wished that its roots had come from the region 
of the life eternal. In that respect, both the Bhaga- 
vadglta and the Upanishads l1ave a distinct advan- 
tage over the Scandinavian mythology. 
12. We must not forget, however, to discuss t,he 
merits of a question which has 
The Krishna of the 
Chhandogya and tbe assumed some importance at the 
KrIshna of the Dha- hands of certain modem inter- 
gavadgita. preters of the Bhagavadglta and 
the Upanishads, especially because it seems to us 
that these interpreters have raised a dust and com- 
plain that they cannot see. In the Chh andogy a , 
there is the mention of a Krishna who was the son 
. . 
of DevakI, and these interpreters feel no difficulty 
in facilely identifying him with Krish:Q.a, the son of 
Devaki, who was the divine hero of the Mahabharata. 
We shall see how futile such an identification is. 
But before \\'e go on to this discussion, we must state 
first the meaning of the passage where the name of 
Krishna, the son of DevakI, occurs. In the third 
. . 
chapter of Chhandogya, there is a passage which stands 
by itself, the purport of which is to liken a man to 
a sacrificer and thus institute a comparison between 
the human life and the sacrificer's life. What hap- 
pens in the case of the life of a sacrificer? When h
undertakes to perform a sacrifice, he is first disallowed 
to take food, or to drink water, or in any way to 
enjoy. This constitutes his Dlksha. Then, secondly, 
there are certain ceremonies called the Upasadas in 
that sacrifice, in which he is allowed to eat and drink 
and enjoy himself. Thirdly, when such a sacrificer 
wishes to laugh, and eat and practise sexual inter- 
course even while the sacrifice is going OD, he is 
allowed to do so if he just sings the hymns of praise_ 
called the Stutasastras. Fourthly, he must give certain 

DaxiQis or gifts to the sacrificial priests in honour of the 
sacrifice that he is performing. Fifthly, he pours out 
the Soma libation which is equivalent to a new birth 
of the sacrificer. Finally, the sacrificer takes the 
Avabhptha bath at the end of the sacrificial ceremony 
which puts an end to the sacrifice. These are the 
stages through which a sacrificer's life passes. Now 
we are told in the passage which we are discussing that 
Ghora Angirasa, the reputed teacher of KpshQa who 
was the son of DevakI, institutes a comparison be- 
tween the life of a sacrificer and the life of a man in 
general. At the initial stage of a man's life, he has to 
serve merely as an apprentice, and cannot eat and drink 
and enjoy on certain occasions. SecondlYJ another 
stage opens before him, namely, when he can eat and 
drink and enjoy himself. Thirdly, when he grows a 
little older, he can laugh and eat and practise sexual 
intercourse. Fourthly, the price which he has to pay 
for leading a holy life is that he should cultivate the 
virtues, namely, penance, liberality, straightforward... 
ness, harmlessness, and truthfulness. Fifthly, when 
he has procreated, we may say he is born again in his 
child. The final act of the human drama takes place 
when death lets down the curtain, and the man is on 
the point of departing from his life. At such a critical 
time, says Ghora Ailgir asa to Krish:Qa-and we are 
told that when this knowledge was imparted to Krish
he never thirsted again for further knowledge- 
-man must take refuge in these three thoughts: 
Thou art the indestructible ; Thou art the unchange- 
able; Thou art the very edge of life (5. 17). From 
this passage a number of modem critics have argued 
that the Krishl}a, the son of Devakl, who is mentioned 
in this passage, must be regarded as identical with 
a, the son of Vasudeva, who, as we have pointed 
oat, i. the divine hero of the Mabibhlmta. Mr. 

Grierson in the II Encyclop
dia of Religion and 
Ethics II points out in a very facile fashion, that 
I' Krishna Vasudeva, who was the founder of the new 
. . 
monotheistic religion, was the pupil of a sage named 
Ghora Angirasa, who taught him so that he never 
thirsted again." In answer to such an identification 
of Kpsh
a, the son of Vasudeva, and KpshQa, the 
pupil of Ghora Angirasa, we have to point out that 
this is merely an assertion without proof. It 
passes our understanding how for the simple reason 
that KpshQ.a, the pupil of Ghora Angirasa, was the son 
of DevakI as mentioned in the Chh an dogya, he could 
be identified with Kpshl;la, the son of Devakl, of the 
Mahabharata, where no mention is made whatsoever 
of Ghora A ilgirasa who was the teacher of KrishQa in 
the Chhandogya. Such a fact cannot be easily ignored 
in a work like the Mahabharata which is expected to 
give us everything about the divine warrior Krish
and not leave the name of his teacher unmentioned. 
If the KrishQa of the Chhandogya is to be identified 
with the KpshJ;1a of the Mahabharata, for that matter 
why should not we identify the HariSchandra of the 
Aitareya BrahmaQ.a who had a hundred wives with 
the HariSchandra of mythology who had only one 
wife? Mere similarity of name proves nothing. It fills 
one with humour that a new facile philosophy of 
identifications BraJunana-wise should have been insti- 
tuted in modem times by a host of critics of no 
small calibre when they would raise a huge structure 
of mythic
-imaginary identifications by rolling to- 
gether the god Vish
u of Vedic repute, NariYaQa the 
Cosmic God, KpshQa the pupil of Ghora ADgirasa, and 
Vasudeva the founder of a new religion.. and thus try to 
prove that the sources of the religion of the Bhagavad- 
gtta. are to be found in the teaching of Ghora ADgirua I 
There would seem to be IOme m eaninl , however, ba 

attempted identification of the KpshQa of the Chhan- 
dogya with the Kpshl).a of the Bhagayadgita, when. 
in verse 4 of the passage we are discussing, we are 
told that the gifts which such a sacrificer should make 
to priests are those of the following virtues: Tapas, 
Danam, A rjavam, Ahinsa and Satyavachanam. 
This list is closely similar to the list of virtues enum- 
era.ted in the Bhagavadglta XVlaI-2, where the 
same virtues are enumerated along with a number 
of other virtues, and almost in the same order. But 
this fact also proves nothing, because, as we have 
pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, the Bha- 
gavadg'ita is a congeries of quotations, phrases, and 
ideas borrowed from the Upanishads, and it is only 
by accident, as we may say, that the five virtues 
mentioned above should have been enumerated in the 
Upanishadic passage where KpshQ.a, the son of DevakI, 
is also mentioned. There is a story about the Delphic 
Oracle that a number of trophies were hung round 
about the temple in praise of the god who had 
saved so many souls at different times from ship- 
wreck in the midst of waters. A philosopher 
went to the temple and asked, Yea, but where 
are those that are drowned? Similarly may we say 
about the virtues in the Chhandogya passage 
which are identical with the virtues in the pas- 
sage from the Bhagavadglta. True, t
at the virtues 
enumerated in the Chhandogya almost correspond to 
the virtues enumerated in the BhagavadgIta; but, 
why, for the world, should not the essence of the teach- 
ings of Ghora Ailgirasa have been il1corporated into 
the Bhagavadglta, when the Upanishad passage tells us 
that at the last moment of a man's life, he should take 
resort to" these three thoughts: Thou art the indes- 
tructible; Thou art the unchangeable, Thou art the 
very "edge of life? Why. should not the BhagavadgIti 

have profited by these three expressions: Akshita, 
Achyuta and Pral
asarhsita ? Why should it have left 
us merely with the advice that a man should utter Om 
at the time of his death and meditate upon God? 
Finally, we may say that the burden of the proof of 
the identification of the two KrishI)as falls upon those 
who make the assertion, and so far as their arguments 
have gone, we do not think that they have, in anJ' 
way, proved the identification at all. 

13. The relation of the Upanishads to the Brahma- 
The Upanishads and sutras is no less interesting and 
the Schools or the Ve- no less important than the rela- 
danta. tion of the Upanishads to the 
B11agavadglta,. In fact, the whole of the philosop11Y 
of the Vedanta in its various schools has been based 
upon t11ese three foundation-stones, namely, the Upa- 
nishads, the Brallmasfitras, aI1d tIle Bhagavadglta, 
and thus it may easily be expected that the inter- 
relation of the Brahmasutras to the Upanishads from 
which they were derived must constitute an equally 
important problem. Badaraya
a, the author of the 
Brahmasutras, borrows so frequently and so immense- 
ly from the Upanishads, in fact, all his aphorisms 
are so much rooted in the texts of the Upanishads, 
that it would be impossible either to understand or to 
interpret the Brahmasfitras without a perpetual re- 
ference to tIle texts of the Upanishads. As to whe. 
ther he taugllt the dualistic Vedanta or the qualified 
monistic Vedanta, or the monistic Veda.nta, it is not 
our business here to discuss; but it must be remem- 
bered that each of the three great schools of Vedantic 
philosophy I namely, the schools of Madhva, Ram i- 
nuja, and Sankara, interprets the Brahmasutras as 
well as the Upanishads in its own way. .The Suddh ad - 
vaita, the Dvaitadvaita and other interpretations of-the 

philosophy of the Brahmastltras and the Upanishads 
are merely varied combinations of the ultimate posi- 
tions reached in these three main systems of philosophy. 
Hence, when we have discussed how far the Upanishads 
sanction the difference between the Dvaita, the 
Visishtadvaita and the Advaita schools of philosophy, 
we have exhausted all the different fundamental con- 
ceptions of the Vedanta, from whose permutation and 
combination all the other systems are derived. And 
even while we are discussing these three main schools 
of Vedantic philosophy, a number of fundamental 
propositions arise, difference in the treatment of which 
constitutes difference in the systems themselves. Thus 
the main problems which these philosophers have to 
answer are these: What is the nature of God? Is He 
different from, included in, or identical with the Ab- 
solute? In other words, are the theological concep- 
tion of God and the phi1osophical conception of the 
Absolute one and the same? What is the relation of 
the Individual to the Universal Soul in these systems? 
Do these systems maintain the reality of creation, or, 
do they suppose that, after all) creation is only an 
appearance and an illusion? What is the doctrine of 
Immortality in these systems? What do these systems 
say about the immanence and transcendence of God ? 
How can we define the Absolute-in positive terms. 
in negative terms, in both, or in neither? The an.. 
swer to these and other problems of the same kind 
constitutes the fundamentum divisionis of the systems 
themselves. We shall see how the three great schools 
of Vedantic philosophy find answers for these pro- 
blems according to their different lights in the texts 
of the Upanishads. 
14. The dualistic school of philosophy initiated by 
AnandatIrtha finds' justification for its maintenance of 

OOTS OP PmLosopmxs 201 
the doctrine of the entire disparateness of the Indivi- 
dual and the Universal Souls in 
Madbvalsm in the such a P assa g e as the one from 
the Katha, which tells us that C( in 
this world there are two Souls which taste of the 
fruits of action, both of which are lodged in the 
recess of the human heart, and which are as 
different from each other as light and shade" 
(5. 18. a), corrected, as later, in the passage from 
the MUI).Q.akopanishad which tells us that (( there are 
two birds, companions and friends, both sitting on 
the same tree, of which one partakes of the sweet 
fruits of the tree, while the other without eating mere- 
ly looks on " (S. 18. b). The difficulty in the passage 
from the Kathopanishad which we have quoted 
above is-how can we regard the Universal Soul as 
enjoying the fruits of action? The enjoyment of the 
fruits of action could be predicated only about the 
Individual Soul and not about the Universal Soul 
which must be regarded as above such enjoyment. 
Hence, it was probable. that the MUQQaka Upa- 
nishad relieved the Universal Soul of the burden of 
the enjoyment of the fruits of such action, and laid 
the fact of enjoyment at the door of the Individual 
Soul. In any case, it is worth while noting that the 
Individual Soul is in the above two passages spoken of 
as being entirely distinct from the Universal Soul, and 
as being probably dependent upon it. These are the 
texts, which, like the later one from the BhagavadgIti 
" there are two Persons in this world, the Mutable 
and the Immutable; the Mutable is all these beings, 
while the Immutable is the one \\r}10 exists at 
the top of them ., (XV. 16), have been quoted in 
support of their doctrine of the entire disparateness of 
the Individual and the Universal Souls by the followers 
of Madhva. Then, again, when they speak about 


'the existence of a supreme God, who is the creator, the 
preserver and the destroyer of the universe, who 
exists as a persollal Being, and as over-lord of all.the 
Souls WIlO are llis serva
ts, tl1ey llave all1ple justifica- 
tion in passages like the one from the Svetasvatara 
which tells us that c, there is a single God who is hidden 
in all beings, who pervades all, and who is the inner 
Soul of all Souls" (S. 19. a), as well as those others 
from the Svetasvatara itself 
rhich tell us that 
Ie beyond this universal God there exists 110thing, than 
whom there is nothing subtler or greate
, \\7ho stands 
motionless like a tree in the sky and fills every nook 
and cranny of the universe" (5. 19. b), or again like 
that last passage from Svetasvatara, which, in the spirit 
of Xenophanes, tells us that God is all eye and all ear- 
 / ""\. 
, '" .
 r' J' , 
 opot.J OVf\O
 Of rlOfL, OVf\OS' or T oacO(I£L 
-with his face everywhere, his hands and feet every- 
where, who creates the beings of the earth and the 
fowl of the air, and who brings into being both the 
heaven and tIle eartll (5. 19. c). Such a theory of 
the sovereignty of the Lord over organic as well 
as inorganic nature brings in its train a realistic 
theory of creation Wllich tells us that " all these beings 
were created from Him; they live and move and have 
their being in Him; and they are ultimately resolved 
in Him" (S. 20. a), as well as that all inorganic nature 
was created by Him, H space being the first to come 
out of Him, from which later were produced air and 
fire and water and earth, and the herbs and the trees and 
the food in the universe " (S. 20. b). We have already 
seen in ottf discussion of tIle theories of coslllogony in an 
earlier chapter that a realistic account of creation such 
as is implied in these passages is really an obstacle to 
those who try to make creation merely an appearance 
or an illusion, and that therefore these texts support 
the doctriD.e of tae realistic theory of creation of 


Madhva as of none else. It is true that Sankara tries 
to explain the ablativ'e implied in II yatova " or CI tas- 
madva" as being Adhishthana-paftchami, Ramanuja 
trying to explain it as merely Upadana-pafichamI, 
while Madhva explains it truly as Nimitta-pafi- 
cham!. '[his is as much as to say, that while accord- 
ing to Sailkara the A tman or the Ultimate Reality 
stands behind the universe as the support and sub- 
stratum of all creation which merely appears on it. 
according to R8m an uja, the A tman is the material 
cause of the universe as gold of gold-ornaments or 
earth of earthen-ware in quite a realistic manner, while 
according to Madllva, the A tman or the Supreme Soul 
is the creator of tIle 11niverse or the instrumental cause 
of its unfoldment. Finally, so far as the doctrine of im- 
mortality is concerned, a passage like the one from the 
Chhandogya whicll tells us that the worshipper is 
lifted up to the region of the deity whom he has 
worshipped in life (5. 21) supports the doctrine of' 
Madhva that absolution COl1sists not in being merged 
in the Absolute, nor even in being assimilated to Hinl. 
but in coming near his presence and participatiIl
in his glory so that the devotee n1ay be lifted, accordin
to the requirements of the doctrine of Kramamukti. 
along with the God whom he has worshipped, to the 
state of the highest absolution at the end of time. 
15. Ramanuja agrees with Maclhva in maintaining 
the utter separateness of the In- 
The Triune Absolute dividual Souls and God.. the 
of RamanuJa. 
reality of Creation, as well as to 
a great extent the doctrine of Immortality; but he 
differs from him in regarding the Absolute to be of 
the nature of a Triune Unity,-a sort of a philosophic 
tripod,-of which Nature, the Individual Souls, and 
,God form the feet. So far, again, as t
e r


between the Souls and God is concerned, he disagrees 
with Madhva in maintaining a qualitative monism, 
though he agrees with him in maintaining a numerical 
pluralism. For his doctrine of Triune Unity, Rama- 
nuja finds ample justification in the passages from the 
SvetiSvatara which tell us that there are It three ulti- 
mate existences, all of them eternal and all together 
constituting the Absolute, namely, the powerless un- 
knowing Soul, the powerful knowing God, and the 
eternal Prakpti, which exists for the enjoyment of the 
individual Soul, and from which he receives recompense 
for his works" (So 22. a), and yet again that II man 
need but know the three entities which constitute the 
Absolute, namely, the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the 
mover, and that when a man has known these three, 
nothing remains to be known " (5.22. b). Thus we 
see that the Absolute of Ramanuja consists of Nature, 
Soul and God, God being identical with the Absolute 
considered in his personal aspect, while there is only 
this difference between them that while God is the 
theological conception, the Absolute is the philosophi- 
cal conception, of tIle Triune Unity. It thus comes 
about that God is as much the Soul of Nature as 
he is the Soul of Souls. This is the fundamental 
platform in the philosophy of Ramanujacharya, and 
we shall see what justification he finds for such views 
in the Upanishads themselves. 
16. How is God the Soul of Nature? There is 
a passage in the Brihadaranyaka 
God the Soul of Na. h . ... 
ture. · W lcll tells us that God 15 the 
Antaryamin of the universe: He 
lives inside and governs the universe from within. 
This doctrine of the Antaryamin, which is advanced 
in that Upanishad in the conversation between Uddl- 
!aka Aruqi and Yajnavalkya, constitutes the funda.. 

mental position in the philosophy of Raminuja when 
he calls God the the Soul of Nature. Uddilaka 
AruQ.i asked Yajftavalkya two questions. U Pray ten 
me," he said, II what is the Thread by which this 
world and the other world and all the things therein 
are held together?" .e Pray tell me also," he con- 
tinued, II who is the Controller of the Thread of this 
world and the other world and all the things therein?" 
These are the two celebrated questions propounded 
in the passage which we are discussing, namely, the 
doctrine of the Thre,ad and the doctrine of the 
Thread-Controller. Yajiiavalkya answered the first 
question by saying that Air might be regarded as 
the Thread bv which this world and the other 
world and all the things therein are held together. 
The second question he answered by saying 
that He alone might be regarded as the inner Con- 
troller ., who dwells in the earth and within the earth, 
whom the earth does not know, whose body -the 
earth is, who from within controls the earth. He 
is thy Soul, the inner controller, the immortal. He 
who dwells in the waters and within the waters, 
whom the waters do not know, whose body the 
waters are, who from within controls the waters, He is 
thy Soul, the inner controller, the immortal." Thus 
Yajiiavalkya went on to tell Uddalaka AruQi that the 
inner Controller is He who is immanent likewise I' in 
fire, in the intennundia, in air, in the heavens, in the SUD, 
in the quarters, in the moon, in the stars, in space, 
in darkness, in light, in all beings, in PriQa, ill 
all things and within all things, whom these things 
do not know, whose body these things are, who con.. 
troIs all these things from within. He is thy Soul, the 
inner controller I the immortal. He is the unsee8 
seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the 
uounderstood understander; other thaD Him, there it 


no seer, other than Him there is no hearer, other than 
Him there is no thinker, other than Him there is no 
understander; He is thy Soul, the inner controller. 
the immortal. Everything beside Him is naught II 
(S. 23. a). In this wise does Yajfi.avalkya declare the 
immanence within, and the inner control of the universe 
by the all-pervading God. In the same fashion does 
the author of the Taittiriya tells us that II at the 
time of creation, God entered everything that he 
created, and after having entered, became both the 
This and the That, the Defined and the Undefined, 
the Supported and Supportless, Knowledge and Not- 
Knowledge, Reality and Unreality-yea, he became 
the Reality; it is for this reason that all this is verily 
called the Real" (5. 23. b). This passage also decla- 
res the i mman ence of God in all things whatsoever, 
even in contradictories, and tells us that what thus 
comes to exist is the Real. The whole of Nature, 
therefore, which is God's handiwork, as well as God's 
garment, is filled and inspired by God who is its inner 
Controller and Soul. 

17. How is God the Soul of Souls? We are told in 
the BrihadaraQyaka by the help of 
God, tbe Soul of a simile which is oft re pe ated in the 
Sow. . 
Upanishads that "just as the spokes 
of a wheel are held together in the navel and felly 
of a wheel, similarly in this Supreme Soul are centred 
all these beings, all gods, all worlds, all the individual 
souls-the Supreme Soul is the king of them all" 
(8. 24. a). In another passage, the same Upanishad tells 
us, by. a change of metaphor, that u. just as little 
sparks may come out of fire, even so from the Supreme 
Soul all praQaS, aU worlds, all gods, all beings come 
out. This is to be mystically expressed by saying 
that the SupreIQe Sou1 is the verity of verities; the 


pr a
as , as well as othel tllings mentioned along with 
them, are verities, of whom the Universal Soul is the 
supreme verity" (5. 24. b) . In these passages we are 
told how God may be regarded as the Soul of Souls, 
and we are also unmistakably told that the Supreme 
Soul is the Real of the Reals, the verity of verities) 
the individual souls and the world being themselves 
verities. This is corroborated by another passage of 
the BphadaraQyaka which tells us that God is the All- 
" both the formed and the formless, the mortal and 
the immortal, the stationary and the moving, the this 
and the that...... He is the verity of verities, for 
all these are verities, and He is the supreme verity'. 
(So 24. c). Both the moving and the statiol1ary are 
thus the forms of God; this is as much as to say, that 
God is the Soul of organic as well as inorganic nature. 
He fills the Souls as he fills the Universe, and controls 
them both as their inner governor. 

18. What is the doctrine of Immortality corres. 
ponding to such a philosophic 
.8""aD aJ.'. DoctrIDe . ti ? R - - ., · t xt 
of Jntln ortalltJ. poSl on]a S maID e 
in this matter is the passage from 
the MUI;\4aka which tells us that "when the de- 
votee sees the golden-caloured Person who is the all- 
doer, the all-governor, and the source of tbe universe, 
he shakes off both sin and merit, and free from 
these, attains to divine likeness " (5. 25. a). We have 
already noticed to a certain extent in the concluding 
portion of the last chapter how this conception of the 
irnm ortallife in R am anuja compares with the concep- 
tions both of Madhva and Sankara. While, to Madhva, 
beatitude consists in being lifted up to the region of 
the deity and coming into his presence, to Raman uja 
it consists in at btining to divine assixnilati on and in 
being like him though different from him, while to 

&:h.kara it consists in being finally atoned to Divinity and 
being absorbed in that Divine Life in such a way that 
no trace of personal existence remains. These concep- 
tions of Immortality are the logical outcome of the 
philosophical positions advanced by these thinkers. 
We are not concerned here to discuss which of them 
seems to us to be philosophically sound, but we are only 
Doting how each of these philosophers finds, justification 
for his theory of the im
ortal life in the Upanishads 
themselves. There is a further point in which Madhva 
and Ramanuja agree with each other and differ from 
Sankara. In a passage from the MUI).<Jaka we 
are told that "a man, who has attained to a per- 
fect catharsis from evil, and has his intellect firmly 
rooted in the principles of the V edmta, after death 
goes to the regions of Brahm a , with whom he attains 
to final absolution at the time of the great end" 
(S. 25. b). This passage preserves the personal im. 
mortality of the souls and keeps them from being 
absorbed in divinity. Such a II Kramamukti," as it is 
ca1led, is not in line with the real philosophical posi.. 
tioD of Advaitism, which sees in man the possibility of 
being liberated even while he lives. According to 
Advaitism, it is possible for man to attain to H Jlvan- 
mukti" as it is called, to become free while living and 
though living, to say nothing about the state of the 
soul after man's death. When a man has realised 
God, he becomes one with Him, and is absorbed in 
him. That is the Advaitic position. There is an end 
of the matter, and the help of no celestial god, how- 
ever great, need be invoked for carrying such a de- 
votee along with him to the state of liberation at the 
time of the Great End. 
19. How does Sankara's philosophy lead to such. 
view of the immortal life? What are the logical pre- 


suppositions of such a doctrine? What, in other 
words, are the fundamental concep- 
Tbe fundamental pro- tions of Sankara' s philosophy which 
poaitioDS of Sankara '.. ., . 
Phllosopby. ultImately Justify such a VIew of 
the absorption of the Individual 
into the Universal Soul? How does Sankara answer 
the problems which have been mooted in the systems 
of Madhva and Ramanuja? A full solution of these 
questions cannot be attempted here. We can only in- 
dicate the lines on which Sankara answers the oppo- 
site points of view and constructs an Advaitic philo- 
sophy, which is all the while, according to him, based 
on the Upanishads themselves. From the point of 
view of the Absolute, sub specie aternitatis, Nature 
and Soul and God are all equally appearances. The 
Absolute alone is : and Nature and Soul and God are, 
only so far as they are, the Absolute. But, sub sp
lempo,is, there is a Nature, there are the Souls, there 
is a God. SaJikara makes the great distinction between 
the Paramarthika and Vyavaharika views of reality 
as Kant makes the distinction between the noumenal 
and the phenomenal. It is from the phenomenal point 
of view that we may say that Souls are different from 
God ; that Nature exists as a h.ete,os I. that God creates; 
but noumenally, the Absolute alone exists, and Nature, 
and Souls, and God are all merged in the Absolute. 
For him who sees the .Atman everywhere, what differ.. 
ence can ever remain, asks Sankara? All difference 
vanishes for him. " Theologians may battle among 
themselves, but the Absolutist battles with none. u 
It is from this point of view that the truths of 
the dualistic and the- qualified-monistic systems 
of the Vedanta are both subsumed in the higher 
synthesis of the monistic. We shall see how SaDkara 
fiRds justification for SUCR views in the Upani- 


,20. The fundamental platform of Sailkarite philo- 
sophy is that the universe is one: 
Tbe Absolute. the that there is no difference within 
oal, Reality. 
it, or without it. From death 
to death does he go, says the Kaihopanishad, who 
sees difference in this world; non-difference can be 
perceived only by the highly trained intellect 
(5.26. a). Brahman is alike tllroughout its structure, 
and the knowledge of any part of it is the 
knowledge of the whole. When Svetakctu returned 
from his teacher's house, proud, self-satisfied, and 
thinking himself learned, his father asked him whether 
his teacher had taught him the knowledge of Ultimate 
Existence, II by hearing which everything that is not 
heard becomes heard, by thinking which everything that 
is not thought becomes thought, by knowing which 
everything that is not known becomes known." Sveta- 
ketu plainly confessed ignorance and requested his 
father to tell him what that supreme instruction was. 
Then AruJ}.i, his father, told him that, " just as by the 
knowledge of a lump of earth, everything that is made 
of earth comes to be known, all this being merely a 
word, a modification and a name, tIle 111tilnate sut,. 
stratum of it all being tIle earth; that just as by the 
knowledge of a piece of iron everything made of lrOl1 
becomes known, all this being merely a word, a modi- 
fication and a name, the ultimate substratun1 of it all 
being iron; that just as by the knowledge of a pair of 
nail-scissors, everything made of steel becomes known, 
all this being merely a word, a modification and a name, 
the ultimate substratum of it all being steel ,. (S. 26. b), 
similarly, when any part of Brahman is known, the 
whole of it. is known, tIle ultimate stlbstratum of it 
all being Brahman itself, which is self-identical, self- 
subsistent, and self-mown. The implication of thia 
passage is that everything that exists is B

This is corroborated also by a passage from the Briha- 
daraI)yaka when in his c011versation with his wife 
Maitreyi, Yajfiav T all{ya said U a]l t11is Brahmal]a-hood, 
all this Ks11atriya-hood, all tllese worlds, all these 
gods, all these beings, in fact, c\lery.thing tl1at exists 
is A tman. ]llSt as wIlen a drum. is 1)eing beaten, one 
is not able to grasp the external sound l bllt b). grasp- 
ing the drum or the beater of tIle clrum, tIle sound be- 
comes grasped; just as wIlen t-l COllCll-shcll is being 
blow11, one is 110t able to grasp tI1C external sOtlncl, but 
by grasping the conch-shell or the blo"ver of tile concll- 
shell, the sound becolnes grasped; tllat just as when a 
111te is being played, one is not al)le to gras}J tlle ex- 
ternal souna, but by grasping t}1e ll1te Of the player of 
the lute, tIle saun(l becoI11CS grasped" (S. 26. c), 
similarly, in the case of the l
nowledge of the external 
world, if one is not able to grasp the external ,vorld as 
it is in itself, by grasping the 
lind, or by grasping 
the Atlnal1, t.he exter11al \yurld becomes grasped. This 
latter statement, of course, is only inlplied ll] tIle above 
passage, and not explicitly stated; but it cannot be 
gainsaid that tI1C Atn1an is llere COl11!>ared to tIle lute- 
player or tIle drun1-bcater or the concl1-blc\ver, \vhile 
tIle Mind by Ineans of \Vllich the At In all perceives is 
compared to the lute or tIle drul11 or the conch, \Vllile 
the external ,yor]d is cOl11pared to the sounds that 
issue from tllese instrllll1e11ts. This is "Tcril)"p a11 ideal- 
istic monism in \vllic11 the active part is attributed to 
the Atman, while the l\Iind serves as the instrument for 
its activity. In another passage of the same Upa- 
nishad, Yajiiavalkya tells 1\faitreyi that t11e Atman 
is the only kn0\,ver and that lle could not be 
known by anYOI1C except himself. II It is only 
when there seems to be a duality that one smells 
the other, that one sees tl1e other} that one 
hears the other, that one speaks about the other, tha


one imagines about the other, that one thinks about 
the other; but where the Atman alone is, what and 
whereby may one smell, what and whereby may one 
perceive, what and w]1ereby ma); 011e hear, what and 
whereby may one speak, wbat and "'Thereby ma}' one 
imagine, what and whereby may one think? He 
who knows all tllis, by wl1at may anybody know Him? 
He is the eternal knower, by what may He be lcnown?" 
(5. 26. d). Such a doctrine takes lTajfiavalkya peri- 
lously near the position of an absolute solipsism 
from which l1e tries to extricate llimself in his conver- 
sation with king Janaka in a later chal)ter of the same 
Upanishad when he tells 115 that "
'hen it is said 
that such a one does not see, the real truth is that he 
sees and yet does not see; for never is the vision of 
the seer destroyed, for tllat is indestructible; but 
there is nothing besides him, and outside him, which 
may be said to be seen by llim. \\'hen it is said that 
such a one does not smell or taste or speak or 
hear or imagine or touch or know, he does all these 
things and yet does not do them, for never are the 
olfaction, the taste, t11e speech, tl1c au(lition, the ima- 
gination, the touch and the knowledge of him des.. 
troyed, for the
' are indestructible; there is, however, 
nothing outside llirn and different from llim which he 
may smell, or taste, or speak, or l1ear, or imagine, or 
touch, or think" (5. 26. e). In this way, does Yajfiava- 
lkya extricate himself from the absolutely solipsistic 
position in which his absolute monism has landed him. 
The outcome of these passages is, that for the Abso- 
lutist there is nothing different from or outside the 
Atman, that knowledge of any part of him is the 
knowledge of the w1101e, tl1at all causation is ultimately 
due to him, that everything beside him is an appea- 
rance, that he is the onl)' eten1al kno\\,'er, and that it 
i. only when he becomes en tangled in the phenomenal 

acts of perception and knowledge that he may be said 
to perceive and know, and yet the truth is that he 
does not perceive and know. The Atman is the only 
entity to exist, and there is naught beside him. 

21. Even though metapllysical philosophy may re- 
The neaatlve-posltive quire such a rigoristic conception 
characterisation of the of the Absolute. for the purposes of 
Ab.olute. religion and for the explanation 
of the phenomenal existence of the world, a God has 
to be invented, who, in Ma'
Qukyan fashion, should be 
the lord of all, the knower of all, tIle inner controller 
of all, tIle Ions et origo of all, the final haven of 
all. Advaitism does not negate such a conception of 
God. It reqllires God just for the .sake of the pur- 
poses above mentioned; but higher than God philo- 
sophically, it regards the conception of the Absolute. 
God to an Advaitist is the personal aspect of the 
Absolute, and the Absolute the impersonal aspect 
of God. I t is in this spirit that the MaJ)Qukyopani.. 
shad makes a distinction between the conceptions of 
God and the Absolute, and regards the latter con- 
ception as philosophically even a higher one. 
"The Absolute is neither inwardly cognisant, nor 
outwardly cognisant, nor on both sides together. It 
is not a cognition-mass. It is neither knower nor 
not-knower. It is unseen, unpracticable, ungraspa- 
bIe, indefinabJe, unthinkable, unpointable. It is the 
essence of the experience of self-identity; in it all this 
universe ceases. It is tranquil, blessed, and without a 
second" (5.27. a). It is true that there are a few posi- 
tive characterisations of the Absolute in this passage; 
but the general description of it is, as may be easily re- 
marked, couched only in negative terms. It is impossi- 
ble for any absolutist philosophy to say anything, and 
to the same time that it is not outside itself. 

However much a rigorou
 monistic philosophy may 
describe the Absolute il1 negative terms, the very 
negatiol1 becomes affirmation, and it cannot rid itself 
entirely of some positive characterisation at least of 
the Absolute. It was this that happened in the case 
of the Upanisbadic Absolute. The BrihadaraQyaka 
describes tIle Absolute as Cf the not-gross and the not- 
subtle, t11e not-short and tIle not-long, the not-glowing 
and the not-shadowy, the not-d
trk, the not-attached, 
the flavour-less, the smell-less, the eye-less, the ear... 
less, the speecll-less, the mind-less, the PraQa-Iess, the 
mouth-less, tIle un-internal, the un-external, con- 
suming nothing, and consumed by none" (5. 27. b). 
This is a purely negative characterisation of the Ab- 
solute in tIle BrihadaraQ.yaka. The Ka tha mixes up 
negative and positive characteristics of it, as does 
the MUI}Qakopanishad. The Katha tells us that the 
Brahman is II sound-less, touch-less, form-less, taste- 
less, imperishable, smell-less, beginning-less, end-less, 
greater than the great and eternal, garnering which one 
is able to escape the Cl1.1tches of death JJ (5. 27. c). The 
MUI}.Qaka tells us that the Brahman is "unpointable, 
ungraspable, witholtt family and without caste, without 
eye and without ear, without hands and without feet, 
eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, extremely subtle, 
imperishable, and the source of all beings" (5. 27. d). 
The typical formulation of the negative characterisa- 
tion of the Absolute is in the famous formula II Neti 
Neti," which, as \ve shall presently point out, is itself 
interpreted in a negative as well as a positive signifi- 
cation. In most of the passages from the Brihada- 
yaka in which this famous expression occurs, the 
intended meaning is that the Absolute is character- 
less and indefinable; that whatever may be predicat- 
ed of it falls outside it and thus fails to define it. 
II The .A.tman is ungraspable for he cannot be grasped; 

he is indestructible for he cannot be destroyed ; he is 
unattached because he clings to nothing; he is un- 
bound, he does not wriggle, he is not injured...... 
Know this to be the secret of immortality, said y"ajfia- 
valkya to Maitreyi, and forthwith he entered the 
order of Sarhnyasa If (5. 27. e). There is, however, 
one passage from the BphadaraI)yaka where an at- 
tempt is made to give a positive connotation to the 
expression N eti N eti: .. It is for this reason that the}" 
describe the Absolute as N eti N eti: there is noth£ng 
which exists outside it, the Brahman being all-inclu- 
sive " (S. 27. f). The inclusive character of the Absolute 
leads to a transcendental vie\\T about it in a later passage 
of the B:rihadarat}yaka ",there the Absolute is described 
as full both " of light and not-light J of desire and not- 
desire, of anger and not-anger, of law and not-Jaw, havjng 
verily filled all, both the near and the far-off, the this 
v . 
and the that, the subject and the object" (5. 27. g). 
We t11us see how the l:panishadic characterisation of 
the Absolute passes from the negati\"e stage of neither- 
nor, 111rough t11e affirn1a ti\
e stage of inclusi,"eness, to 
the transcendental state of either-or. 

22. "That is Sankara's answer to the question of 
SaDkara's Doctrines the relation bet\veen the Self and 
of Identity, Creation the Absolute? It is true that the 
and Immortality. Absolute sub specie (l'fer11£tatis is 
the only reality; but \\That can \ve sa)? about the realit:y 
of what we empirically call the Self? Sankara an- 
swers that the Self is empirica]ly real, bl1t transcen- 
dentally ideal. From the phenomenal foint of 
view, we say that it exists as a separate entit}
 ; but 
transcendentally, it is identical with the Absolute. 
There are many passages in the l.panishads which 
support this view of Sankara. The Chhandogya tells 
t1S that U the Self which inhabits the body is verily 


the Brahman, and that as soon as the mortal coil ii 
thrown over, it will finally .merge in Brahman" 
(5. 28. a). In the Svetasvatara we are told that If the 
individual Self flutters like a swan in the wheel of 
Brahman considering itself and its Mover as separate 
entities; but it is only when it becomes one with it 
that it becomes immortal" (5. 28. b)
 The Br i11a - 
daraJ)yaka tells us that "he who worships the deity as 
separate from himself is merely the beast of the gods II 
(5. 28. c). In the Taittirlya an identity is asserted 
between the person in the Man and the person in the 
Sun (S. 28. d). The MU
Qakopanishad teaches the 
identity of the Soul pent up in the recesses of the 
human heart with the Supreme Person, and identifies 
botll "viiI1 the Ulliver
e (S. 28. e). Finally, in that oft- 
repeated instruction which Aru t;li imparts to Sveta- 
ketu, he teaches the absolute identity of the Self and 
Brahman (5. 28. f). These passages are verily a crux 
to the non-Advaitic interpreters of the Up anish ads. 
What does Sankara say, again, to the question of 
Creation? What, according to him, is the relation 
that subsists between the world and the souls on the 
one hand and Brahman on the other so far as 
creation is concerned? To explain creation empiri- 
cally, SaDkara draws upon the Mu
which tells us that If just as a spider creates and re- 
tracts its thread, as the herbs and trees grow upon the 
surface of the earth, just as from a living person the 
hairs of the head and the body grow, similarly, from 
this immutable Brahman does all this universe spring" 
(5. 29. a) ; and yet again " just as from a fire well-lit 
thousands of scintillations arise, and into it are 
resolved, similarly, from this immutable Brahman 
manifold beings come into existence and into it 
are merged "(5. 29. b). As regards the doctrine of 
Immortality, Sahkara asserts the impersonal immorta.. 

lity of the liberated Souls in their final mergence in 
the Absolute. "Just as rivers, which flow into the ocean, 
disappear in it after having thrown away their name 
and form, similarly, the Sage after having thrown off 
his name and form enters the highest heavenly Person 
(5. 30. a). "His breath does not expire; being 
Brahman himself, he goes to Brahman; as a serpent 
may throw off his slough, even so does the Sage cast 
off his mortal body" (5. 30. b). This last passage im- 
plies also the state of H JIvanmukti," inasmuch as it 
asserts that having realised his identification \\'ith 
Brahman even while life lasts, he merges in Brahman 
when he has thrown off his mortal coil. 

23. We now come to discuss a problem, upon which 
Three theories about there has been a great deal of differ- 
the origin of the Doc- ence of opinion among interpre- 
trine of Maya. ters of Vedantic philosophy, name- 
ly, problem of the sources of the doctrine of Ma)la. 
There are, on the whole, three different theories \\Thich 
try to account for the doctrine of Maya, as found in 
SaDkara and later writers, in three different ways: 
according to the first, the doctrine of Ma.ya. is a 
mere fabrication of the fertile genuis of Sankara; 
according to tbe second, the doctrine of Ma)
a as 
found in SaDkara is to be traced entirely to the in- 
fluence of the 5unyavada of the Buddhists; accor- 
ding to the third, Sankara's doctrine of Maya is to 
be found already full-fledged in the Upanishads, of 
which he is merely an exponent. To say that the doc- 
trine of Maya is a fabrication of SaDkara is to deny 
outright the presence of its sources in the Upanishads. 
To say that it is the outcome of the nihilism of the 
Buddhists is to give, in addition, merely a negativistic, 
nihilistic interpretation to the philosopllY of Sailkara. 
To say, again, that the doctrine of Maya ii to be 

found full-fledged in the Upanishads is to deny the 
process of the development of thought, especially in 
such a well-equipped mind as that of SaDkara. All these 
theories could be disproved if we find sufficient justi- 
ficatiol1 for the sources of the doctrine of Maya in the 
Upanishads, and if Sailkara's philosophy be shown to 
have developed these, and brougllt them to maturity. 
One of the chief ways in w11ich an attelnpt is generally 
made to trace the source of tIle cl()ctrinc of Maya in 
the Upanishads is to find in a C()11COrdance references 
to a word like Maya, ancl to argue therefrom as to tIle 
presence or otherwise of tllat doctrine i11 tI1C IJpani- 
shads. Such a procedure is all elltircI}? ridiculous 
one, inasmuch as it finds the existence of a doctrine 
like tllat of Maya in words ratllt'r than il1 ideas. To 
find out wllether the (loctri11C ot lVlaya is present in 
the Upanishads or not, \ve ffitlSt exallline the ideology 
of the Upanishads, and see wl1cther 111is affords us 
sufficient justification for s'lJring tl1at tIle doctrine is 
to be met with there. We s11all see in the sequel of 
this chapter that there are definite traces of that doc- 
trine to be n1et \vitil in lTpal1isl..a(lic Ilteral11re, and t11at 
so far from Satikara ha \Til1g fabricate<l a l1e\V cOllception 
altogether, or ha\Tll1g owed it to tIle illfluence of the 
nIhilistic school of thought) he maJ' defil11tely be said 
to have gone back to the Upa11isl1ads to find l]is in- 
spiration there, and as may befit a trt1e thinker and 
philosopher, to have elaborated it out of the incl10ate 
mass supplied to llim by the Upanisllads. Ot1r con- 
clusion, therefore, is that Sankaracharya only elabo- 
rated the ideas that he found in the Upanishads, and 
wove them into the contexture of his Advaitic philo- 

24. As we l1ave said J \ve shall exan1ine tIle ideas 
instead of the words in the Upa11ishads l and see ,vhether 

the traces of the Maya doctrine cannot be found in 
them. 1"'11e lsopanishad tells us that 
The Doctrine of Maya truth is veiled in this tlniverse 
In the Upanishads. 
by a vessel of gold, and it in- 
,rokes the grace of God to lift up the golden v.essel and 
allow tIle truth to be seen (5. 31. a). The veil that 
covers tIle trut11 is here described as golden, as being 
so riel), gaudy, and dazzling that it takes a\\'ay. the 
mind of tIle obser\"'cr from the inner contents, and 
rivets it upon itself. Let us not be dazzled b
l the ap- 
pearance of gold, saJTS the Upanishad, e"er
ythiIJg that 
glitters is not gold. us penetrate deeper and see 
the reality tllat lies ensconced in it. \\:e ha"ve thus, 
first, tIle conception of a "veil which pre'"'ents truth 
from tcing seen at first glance. Then, agairl, ".e ha\re 
another imag
 in tIle Ka1hopanishad of ho\\r people 
livil1g in ignorance, and thinking themsel'
es ,vise, 
move about \\"'andering, like blind men follo,,"ing the 
blind, in search of reality, \vhich they \vould ha,"e 
easily seen had they lodged themselves in kno\\t]edge 
instead of ignorance (S. 3 1 . b). \\re lla\Te bere the 
conception of bliI1dfoldness, and we are told that \\
deliberately shut our eyes to the truth bei"ore us. 
Then, thirdly, ignorance is compared in the l\luI)qako- 
panisllad to a knot whiol1 a man has to untie before he 
gets possession of the Self in the recess of his o"'n 
heart (5. 31. c). Fourthly, tIle Chhandog)
tells us how knowledge is power, and ignorance im- 
potence (S. 31. d). We, who are moving in this \\Torld 
without having attained to the kno\vledge of Atn1an, 
are exhibiting at every stage the po\ver of t11e impo- 
tence that lies in us. Not urness we have attained to 
the knowledge of Atman can we be said to have 
attained power. Then, fifthly, the famous pray'er in the 
BphadaraQ)Taka, in whic11 a devotee is pra).ing to 
God to carry him from Not-Being to Bei
, from 

Darkness to Light, from Death to Immortahty, mere- 
ly voices the sentiment of the spiritllal aspirant who 
wishes to rid llimself of tIle power of E,iJ. over 
him. Unreality is here compared to Not-Being, to 
Darkness, or to Death (5. 3I. e). The Kathopani- 
shad declares that the Sages ne\rer find reality and 
certainty in the unrealities and tlncertainties of this 
world (s. 31. f). Maya is here described as an fC adh- 
ruva"-an Unreality, or an lJncertainty. The Chhan- 
dogya again tells us that a cover of Untruth hides 
the ultimate Truth from us, just as the st1rface of the 
earth hides from us tIle golden treasure tIlat is hidden 
inside it. We, who unconsciously move to the re- 
gion of Truth day after day, do yet labour under the 
power of Untruth, for we do not know the Atman. 
This Atman is verily inside our own hearts. It is 
only he, who reaches Him every day, tllat is able to 
transcend the phenomenal world (5. 31. g). Maya is 
here compared to an Untruth, an Ii anpta." Then 
again, the Prasnopanishad tells us that we cannot 
reach the world of Brahman unless we have shaken 
Jff the crookedness in us, the falsehood in 115, tIle illu- 
:.-Ion (Maya) in us (S. 31. h). It is important to rem- 
ember that the word Maya. is directly used in this 
passage, and almost in the sense of an illusion. In 
the same sense is the word Maya used in the Sveta- 
svatara where we are told that it IS only by meditation 
upon God, by union with Him, and by entering into 
His Being, that at the end there is tIle cessation of the 
 world-illusion (5. 31. i). Here again, as before, 
the word Maya can mean nothing but illusion. It 
must be remembered, however, that the ,vord Maya 
was used so far back as at the time of the 
igveda in 
a passage, which is quoted by the Brihadara:Qyaka, 
where Indra is declared 
o have assumed many 
shapes by his h Maya". (5. 31. j). There l appa- 

-OPHIES 227 

rently) the \vord Maya, meant II po\\?er" instead of 
" illusion U --a sense in Wl1ich the Svetasvatara later 
uses it, when it describes its God as a Mayin, a magi- 
cian, a powerful Being who creates this world by his 
powers, whi1e the other, namely, the individual soul 
is bound do\vn again by" Maya I' (S. 31. k). Here it 
must be remembered that there is yet no distinction 
drawn, as in later Vedantic philosophy, between the 
Maya that envelops Isvara and the Avidya that en- 
velops jIva: for both the generic word Maya is used, 
and in the passage under consideration it means 
only II power" -almost the same sense \\Thich Kuno 
Fischer gives to the U Attributes" of Spinoza. Then 
again, in the Svetasvatara, Maya is once more identifi- 
ed with Prakpti (S. 3 1 . I), a usage \\'hich prevailed 
very much later, as may be seen from the way in 
which even the aut110r of the Kusumaiijali had no ob- 
jection in identifying the two even for his theistic pur- 
pose. The Svetasvatara also contains passages which 
describe the Godhead as spreading Ius meshes and 
making them so manifold that he catches all the beings 
of the universe in them, and rules over them 
(5. 31. m). Here we have the conception of a net or 
meshes, inside which all beings are entangled. Then 
again, a famous passage from the Brihadar
which we have already considered, which speaks of 
II as if there was a duality," implying thereby that 
there is really no duality, signifies the identification of 
May a with a semblance, an as-it-were, an appearance 
(5. 3I. n). Finally, in that celebrated conversation 
between Svetaketu and Aruni which we have also 
had the occasion to consider, we are told that every.. 
thing besides the Atman is merely a word, a mode, 
and a name (5. 31. 0). We thus see from an exami- 
nation of the various passages in the Upanishads that 
even though the \vord Maya may not have beea used 


for man)T times in the Upanisllads, still the conception 
that underlies l\ia)
a is already present there, and even 
thOl1gh we do not find there the full-fledged doctrine 
of illusion in its philosophical aspects as in Gaugapada 
and later writers, still we do find in the Upani- 
shads all the material that may have easily led 
Sai11<ara to elaborate a theory of Maya out of it. 
When we consider that we have the conceptions of a 
veil, of blind-foldness, of a knot, of ignorance, of not.. 
being, of darkness, of death, of unreality and uncer- 
tainty, of untrtlth, of crookedness and falsehood and illu- 
sion, of the power of God, of this power as identical with 
nature, of meshes, of semblance, an as-it-were and an 
appearance, and finally, of a word, a mode and a name, 
let no man stand up and sa)' that we do not find tIle 
traces of the doctrine of Maya in the Upanishads! 

25. Having tra
fd the source of the doctrine of 
Maya in the Upanishads, it is but 
Vicissitudes in the proper that we should give a very 

l deve lopmet1t . .. . 
of the doctrine of Maya. l)nef account of the VICIssItudes of 
that doctrine in its historical de- 
ve]opment in the post-Upanishadic period, and 
especially of the transfonnation of it which was 
effected by GauQ.apada and Sankara, inasmuch as 
t 11 is particularly concerns the question as to how far 
Sankara may be said to have elaborated his full.. 
fledged doctrine from the teachings of the Upanishads 
and from those of his spiritual ancestor, Gauq.apada. 
In the post-Upanishadic period, as early as even in the 
days of the Bhagavadglta, we do not find the doctrine 
stated in' the terms in which the philosophers Gauga- 
pada and Sailkara state it. In the Bhaga,'adgita, the 
Iaya is used in the sense almost of magical 
power, and God, the great magician, is declared to 

use the spirit-host to revolve as by the power of His 

divine magic (XVIII. 61), and yet again the beings in 
the world are declared to be resorting to the demoniacal 
sort of life when God robs them of their wisdom b:y 
his power (VII. IS). Moreover, it must be remem- 
bered, that here again we have to investigate the doc- 
trine of Maya in ideas rather than in words. Also, 
the Bhagavadgita is a short treatise compared with 
the Upanishads, nor does the theistic-mystic trend of 
the argument leave much room for a plnlosophical de- 
velopment of the conception of Maya. When we 
come to GaucJapada, however, we find that a great stride 
forward is taken in the development of that doctrine. 
Gaugapada uses Buddhistic tenninology, but sets 
forth an original doctrine. He tries to write a sys- 
tematic treatise on philosophy instead of only giving 
a lift to the spiritual impulse of man in the manner of 
the Bhagavadglta. Hence he states his opinion deli. 
berately and fully, and we find him in his 
Karikas maintaining the doctrine, not simply that the 
world is an appearance or an illusion, but that the 
world V\'as never created at all! His was what has been 
known in the history of Indian Thought as the doc- 
trine of It Ajatavada," the doctrine of Non-creation. 
It If there were a universe, the question might arise 
whether it would hide from our view; but the universe 
is not; duality is only Maya.; non-duality is the only 
reality" (I. 17). The sage Gaugapada, ho,vever, is not 
decided as to whether he should regard the world as a 
dream or an illusion, or not. In one place, he praises 
those ,vho have called the world an illusion: he calls 
such people the U well-versed in the Vedantic science" 
(II. 3I). On the other hand, when he is enumerat- 
ing the various views about the creation of the uni- 
verse, he is stating the view that the world is a 
dream or an illusion as a view which is held by others 
besides himself. II Some people regard the universe 


as the greatness of God, others as his creation, others 
as a dream, others as an illusion, others regard it as 
merely the will of God,. . . . . . still others the object of 
His enjoyment, some people call it the play-thing of 
God, and yet others regard it as God's nature" (I. 7--9). 
As contrasted with these :views, he states his position 
that he is at one with those who maintain the doctrine 
that the universe was not created at a11 (IV. 4-5). 
But it must be remembered that for the purposes of 
spiritual perfection and ethical conduct, GauQapada 
has to take account of the world as a verity. II That 
is the state of the highest Samadhi, in which all talk 
is at an end, all anxiety is at an end, which is full 
of .the highest tranquillity and eternal illumination" 
(III. 37); and, again, It creation has been recom- 
mended by the sages for the benefit of those who can- 
not but find the world to be real (Upalambhat) and 
who must needs be led on the path of good conduct 
(Samacharat) " (IV. 42). We thus see how even the 
sage GauQapada has to take some cognisance at least 
of the world as real, though it may be for the perfec- 
tion of mystical endeavour or ethical conduct, even 
though, philosophically, he may regard it as not 
having been created at alJ. Sankara profits by all the 
conceptions that have preceded him, and weaves his 
full-fledged doctrine out of the strands left at his dis- 
posal by the Upanishads and Gauqapada. If we exa- 
mine carefully the expressions which Sailkara uses 
about M ay a in his great Commentary on the Brahma- 
sfttras and elsewhere, namely those of inexplicability 
(sadasadanirvachanryasvartipatva), super-imposition 
(atasmin tadbuddhiJ.:l), and illicit transformation (raju- 
sarpa and suktikarajata) on the one hand, and those 
of subjective modification (akiiSe talamalinatvadi), and 
postulation of negation (khapushpa, mrigatrish
aindrajilika, Sa.vishiQa and vandhyiputra) on the 

other, all to designate the phenomenal appearance of 
the world, we shall see that Sankara is placing 11imself 
between the doctrines of lesser reality and illusion ; but 
his meaning is entirely unmistakable, that the world 
is merely an appearance on the background of Brah- 
man. We cannot enter here into greater details about 
the doctrine of Maya as Sailkara develops it. But we 
cannot leave unmentioned even in the short space at 
our disposal here the objections which Ra.manuja 
raises against Sailkara's doctrine of Maya, in order 
that we may be able to understand the real meaning 
of Sailkara's doctrine better. R3rnant1ja asks-What 
is the seat of Maya, the Soul or Brahman ?-How does 
the ever-luminous Brahman come to be hidden ?-Is 
Maya real or unreal? If real, it cannot be an illusion; 
if unreal, it cannot be an " upadhi" of Brahman-Is 
not the description of Brahman that it is incapable of 
definition a definition itself ?-What is the criterion of 
the proof of Maya ?-Is it not a contradiction in terms 
to say that Maya ceases by the kno,vledge of the attn- 
buteless Brahman ?-Is not tl1e removal of ignorance, 
once established, for e'
er impossiblef-all these ob- 
jections would seem to be merely an ignoratio cle1'lchi, if 
we only censider for a \vhile Sailkaracharya's criticism 
of the Vijfianavadins and the Sfinya"vadins in llis ex- 
position of the Brahmasfitra c, Nabha\ra upalabdhel). " 
(II. 2. 28), where by a severe criticism of theories \\,hich 
hold that the world is merely an idea, or that the \\yorld 
is merely a naught, Sailkaracharya proves himself to 
be neither an epistemological idealist, nor an epistemo- 
logical nihilist. To Sankara, the world is real, but 
only phenomenally real. Noumenally, sub specie ater- 
nitatis, it is unreal. We shall entirely n1istake San.. 
kara's point of view if we do not consider the great 
distinction that he draws between tl1e .l paramarthika " 
and the " vya.vaharika" vie\\rs of reality. Like his 


later successor in Germany, he was the first in India 
to bring into vogue the distinction between empirical 
reality and transcendental ideality. Kant was him- 
self charged with having been an Idealist in spite 
of his celebrated Refutation of Idealism. In like 
manner has Sailkara been charged with Ilaving beel1 
an idealist-nihilist in spite of his celebrated criticism 
of these doctrines. The recognition of the distinc- 
tion between the Vyavaharika and the Paramartllika 
views of reality, added to the recognition of tIle 
Pratibhasika and the SV3,p11ika 'views, wllich -may also 
be gathered from his philosopl1Y else\\Tllere, YIelds us 
a doctrine of the Degrees of Reality, Wllich is all the 
while implicit in Sankara, tlloug11 it is l1ever explicitly 
stated. Greater realit
y than tl1e reality of the \\7orld 
of illusion belongs to the world of dream; greater 
reality than the reality of t11e world of dream belongs 
to the world of life ; greater reality than the reality of 
the world of life belongs to the \vorld of tl1c Self, or 
God" or the Absolute, which are all ultimately identical 
with one another. Every system of philosophy must needs 
take account of some sort of appearance. From tllC 
days of Parmenides, Plato; and Plotinus to tIle days 
of Berkeley, Hegel, and Bradley, there l1as been the 
same cry. There is an extraordinary "moral" meaning 
in the doctrine of Appearance which critics of tilat 
doctrine systematically ignore. To quote the words 
of Carlyle: ,. Where is tile cunning eye and ear to 
whom that God-written Apocalypse will yield arti
culate meaning? We sit as in a boundless Phan- 
tasmagoria and Dream-grotto; boundless, for the 
faintest star, the remotest century, lies not even 
nearer the verge thereof: sounds and many-coloured 
visions flit round our sense; but Him, the Unslumber.. 
ing, whose work both Dream and Dreamer are, we 
see not; except in rare half-waking moments, suspect 


Dot. Creation, says one, lies before us, like a glorious 
Rainbow; but the Sun that made it lies behind us, 
hidden from us. Then, in that strange Dream, how 
we clutch at shadows as if they were substances; and 
sleep deepest while fancying ourselves most awake! 
. . . . . . Where now is Alexander of Macedon?..... 
Napoleon too, and his Moscow Retreats and Auster- 
litz campaigns! Was it all other than the veriest 
Spectre-hunt? . . . . . That warrior on his strong war- 
horse, fire flashes through his eyes; force dwells in 
his ann and heart: but warrior and war-horse are 
a vision; a revealed Force, nothing more. Stately 
they tread the Earth, as if it were a firm substance : 
fool I the Earth is but a film ; it cracks in twain, and 
warrior and war-horse sink beyond plummet's sounding, 
Plummet's? Fantasy herself will not follow them. A 
little while ago, they were not; a little while, and they 
are not, their very ashes are not...... Thus, like a 
God-created, fire-breathing Spirit-host, we emerge 
from the Inane; haste stormfully across the astonished 
Earth; then plunge again into the Inane.......... 
But whence ?-Q Heaven, whither? Sense knows 
not; Faith knows not; only that it IS through Mys- 
tery to Mystery, from; God and to God," 

1 (a) q


 , ute VI. 2. I. 
(b) qq Atr
'fi'. I. 1. 20. 
(0) Mftmerr. llt4E'I q
.. a:

 n: I 


11ft ri 
crmq II W

ir8 II 
. I. 1. 26, 28. 
(tl) "'
rqTR f'ft
t'-t1lS m

w'" fi:f",.q ;X

 I t. IV. 4. 22. 
(e) (mfif 'f_

tfif .... 84Q
,,"fir .. \if1'f!.,f;t. 


\T\Wrfir =er 
JQT IT"': 1

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 =- q(t
 . f.I=i:g '.:'!T'It ri 



. III. 3. 
(I) wf(
q (
8J{ I itr3+1

q ffft{- 
aJl1f: I if ;r, 

;y {t'8 I t=t'{ 


 ( q
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u '«S1fl1

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h tmrIQJU
g: I 
Qqy _ 
if $

it f8 I !. III. 2. l
(g) q""qRr SA



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(If{ I 
. I I. 5. 7. 
2 (a) 
rOJi 9jQq
)qTfiTq;q _T
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"'U: I 
,.. VI. 13. 
ir R

(fi[tf, q
t, q(t:1Qr 

tftlTP{iR:rmt, 'f'rerT
ot Rr
,u ilm

 I uti VI. 4. 1. 

'V1t lI'it: nrr: 
ql : , ,.. IV. 5. 
3 (a) 

q: q
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 Jf ('''<4
 : I Jf((r: 


'1': '11:: , !ti"'. 
8T 91 q-
I ,,#8: II 
"'. I. 3. 10, 11. 
(b) SQ": 
T'Jlf;r I "..m. 
" """ Q:ftI firq

ui<1 "mlf;t II 
..-. I. 3. 13. 
4. (a) 
: timrq,: 

 I Jr. VI. 2. 
. (b). v 
, snu(1'
w:t, 'Ii, "I!&, ",Ris, i1Tq: 


:, I 
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q, 8
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q ..;n;f . II sr. VI.
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a (',,
i ifTRit 
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f ...r


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) nRr I Sf. VI. 5. 
(d) 8f(f 
: I (t W 

, 'fvr m en
: qf(oq'lf 
Rr II 
sr. VI. 6. 
5 (a) 
Jilqn'ir:J q f 
;rim: I t=r 
, guriaT 


v: II ,.. VI. 5. 


. VI. 16. 
(c) q'=qu'., m 
f1f: sre1td: 
<it " 

 I "". VI. ro. 
6 (a) ifr
i 9 q;Rf 

" !I d,.
.. VI. 10. 

) mq
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7 (a)
) it

... rvns

'IJ' ..
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,.. IV. 5. 


M: '3
 .nn ,

.. VI. I. 
. 8 (a)!ftf'r 

M .TQm;f .. 
((. I .. V. 2. 
(b) f(
Ol(lT it 
 1{iq I ,.. III. 4. 
lq..., ;i 9 .n P'" 
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)' it. 
.. VI. IS. 
9 (a) 


rf8r ".,
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1! : 

"'(I I 

if;t ft1
,.....n \(1

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 if 9 


,., t 

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"', ;r '1r
t!: !I'8
 tUrrrfirri t[I
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'F6 II q

R m"
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(:1ttif m 

)1f;: U 'lip" 
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1PW """


8 tf;:q;:8 


arrq: I 



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(c) "'1"

tI-. I. 14. 



. III. 1. 1. 

 It'll dc..?,,,,
 q:;r ,.

: I 

ltff' if 

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1fi'. II. 5. 11. 
) +I'lq"




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f'k 'la1

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(f) fttn '1M !!

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f¥r R(I"
1:4' m 
N'(var: fq



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R " 
." q
fir II 


(g) 8{
 qf 'Un m
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(fl : fq; 

.q ;fi

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uf. VIII. 6. 1. 
( h) m 

(fr f(a,;rm "'
'" q'-lT inJ: 

,=81q(lI fUr;;n ftruP8 g
 TJI': I 
'l. IV. 3. 20. 
10 (a) 8ft.t 
'ff8 tier' If 'fi
q.... "'f, (((IT;mr 

a fd

lfOr pq
arfiT: J((qq

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r 1fT QJ- 

r3ft 'IT QT
'81ffr-r1 J[rt:l
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d I 'I. II. 1. 19- 

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v: I 



'( " 
.. VI. 2. 
1"" Uif
, 8{r
c it... 

J.U"ta' I is{rChr

ftr I 
m. VII. 12. I. 
II _(I1I:sr
) q 
T: I 
RlUq t , ((8 

lu,i i:( wt

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 Q I 
 f'ltQQ1 - 

 I t. 9, II. 
12 (a) 
 . oq
 fit,.dtU: I 

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qrtr: II ,.. I. 8. 
... artft
: q \ftl
: I R (q
m fti1r 
 qm: n 

,.. III. 2. 
' ftN EI

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t\'t, .: II 
,.. IV. 16. 


t m q\1t 
: I 



, II 
,.. v. S. 
13 (a);f 
ttt8 ftf
a '-It 

",q pfB.m

: UTH«ft
" (RI
'E. I. 2. 18. 

.Q""0"C4iJ '1m( I :nit 

 if tt=rdf n 

. I. 2. 19. 
(') "QUlIQrfq 
: '!Qq.m sR 

: I 

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:II '6. I. 2.7. 

m q:;rii 
 II .. I. I. IS. 
(e) (AI 
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9iJ asfit. 


) S(

m UN\1
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fa "l1;J
met. II m
: n
qte - 

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TiQf ,",Q
f.ITiI: q;:
 U8 II Ifq 

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a a 



CR'CI \% ¥I'4




 11..11 .R(ffI


t4d..d I 
ut. V. 10. 1-5. 
14 (a) 


 em: I q;?i 



: tiTW, ""t fU!.. 
: I 
: snuTt J 
fmr II 
i. II. I. 4. 
,"" w 
 q-( JIW: I ...,,


(t..""t( : II
: '4

I ' 

q: 1f
: , !!

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. 1. 3. 10-11. 
IS (a) 

JI, "'(iI

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fa {=lIst 

).,tit, (I 'IT 
"qTWI: fiTT

q qTt m{
Rqfa " 
ui. VII. I. 



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ci ;it rrf8: I 

. I. 7. 


,.. VI. 2. 
q iter

 (fQT gu I RI. Vl. 53. 

"T8it: I 
 a\q 'Jl(1


)"T: f'18T: 
ij 8! 

1:1ir I 
(1i(l ((' 

. II. 6. I. 
17 9 q?('fu
'ff8 qffcrq'f9Rr


T: I 

8 (f
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g;i .




q-c....mta 81' 

T; I (I

i,tRr I 

( uM,,

: I ata{ 
q \=f 

q m
qU(f Tf\1a


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18 (a) _ 


 qd q

'6' . I. 3. I. 
(b) IJ Wfur' 

,;f '1
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tt_ m I 
: Ntq-it 
....q) 8tf¥l 
t",d ta- II 

. III. I. I. 
19 (a) u;eEt 
; g
: f:T
,qt \=I 
l(tI' I 
,.. VI. II It 


T(qt ;rr"

' ;r 

(J ,-"fWE[1 '1\t 



II .. 111.9. 
(c) fif
) NJCI(()It I!
(1 ftr Jct(1
cr RlI 
9-rrpqi mila- 9 m'Q,,"
: II 
,a.. III. 3. 
20 (a) 

 Q-;r \ilraT"" \iftqfi(f 
q (11q

 (I{Rj(ir I 

. I II. I. 
(b) a

 r O:(I
 r'{,m;r atT'fi"t(t 

 ''''It:1 q: 

l+q: 'l1"-riil 'lT

' '1'

q)sq I 

ft. II. I. 


'( 1l.(f'


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ut. II. 20. 2. 
22 (a) _,,, m
titfiTT;ftflT ttt"" m

' I 

) "<IT 'I1i Q'(T Al;:era- .1Im.
,.. I. 9. 
(b) ...a
 fiI (q
'I' ",6
U ;mr:q



(c(T {1" ST


II Mr. I. II. 
23 (a) in" S 'e( 
rcq cm{w 
;nq r;f:
: qUJ tI"'-: 

Tf;r 9P:1Tfi1 
"Tf8...",'l i 
1fi1Q( 8
81f1fifoi q s:1i iii 

'IifVt .. 

) tm
8tfiJ. .q

IQ( Ii" f'luRl ti 
.. 1ItP(1

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 'if 8

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R\- I 'l: 
!Prari ftrs;s: tf'roqT -;c:t

!I' ;r 
'f, 11

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 a "I

+CI¥l'd : I o
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, """, 

, (q, 
mJ ftm8, nt\T, 

, !frat, crrr'V, 
;rRr, (Cf'
me I. .I
" (f 
 T,"aqt+i.tftdr sms;:q
'I. III. 7 
(b) (I
t (I 


I f;r

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q.{ .Tfir

;t :q- I 

;f :urN,"T;( :q I 
tti .



a- I 

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24 (a) '3 qT a11I 

TWT, (tUQ1 


:a- O{'{T: 


(q(fT: Q.q


rCf;r: ri t«r atftfrfif : 

Jlfihn: I i. II. 5. 15. 


f(...., : 
ri SrTutr: ri i1


 I (I

mfW I srrurr: 


rit '5l' «t4q I 
if. II. I. 20. 
(c) I: ifTq Jr@fuTr 
q. i
tr :qJ1l(i,,, 
:er q., gig" (
. II .. U ittT ;:rr
itli {=f
fJrRt, !frUIT 
tql{ I 

. II. 3. 1-6. 
25 (a) qf{T q
q; q

. ti
lfqut Cf.a)
fJ{ SN
q, fif
(lEfT fQ:t

: q
Ji Q',

fff II 

. III. I. 3, 




) i69; q

if II 
!j. III. 2. 6. 
26 (a) 

Cf f
:e" I 

: 6 

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f(f .11 'Ia. II. 4. II. 
(b) a- t f
i6m q 
TRl s:
 qmlfT atert'- 
a aI{T
tt: II qil'

tt Jramum IQ-mffrRt 'f)tf s 
rnr: i 


" +tq
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ii Ip

"Tit ifTII\Tq 


(qi( II qqr 
;q ci1t
fVt;rr {=If 

IT.rotOr R.
fiT ifT"

q II 

itil ;f

if t=f


U "'t.I

unq t=l fJr

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tj Jr;nq

 (f'U mRrftr 
. ut. VI. I. 2-7. 

,: {fr 
(;f ri 

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 " 'II



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tI qr fU
: II 6 

;r it'm



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: II 
 qQT .nunft itTV- 
 if ({

q q'tunft 9 
q qt 
: II 
i. I I. 4. 6-g. 


q" tIT 

mrot if m 
'fH {:r 
€t&qi fit If err m:st ",t 
a-eftfJr n 
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(fi fiiFlm 
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Ta (f
((i: s:cri: 'lurrnr 



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;;( 9 



;r t amN


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i( if; 
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iT ftNfr

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(e) Q: (f'i q




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R ntft-tb . 
 I o
fa 0«f

lfa °N






,. IV. 3. 23-3 I. 


27 (a) q:q riq,:: q:q 9_: 


11I.11 wrPa-:q WI i(
'ri ;i't+r
.. if )llttifttfi iF sri "rqll' &t'

((JJ"(q q6tt Sfrf
 ftrei aTtir 
f ""
 fQq: II 
. - 
JlT. 6, 7- 
(b) 9 ({mbi: (fq
 mffi il

(f I 
t ir
, Of
i«r1iT, ST9ll, m:9, 3fm4-, 
, , a1
rui , aTfI., 
t, atq')'U, ;; 
fik:att, ;r 
1:19f I 
. II
 8. 8. 
(c) at'il,&t( JI
tffd ll
"4J.tQ Q
, aqTS


: q-t 
ci fir

q o

tTa n 

. I. 3. 15. 
(d) q

ri".Pd;w)si (1
 q rTtzt q-ya:JI: I 
f1r(q fq 




: II 
. I. 1.6. 
(e) 9 

r" f{ flIRt, st
1 if 

(jiTT if f{ 

d , 
) II' Qq.m WI Rv.rrn 


II. IV. 5. IS; cf.also ,. III. 9. 
6; IV. 2. 4; IV. 4 22. 
(f) 81tm( 01
: ¥rRt itm I "if" 


" if " mt 
 I ,. II. 3. 6. 



qyS 'fiIR" q:, 

q:J d

) .. 

: II if. IV. 4. 5. 
28 (a) 
 I( 04'
" 'sP8i

 I m. III. I4- 4. 
 t9) BT
d q
sE I 'It.t ql('ftttf JrRa-r': . 
; 8i1''t(l
q" Rr II ,.. I. 6. 
(c) Qr'IT 

 11( qn
l(t 8
 m q) 
q...i R





q II( Qr
 w:;t d 
 I VAl '"SAri 

S ("
, 91 9 q 
 I ,. I. 4. 10. 

: II 

. II. 8. 

Rl II !j. II. I. 10. 
(f) ta q 
 ri (tt

((m , 
q.. f{:r 

m I ut. VI. 8. 7. 
29 (a) QQruf;rrfit: 
. Qtn tf
't4q ; n- 
 I Qt.11 
 n i. I. I. 7. 
J3ttt qqy 
rrT .vu: 

 ftqy: I o
);q .
Iql : nit- 
q;:a 8" ,,

 II d. II. I. I. 
30 (a) 

 I (f'1T 
: q(l(q

RJIlIl !i. III. 2. 8. 
I8 ...(RI,"s- 
q;fJ "flit"- 


 I &I. IV. 4. 6-7- 
3 1 (a) 

 I (Rei tw- 
 qif II i. 15. 

 11m I 


: qftW "'"-4tt.I
.' : 

...tQlt : qftq
r 81
: " 
'6". I. 2. 4, 5. 
(c) !" u:
'-f f'f
- -'«tv) tf'{ firft<t 9(,q
 I VrS" 

,IiRr Rr,

 II !i. II. I. 10. 
(d) en;n 9 f'mr. 
VT . I q
WI. I. I. 10 
(e) WI"dl lit 
 I (I


_ -t"q I '{. 1.:3- 28 


(1) "'I ""
 if sni- 
q;:& , '5. II. 4. 2. 
(g) a (it 
Jf': 8t;zarfit\111R: M 
(q, ;rt m 

 {8: &t8;r af'q: 

d I.. (Rf1!l It 

litRr fir

 Q .
.c?t "AA5: 
W'l gn: n't: nn: 
8f(q: I'"09
 : u:a- Sltt!lcdr ti" 



 I Gf. VIII. 3. 1-3. 
i ST
' ftr
\1f) qllf''fil ;r q ftr. . if IlNr 

 I sr. I. 16. 

JBR\- f'f,.. 
JfJqT At
 ; , ,.. I. IC. 
(j) tit( 

 I (it 
ttlqmt : 
,. II. 5. 19; cf.also $ft. VI. 47. 18. 

 f'f Jc4
: I JI'. IV. 9. 
(l) mqf g Sf
iJ RrtnPIITfq;f 
,.. IV. to. 
(m) II 
 (u;ftRr: ElJt'\ 
,.." bM 
: I JI'. III. I. 

 ",,(j W(I


: I 

: qt 
.. v. 3. 
(n) qw f( htiN 
it. I I. 4. 14. 
(0) Q'1T 

h ri 
q Pt.-td 

'&T ,
vi. VI. I. 4



1. In the midst of all the metaphysical conflicts 
that we have witnessed in the last 
The Supreme Philo- h h · 
sophlcal Problem. C apter, t ere anses one supreme 
question-what, if any, is the 
core of Upanishadic teaching? Shall our minds be 
only tossed on the waves of philosophical conflicts, 
or can we have a ballast which will give the necessary 
poise to our philosophical specu]ations? Shall our 
minds be only sunk in the mire of the metaphysical 
conflicts of Pluralism, Qualified Monism, and Monism 
as we find them in the Upanishads? Is there not, at 
the basis of these various attempts at the solution of 
the central metaphysical problem, one fundamental 
conception, which will enable us to string together 
the variegated philosophical speculations of the 
Upanishads? This raises a very important pro- 
blem-the problem of Ultimate Reality as understood 
by the Upanishadic seers. As we shall notice in this 
chapter, the Upanishadic philosophers solved the pro- 
blem by taking recourse to the conception of Atman, a 
word which originally signified the breathing principle 
in man, but which came in the end to denote the 
essence of the Universe. Readers of Greek philosophy 
need hardly be reminded of the close parallel that exists 
between this Upanishadic conception of A tman and 
the Platonic conception of the MO DiD) ttUrb. The 
A tmaD , as we shall see in the course of this chapter. is 




the ultimate category of existence to the Upanishadic 
seers. How they arrived at this conception, and what 
use they made of it in the solution of the fundamental 
philosophical problem will form the theme of the 
present discourse. 

2. If we look at the history of philosophic thought, 
we shall see that there are various 
ways in which the problem of Ulti- 
mate Reality has been approach- 
ed. The three chief types of ap- 
proach are the Cosmological, the 
Theological, and the Psychological. Dr. Caird ha..
said, that, by the very constitution of man's 
mind, there have been only three ways of think- 
ing open to man: U He can look outward npoIl 
the world around him; he can look inward upon 
the Self within him; and he can look upward to the 
God above him, to the Being who unites the outward 
and inward worlds, and who manifests himself in 
both."I According to him, the consciousness of objects 
is prior in time to self-consciousness, and the conscious- 
ness of both subject and object is prior to the consci- 
ousness of God. As he also elsewhere expresses it: 
U Man looks outward before he looks inward, and he 
looks inward before he looks upward."2 The ques- 
tion arises : Is this account of the development of the 
consciousness of Reality ultimately valid? Is it ne- 
cessary that man must look at the outside world 
before he looks within, and must he al,vays look 
within before he can look up to God? The solutions 
which the history of philosophy gives to this problem 
1Ie not exactly as Caird would have them. The 
artesian solution does not start by saying that the 

The three approaches 
to the Problem in the 
history of thou
ht : 
cosmological, theologi- 
caJ, psychological. 

I Evolution of Religion,!. 77. 

 Evolution of Religion, II, 


outside world is rea]. For Descartes, the Self is the 
primary reality, self-consciousness the primary fact 
of existence, and introspection the start of the real 
philosophical process. From the Self, says Descartes l 
we arrive at the conception of God, who is the cause of 
the Self, and whom we must therefore regard as more 
perfect than the Self. Finally, it is from God that we 
anive at the world which we started by negating, by 
regarding as the creation of a deceptive evil spirit. On 
the other hand, to the God-intoxicated philosopher, 
Spinoza, neither the Self nor the world is the primary 
reality. To him, God is the be-all and the end-all of all 
things, the alpha and the omega of existence. From 
God philosophy starts, and in God philosophy ends. 
The manner of approac11 of the Upanishadic philo- 
sophers to the problem of ultimate reality was 
neither the Cartesian nor the Spinozistic one. The 
Upanishadic philosophers regarded the Self as the ulti- 
mate existence and subordinated the World and God 
to the Self. The Self, to t11em, is more real than either 
the World or God. It is only ultimately t"hat they 
identify the Self with God, and thus bridge over the 
gtllf that exists l)etween the theological and psycho.. 
logical approaches to Reality. They start, no doubt; 
by looking out into the world, but they find that the 
solution of the ultimate problem cannot come from 
the world withol1t : it is necessary for us, they say, to 
go back to the psychololgical category. Then they 
try another experiment: they go by the theological 
approach to the problem of reality, but they find 
that also to be wanting. Finally, they try the 
psychological approach, and arrive at the solution of the 
problem of ultimate existence. We thus see that the 
problem of ultimate Reality to the Upanishadic philo- 
sophers is a cosmo-theo-psychological problem: finding 
both the cosmological and theological approaches 




deficient. they take recourse to the psychological 
approach and arrive at the conception of the Self. 
which they call the A tman. We shall proceed to show 
at length in this chapter how the Upanishadic philo- 
sophers regarded the cosmological and theological ap- 
proaches as only ancillary, and the psychological ap. 
proach as the only true approach to the ultimate 

3. We shall first discuss the cosmological approach, 
and see how it was found defi- 
Regress from the COI- cient. The naive mind of the na- 
mologlcal to the pb)'- . . . 
siological cateitorles. tural man IS likely to consider the 
forces of nature as ultimate reali- 
ties; but a deeper speculation and a greater insight 
into events show that the phenomenal forces cannot 
be taken to be ultimate realities. This fact is illustra- 
ted by a story in the Chhandogya Upanishad, where 
we are told how one student. Upakosala, lived for in- 
struction with his preceptor, Satyak am a JabaIa, and 
served him assiduously for twelve years; how even 
though the ordinary period of tutelage was over, his 
teacher would not leave him; how the wife of the 
teacher asked her husband why it was that he would 
not leave this one disciple while he had left the others ; 
how, when Upakosala had once gone to the forest. 
the three sacrificial Fires, whom he had assiduously 
served in his master's house. rose in bodily form 
before him; how the first. namely Glhrapatya. 
told him that the ultimate reality was to be found 
in the sun; how the second, namely Anvah
yapachana, told him that it was to be found in the 
moon; how, the last, namely Ahavantya, told him that 
it was to be found in the lightning; how, in fact, 
Upakosala seemed to be temporarily satisfied witb tb, 

instruction imparted to him by the three Fires; how, 
when he returned home, his teacher asked him why it 
was that his face shone as if with spiritual illumina- 
tion; how the student told lrim that the spiritual illu- 
mination, if at all, was due to tIle instruction imparted 
to him by the three Fires; how tIle teacher replied 
that the teaching imparted to llim by the Fires was 
deficient and inferior to the teaching which he himself 
knew; how he ultimatel
T ilnparted that teaching to 
his disciple, which consisted in saying that the ulti- 
mate reality was to be found neither in the sun, nor in 
the moon, nor in the lightning I but in the image of the 
person reflected in the human eye. "It is this Image," 
said Satyakama Jabala: H \VIlich is tIle Atman. It is this 
image which is fearless, and the ultimate reality. It is 
this image which brings all blessings. It is this image 
which is the most resplendent t11il1g in all the worlds. 
He who knows it to be so \vill himself be resplendent in 
the worlds" (S. I), This passage evidently indicates a 
regress frol11 the cosmological to the physiological 
ot satisfied \vitil objective existences 
being regarded as ultimate reality, -Satyakffina de- 
clares that ultimate reality is to be fOUlld in a phy- 
siological categor
:', namely, the eye. This, in itself, 
as we sllall see later on, is only an inferior truth, 
though evidently it has the merit of taking us from the 
outside world to the physiological sphere. In a simi- 
lar spirit, in another passage of the Chhandogya Upa- 
nishad, we are told how the light Cf which shines in the 
high heavens in transcendent space is the same light 
which is within man, and of this we have tactual proof, 
namely, wIlen we feel the warmth in the body, and 
audible proof when after closing our ears we hear what 
may be regarded as the thunder of heaven, or the 
bellowing of an ox, or the sound of a burning fire. He 
wbo meditates on ultimate reality as thus dwellinC in 




the human body becomes himself conspicuous and 
celebrated" (5. 2. a). This same idea is expressed in 
the Maitri Upanishad when tIle author of that 'Upani- 
shad speaks of the ultimate reality in man as being 
verily the sound which a man hears after shutting his 
ears (5. 2. b). We thus see that in these passages 
we have a regress from the cosmological to the physio- 
logical categories, namely, the eye, or bodily warmth, 
or the sound that man hears after closing his ears. 
The cosmological approach has been tried and found 
wanting. It seems necessary for the Upanishadic 
philosophers to halt at the caravansary' of the physio- 
logical categories I before they can proceed to the 
psychological destination. 

4. In a passage which occurs bot11 in the KaushItaki 
Re4re88 from the cos- and the BphadaraQyaka Upani- 
mologlcal and ph
lo- shads, we are told ho,y both the 
loaIcal to the p:;}'cholo- cosmological and physiological 
aleal categories. 
categories must be regarded as 
deficient, and how they must, therefore, necessarily 
pave the \\ray for . the psychological category. 
There is here a discussion as to how the proud 
BaIIiki once went to Ajatat
tru, the king of 
KasI, and hovv he tried to impose upon him by 
saying that he \\
ould impart supenor ,visdom to 
him; how Ajatasatrtl \\relcomed this great man who 
told him that he would impart superior knowledge; 
how the proud Balaki began by sa}ring that true \visdom 
consisted in regarding the sun as ultimate reality; 
how he went on to say that the ultimate reality was 
to be found, one after another, in such objects as tht 
moon, the lightning, the thunder, the \\'ind, the sky, 
the fire, the water, the mirror, the image, the echo, the 

I There is the lame distinction bet,,-een physiology and ps)'chololY &S 
Matthew Arnold would lay between the poetries of Byron and Wordsworth. 

sound, the body, the right eye and the left eye ; how 
ultimately Blllki's mouth was gagged when he could 
proceed no further in his peculiar way of philoso- 
phising; bow AjitaSatru took Bilski by the hand, went 
to a man who had fallen in deep sleep, and called upon 
him saying · Thou great one, clad in white raiment, 0 
king Soma'; how the man, who had fallen in deep 
sleep, still remained lying; how he rose at once when 
AjataSatru pushed him with his stick; and how, 
finally, Ajata
tru told Balaki that in the person who 
had gone to sleep, the sleeping consciousness may be 
regarded as ultimate reality (5. 3). In this passage we 
have evidently the deficiency of both the cosmological 
and physiological categories brought out in favour 
of the psychological category, namely, the deep-sleep 
consciousness. We shall see later how even this is an 
inferior answer to the problem that has been raised; 
and, therefore, we shall not stop at this place to discuss 
the final psychological answer of the Upanishadic 
philosophers on this head. 
S. The cosmological approach has been tried 
The coamolotlca1 and found wanting in favour 
arlument for the es1a- either of physiological or psycho- 
teDce of God: God Ie logical categories. But it does not 
all-powerful. by any means follow that the 
cosmological speculations of the Upanishadic philo- 
sophers did not lead them independently to the 
positing of Absolute Existence. If we look deeper, we 
shall find in them the same kind of cosmological proof 
for the existence of the Absolute, as we find, for ex- 
ample, in the history of Greek Philosophy. A passage 
of the Taittirtya Upanishad declares that behind the 
cosmos there must be an existence which must be- re- 
garded as responsible for its origin, sustenance, and 
absorption: "that from which all these beings come 




into existence, that by which they live, that into which 
they are finally absorbed, know that to be the eternal 
verity, the Absolute" (5. 4. a). And, again, a cryptic 
formula of the Chhandogya Upanishad declares that 
a man must compose himself in the belief that the 
world has come out of, lives in, and is finally absorbed 
in the Absolute. The philosopher of this Upanishad 
expresses this whole conception by means of a single 
word tajjallin, which means that it is from the Absoltlte 
that the world has sprung, it is into it that it 
is dissolved, and it is by means of it that it lives 
(5. 4. b). This II cosmological" proof for the existence 
of an eternal verity behind the cosmos by reference to 
the origin, existence, and destruction of the world 
is known to all students of philosophy, and we 
find the same thing in the Upanishads also. It is true 
that the same kind of objections that were advanced 
by Kant against the traditional cosmological argument 
may likewise be advanced against this way of argu- 
mentation in the Upanishads; but the fact cannot be 
gainsaid that the argument is there. When once an 
eternal verity behind the cosmos has been postulated, 
the Upanishadic philosophers have no hesitation in 
making it tIle fount and source of all power whatso- 
ever. They consider it to be the source of Infinite 
Power wllicll is OIlly partially exhibited in the various 
phenomena of Nature. Thus the forces of Natl1re that 
we are aware of are \lltimately only partial manifes... 
tations of the power that is in tIle Absolute. There 
is a very interesting parable in the Kenopanishad 
which tells us how this is so. Parables and mytlls in 
philosopI1ical works are to be understood as merely 
allegorical representations of phIlosophical truths, 
and it is thus that tIle story in that Upanishacl of Brah.. 
man, the eternal Verity, showing its prowess against 
the arrogant godlings of Nature, must be under- 

254: SUR\

stood. The story runs, that there was, once upon 
a time, a great fight between the gods and the 
demons, and the gods were s11ccessful. The gods 
thought that the success was dtle entirely to their 
own power, and forgetting that this power was only 
a manifestation of the power of Brahman in them, 
they became proud. The Brahman, knowing this, 
suddenly made its appearance before them, and the 
gods were greatly' \vonderstruck, not knowing what it 
was. Then they sent forth one of them, namely, 
the god of fire 1 as an emissary to Brahman, and charged 
him ,vitI1 tIle task of leamil1g the real nature of tb,at 
Great Being. The god of fire ran in pride to Brahman. 
Brahman asked Ilin1 who he was, and the god of fire 
proudly ans,vered that he was Jata,redas, in whom lay 
the power of burning the whole of the eart11 if he pleas- 
ed. Then Brahn1an tllrew before him a small blade of 
grass, and asked hin1 to burn it if he cOl11d. TIle 
god of fire ,vas unable to bum it \vith all 11is might. 
He becan1e disapfJointed and returned to the gods. 
Then the gods sent another god1ing of nature, 
the god of wind, and charged him with the same mis- 
sion. TIle goo of \vind ran in pride to Brahman, and, 
being asked who l1e was, said that he was Matarisvan, 
in whom lay the power of blowing away anything from 
off the surface of tl1e earth. Brahman again threw a 
blade of grass before l1im. Not with all his might was 
the god of wind able to mO'7e it to an infinitesimal dis- 
tance. Then the god of wind returned in shame, not 
being able to kno\v tIle nature of that Great Being. 
Then the gods sent Indra and charged him y, ith the 
same mission. Jl1dra was a more modest god tll:l.n either 
the god of fire or the god of wind. He ran to Brahman 
to know its natt1re, and Brahman disappeared from his 
sight, for the simple reason, it seems, that Indra was 
more humble than either of the gods previously sent. 




Then suddenly sprang before Indra one very beautiful 
celestial damsel, from whom lndra inquired w11at that 
Great Being was, which had made its sudden dis- 
appearance from before him. Then that damsel told 
him that it was Brahman, and said furtller, that it was 
due to the power of the Brahmall t11at the gods had 
gained victory over the demons, and not to their own 
personal power. God lndra was Sllre\\'d enough and 
understood that the power of the gods was only a 
manifestation of the power of the l\bsolute. It was on 
account of this humility, which made it possible for him 
to go to Brahman and touch him nearest, tllat he became 
the foremost of the gods. Ie It is \.erily t11e IJower of 

rahman which flashes forth in the liglltning and 
vanishes again. It is tIle po\ver of Brahman \\Thich 
manifests itself as the motion of the soul in us and 
bet11inks itself JJ (S. 5. a). Tllis parable tells us that all 
physical as well as mental power is to be regarded 
merely as a manifestation of the po\ver of Brahman. 
We thus see how the philosol)her of t11e I{enopanishad 
arrives cosmologically at the conceptiol1 of an un- 
manifested l>ower which lies at the of the so.. 
called manifest powers of nature and mind, and 
which must therefore be understood as the primary 

6. It is not merely tllat all the power in the \\'orld 
is ultimately due to Brahman: the 
God Is aupreme re- ver y res p lendence and illull1inatioD 
.plendence. . 
that we meet \vith In tIle "
are also to be regarded as maniiestations of the 
great unmanifest IUlninosity of the Absolute. H Does 
the sun shine by 11is own power ?" asl
s the Kathopa- 
nishad; II Do the moon and t11e stars shine by their 
own native light? Does the lightning flash forth in 
its native resplendence ?-Not to speak of the paltl7 


earthly fire, which obviously owes its resplendence to 
something else ?" Shall we say that all these so-called 
resplendent things are resplendent in their own native 
light, or must we assert that they derive their power 
of illumination fron1 a primal eternal verity \vhich 
lies at tIle back of them all, and whose illumi- 
nation makes possible tIle illumination of the so-called 
luminous objects of nature? "Before Him the Sun 
does not shine, before Him the moon and the stars do 
not shine, before Him the lightning does not shine; 
far less this earthly fire. It is only when the Absolute 
shines first, that all these objects shine afterwards. 
It is by His luminosity that they become luminous" 
(So 5. b). 

7. The Brahman, therefore, which must be posited as 
God Is the subtle ea.. the fount and source of all existen- 
S8nce underlyinlt phe- ee, and which must be regard.. 
Domenal existence. ed as the origin of all power and 
resplendence, must also be taken, say tIle Upanishadic 
thinkers, as the subtle essence underlying all the gross 
manifestations that we meet wit11 in the world. An- 
other parab]e, tllis time from the Cllhandogya Upani- 
shad, tells us how in the conversation that took place 
between a teacher and his pupil, the teacher, in order 
to convince Iris pupil of the subtlety of the underlying 
essence, directed him to bring to him a small fruit 
of the Nyagrodha tree; how, when the disciple had 
brought one, the teacher directed him to break it open; 
how, when it was broken open, he asked him to see 
what was inside the fruit of the tree; how, when 
the disciple looked into it, he saw that there were 
seeds infinite in number, and infinitesimal in size; 
how when the teacher again directed him to break 
open one of those seeds, the disciple did so, and, being 
uked to see further what was there, said" Nothing. 




Sir ", upon which the teacher told him, .. My dear boy, 
it is of the very subtle essence that you do not perceive 
there-it is of this very essence that the great Nya- 
grodha tree is made. Believe it, my dear boy Jt 
(5. 6). This parable tells us how the underlying 
essence of things is to be regarded as subtle and un. 
manifest.. and how tIle gross and manifested objects 
are to be understood as merely phenomenal appear- 
ances. There is, however, a further pOInt in the 
parable which we must duly notice. When the teacher 
told his disciple that behInd the Nyagrodha tree there 
lay a subtle essence which was unmanifest, he also told 
him that it was to be identified with the Self, and fur.. 
ther J that the disciple must identify himself with it 
(5. 6). We see here the limitation of the mere cosmo- 
logical conception of an underlying essence of things, 
and it seems as if cosmology must invoke the aid of 
psychological categories once more before the esSence 
underlying the cosmos could be identified with the 
essence that lies at the back of the human mind. 
Thus the whole Universe becomes one, only when 
we suppose that there is the same subtle essence 
underlying both the world of nature and the world 
of mind. 

8. The cosmological argument, as it happens in the 
history of thought, seems also to 
The ph,.ico-tbeolo- take the help of the physico- 
tical ....umeDt. theological proof and the two 
together seem to offer a fonnidable front to the think- 
ing mind. Likewise does it happen in the case of Upa- 
nishadic philosophy. The argument from design and 
the argument from order are merely the personal and 
impersonal aspects of the physico-theological argument. 
Those who believe in God believe in design. Those 
who believe in an impersonal Absolute believ 

only in order. Very often, as in the case of the Upa- 
nishadic thinkers l the personal and impersonal aspects 
are fused together, and we are told how the Self as per- 
sonal existence is yet II an impersonal bund which 
holds the river of existence from flowing by. Neither 
night nor day, neither age nor death, neither grief nor 
good nor evil, are able to transgress this eternal btU1d 
of existence" (5. 7. a). It It is at the command of 
this imperishable existence," says the BrihadaraJ;lyaka 
Upanishad, "that the sun and the moon stand bound 
in their places. It is due to the command of this Ab- 
solute that the heaven and the earth stand each in its 
own place. It is due to the command of this imperish- 
able Brahman that the very moments, the hours, 
the days, the nights, the months, the seasons, and the 
years have their appointed function in the scheme of 
things. It is at the command of this Brahman that some 
rivers flow to the east from the snow-clad mountains, 
while others flow to the west" (5. 7. b). We shall 
not try to disentangle here the personal and impersonal 
aspects of the physico-theological proof, the aspect of 
design and the aspect of order. Suffice it to say that 
the physico-theological proof is present in the Upani. 
shads, pointing out that the Absolute must be regarded 
as the ballast of the cosmos, preventing it from rock- 
ing to and fro at the slightest gust of chan
9. We shall now see how the Upanishadic philoso- 
phers went by the theological 
Rear-- from polJ. a pp roach to the conce p tion of 
thefan to monotheism. . 
reality. They began by inquiring 
how many gods must be supposed to exist in the uni- 
verse. They could. not rest content until they arrived 
at the idea of one God, who was the ruler of the whole 
univone. Ultimately, they identified this God with the 

S 10] 



inner Self in man. In this way did theologi
al categoriel 
become subservient to the psychological category of 
the Self. We shall see how this happens. In the contro- 
versy which took place between Vidagdha Sakalya 
and the sage Yajfiavalkya as reported in the Bp.hada- 
raJ.1yaka, we are told that the former asked Yajiia- 
valkya how many gods must be regarded as existing 
in the world, to which the first answer of Yajiiavalkya 
was U three and three hundred:' Yajfiavalkya closely 
following upon this by saying that there were ff three 
and three thousand." Not satisfied with the answers, 
Sakalya asked again how many gods there were. 
Yajfiavalkya replied there were thirty-three gods. 
SakaIya was again dissatisfied and asked again. 
Yajfiavalkya replied there were six gods. In answer to 
further inquiries from Sakalya, Yajfiavalkya went on 
to say that t
ere were three gods, and then two gods, 
and even one-and-a-half (1) god, and finally that there 
was only one God \vithout a second. Yajfiavalkya 
was merely testing the insight of Sakalya as to whether 
he would rest satisfied \vith the different answers that 
he first gave, and when Sakal)7a did not seem satisfied, 
he finally said that there was only one God. By 
mutual consent, Sakalya and Yajiiavalkya came to the 
conclusion that He alone is the God of the Universe 
" whose body the earth is, whose sight is fire, whose 
mind is light, and who is the final resort of all human 
souls 'J (5. 8. a). 
10. The Svetasvatara Upanishad develops this COB- 
ception of a personal God. In a 
Tbe theistic CODcep- 
dOD of God and His theistic vein it declares how the 
IdentlftcaUoD with the one God, whom it calls Rudra, 
seU. beside whom there is no second, 
and who roles the worlds with his powers, stands 
behind all persons, cRates all the worlds, and, ia 

the end of time. roUs them up again. He h
his ey
s everywhere, and his face everywhere; his 
hands and feet are also omnipresent. He creates the 
men of earth and endows them with hands. He 
creates the fowl of air and endows them with wings. 
He is the only God who has created the heaven 
and the earth (5. 8. b). In a later passage of . the 
same Upanishad, the author inquires further mto 
the nature and attributes of this God. He calls 
him the only Lord of the universe, the creator, the 
preserver, and the destroyer of all. He en
s by 
declaring that it is only to those who regard this God 
as identical with the Self within,-to those be- 
longs etemai haj}pi..'!

\, to 

e else 
. "50m.e $0- 
called wise men, being under a great C...U{J

lusion, regard Nature, and others Time, as the 
of being. They forget that it is the greatness of the 
Lord, which causes the wheel of Brahman to turn 
round. It is by Him that all this has been covered. 
He is the only knower, he is death to the god of death J 
the possessor of all qualities and wisdom. It is at 
His command that creation unfolds itself, namely, 
what people call earth l water, fire, air and ether. He is 
the permanent as well as the accidental cause of unions. 
He is beyond the past, the present, and the future, 
and is truly regarded as without parts. That univer- 
sal God, who is immanent in all these beings, should 
be meditated upon as dwelling in our minds also- 
that God who is the Lord of all gods, who is the Deity 
of aU deities, who is the supreme Master of all masters. 
and who is the adorable Ruler of the universe. There 
is no cause of Him, nor any effect. There is none equal 
to Him, nor any superior. The great power inherent 
in Him manifests itself alike in the fonn of knowledge 
and action. There is no master of Him in this world. 
nQr any ru1er, nor is there anythinS- which we might 

! 11 ] 



regard as His sign. He is the only Cause, the Lord of all 
those who possess sense-organs. There is no generator 
of Him, nor any protector. He is the self-subsistent 
mover of the unmoving manifold, who causes the 
one seed to sprout in infinite ways. I t is only to those 
who regard this Universal Being as immanent in their 
own Selves, to them belongs eternal happiness, to 
none else" (5. 8. c). In this theistic description of the 

vetasvatara Upanishad we are told how God is the 
only cause of the world I and how ultimately he is to be 
regarded as identical with the Self within. Here again 
the purely theological category becomes subservient to 
the psychological category of the Self; and it seems 
as if the ultimate category of existence to the Upani- 
shadic philosophers is God-A

'e,; Th
'''' Upanishads are not without reference to 
. the immanence and transcendence 
Tbe II anence.. f G d Th 
transcend Dee of God. 0 o. ere are some passages 
which declare merely his im- 
manenc I others merely his transcendence; others 
again \)ring together the two aspects of the imma- 
nence ;and transcendence of God. Thus, for example, 
we are 'told in the Sveta5vatara Upanishad that" God 
is to -be regarded as being present in fire and in 
water, in all the universe, in the herbs and plants. If 
In the BphadaraI].yaka Upanishad we are told how 
God-Atman is immanent in us from top to toe, as a 
razor is entirely closed up within the razor-box, or 
again. as a bird is pent up within its nest. A story 
from the Chhandogya Upanishad also brings into 
relief this aspect of the immanence of God. We are 
told there how the disciple was asked by his teacher 
to place a small piece of salt in water at night, and 
come to him in the morning ; how the disciple did as 
he was commanded; how, when the teacher asked 

him what had become of the salt, the disciple could 
not find it out because it had already melted in the 
water ; how when the teacher asked him to taste the 
water from the surface, then from the middle, and 
then from the bottom, the disciple replied that it was 
salt in all places ; then how the teacher told him that 
the salt, even though it seemed to have disappeared 
in the water, was thoroughly present in every part of 
it. Thus, verily, says the clever teacher, is that subtle 
Atman immanent in the universe, whom we may not 
be able to see, but whom we must regard as existing as 
the supreme object of faitll (5. 9. a). All these passa- 
ges speak of the thorough immanence of God. A 
passage from the Ka thopanishad, which reminds us 
of a similar one from _the_. _R_ eE

lic of Plato, which 
speaks of the Sun of the world' of tdt
t tells }:;
how the universal Self is to be regarded as 2
all the happiness and the misery of the world/
-" like 
the celestial Sun who is the eye of all the universe and 
is untouched by the defects of our vision 11 (S. 9. b)
Here the transcendence of God is clearly brought into 
relief. In other passages, we are also told how God 
is to be regarded as having U filled the who1e world 
and yet remained beyond its confines." "Like the fire 
and the wind which enter the world and assume 
various forms, the universal .Atman is immanent in 
every part of the universe and protrudes beyond its 
confines ." " Verily motionless like a lone tree does 
this God stand in the heaven and yet by Him is 
this whole world filled. I' This is how the Svetasvatara 
Upanishad declares the transcendence and immanence 
of God (5.9. c). We see from all these passages how 
God-A.tman is to be regarded as having filled every 
nook and cranny of the Universe, and yet having 
overflowed it to a limitless extent. In any ease, 
the God in the universe is to be regarded as iden- 

i 12] 



tical with the Self within us : it is only when this identifi- 
cation takes place that we arrive, according to the Upani- 
shadie philosophers ,at the ultima te conception of Reality. 
12. Let us now proceed to see how the Upanishadic 
phi19sophers reached the idea of 
ultimate real
ty by the psycholo- 
gical method. In a conversation 
which took place between King 
Janaka and Yajfiavalkya as re- 
ported in the Brihadara
yaka Upanishad, we find 
that Yajiiavalkya asked Janaka as to what psycho- 
logical doctrines he had heard about the nature of ul- 
timate reality. Janaka was a very inquisitive and 
philosophically inclined king, and he had therefore 
known all the opinions on that head which had been 
imparted to him by different sages. He proceeded 
to tell Yajiiavalkya the opinions of these various 
philosophers. II Jitvan SaiIini told me," said king 
Janaka, It that speech was the ultimate reality. " 
Yajfiavalkya answered that this was merely a par- 
tial truth. Then king Janaka told him that Udailka 
Saulbayana had said to him that breath was the 
ultimate reality. This also, said Yajfiavalkya, was 
only a partial truth. Varku VarshQ.i had told him, 
said J anaka, that the eye was the final reality. This 
again, said Yajfiavalkya, was only a partial truth. 
Then the king went on to say how GardabhI-vipIta 
Bharadvaja had told him that the ear was the final 
reality; bow 5atyakama Jabala had said that the 
mind was the final reality; how Vidagdha Sakalya 
had told him that the heart was the final reality;- 
all of which opinions, said Yajiiavalkya, were only 
partial truths (5. 10. a). In this enumeration of the 
opinioos of different Upanisbadic philosophers as re- 

The conception of the 
Self reached by an ana- 
lysis of the various 
pbY81oloQlcal and pay- 
cholo81cal categories. 

gards the various physiological or psychologicaJ cate- 
gories as constituting the ultimate reality, and in 
y aj fiavalkya's rejection of each one of them in turn, 
there lies implicitly the conception that ultimate 
reality can be found only in the Self, and not in 
the accidental adjuncts with which the Self may come 
to be clothed. This same idea has been developed in 
the Kena Upanishad where we are told that tt the Self 
must be regarded as the ear of ear, as the mind of 
mind, as the speech of speech, as the breath of breath, 
as the eye of eye. Those who know the Self thus are 
released from this world and become immortal. ., 
"That which speech is unable to give out, but that 
which itself gives out speech, know that to be the 
ultimate reality, not that which people worship in 
vain. That which the mind is unable to think, but 
which thinks the mind, know that to be the ultimate 
reality; that which the eye is unable to see l but that 
which enables us to see the eye, know that to be 
the ultimate reality ; that which the ear does not hear, 
but that which enables us to perceive the ear, that 
which breath is not able to breathe, but that by which 
breath itself is breathed, know that to be the final 
reality" (5. 10. b.). In this passage we are told that 
the Self must be regarded as the innermost existence, 
while all the physiological and psychological elements 
are only external vestures, which clothe reality but 
which do not constitute it. 

13. We now come to a very famous parable in the 
The stat.. of con- Chhandogya Upanishad which un- 
.clOUSDe.. : waJdDg- mistakably tells us how we must 
conaciOU8Deee, dream-. h . · 
COD8Cloulne.., sleep- arnve at t e conception of the 
COD8clouene... Selt- Self-conscious Being within us as 
cOD.cloUID.... constituting the ultimate reality. 
In a very clever analysil of the psychological s'atel 




through which a man's soul passes, the author of 
that Upanishad brings out ho,v the ultimate reality 
must not be lnistaken \vith bodily consciousness; 
how it must not be confused \vi th the dream... 
consciousness; 110\v it tran
,ecl1ds" even the deep-sleep- 
consciousl1ess; 110\v, f1na]]}7, it is the pure Self-cons- 
ciousness, ,vhiell is bC)7ond all bodily or men... 
tal limitations. We arc told il1 tl1c Chhandogya Upani... 
shad that t11e gods and demons \yere, once upon 
a time, both anxiolls to learn t11e nature of final 
reality, and t11ey tbrrcfore \ycnt in ptlrsuit of it to 
Prajapati. Prajal)ati 11ad l11aintained tllat CCthat entity J 
which is free from sin, free frc.m old age, free frem death 
and grief, free fronl l1ungrr ancl t11irst, \vl:ich de
nothing, anc1 imagines 110tlling, must te regarded as the 
ultimate self." 'Ibe gcds tl11d demons \\"ere anxious to 
know what this Self \\'as. So the gods sent lr:dra and the 
demons Virochana as tl:cir El11i
sarics to learn the 
final truth from Prajapati. Tl:c
' d\yclt there as pupils 
at first for a period of tllirty'-t\yO )
earsJ \Vl1ich condi. 
tion was necessary" before a master cotlld impart spiri- 
tual \visdon1 to l1is discil)les. T11en Prajapati asked 
them what it \vas tl1at l1ad brougl1t them there. Indra 
and Virochana told l1im t11at tl1c)7 11ad come to him in 
order that they n1igllt kno\v the nature of the Self. 
Now Prajapati \vou]d not immediately tell them the 
final truth. He tried to dcll1de them by Sa)1ing first 
that the Self \vas notlling more than the image that we 
see in the eye, in \vater, or in a mirror. It was this, he 
said, which must be regarded as tIle immortal and fear- 
less Brallman. lndra and \Tirocllana became compla- 
cent in the belief that trlC)' l
acl understood the nature 
of the Self. They bedecked thems
l\'es by putting on 
excellent clothes and ornaments, cleaned themselves, 
looked into a water-pan, and imagined they had 
visualised the ul titna te Self, and went altogether WIIl

posed in mind. Virochana told tIle demons that he 
l1ad been in possession of the ultimate secret, namely, 
that the so-called Self \\ras no other than the image that 
one sees in the eye, in a mirror, or in a pan of water, 
thus idcntifyi11g tl1e Self with the mere image of the 
body. 1"he Upal1is11ad tells us how there are a certain 
set of l)eople who take this as final gospel, which it 
calls the gospel of the Asuras. There must be a s]igllt 
reference here to those, who, like the later Charva,kas. 
maintained that the Self was nothing more than tIle 
mere consciousness of body
. Indra, however, un... 
like Virochana, bethought himself that Prajapati 
must 110t have given him the final answer in the 
matter of tIle k11o,vledge of ultimate reality. There 
was this difficulty that pressed itse]f before him. 
et It is true/' 11e said, U that, when tIle body is well 
adorned, tIle Self is well adorned; \\T}len t11e body is \\'ell 
dressed, the Self is well dressed; '\Then the body is well 
cleaned, the Self-'is well cleaned; but '\vhat if the body 
were blind, or lame, or crippled? Shall not the Soul 
itself be thus regarded as blind, or lame, or crippled"? 
He tllought that there was this great difficulty in the 
teaching that had been imparted to him by Prajapati, 
and so l1e went back again to Prajapati to request llim 
once more to tell him what ultimate reality was. 
Prajapati advised him to practise penance once more 
for thirty-t\vO years, and, when lndra had performed 
that penance, Praj apati supplied llim with another 
piece of knowledge. cc The true Self is he, " said Praja,.. 
pati, (( who moves 
lbout llappy in dreams. He is the 
immortal, the fearless Brahman." In fact, Prajapati 
told him tllat dream-consciousness must be re.. 
garded as identical with the Self. This seemed to 
please lndra and he \vent back; but before llC reached 
the gods, he saw again that there was another diffi.- 
C\llty in th
 infonnatioll that had been imparted to 




him by Prajapati. If Do we not feel,)) he asked 
himself, (f as if we are struck, or chased in our 
dreams? Do we not experience pain, and do ""e not 
shed tears in our dreams? How can we account 
for this difficulty if the Self were to be identified 
with dream--consciousness"? 
o he went back to 
Prajapati again, and told ldm tllat the kno\\lledge 
which he llad imparted to him couIc1 not be final, 
inasmucll as the dream-consciousness se
med to him 
to be affected with feelings of pain and fear. The 
true Self could experience neither pain nor f
Prajapati saw that Indra was a pupil \vorthy' to know 
better things, and so he asked llirn once more to prac- 
tise penance for another t11irty-two )'ears, at the end 
of which time he imparted to him another piece of 
knowledge \\rhic11 was yet not the l1ighest kno\vledge, 
namely, when he said, that the true Self must be re- 
garded as identical \vith the deep-sleep consciousness in 
which there is perfect repose and perfect rest. Indra 
was satisfied \vith the answer which Prajapati had gi\?en 
and returned. But before he reached the gods, he 
again saw that the real Self could not be identified 
even wit 11 deep-sleep consciousness for the simple 
reason that hi deep-sleep \ve are conscious neither of 
our o\\tn selves nor of objects. In fact, in deep-sleep 
we are as if \ve ,vere only logs of wood. There i5 
neither consciousness of self nor consciousness of tbe 
objective world. Feeling this great difficulty in the 
teaching that had been imparted to him by Prajapati, 
he went back again and told him that he could not be 
satisfied with the kno,vledge which had beel} imparted 
to llim, namely tllat the ultimate Self \\9as to be 
found in the consciousness of deep-sleep. For, he 
said, in that state there was neither self-coI1Scious- 
ness, nor any consciousness of the objecti\'e \vorld ; 
and it seemed as if the soul was entirely annihi- 

lated in that state. This could not be regarded, said 
Indra, as the final \visdom. Prajapati no\v saw that 
Indra by his shrc\vd in
t had 111
ctC 11in1self ,vorthy 
of receiving tl1e 11jgl1c
t kno\vJcdge. 
\o he asked 
Indra once morc, anct tllis tin1C final1
l, to I,ractisc 
penance for fi,re )7CarS ag3in. 1n(lr3. jlractisc(l penance 
for five )1ears, thtlS ron11)leting tb.c roul1d of penance 
for a l1undred and one y'c
rs. At t11e end of that 
period, he ,vent in all 11l1milit
y to Prajapati and 
implored 11im to gi,rc 1111n an insigl1t into the final 
knowledge. Prajapati said, " Vrrily.) 0 Inclra, t11is body 
is subject to deat11, l1ut it is at tl:e sa111e 1i111e the ves- 
ture of an immortal Soul. It is only ,vhen t11e Soul is 
encased in the body) tllat it is cog11i
ant of pleasure 
and pain. T11erc is neitl1
r !JleaS11rc nor pain for tIle 
Soul once relie\.cd of its body. Ju
t as tIle wind and 
the cloud, tIlc ligl
tning a11d t]1C 111ul1dcr, are \\rithout 
body, and arise fron1 Ilea \tC111y space ancl appear in 
their O\vn form, so does tl
is serene being, namely, the 
Self, arise from this mortal bed)!, reaell tIle highest light, 
and then appear in l1is o\yn forIn. Tllis Serene Being, 
who a.ppears it1 Ilis o\vn forn1 is tl1c Idgllest Person." 
There is here an indicatiol1 of 1Ile true nature of ulti- 
mate reality as lleing of tIle l1atllre of self-col1sciousness. 
That which sees itself by itself, tl1at \\'11ich recognises 
itself as identical wit11 itself i11 tIle Jig'ht of supreme 
kno\vledge-tbat must be regarded as tIle final reality. 
The final realit)T, 111erefore, accordir g to tIle C11hando- 
gya Upanishad, is reac11ec1 in t11dt tbeor<:tic , ecstatic, 
r state in \,,11icl1 tIle Self is conscious of 
noth1ng btlt itSfJf. (S. II). There is a great meaning 
which runs through tl}js f 1 araLle. B).' an analysis of 
the different states oJ conscjOtl
11(SSI tl1e J)hilosophet of 
the Chhandog.\.a Upanis113d points out tllat the bodily 
consciousness must not be Inistaken for final reality, 
nor the consciousness in dreams, nor that in deep sleep. 

S 14] 



The Soul is of the nature of pure self-consciousness, 
the Kantian tI I am I." Those 'Vl10 mistake the ulti- 
mate Self as identIcal ,vith bodjl
/ conscio11sness are 
the materialists. T1:cse \vLo ic1c11tl£\T it ,,,it11 tIle con... 
sciousness jn t11e clrca111-
.1atc ri,:,:,e a little llje-her no 

doubt, but they" n'li
tl:c tLc 
 If for ,\'ll
t the modem 
Theosopl11sts call iLe II ci])C'ric dOllLlc." Tllose, on the 
other hand, ,\
llO rcg
rd tIle 8cli as identical ,vith deep- 
sleep consciousness also 11;isnl1clcrstancl its nature, be- 
calIse tllcrc is in t]1at 
tatc no COllSCi011sness eitller of 
the object \yorlrl or of tIle 
,(lf. 'fIlc true Self could 
only be the self-conscious Being, sbil1jng" in his own 
native Iigl1t, thil1king of l1otl-iing l)ut l]is o'\vn thought, 
the "OrJ(Tl
 l/()i}(J(CJ.)f) of Aristotle, tIle supreme theoretic 
Being, tIle eterl1al Self -::I)ccta tor. 

14. Vle ha'vc llitllerto seen ho,v tlle pllilosopher of 
The ontological ar- t he Cbl1firldog)
J. L i r;3J1isbad arrives 
Qument for the cxls... at tbe concCl)tjol1 of Self-cons- 
tence of the Self. ciousncss as constituting the ulti- 
mate reality. \\.Tc 11a,!c seC11 a!
o bo\v 111e 1}panishadic 
philosopl1ers generally' regard GC(} as iclentical \vith this 
pure self-con
ciousncss. 1-1
e pl':ilosol)l-
er of tIle Taitti- 
rij 7 a U panisll(1cl gi\
es t1S c:crtail1 cli
ractcristics of this 
final re3.1itjT 'Vllicll cl13.1Jle us to rcgarcl his argulnent as 
almost an ontological cI
aractcri5ation of reality. 
"The Absolute," he Saj'S, t( is Existence, Conscious- 
ness, and Infinity" (5. 12. rl). In tJljS identifica- 
tion of the A1JsollltC ,vitil Consciou
,nrss, ,ve have 
again the real nature of tIle Atn1an lirought out in 
bold relief. Exi
 tC11CC to t 113. t pbilosoI)her means 
Consciousness. Tl)e sanl.e i(l
a is rcpcatccl else,\\7here 
in tIle Aitare:ya lTpa11ishad, ,,,here the autl10r of that 
Upanishad speaks cc of the goc1s of the hea\
en and the 
beings of the earth, \vllet11er prOdtlCed from eggs, 
or embrye, or sweat, or from t11e earth, everythinc 


that moves, or flies, or is stationary-Self-consciousness 
is the eye of all these. They are rooted in Self... 
consciousness. Self-consciousness is the eye of the 
world; it is Self-consciousness which is the 
Absolute II (S. 12. b). Here we have unmistakably 
the ontological argun1ent, namely, tllat ultin1ate Exis. 
tence must be identified with Se1f-consciousness. Thui 
by a survey of the different approaches to the problem 
of Reality, namely, the cosmulogical, tIle theolo- 
gical, and the psychological.. \\'C see tllat tIle Upa- 
nishadic philosophers try' tC) estal)]isll Reality on the 
firm footing of Self-collSciouslless. Self-consciousness 
to them is the eternal verity. God to them is not 
God, unless he is identical with Self-consciousness. 
Existence is not Existence if it does not mean Self- 
consciousness. Reality is not reality, if it does not ex- 
press throughout its structure the marks of pure 
Self-consciousness. Self-conscious11ess thus constitutes 
the ultimate category of existence to the Upanishadic 


15, The great question that now confronts the 
lJpanislladic seeker after truth is : 
if Self-consciousness is the final 
reality, how would it be possible 
for us to realise it? Can bare 
intellect suffice to give us a vision 
of this final reality, or is there any other process 
beyond the reach of intelligence which has the power 
of taking us within the portals of pure Self-consci- 
ousness? The Upanisha.dic answer is that mere in- 
tellect would be lame to enable us to realise pure 
Self-consciousness. Pure Self-consciousness could only 
be reached in a state of n1ystic realisation. Whether 

Its epJstemoloiical and 
metaphysical siQnift. 
C8Dce contrasted with 
the mystical. 




the mystical faculty, which may be called intui- 
tion, is l1igher than, analogous to, or included in 
the faculty of intellect, whose product all philosophy 
is, we shall not stop l1ere to consider. I t raises a 
large problem \\"hich does not lie \\
itl1in tile scope of 
this work. We shall, 11o\ye\rer, try to describe it 
partly in our last Chapter on ct TIle Intimations of 
Self-Realisation, " 

11ere \ve shall see how it \\90uld be 
possible mystically to realise Self-consciousness. Our 
answer there would evidently be the super-sensuous 
aIld the super-intellectual answer. Intuition) as we 
shall see, is a sl1perior faculty to either mere sens- 
uous perceptiol1, or intellective apprehension. At pre- 
sel1t, howe,'er,. \ve are concernrd ITlerely with the 
(I philosopl1ic " aspect of 11tlre Self. consciousness, 
Wllich nlay be looked at from t\VO different points of 
vie\v, the epistemological and the metaphysical. Vv"e 
sha11 see first wllat the epistemological aspect of 
Self-consciousness is according to tIle Upanishads, and 
then shall end this chapter by bringing out its full 
metaphysical significance, reserving the mystical 
aspect of it for our last cllapter. 

16. Episten101ogically, \\
e are told in ,rarious 
passages of the Upanishads, it 
The Epi
)' of \vould not be P ossible f t 
Self-conscJousness. or us 0 
kno\\' the Self in tllC teclmical 
meaning of tIle \vord (( knowledge." Our readers might 
bring to mind tIle fact that Kant equally well regarded 
Reality, as consisting of God and tIle Self, as techni- 
cally unkno\vable. 1'hese \\
tre, he said, n1erely mat- 
ters of faith. 
flle Uparlishadic ans,,'er is that it is 
tnle that God and the Self are unkno\\tabIe, but they 
are not merely objects of faith, they are objects of 
my'stical realisation, Then, a.gain, the (Tpanishads do 
not regard the Self as unkno\yable in tl}e a@noItic 


sense of the word, for example, in the sense in which 
Spencer understands it. Rat11cr, it is II unl(nowable II 
from the standpoil1t of pllilo
,ophic llumility. 
(i) The Atman, 

(l)T tllC lTra11j
}-ladic 1:11i1osophers, is 
unknowable jl1 llis (sscnijal l1aiure. "11
at, frem 
which our speeell t11rns llClck along ,,'itl1 mind, being 
unable to comprehend its fll]nes
:, is tIle ultimate rEa.. 
lity, " sa:ys the Tail tirI
ya Urlal1j
Jlad. It Tl1at w11cre 
the eye is unable to go, \\)1-:cre I1ciihcr 
,pe(Cll 110r mind 
is able to reac11--\vI1at COI1CCI)tic11 ea11 \ve ha\Tc of it, 
except that it is bC:YOI1Cl all 11Jat is }.,:l1o\yn, and be)70nd 
all that is unl:no,,'n !" sa

s tI1C I{cI10pal1i
.:bad. The 
philosopl1cr of tl1at lJpalli
l}ad f:ay
s in all .
mood that he ,rho t11i111(s 11e l:rJc\,"s docs not kno\v, 
while he "rIlO tllil11
s ]IC docsnotl
no\v does reaJly 
know. C ognosccndo 1 0 gnora1'i, ct 1'g'noralldo cog1losci. 
The Ka 1hopa11isl1ad ill a Sill1i1ar '
fin sa)ts that "the 
Self is not i11 tIle first il1stallce or
cn to tIle hearing 
of men, but tllat c\"cn }}a\
iI1g llcarcl11iln, n1an)7 are 
unable to J
r:O\V Ilil11. \\Tor1dcrful is tIle man, if 
found, ,vho is ab1e to Sl)cal
 about llim; \vonderful, 
indeed, is he ,y11o is al)lc to COITlf)rc}1cnd hin1 in ac... 
cordance \\ti th the instruction of a teacher" (5. 13. a). 
We see in all t11cSC passages 110W t11e A trnan is to 
be regarded as ull}.
nO\vable in llis essential nature. 

(it) There is, ho\vc,"cr, anotller side to the sub- 
ject of the un}.
110\vaLili (y of A tn1al1. The A tman 
is unknowa1)le because I-Ic is the Eterllal Sllbjcct w110 
knows. Ho\v coulel tl1e Etcr11al I{no\ver, asl\: the Upa- 
nishads in \.arious Ijlaccs, be a11 o11ject of knowledge? 
I' The Atn1an is the Great Bcirlg," sa
ys the Svetas- 
vatara Upanishad I' \VI10 l
no\vs all tJ:lat is knowable; 
who can Itno\v lunl \vho 11in1self knows ?" In the 
BrihadaraI;lyaka Upal1ishad, in various passages, we 
are put in possession of the bold speculations of the 

'5 16 ] 



.philosopher Yijfiavalkya. " That by ".hom e,"erything 
is known, how. could he himself be knO\Yn? It is 
impossible to knO\V the knower. II "It \vould not 
be possible for us to see the seer, to hear the hearer, 
to think the thinker J and to apprehend him by \vhom 
everything is apprehended." U He IS the eternal seer 
without himself being seen ; he is the eternal hearer 
without himself being heard; he is the only thinker 
without himself being thoug11t; he is the only com... 
prehender \\ithout anyone to comprehend him: 
beyond him there is no seer, beyond him there is no 
hearer, beyond him there is no thinker, beyond him 
there is no being who comprehends "(5. 13. b.) We 
thus see that the question of the unknowability of 
.Atman has another aspect also, namely, that He is 
unknowable because He is the Eternal Subject of 
kno\vledge, and cannot be an object of knowledge 
to another beside Him. 

( iii) But this raises another fundamental ques- 
tion. Granted that the Self is the eternal knower of 
objects, granted also there is no other knower of 
him, would it be possible for the knower to know 
bimseU? This \'cry subtle question was asked of 
YAjfiavalk}ya in another passage of the Brihadirao- 
opanishad, and here again we see the brilliant 
light which the sage Yljfia\yalk
a throws on thO 
problem. It is possible, he S
YSJ for the knower to 
know himself. In fact, Scl!..knowlcdge or Self-con- 
Iciousness is the uItio1ate category of existeIlce. The 
Self can become an object of l'IIO\vJedgc to himself. 
According to tIle philosophy of Yljfia\palkya, nothing 
is possil)lc. if self-consciousness is not possible. SeU. 
consciousness is the ultimate fact of existence. "'. 
ere how boldly Yajfia\9a1k)7a regards both in. 
trGlpeWaG I.Dd eeU-coneciql81_ _ the vaiti. 9( 
U · 

experience. We also see the nudity of the doctrines 
of Kant and Comte when they try to deny the fact 
of introspection. Introspection is a psychological 
process eorresponding to Self -consciousness as a me- 
taph}rsical reality. Self-consciousness is possible 
only through the process of introspection. The Self 
is endowed with the supreme power of dichotomising 
himself. The empirical conditions of knowledge are 
inapplicable to the Self. The Self can divide himself 
into the knower and the knoWD. It is wonderful 
how Kant should have posited the II I am I " as the 
supreme metaphysical category, which he called the 
transcendental, original, and synthetic unity of ap
perception, and yet should have denied the reality 
of the corresponding psychological process of in- 
trospection. The answer of Yajfiavalkya is that 
Self-conscio\1sness is possible, and is not only possible., 
but alone real. King Janaka asked Yi.ji1avalkya 
what was the light of man. Yajiiavalkya first said 
that the light of man was the sun. It is on account 
of the sun that man is able to sit and to move about, 
to go forth .for work, and to return. II When the 
sun has set, 0 Yajiiavalkya," asked king Janaka 
"what is the light of man?U Yajfiavalkya said 
that then the moon was the light of man. For, 
having the moon for light, man could sit, and move 
about, and do his work) and return. .. When 
both the sun and the moon have set, " asked king 
Janaka, (I what is the light of man?" U Fire indeed, '
laid Yljfiavalkya, U is man's light. For having 
fire for his light, man can sit and move about, do hi, 
Work, and return.. II cc When the sun bas set, whea 
the moon has set, and .when the fire is extinguished. 
what is the light of man ?" asked Janaka. 'f Now, 
verily." says Yljfiavalkya, II you are pressing m. 
-to the deepest. qUfJltioo.
. WJaea the IUD bu lit., 

117 ] 



when the moon has set, and when the fire is extin- 
guished, the Self alone is his light" (5. 13. c.). YI,- 
jfiavalkya is here clearly positing what Aristotle 
called I' theoria," the act of pure self-contempla- 
tion in which the Self is most mysteriously both the 
subject and object of knowledge. 

17. We have seen, hitherto, the epistemological 
significance of the conception of 
The Metaphysics 01 S If · · 
Self-coD8cloU8De... pure e -conSCIousness In the Upa- 
nishads. We have seen that the 
Self is regarded as unknowable in his essential nature, 
as well as because he cannot be an object of knowledge. 
We have seen also that he can dichotomise himself and 
make himself at once the knower and the known. It 
remains for us now to discourse on what may be called 
the metaphysical significance of the conception of Self- 
consciousneess. In the preceding Chapter we have 
seen how the whole field of philosophic thought 
was torn by the conflicts of the metaphysicians, some 
regarding the Self as entirely distinct from the Abso- 
lute, others regarding it as a part of the Absolute, 
and yet others regarding the Self and the Absolute 
as entirely identical. These constitute respectively 
the fundamental positions of the three great metaphy- 
sical schools -the dualistic, the quasi-monistic, and 
the monistic. Never has any land possibly experi- 
enced such bitter and prolonged argumentative 
battles as were witnessed in India throughout the 
history of its thought. The question arises: Is 
there any way out of the difficulty! How is it that 
each of these different metaphysical schools comes to 
interpret the same Upanishadic passages as confirm- 
ing its own special metaphysical doctrines t Shall we 

ot say that the Upanishads 
re higher than the 
Commentators? Is there not a common body of meta- 

ph}"sical doctrine in the Upani.shads whicl1 each of,the- 
.sical schools has onl
l partially envisaged.? 
Is tile of tllat greatest of Indian philosophers 
to be regarded as ,rain, \vhen he said that the Schools_ 
 battle among themse]\ycs, but y'et that Phi1osophy_ 
is above the Schools? l\fay' we not find a supreme 
clue to the reconciliation of these different battling 
 We must go back to the Upanishads them. 
selves, with our mind entirely pt1rged of all scholastic 
interpretation & Let us make our mind a tabula rasa, 
an unwritten slate upon which there is no hurtful im- 
print of scho]astic superstition, and we shall see that 
there is a clue through the laby.rintll and mazes of the 
philosophic conflicts. It is true that the reconciliation 
of the different schools must come) if at all, only- 
through mystical experince. It is only in mystic experi. 
ence that each school and each doctrine can have its 
own appointed place and level. But it Inay also be 
granted to us to ]ook even philosophically at the 
problem, to go back to the texts of the Upanishads 
themsel\'es, to arrange them in a serial order of 
developing philosophical propositions, and finally to 
see a vista of supreme reconciliation spreading out 
before us among the battling forces. 

18. We may arrange the different stages of spiri- 
Tbe Ladder of Spld- tual experience, as developed in 
taaI ExperieDCe. tIle Upanishads, philosophically 
interpreted, in a series of fi"ye developing proposi.. 

ions. We may regard them as constituting the 
ladder of spiritual experience with a series of five 

sc steps. The first stage of spiritual experience 

uld consist, according to BrihadaraQyaka Upani- 
ad,_ in realising tIle Self, in mysticall)' apprehendmg 
tJle glory of the Self within us, as thO\1gh we were 


t from him . (S. 14. a ). N ow co
es the . 




ltage. Another passage l from the Brihadlr&9yaka 
U.panishad tells us that the Being, which calls itself 
the" I " within us, must be identified with the Sell that 
is hithertofore realised. We must experience that we 
are really the ,yery Self, and that we are neither the 
bodily, or the sensuous, or the intellectual, or the emo- 
tional vestures; that we are in our essential nature 
entirely identical with the pure Self. This is the second 
stage (5.14. b). In the third stage of spiritual expe.. 
rience, we must con1e to realise, according to Briha- 
diraI.\yaka Upanishad, that the Self that we have 
realised is identical with the Absolute. This same 
identification of the Atman and the Brahman, of the 
Individual Spirit and the Ul1iversal Spirit, of the Self 
and the Absolute, is also proclain1ed by the episto- 
lary stanza of the 153. and its cognate Upanishads, 
where we are told that the Atman must be regarded 
as verily the Brahman, that the Atman is infinite in 
its nature as also the Brahman, that the Atman de- 
rives its being from Brahman, that subtracting the 
infinity of the Atman from the infinity of the Brah- 
man, the residuum is even infinite. Thus does that 
epistolary stanza pile infinities over infinities, and, 
taking the mathematical lead, speak as if when the 
infinity of the Atman is deducted from the infinity 
of the Brahman, the remainder itself is infinite. The 
inner meaning of this assertion is that we should see 
that there is no difference between the Self and the 
Absolute. This constitutes the third stage (S.I.f.C). 
Now comes the fourth. If the Being that calls itself 
the ,. I II within us is the Atman according to our 
second proposition, and if it is to be entirely 
identified with the Brahman according to our third 
proposition; that is, in other words, if I am the Self, 
and the Self is the Absolute; then, it follows syno- 
ca1ly that I am the Absol
te. Th
 is u-."'is- 

takably inculcated by a passage of BphadlraQyaka 
Upanishad, where we are told that we must iden- 
tify the " I II with the Absolute. Another aspect of 
the same doctrine is proclaimed in the Chhindogya 
Upanishad, where the "Thou JJ comes also to be 
ff projectively U identified with the Absolute. This 
constitutes the fourth stage (S. 14. d. ). If now the 
" I" is the Absolute, and if also the If Thou ,J is 
equally the Absolute, if, in other words, both the sub- 
ject and object are the Absolute, then it follows' 
that everything that we see in this world. Mind 
and Nature, the Self and the not-Self, equally consti- 
tute the Absolute. Whatever falls within the ken- 
of apprellensioD, equally with whatever we are, 
goes to make up the fulness of the Absolute. The 
Brahman according to the Chhandogya Upanishad 
is verily the If ALL ". ( S. 14. e). To such a giddy 
height does the philosophic ladder take us on the 
rising steps of philosophic thought. This is verily 
the position of Absolute Monism. Whether this 
state of Absolute Monism is to be merely intellec- 
tually apprehended, or mystically realised, dePends 
upon whether we are by nature destined to be merely 
torch-bearers or mystics in the spiritual pilgri- 
mage. That we should prefer the second alternative 
will be evident in our last Chapter on the " Intima- 
tiODS of Self-Realisation." . 


mm t it 

.,it wr..
ltt'" I n. 
_ q

 I i8 


m q-et,(t 
 lit mgq: qft:. 
' s:Rt 8
" II'nElfd I . . , 
": 'EI
) qr;m.'t pt. ;r: .R\'- 

: I...' W't \Ii 11T\


 dfr I q 1('1 




 m I...' .'1 tit. 
ep trm

 SSUt(l'V OIm 

lfOr qm 
{fit I q 1('1 :alI(IIRr 


Il '3

 1...1 8fQ t1i -n(CI1I'P.t) 

'1I9 mar 
WT "",n 
ftf I q 1('1 fiI

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"",){:r . 
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& ITftr 

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9tI \ d8 I ¥fIN 
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Wr;q '" 5'" m
 "'Ts ,,"
 ,..., " 
'" .

(l 1('I 
mRf ,1'1t. 

 IIiftr '...1 
tmPft: · \ · 
"I Ci5)\. ¥lTfit .. 
vi. IV. 10. 15- 
2 ( a) ttq qw: 1R) 
)f8(fQ'.(it f'rJil<f: ns 6'i8: 
 :s-",q mi5
 "''' 8tJ
:"''' '(81.. 
dt;rifWtm;t fit
fW I 8

' W'

'f "
,, V4
 G1IR n.. 

 I tI
8'{ri rq 
'8 .."1: 
\1tIftr If d 
ut. III. f3. 
 I 'IQft/t,.r-m q )Sttii
& I q
'q \i)
 nf8 I 'f

,"",'I 'F y f6 I 
,. II. 6. 
, WQ ( __ tn"". .
_ flt" ...

wnw _'
" . 

a1tl!= _ 
8 v.t1
 I W 


aJJ ..rqq", (ftr I 


. .... 
... OWI'{U OUyqtqt OSIfa!!.('f;Tllt 
__ e(I(it 

oq sR:1fUr I Cl8 V ( 
IlRI 1...1 8' tN'
trifft I if ("rar
V SI'lIIRr '" ('Ice 11N- 
ti, qf.t 
m."'81 __ 

I IV. 1-18, also!. II. I. 1-15. 
4 (0) dr '" tmfit 'F',{ir 
tti& I iall ",mtffr "Wf81 

9fimftr I 
 , 8'(Q)ftr I 
,. III. I. 

(b) a..1 i11f8 ((1''' 
'tItf1 " I 

IIf. Ill. 14- I, 
S (0)" ( 
) fttta" nq ( ..n PIn 

p\! I 11 
f16hPt fO'titS.,-. . 
fa1mt "'
 I Rtri 

lt I 

flr I ,,

ft fit



i1M ,,,f4 tt

ri d-i

 I t\'. 


ri ftm!i 
Qftr{811t1l '"51tP't

ftr I 8.nw I 

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ffrqft I 

" Mti I drJr. 


fiIftr , ri. 
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T iI

f"fa om 

ff:r{ utiTfiJ 1...1 
'-' tit.. 
qr;i.. « it




rH I :. i"'i:
't aTr


" -.. -.. ,... ,.....,... -0 


1rT., ;:1J.1irfT{7
 {T(f.. .

... '- 
, "", , . 
;:;r tfilTS\"i;r 

q -r-. r

: I 

. III. IV. 
(b) if (f!f 

Tfa iJ' 

ifT (tr

fr +llfa 

+ntr: I airq 

:* i{ r;
fi1+1rfff n 'fa. I I. 5. IS- 
6 R(1f)

 {(;:r i f
rn I 
....... . ... ......,- , r"'- ... 
t '\T
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l' ;.r,"'
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n. ",.,.2 1 
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l' {
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;f r*;
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tiaTr;; ;r f
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Tq':a' q 
 11::--17..; TIJr1ii;T if fit+t1T
;-\ iEi 


;y [


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 {1q or

 ;a(T$?fT {f
ute VI. II. 
7 (a) 6f
T,;rr (1" BITf




(f: ;r 
1'; ;'1 



ute VIII. 4. 1. 
(b) q:
q q-f 


it .

r ....,...,. ,,
1m:, u:;::r
tf crT 

;;: s{
if fTtJfJ tJlql

Tm f

Dar :Ji{)t
't'RTw:r' m
r iftCIf(: 


. q:noC.q at
q Rtrrf{1if qtffi 
.i t. 
r tnl: 
8+q: q
m:tr: sni
)SRlT: I 
i. III. 8. 9. 
8 (a) 
q- tit' 

r qrlJ


 fiTCiT, "tiS cd:. 
fiJfi!.- y{i"r.- I 
.m'll{tn q,....w'fQffJ 

rliiRit ,







qJ 'q
1firf8 i\ql

ftrf8 tm:a I 


m t1
'lfq. q
) :Rftf8: .n " ft 
!J'i" f'Rn
{l':Iai 9" 
111' . 
 'IT "t 8' 
I(tt" : "<Iq\lll{ ' 
- !. III. 9. 1-10. 
' {( 


: I mq:.-n_fif 
q '.a

 -ftq,: II 

 Jadr" 'I
'q1'l I 8 
t 'Idr . 

: II 
,.. III. 2. 3. 
 ..Tit (f
 qft Pat,..,: I 

 lritm !I

 BI"d a'll

If. "

 it gi.: .-RS ChIlW5) gaft 
t\fq: I iPf. 
ftnt '5
 Ncrft ( 


 II. .1 

: 9 

sAq: 18 



JIRIU(i m 

qt 8 \
a(..i m.. 
qfir qcft;t't trot 

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\li .. 
'I(w ;y aN

",",8 I q





h .. 

 fillTl{ I 'i Ct.r
uT ",
ftRt ;r .,

 " 1iJT
q": II.. II 

 1(1\11 fft "'
 I 8m

W . urq 
d(",t( II 
.. VI. 1-12. 
9 (a) '" 
ssft q)
 q) ftrNt 
 I q th. 
 II1it 'PI: II 
.-.. II. 1'- 


;r S1lfbr: 

J1h1t, 'II f'I "

1 q tt if q

,. 1.4. 7- 
S!I\1Pn'-t m 

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q lI
q'lT ftrc.;ft;rh I 
,,,RI 'EtfM

(! I W1-q, . 

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fitfa- I .
ul fitRt I iT fi1J1ltt
'1 IIN
", (f3 I 
q 8'lI 

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u MK

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'fJT'JI '"" 

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,. · 8?m " 8Trmr (RCl
vi. VI. 13. 1-3- 
, q-n 



: I 

 r if
. it'fi"!:
: II 
1£. II. 5-11. 
(c) 9 
i f'lMRit pn

. "'. III. 14 ( also RV. X. 901 ). 
enh\h't sri sn'frit d d 

 d d 

.ftat II 
h.i p;t Rft.tit 
 d srfd.

mn d

tE. I I. 5. 9, 10. 
W {'( 

 Tit !!
jq-. III. 9. 
10 (4) 
 . 'I) it
Qtftr. .
., fti8, ... , 

f'I1I: snun' Qaftr... 1(

: ..- QIftr...
tiI1ftftr I...I

a'liII : ""*" 
1Iif8... ".q 
tlfr.i ftr I ... I 81'
tmb ",..,.1 w;lT" Qtta... ....

: WJ

q "fW...


'(. IV. I. 8-'J. 



;:ft QrIF=lT tr 'IT'i 
!ITOT: I rq


:[J. \ft:r: !r

__ _, 

a 11 .., II t:1Jt

t;i' 1:te:r EI11T

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:T'.!t. -.r:::. '-r';'" tf' r 
f',,* " 7I'-'I"I'

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d+{ t (\

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..... . 
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tr I (1 I a
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(irT:t it
q-t(ia I ti:;
1irur if 
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si r
;f tt

Elit I 

!1'TQr;:r if 
Tftilrn fj {'
!OT'itfd' I 
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fitf:a ir
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it. I. 2. 8. 
II (t

r :at


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fuft J(
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ti 4T


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t?+t, (1 tT- 
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a q.f
tfl;a: TJ:




l.f: qf

eru1 t;ft

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sr +itRr 

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 fo , 

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,¥Jitm ;if tt'Ef (""'" 


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i#'tftr 9 

yq , · ..1 o
it ( ""') ,

q 'IT ri tti,


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: fR

q '30:: fir
mr , '1ttl
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a: I at
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ii ff(

tfif atJ
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;r .qurrfi1iii
, ::-. 
 · .........c. · 

Clq '3Sf
(QTq q

1aqtRr {=f 

Jf : 

'{: I 
ut. VIII. 7. 12. 
12 (a) 9i1i 
a !!(tqi 1:f
" RiT

. II. I. 
(b) t('{ QrT tJ:
:... q:

T (IIrtir 

i:f,f;r · · . 

\fl tfu :a: \WTti\irTfit 'I 

3rTfif =if 
STTif 1...1 ;:r

tT" :a- q(f(ir :er f.lV" 
iT o(s(
titSl !11(11'
 sr{a-mir !I,",;r5() 
Q1 srfm QT;j qr i 

ft. III. 3. 

13 (a) qaT ctt;;;r') firq(\-=a itSlTtlr 
, I 

. II. 4. 
... (t'!I . 
iJf8 " Cf';rr 
iJm ;iT 
 ;y Rrv) ;:
tta a:

q a


fft«PJ:N I 
. I. 3. 

a (I
q JI(f 
({ t1
q it ,,

: 11I
IJRf f'fwr- 
Tit(fTq: u 

. II. 3. 
T if 
({t sfq "teft it..- 
Rf'IJ: I 8It


1\1'sslPif ,",8T 
 II. 'Ii. T. %7. 
 ffAJ W WI" ra- 

r"(f it'fJr I (JJlr({Rt Jri 

P(Yr{ I 

_. III. 19- 
 ri Rr
fifTfiI ti 
 t'f",pfNn{ I 


. II. 
. I.f. 


II ri
 p: WRrR 

: I 
 !. III. 4- 2. 
r prs
: ."'.nIM JlPc:ll sfQRR fQm, 
---n', "IRI)
 lInn, ....
m, ..I..... ms
 fWRrr . 
'I. III. 7. 23. 
, f$





I'i F' {fi\' qm 


..,' ''- (l



'fIt S

iertftfW.. I 
 'I' I(I"

 (lPWsRt f'E'RtIftrbn-t!" 

14 (a) ""'" 'II lit 
t&t1 : I 

: I 

t. IV. 3. 2-6. 
'I. II. 
. S. 

,. IV. 4. II. 
) Gtq..I'ttt __ I , II. 5. Ig. 

(d) lit 

(e) ri.
qr ,I 

1[. I. 4. 10. 
ut. VI. 8. 7. 
ut. III. 14- I. 



1. After a discussion in the last chapter of the 
central metaphysical position 
Metapby.icl, Mora- reached in the U p anishads and 
ItIy, aad Mysticism. ' 
after a suggestion that that 
position is to be attained more by the way of mysticism 
than by the way of thought, it would behove us 
for a while to bestow our attention on the moral 
problem in the Upanisllads, .which might easily be 
seen to be connected with their metaphysics on 
the one }land, and mysticism on the other. The 
problem of the relation of metaphysics and mo- 
rality has been a much.debated problem from very 
ancient times; nor is the problem of the r
latioD of 
morality and mysticism in any way a less important 
problem. For, just as it is hard to decide as to 
which of the two-metaphysics and moralit}T-should 
receive the primacy in the discussion ()f the develop- 
ment'of man's consciousness as a w1:cle, similarly, it 
i5 equaHy hard to decide which of the two- 
morality and mysticism-plays a more important part 
in that development. If we take into account, however, 
the integrity of man's consciousness as a whole, it 
would seem absolutely impossible, in the inter
t of 
the }righest development of which man's conscioaa. 
ness is capable, to iunder the intellectual from the 
moral, as the moral from the mysti08.1 element. in- 
telligence without the moral backbone might only 
flegenerate into the cleveTe;t fonns of chicanery, and 
a myati
 without morality, if .u
h . 001 Mi. ))OIIib 1t, 



[S 1 

might only be a 11ideous creature who is a blot on the 
spiritual evolution of man. And, again, just as morality, 
to be ratiocinative, must be firmly linked to the intellect, 
similarly for its conSUD1rnatio11, it D1USt end in the 
mystical attitude, Wllich alone is tIle goal and end of 
the life of man. In sl10rt, Metapllysics, Morality and 
Mysticism are as inseparable from each other in the 
interest of the highest spiritual development of man, 
as intellect, will, and emotion are inseparable for his 
highest psychological development. It would thus 
seem necessary for a while to linger on the discussion 
of the mora1 problem in the Upanishads, as the con- 
necting link between tIle Inetapl1ysical position reach- 
ed therein and the final n1ystical realisation taught 
in the Upanishads. 
2.. At a time w11en moral reflection in other lands 
had hardly reaclled even the gno- 
Progress of the Cha-. . .. . 
ter. filC stage, It IS mterestmg to 
P note that, in the Upanishads, we 
have a fairly good discussion of all the more im.. 
porta11t etllical l)rolJlcn1s; wllilc, in certain cases at 
least, the solution reached might be contemplated 
upon with great profit even by present-day moralists, 
because the solution whicll the Upanishads attempt 
is a solution which is based upon the eternal troths 
of Atmanic experience. It is true that in the 
Upanishads we have not a very full discussion 
of the theories of the moral standard as apart from 
the theories of the moral ideal) inasmuch as thought 
is required to be necessarily mo
 abstract in the dis- 
cussion of the former, while in that. of the latter it 
has to deal with the concrete problem of the end of 
human life. In t11e course of tae present chapter, we 
shall first discuss the rudiments of the theories of the 
moralltandard as we find them in the b,p

. f. 



and after a consideration of the limitations of the 
. tbeoriep so advan
ed, we shall proceed to a discussion 
of. the theories of the moral ideal. Of these latter, two 
at least are specially noteworthy-the Doctrine of 
Beatificism, and the Doctrine of Self-realisation. 
After having considered these theories, we shall next go 
on to the discussion of practical ethics in the Upani- 
. shads, and thus survey the lists of virtues enumerated 
in the various Upanishads, considering more especially 
_ the virtue of Truth. It is undoubtedly true that in the 
discussion of the practical side of ethics, the Upanishadic 
period IS st1rpassed by the Neo-Upanishadic period, 
for there the metaphysical interest having waned, 
interest in practical conduct got the upper hand. 
Then, after a short discussion of the problem of the 
freedom of the will as considered in the Upanishads, we 
shall conclude the chapter by a short portrayal of the 
.ideal of the Upanishadic Sage, bringing out the 
contrast betv\teen the Upanishadic Sage on' the one 
hand and the Stoic and Christian Sages on the other. 


3. Coming to the consideration of the theories of the 
moral standard as advanced in the 
. Upanishads, we have to note at the 
'outset, that, as in the childhood of man, so in the child- 
hood of the race, heteronomy is the first principle which 
serves .to dictate rules for moral conduct. Reference 
is always made in such cases to the conduct of others, 
of those who are better situated mor
y than 
ourselves as dictating to us the principle of con. 
duct for our own behoof. Not without reason 
did Aristotle think that the opinion of men- of 
trained character should count 
 the principle of 
moral authority in cases when one is not able, OD a



[t a 

count of one's ignorance, to choose the way of moral 
action for oneself. ITlle Taittiriyopanishad contains a 
celebrated passage, where the disciple is told that 
"he should follow only the good actions of the 
spiritual teacher; that he might even more profit- 
ably follow the good actions of those who are still 
better situated than the spiritual teacher; that if 
ever he should seek to find out the intimate nature 
of duty or conduct, then he should always be 
guided by this one principle only, namely, how the 
Brahmins, who are cautious, gentle, and intent upon 
the law, conduct themselves in that particular case II 
(5. I). This quotation evidently implies the maxim that 
we should always mould our conduct on the pattern of 
the conduct of those who are better than ourselves and 
are in a position to give us rules of conduct by their 
example. The opinion of Society in general, or the 
opinion of the State, are rather vague terms for defining 
the nature of heteronomic duty. It may not be possible 
for either the Society or the State to always impart 
to us one uniform principle of moral conduct. On the 
other hand, if we penetrate deeper, we shall find that 
the opinions of the Society or the State are themselves 
based upon the maxims of conduct which are sup. 
plied to them by Wise Men. There is an oligarchy in 
Morality, as there is an oligarchy in the Society or 
the State, and it is the \'oice of the Moral Oligarchy 
which, according to the TaittirI}TOpanishad, ought to 
prevail in supplying us with the pattern of conduct. 

4. Theonomy is also a sort of heteronomy, inas- 
much as the" theos " is also a It heteros I' from the 
properly moral point of view. 
But it is convenient to consider 
Theonomy as separate from Heteronomy, inasmuch .. 
I. NI '*Dac Mu1 Etbica I. ... 





the Law of God stands in a somewhat differeni.ca1p 

from the Law {if M;w. TTnless it were Oo c:
,.. to D
.) · _h

,.."n;c:t-as {1
. +.1'"-1-'1 Q-.. 
"jl r....,."'
.. _
v 0-'''- 4-'" A-a15" tI16tal 
conduct, unless it were possiblP ":.='
ch as to note 
what principles in g6\\o.
. -6511i'1>e regarded as constittlt- 
ing the wishes of God-if we were not to understand these 
as identical with the dictates of Conscience which is the 
candle of the Lord within us-it might not seem very 
possible to set down in detaiJ the Laws of God as enjoin- 
ing the performance of certain duties upon us, in pre- 
ference to, or in cance1ment of, other duties. But in 
communities which entertain a vague fear about God 
as a Being who is separate from ourselves, the laws 
which are after all "attributed" to God by man 
ever hang like the sword of Damocles on the moral 
agent, and theophobia instead of theopathy supplies 
the rules f.or moral life. It was thus that the sage of 
the Kathopanishad said that " God is that great fear- 
ful Thunderbolt which is raised over our head, by 
knowing which alone can man become immortal. 
For is it not through His fear, tllat the fire bums, 
the sun shines, the god of gods. the wind, and death 
as the fifth, run about doing their work?" Of the 
sam e import is the passage from the Taittiriyopa- 
nishad which only reiterates the passage from the 
Katha with slight alterations (S. 2 ). But when all 
has been said in favour of the Law of God, on a careful 
consi deration of the intimate nature of moral actioD, 
it may become evident that the law issuing from 
anybody except one's own Self can never be regarded 
as a sufficient guarantee for the moral tone of actions. 

5. It is thus that moralists have arrived at the 
conception of autonomy which 
alone supplies the true principle 
of moral conduct. It is neither the Society, nor tht 


. "or God, who can give us the essential rule for 

.; fo
 "'11st spring entirely from within 
ourselves. 'Wee
ftl0r'glsP Ll1Re .£\


t: --
:: seers 
envisaged this principle of moral\. d

on unleSs. 
course we see it in that q

\ from the Chhan- 
dogya Upanishad where j

 are told that the ..mind 
should be meditated upon as the Ultimate Reality 
(5. 3. a), or even again in that other quotation from 
the same Upanishad where we are asked to regard the 
mind as verily the A tman in us, as also the Ultimate 
Reality (So 3. b). These passages have been under- 
stood by a recent writer on Hindu Ethics as involving 
the theory of Intuitionism. But it may be easily 
Seen that inasmuch as it is the Mind which is here 
equated with the Highest Reality and not the Self 
which is mentioned as .apart .f.rom it, we can only 
Understand the passage as involving a lower intui:.. 
tionism instead of the higher intuitionism of auto- 
nomy. Instances are not wanting even in the history 
of European Morals where aesthetic or sympathetic 
intuitionism prepares the way for the higher intui- 
tionism of autonomy. It was not till the days of the 
Bhagavadglta in the history of Hindu Ethics that the 
real-nature of autonomy was clearly appreciated, and 
the categorical imperative of duty with all'its Kantian. 
purism severely inculcated. We have thus to regatd 
the Upanishadic Ethics as on the whole deficient 'in: 
the principle of autonomy as sapplying the rules for. 
moral cOnduct. . 

-., ". 


":6. ,- It 
ish6wever -when we come to the tgnnulation 
, . ..". - , , ' , ' of the theories of the Moral Ideal 

Aad.Bed onJup , tha . . - · . 
. . .' .. . t the U panishadic seers are 
at .their _t. W. "bave iaid aboVe" 'tat -. t'bt' 

1,6 J 



formulation of such theories is ft more concrete pro
blem than the fo

ation of thp +1,

... -.J'..-
M I s ,.1' ;.. --- ....&\.1 the ! n
 tho - 
ora ......'t"'
r-:..-- _..11 .
..I- --- -'-' to'.1 "....."'" -- '-'4 -I1(t'tUre of the 
case bound to be abstract. . As there is a variety of 
Metaphysical theories in the Upadishadic literature 
as .we saw in a previous chapter, similarly there is a 
variety of theories about the nature of the Moral Ideal. 
To begin with, we have an entirely anti-hedonistic 
theory advocated by the author of the Kathopanishad. 
We are told there that tI there are two different paths, 
the path of the good and the path of the pleasant, and 
that these two diverse paths try to seduce a man each 
foitself. Of these, he who follows the path of the good 
is..Ultimately rewarded by the fulfilment of his aim; 
while .he who follows the path of the pleasant loses the 
goal which he is pursuing. When the good and tne 
pleasant present. themselves before a man, he - loolG' 
about him if he be wise, and decides which of them to 
choose. The wise man chooses the good before the 
pleasant, while the fool chooses the pleasant before the 
good JJ (5.4. a). In these t\VO verses from the Katho- 
panishad we have a classical expression of the con
flict between the good and the pleasant as experienced 
even'.' in the Upanishadic days. Who will not say 
that the story of the conflict between the Good and the", 
Pleasant in the Kathopanishad trying to attract a man' 
to themselves reminds one of a similar story of . the 
choice of Hercules in XenophoD) where the two mai... 
dens, Pleasure .and Virtue, present themselves before 
Hercules with thei
 several seductions, and Hercules.. 
chooses Virtue? As with Hercules, so with Nachi-_ 
ketas.. Even though the God of Death tries to. seduce 
Nachiketas by the offer of a life of pleasure and glory,..' 
Nachiketas refuses to be imprisoned in the chains', 
which. Y ama has forged for him (5. 4. b), and .-therein 
proves that he is Dot like the ordinary run of maDkiDd" 

which hugs to its l1eart the path of plesaure and glory 

-'-f AOl'\}b
tilIl,ately di
ioned in its choice. 
, .t[,C
.. .4a!lf' ,


 to be 
seduced by the life of pleasure. 

7. It is likel}., however, that anti-hedonism may 
degenerate into an utter pes- 
simism, and so likewise does it 
happen in the case of certain Upanishads. The Katho- 
panishad asks in a pessimistic vein: tt what decaying 
mortal here below wO\lld delight in a life of the con- 
templation of the pleasures of beauty and love, 
when once he has come to taste of the kind of life 
enjoyed by the unageing immortals?" (5. 5. a). This 
is almost in the spirit of Schopenhauer who said that 
the best thing for man here below is not to have been 
born at all, and the second best to have died young. 
In a similar spirit, the Kathopanishad condemns the 
desire for a long life of sensual enjoyment in pre- 
ference to even a momentary contemplation of the life 
immortal. This })essimistic mood is most expres- 
sively brought forth in t11e Maitri Upanishad, where, our 
attention having been called to the contemp1ation of the 
universal evil that exists in the world and the imper- 
manence of things having been most poetically ex- 
pressed, life is described as t11e source of eternal mi- 
sery. U What is the use of the satisfaction of desires:' 
asks Bphadratha, ,t in this foul-smelling 
d unsub- 
stantial body, which is merely a coglomeration of 
ordure. urine, wind, bile and phlegm, and which is 
spoilt by the content of bones, skin, sinews, marrow, 
flesh, semen, blood, mucus and tears? What is the 
use of the satisfaction of desires in this body which 
is afflicted by lust, anger. covetousness, fear, deject.' 
ion, envy, separation from the desired, union 
with the undesirable, hunger. thirst, old age, death, 





disease and grief? Verily all this world merely 
decays. Look at the flies and the gnats, the grass 
and the trees, that are born merely to perish. But 
what of these? The great oceans dry up, the moun- 
tains crumble, the pole-star deviates from its place, 
the wind-cords are broken, the earth is submerged, 
and the very gods are dislocated from their positions ,. 
( s. 5. b.). Contemplating such a situation, Brhad.. 
ratha entreats Sakayanya to save him Cl as one might 
save a frog from a waterless ,veIl." This pessimistic 
attitude of Brihadratha is the logical outcome I only 
camed to an excess, of ttle anti-hedonistIc attitude put 
into the mouth of Nachiketas. 

8. Closely connected with pessimism is the theory 
of asceticism and its monastic 
Alceticlsm., Satya- P ractices. Unless a man be gm e s 
.raha, and Quietism. 
to feel the interest in life waning 
for him, he does not see the necessity of harbouring 
the ascetic virtues. It is only when his heart begins 
to be set on the Eternal that he wishes to adopt the 
life of renunciation. It was in this way, we are told 
by the Brihadiira
yakopanishad, that the wise men 
of old began to feel that there was no use for 
them of any wealth or fame or progeny. "What 
shall we do with progeny," they asked, II if it does not 
bring to us nearer the Eternal ?" In this manner did 
they leave all ambition for progeny and wealth and 
fame and adopt the life of an ascetic (5. 6. a). The 
Kaushltaki {Jpanisllad goes even further, and by a 
curious analogical explanation advocates the attitude 
of Satyagraha. U Just as Pr8J}a which is identical 
with Brahman is served by the mind as its messenger, 
the eye as its guard, the ear as its informant, 
the speech as its tire-woman, and jus
 as all the 
senses bring offerings to PraQa even tllOugh it does 



[S 8 

not solicit them, similarly all these beings will bring 
offerings to a man who knows this secret even though 
he does not solicit them. For him the rule of life is 
f -Beg not J. When he has gone to alms in a village 
and does not find any, he may sit down with the re- 
solve that he shall not partake of anything that may 
be offered to him, and those who had formerly refused. 
him shall come near him and speak to him good 
words-for this is verily what happens to a man who 
does not solicit alms--and bring offerings to him and 
say they shall give" (5. 6. b). This passage from the 
KaushItaki enjoins upon an ascetic the attitude of 
non-begging in the firm belief that when he does 
beg, things will come to him of their own accord. The 
BphadaraI}yakopanishad gives further characteristics 
of the ascetic life, inasmuch as it tells us that " a 
Brahmin ought to grow disgt1sted with all wisdom, ,and 
lead a life of child-like simplicity II (5. 7. a) ; believing 
in the quietistic life, II he should ne\7er give himself up 
to too many words, for that is verily a weariness of the 
flesh" (5. 7. b). 

9. There is, however, a positive side to the quietis- 
tic life taught in certain Upani- 
. Spiritual Activism. 
shads. The Mut;1q.akopanishad 
tells .us that II we should verily leave away all words, 
but should devote ourselves to the knowledge of the 
Atman, for the A t
an is the bund of immortality. 
:Meditate upon the Atman with the help of the symbol 
Om; for thus alone may it be possible for you to go 
beyond the ocean of darkness. Sages see Him by the 
help of the light of knowledge, for he manifests him- 
self, the Immortal One, in the form of bliss " (5. 8. a). 
We m:Ist therefore remember that even though we are 
told that we should lead. a quietistic life, that is only 
u' a sort of recoil from the unreal and empty world of 




...5e ; within itself, however, it may contain the marrow 
of self--realisation. II It was thus," says the Brihadi.. 
rq.yakopanishad, II that one who lived a peaceful 
life, of self-control, - of cessation from activity, 
and of patient suffering, having collected himse]f, saw 
the Atman within himself, saw in fact everything as 
verily the Atman. Evils cease to have any power 
over him, for he has overcome all evil. Sin has ceased 
to toiment him, for he has burnt all sin. Free from 
evil, free from imptlrity, free from doubt, he has be- 
come properly entitled to the dignity of a Brahma
a " 
(5. -S. b). The Mut;lqakopanishad makes a more posi- 
tive assertion by telling us that II a man who has left off- 
all argument in the superiority of his spiritual illumi- 
nation begins to play with the Atman, and to 
the - Atman, for that verily constitutes his action. 
TItus does he become foremost among those who have 
known Brahman" (5. 8. c). Here we are told that 
though, to all appearances I such a person- may be. 
leaamg -a life of freedom from the bustle of society, 
alcme to himself in the privacy of spiritual solitude, 
he still has an object to play with, an object to enjoy, 
namely the Atm an. In fact, his life in Atman is a 
life of intense spiritual activity, and not, as it may 
Hem to others, a life of retirement and quietude. 

10. Contrasted with this kind of Activism, however, 
stands that other kind of Activism, 
with which alone people are ordi- 
narily familiar, namely. what we 
may call Phenomenal Activism. The Isopanishad tells 
us' that "a man should try to spend his life-span 
of- . hundred years only in the constant perform- 
ance of actions. I t is thus only that he can hope 
na& to be contaminated. by actions" (5. 9. a). It 
is DpwtaDt to note that even though this 


Pbea01J'"pl Ad:l- 

iD8 SURVEY 01' UPANI8BADJC PmtosoPHY [110 
from the I
par¥shad tells us that we should spend 
our life-time in doing actions, the actions that are 
here implied have no further range than possibly 
the small circumference of I' sacrifice "; and further. 
the way in which, e\
en in the midst of a life of 
action, freedom from contagion with the fruit of action 
may be secured is not here brought out with suffi- 
cient clearness. It is only later, when we come to the 
days of the Bbagavadglta, that we see how even in 
the midst of the life of action actionlessness may be 
secured, only if attachment to action is annihilated 
once for all and no calculating desire is entertained 
for the fruit of action. The ISopanishad does not 
supply these two links between the life of action and, 
the goal of action lessn ess and point out that action- . 
lessness may be settured in the midst of action only 
through freedom from attachment to action, and the 
annihilation of any desire for the end of action. 
But, at any rate, it is evident that the ISopanishad 
goes very much beyond the other Upanishads 
when it tries to reconcile the life of action with the 
life of knowledge. II To pitchy darkness do they go," 
it tells us, It who pursue the path of ignorance, namely 
the path of action. To greater darkness still do they 
go who devote themselves to the life of knowledge for 
its own sake. Sages have told us from very ancient 
times that knowledge leads to the one result, while action 
leads to the other. But he alone who can synthesise 
the claims of knowledge and action is able by m eAJ"A 
of action to cross the ocean of death and by means of 
knowledge to attain to immortality" (5. 9- b). In this 
way does the lSopanishad try to reconcile the claims 
of knowledge and action, telling us that the life of bare 
contemplation and the life of bare activity are alike 
fraught with evil; but that he alone may be said to 
e who mo- how to ht.nDoaiIe 

III ] 



the two different paths. Thus we may see how the 
later claims of Aristotle for the contemplative life, and 
of Bacon for the active life, are prophetically reconciled 
by the philosopher of the Isopanishad. 

11. When the phenomenal side of Activism is thus 
recognised, it is not very difficult 
to deduce from it a theory of the 
moral ideal whIch must needs take account of pheno- 
menal good. The moral good may not be regarded as 
the S umm um Bonum, and the worldly good may come 
to be recognised as at least on a par with it in tIie for- 
mation of the conception of the Summum Bonum. On 
the other hand, the verse from the Svetasvataropa.. 
nishad which comes at the end of its ipurth chapter is 
an echo of the spirit of Vedic prayer, where worldly 
good is craved for as being even a superior moment in 
the conception of the highest good. II Make us n
t suffer 
in our babies or in our sons, " says the Upanishad: 
" make us not suffer in lives, or in cows. or in horses ; 
kill not our powerful warriors, 0 Rudra, so may we 
offer to thee our oblations for ever and ever I" (5. 10. a). 
When the eye of the moral agent is not turned in- 
wards, the good he seeks is evidently the exteual 
good only. On the other hand, when as in the case of 
the Taittirlya Upanishad, the internal good comes also 
to be recognised as of no meaner value, we are asked 
to choose both Truth and Law which have moral, 
along with Happiness and Prosperity which have 
material value (5. 10. b). It was thus that even that 
great idealistic philosopher Y
jfiava1kya, when he 
went to the court of King J anaka and was 
asked as to whether he desired wealth and cattle, 
or victory and controversy, said he wanted both: 
he wanted the cows along with their golden coin, as 
well. as . victory in the argumentative battle with the' 


other philosophers in Janaka's court. The apology 
which Yajfiavalkya apparently offered for his condact 
was that " be was enjoined by his father not to tab 
away any wealth without having imparted spiritual 
instruction" (5. 10. c). It is evident that Yl.jt\a. 
valkya desired both material as well as spiritual good ; 
and in spite of his otherwise supremely idealistic teach. 
mg, he possibly wanted to set an example by showing 
that the consideration of external good cannot be 
entirely ignored even by idealists as constituting a 
moment in the conception of the l1ighest good. 

12. The author of the Taittinyopnishad goes eYeD 
a step further, and tells us that 
probably there is no distinction of 
kind between physical good and, spiritual good, and 
that we may thus regard the two as commensurable 
in terms of each other. In a famous passage he 
makes for us an analysis of the conception of bliss. 
Physical good to him is itself an aspect of "bliss," 
-.s spiritual good constitutes the acme of "bliss"; and 
according to that author, there is a scale of values con- 
necting the so-called physical bliss on the one .hand 
with the highest spiritual bliss on the other. What, 
according to him, is the unit of measurement? We are 
told that the unit of measurement may be taken to 
be "Ute happiness of a young man of noble birth and 
of good learning, who is very swift and firm and strong" 
and to whom is granted the possession of the whole 
earth full of wealth. Of a hundred such blisses is 
made the bliss of the human genii; of a hundred 
bUsses of these genii is made the bliss of the divine 
genii ; of a hundred of these latter blisses is made tJ:ae 
bliss of the fathers ; of a hundred blisses of the fathers 
is made the bliss of the .gods who are born gods; of a 
ltuadred of these is made the bliss of the gods who avo 

Beatlftdem . 

'13 ] 



become gods by their actions; of a hundred such 
blisses is made the bliss of the highest gods; of a hun- 
dred blisses of these gods is made the bliss of Indra; 
a hundred blisses of Indra COl1stitute the bliss of 
Brihaspati; of a hundred StIch blisses is made the bliss 
of Prajapati ; and a hundred blisses of Prajapati make 
the bliss of Brahman: and each time we are told that all 
the blisses, severally and progressively, belong to the 
Sage who is free from all desires" (S. II). It is impor- 
tant to note that there is here no distinction of kind 
brought out between physical good on the one hand 
and spiritual bliss on the other, unless of course it were 
intended by the author that the physical good may be 
taken to be as good as naught before the highest bliss. 
That, however, does not seem to be the trend of argu- 
ment by which the beatific calculus is arrived at after 
such labour by the author of the Taittiriyopanishad 
with the. help of a ph)'sico-m)7thological sc
le of 
measurement. It is also elluall)1 important to remember 
that all these variOt1S blisses arc said at all times to 
belong to the Sage who is free from all desires. If, in 
short, desirelessness is to constitute the highest bliss, 
there is no meaning in saying that the highest good 
could be measured in terms of the unit of physical good. 
In any case, it does not seem possible that spiritual 
good can be of the same kind as physical good: the 
two are probably entirely incommensurate, differing 
not in degree but in kind. The bliss of the Sage, who 
has realised Brahman, cannot be measured in tenns 
of the physical happiness of any beings whatsoever, 
however highly placed or ho\vever divine they may be. 

13. Indeed, there cannot be any physical scale for 
the measurement of spiritual val- 
ues. The bliss of Self-realisatiOD 
is entirely of its own kind, absolutely sui generis. But 

Se1f-reall8aUOD . 

to cavil at the theory of Self-realisation by saying that 
the Self II is realised " already, and that therefore there 
is no necessity of "realising I' the Self seems to us to 
be merely a listless evasion of the true significance of 
Self-realisation. When Canon Rashdall says that the 
Self is realised already, he is speaking about a meta- 
physical fact. On the other hand, when it is said that 
the Self is to be realised, we are asked to take into 
account the \vhole etl1ical and mystical process by which 
the allurements of the not-Self naturally ingrained in the 
human being are to be gradually weaned out, a
d the 
Self to be made to stand in its native purity and gran'! 
deur. It is in the doctrine of Self-realisation that the 
ethical and mystical processes meet, a fact to which we 
shall have to allude presently. It need hardly be said 
that by Self-realisation, as the Upanishadic seers 
understand that expression, is meant the unfoldment 
and the visualisation of the Atman within us, instead 
of tl1e incipid and soul-less realisation of the various 
It faculties" of man, namely, the intellectual, the emo- 
tional and the moral, in which sense Bradley and 
other European moralists have understood that ex- 
pression. The Bphadara1).yakopanishad tells us that 
the. Atman, who constitutes the Reality within us 
as without us, is and OUgllt to be tIle highest 
object of our desire, higher than any phenomenal 
object of love, such as progeny, or wealth, or the like, 
because, the ypanishad tells us, the Atman, being 
the very kernel of our existence, is neannost to us. 
ee If a man may say there is another object of love 
dearer to him than the A tman, and if another replies 
that if there be God overhead he shall destroy his 
object of love, verily it shall so happen as this man 
says. Hence it is that we ought to meditate on 
the Atman as the only object of desire. For him 
who worships the Atman in this way, nothing deaf- 

513 ] 

CRAnER vt: Emlcs 


shall ever perish' I (S. 12. a). There is a further 
reason why, according to the same Upanishad, tile 
Self should be regarded as the highest object of 
desire; because, when one has attained the Self, there 
are for him no desires left to be fulfilled, and he becomes 
entirely desireless (S. 12. b). But the Upanishadic 
doctrine of Self-realisation implies more than that 
the .Atman is the sale object of desire. In a very 
celebrated conversation between Yajiiavalkya and 
Maitreyr in the Brihadar
yakopanishad, we are told 
that when Yajfiavalkya wanted to make a partition 
of his estate between his two wives, KatyayanI 
and MaitreyI, MaitreyI chose rather the spiritual 
portion of her husband's estate, iaying "Supposing 
I obtain the possession of the whole earth full of 
wealth, by that I shall never attain to immortality." 
If Verily not, " replied Yajiiavalkya, "thy life will 
be only like the life of those who have all kinds 
of convenience for them; but there is no hope of 
immortality by the mere possession of wealth.'
MaitreyI thereupon replied: ,t What shall I then do 
with that by which I may not grow immortal i" 
I' Verily most dear to me art thou, my wife, who art 
talking thus," said Yaj iiavalkya I It Come J I shall in- 
struct thee in spiritual wisdom. I t is not for the sake 
of the husband, that the husband is dear, but for the 
sake of the .A tman ; it is not for the sake of the wife 
that the wife is dear, but for the sake of the A tman · 
it is not for the sake of the children tliat the children 
are dear, but for the sake of the A tman ; it is not for 
the sake of wealth that wealth is dear, but for the sake 
of the .A tman. . . . It is not for the sake of evtything 
that everything is dear, but for the sake of the Atman. 
"'rhis .Atman, 0 Maitreyi, ought to be seen, ought to 
be heard, ought to be thought about, ought to be me- 
ditated upon ; for it is only when the At man is seeD aDd' 

heard and thought about and meditated upon dees aU 
this become verily known" (5.13). It is important to 
remember that this passage is not to be interpreted in 
the interest of an egoistic theory of morals.. as some 
have done, but only in the interest of the theory of 
Self..realisation. We have not to understand that the 
wife or the husband or the sons are dear for one's own 
sake.. interpreting the word A tman in an 'egoistic 
sense. The word Atman wl1ich comes at the end of 
the passage in the expression A tma va are drashlavyo 
forbids an egoistic interpretation of that word in the 
previous sentences. We are thus obliged to interpret 
the word A tman throughout the passage in the sense 
of the Self proper, the Ultimate Reality, and, therefore, 
to understand that the love that we bear to the wife 
or the husband or the sons is only all aspect of, or a 
reflection of, the love that we bear to the Self. It is, 
in fact, for the sake of the Self that all these things 
become dear to us. This Self the BribadaraJ.1yaka 
enjoins upon us to realise by means of contemplation. 

14. The ethical and mystical sides of Self-rea- 
lisation are fused together no- 
The eth'cal and mys- where better than in that ce1e- 
ttca1 sides of Self- rea- 
Ua adoa . brated passage from the ChhIa- 
dogya Upanishad, where. having 
started an inquiry as to what it is that induces a 
man to perfonn actions, and ha\ing answered that 
it is the consideration of happiness which impels him 
to doso.--for. we are told, had he experienced unhappi- 
ness in his pursuit, he would not have gone in for the 
actions at all,-.the author of the Chhandogya Upani- 
shad comes to tell us that real happiness is the happi.. 
n.. that one enjoys in the vision of the Infinite, and 
that every other kind of happiness is only so-called, 
... of really no value whatsoever as CODtraat




it. Jt tJIus comes about that, according to the author 
of that Upanishad, ther
 are tw.o radically different 
kinds of happiness, namely what he calls the Great 
and the Small. Great hap,piness consist$ in seeing, 
hearing, and nleditating upon the AtIna.n. Little happi.. 
ness consists ill seeing, hearing and meditating upon 
otl1er thiIlgS besides tIle Atnlan. Great llappiness is im- 
mortal; Little happiness is perisllable. If the ques- 
tion be asked, in wllat thjs Great happiness consists, 
the answer may be given, in Herakleitean fashion, 
that it consists in its own greatness, and possibly not 
in its own greatness! People say that cows and 
horses, elephants and gold, servants and wives, lands 
and houses-these constitute greatness. No, says the 
author, these rest in something else, but the Infinite 
rests in itself. Great happiness is experienced when 
the Infinite is seen above and below, before and be- 
hind, to the rigllt and to the left, and is regarded a& 
identical with everything that exists; when the Being, 
that calls itself the I within us, is realised above and 
below, before and behind, to the right and to the left, 
and is regarded as identical with everything that 
exists; when the Atman is seen above and below, be.. 
fore and behind, to the right and to the teft and is regard- 
ed as identical with everything that exists. He who thus 
realises the triune unity of the Infinite, the I, and the 
A.tman, anel experiences the truth of tIle sentence So 
Aham At'JtL a , is alone entitled to enjoy the llighest 
. One who comes to see thisl 
d think -abol1t 
 and m
ditate on this, really attains S
arajya : he 
e& his SeUJ plays with his Self, enjoys the c
of his Self, and re\yels in his Sell (S.14). In this way, 
according to the Clltlandogya Ppanishad, the ethical 
If1 c9ns
sts in the ID)'stical realisation 
of the jriune upity as the goal of the 

ted elideavaurt 


15. We must not fail to take account, however, of 
a phase of the theory of the moral 
ideal as propounded in the Upa- 
nishads. This is the theory of what we may call 
Supermoralism, the state of being beyond good and 
bad, the ethical counterpart of the metaphysical 
theory of Absolutism. There is, however, a distinc- 
tion between the supermoralism of Bradley and 
Nietzsche on the one hand, and the supermoralism of 
the Upanishads on the other. Neitzsche's super- 
moralism affects only the superman, who l in the pos- 
session of absolute strength, defies, and therefore rises 
above, all conceptions of good and bad. The Brad- 
leyan supermoralism affects only the Absolute, which 
in its absoluteness is to be regarded as being beyond 
both good and bad. On the other hand, the Upani- 
shadic supermoralism affects the Individual as well as 
the Absolute, and the Individual only so far as he may 
be regarded as having realised the Absolute in himself. 
The passage from the Ka thopanishad which tells us 
that " the Absolute is beyond duty and beyond non- 
duty, beyond action and beyond non-action, beyond 
the past and beyond the future," supported likewise 
by the passage from the Chhandogya Upanishad which 
tells us that " tIle bodiless Atman is beyond the reach 
of the desirable and the undesirable" (5. 15. a), has its 
counterpart in the passage from the MW}.Qakopanishad 
which tells us that (c the Moral Agent shakes off all con- 
ceptions of merit and demerit, that is, in other words, 
goes , beyond the reach of virtue and '\ice, and good and 
bad, when he
 has attained to divine assimilation after 
realising the golden-coloured Being who is the lord 
and governor of all" (5. I
. b). Similarly, we are told 
in the Brihadi
yakopanisbad that the A tman 
who liveS in the citadel of our heart, and who is the lord 
aDd protector of all. srOWI neither great by roOd actiODl 

Supermoralism . 

116 ] 



nor small by evil actions (5. 16. a), while he who COD.. 
templates upon this A.tman himself attains a like vir- 
tue, when his greatness ceases to grow by good actions, 
or diminish by bad actions (S. 16. b). These passa- 
ges tell us that the Moral Agent goes beyond the reach 
of good and bad, when and only so far as he has attained 
to likeness with, or becomes merged in, the A.tman, who 
is himself, metaphysically speaking, beyond the reach 
of good and bad. 


16. We have discussed hitherto the theories of the 
Moral Standard and the Moral 
Virtu.. In the DrI- d a1 h . 
adaraDJ8ka. I e W lch have been advanced 
in the Upanishads. We shan now 
go on to a consideration of the practical side of 
Ethics, n
ely the enumeration and inculcati
certain virtues in the various Upanishads. And 
first, about the three cardinal virtues which are 
enumerated in the Brihadir
yakopanishad. There 
we are told how II once upon a time the gods, 
men, and demons all went to their common father. 
Prajapati, and asked him to communicate to them the 
knowledge which he possessed. To the gods, Prajipati 
communicated the syllable Da, and having asked them 
whether they had understood what he had said to 
them, received the answer that they had under- 
stood that they were asked to practice self-control 
(Dilmyata), upon which Prajapati expressed satisfac- 
tion. To the men he also communicated the syllable 
Da, and after having asked them whether they had 
understood what he had said to them, received the 
answer that they had understood that they should prac- 
tise charity (Datta), upon which Prajipati said he was 
satisfied. To the:.
demons likewise, Prajl.pati CODQnU" 

nicated the s)7Uable Da, and ha'\ing asked them whe- 
ther they had understood what he had said to them, 
received th
 answer that they had understood that 
they should practise compassion (Dayadhvam), upon 
which Prajlpati expressed satisfaction again "(S. 17. a). 
Even thougll thus Prajapati gave the same instrtlction 
to the different inquirers, they understood the import 
of the instruction according to their different capacities, 
and learnt what was for them the right thing to do. 
We are told by the author of the Upanishad that II when 
the celestial voice, the Thunderbolt, repeats Da, Da, 
Da, it intends to communicate the three different sets of 
virtues, namel
r, Self-control, Cllarity, and Compassion." 
These, then, are the three cardinal virtues for people 
who are born 
.ith the Sattvika, the Rajasa and tbe 
Timasa elements predominating in tI1em. To those 
who, like the gods, OCC11PY an elevated position, 
the divine voice says: It Be self-controlled, for other- 
wise, out of your elation, }7QU might do acts of un- 
kindness." To those who are in the position of men, 
eqtlals among equals, the divine voice says: H Be 
charitable, and love your fellows." To those, again, 
who, like the demons, have in them the capacity 
of doing infinite harm, tIle divine voice says: H Be 
compassionate. Be kind to those with whom you would 
otherwise be cruel." ThtlS we are told in the above 
passage that Self-control, Charity, and Compassion con.. 
stitute the three different cardinal virtues for the t11ree 
different sets of people, each one of them having a 
certain predominating psychoJogical temperament. 

17 . So far about the Brihadara
yakopanishad. In 
the Chhandogya Upanishad we 
VtmIea and ViceS in · h d ' ff Ii f . 
tile Cbhando8ya. meet Wlt a 1 erent st 0 VIr- 
tues in the conversation between 
Ghora Ailgirasa. an'd Krish
1 the son of Devaki. 




Who this Krishna was, and what the purport 
of tl1e instruction which Ghora .Ai1girasa imparted 
to KpshI)a might be taken to be, \ve llave l1ad 
occasion to consider in a previous chal)ter. At present 
we are concerned merely \vith the list of virtues that 
are entlmerated there, and their ethical significance. 
We are told that the chief virt11es of man are austerity, 
charity, straightforwardness, harmlessness, and truth- 
fulness: these according to Ghora Angirasa constitute 
the chief \rirtues of man (5. 17. b). "re have already 
seen the analogy which the enumeration oi these vir- 
tues bears to the enumeration of a similar list of vir- 
tues in the B11aga¥adglta (X\TI. I. 2). Then, in the 
Chhandogya Upanishad again, a little later on, we 
find the mention of the five cl1ief different sins of which 
man is capable. are told there that "he who 
steals gold, he who drinks \vine, he \vho pollutes the 
bed of his teacher, he wl10 kills a Brahmin, all these 
go down to perdition; likewise also he, WI10 even asso- 
ciates \vitb them" (S. 17. c). In this passage we 
are told what were regarded, by the Upanishadic 
seers, the five chief different kinds of sin. The 
thief, the drunkard, the adulterer, the Brahmocide, 
and the man who associates with them, ar
 all re- 
garded as worthy of capital punishment: thIS is very 
D1UCR like the later injunctions in Manu and ,\Tajiia- 
valkya (III. 5. 227), where the same crimes are des- 
cribed as the greatest of all sins. 

18. The Taittirlya Upanishad is evidently the most 
hortatory of all the Upanishads. 
The hortatory pre- I d d lib 1 d ' d t . 
cepta in the Taittirlya. t a opts a e erate y 1 ac IC 
tone, and impresses a number of 
virtues to be observed, the study and teaching of the 
Sacred Scriptures fanning the burthen of the discourse. 
e asked to respect the Law, to tell the Truth, to 

practise Penance, Self-control, and Tranquillity, to offer 
ceremonial as well as daily Oblations to the Fire, to 
receive guests with Hospitality, to practise Humanity, 
and to Increase and Multiply . We are also told the 
opinions of three different moralists, each of whom 
insisted upon a special virtue. The sage Satya- 
vachas Rathltara taught the virtue of Truth. The 
sage Taponitya Paurusishti insisted upon the virtue 
of Penance. Finally, the sage Naka Maudgalya said 
that there was no virtue higher than the Study and 
Teaching of the Sacred Books, for that, he said, consti- 
tuted penance-that verily constituted penance (5. 18.). 
On the other hand, a little further on, we have in the 
same Upanishad a direct moral advice imparted by the 
teaeher to the out-going pupil. When the pupil has 
finished the course of his studies at his master's house, 
the master by way of a parting advice, tells him to 
speak the Truth, to respect the Law, and not to swerve 
from the Study of the Vedas; after having offered to 
the preceptor the kind of wealth he would choose, 
he should go out into the world to marry and to 
produce children, so that the family lineage may not 
be broken. The pupil is further advised not 
to swerve from the duties that are due to the Gods 
and the Fathers; to regard the Mother as his god; to 
regard the Father as his god ; to regard the Preceptor 
as his god ; to regard the Guest as his god. In gene- 
ral, the pupil is advised only to perform those actions 
which might be regarded as faultless by the society. 
Those, says the Spiritual Teacher, who are higher than 
ourselves in Brahminhood, should be respected "by 
giving a seat"-an expression which is otherwise inter.. 
preted as implying also that "in the presence of such, 
not a word should be breathed by the disciple." Finally, 
the Teacher imparts to his disciple the various con- 
4itions of Charity: Charity sbould be practised with 




Faith, and not with Un-Faith, with Magnanimity, with 
Modesty, with Awe, and with Sympathy (5. 19). We 
thus see how the author of the Taittirlya Upanishad 
enumerates the different virtues that are necessary 
for practical life. 

19. More, however, than any of the other virtues, 
Tnlth seems to find particular 
Truth tbe Supreme f . th th U · hd . 
Virtue. ' avour WI e panlS IC seers. 
Illustrations of this virtue are 
scattered in the various Upanishads. When auda- 
cious potentates speak from the viceregal chair that 
in Indian Scriptures there does not seem to be any 
consideration made of the supreme virtue of Truth, 
it were much to be wished that they had studied 
the Upanishads, where Truth is inculcated as the 
supreme virtue, before they made their daring state- 
ments. In. a famous passage of the Chha.ndogya 
Upanishad we are told how Satyakama, the son of 
one jabala, who had led a wanton life in her youth, 
asked his mother when he came of age, as to who 
it was from whom he was born, 110W the mother 
answered that she could only tell him that he was 
born of her though she was not quite sure from 
what father he was born, how when Satyak8ma 
went to his spiritual teacher in order to get himself 
initiated, he was asked by the teacher as to what 
family it was from which he had come, how the 
youth Saty akam a gave a straightforward reply saying 
that he did not really know from what family he had 
come, but that he only knew his mother's name, and 
that she had told him that she did not know from 
what father he was born, herself. having led a very 
wanton life in her youth. II Heigh I" exclaimed the 
spiritual teaeher to Sat yakima, II these wo
ck coule;! 
Dot some from a man who, was Dot bo
 9f a 

Come.. I shall initiate you, because you hav.e not 
swer,red from the Truth " (S. :0). This story tells us 
how even the son of a wanton girl could be elevate.d 
to the position of a Brahmin merely for having told 
the pure and unadulterated Truth.. Then, again, in 
that same IJ})anishad, we are told how Truth has the 
po\ver of savillg a man e,"en from death, for Truth, we 
are told, is merely the counterpart of Reality. (( When 
a man who has committed theft is brought hand- 
cuffed to the place of trial, the)' l1eat an axe for him, 
and if he has really cOlnmitted the theft, then he covers 
himself 'with untruth, catches hold of the axe and is 
burnt to death. On the other hand, if he has not 
committed the theft, he covers himself with truth, 
catches llold of the axe, and is not burnt at .all, but 
acquitted" (S. 21). This is how they used to distin- 
guish the culprit from the true man in ancient times. 
Whatever may be said in modem times of the efficacy 
of such a trial, the fact remains that underlying the 
idea .of this trial, there lies an unshakable belief in the 
power of Truth. Be true and fear not. Vour strength 
would be as the strengtll of ten, if only your heart is 
pure. ()n the other hand, if YOtl hide the canker of 
,Untruth in your bosom, in mortal fear )'OU shall wa1k 
even in the nlidday Stln. Of like import is the utter- 
ance of Bharadvaja in the Prasnopanishad where we 
are told that if a man may tell tIle Untruth he shall be 
dried up from the \
ery roots; hence it is, he says, he 
dare not tell the Untruth (5. 22. a). On the other 
hand, the MUI}q.akopanishad tells us, that Truth alone 
becomes victorious in the world, and not a lie; by 
Truth is paved the path of the gods, by which tra'vel 
the sages, who have all their dtsires fulfilled, to where lies 
the bi
hest"Repositary of Truth (S'.22. b). This is how 
',ractiee of Troth as a moral virtue enables one tc 
.... . th.. "Abee1ute. FiDally, ill the COIf'Ien&tioa 




between Nl,rada and Sanatkum8,ra, when Narada had 
gone to his teacher to receive instruction from him in 
regard to the nature of Truth, the teacher answered it 
was only when a man had realised the Ultimate that he 
might be said to tell the Truth, while other truths were 
truths only by' sufferance (5. 22. c). This is verily in the 
spirit of the jesting Pilate who asked what troth was, 
and would not stay for an answer. While, however, 
Pilate expressed a doubt as to the nature of truth, 
Sanatkumara gives a more positive interpretation of 
it when he says that ultimate Truth is to be found only 
in the attainment of Reality. What people call truth 
is really no Truth at all. It is Truth only by sufferance. 
Thus we see 110W Truth is regarded by the Chhlndogya 
Upanishad as the ultimate moral correlate of the rea1- 
isation of the Absolute. 

20 . We next come to the treatment of the 
problem of the Freedom of the 
Freedom of the Will. 
Will. I t may be easily admitted 
that a proper discussion of this problem requires 
a very high stage in the development of moral 
philosophy; hence there is not much wonder if the 
treatment of the problem of the Freedom of the Will in 
the Upanishads is but scanty. There are, however, a 
few remarks showing a rather acute insight in regard 
to the problem, and we must not fail to give the credit 
for them to the Upanishadic philosophers. The BJi- 
hadaraJilyakopanishad tells us that man is merely a 
conglomeration of desire, will, and action: tI as his 
desire is, so is his will; as is his will, so is the 
action that he performs; as his action is, so 
is the fruit that he procures for himself "(5. 23). 
There is here a very clever discussion of the 
relation between desire, will, action, and the effect 
of actipn-a contribution indeed of the U


sages to the Psychology of the Moral Self. In the 
Kaushltaki Upanishad, again, we have the enunciation 
of a theological determinism, inasmuch as we are told 
there that man is but a puppet in the hands of God, who 
makes him do good actions if he wishes him to rise, 
and bad actIons if he wishes him to fall (5. 24. a). 
This is a regular denial of the freedom of man, and we 
are told that man does not possess true freedom at all 
as moral philosophy understands that expression. On 
the other hand, in the Chhandogya Upanishad, we are 
told that even thougll true freedom cannot be said 
to belong to mall before the realisation of A tman, 
still we can say that it does belong to him after that 
realisation. Man in the foolishness of the contempla- 
tion of his small success regards l1imself to be the lord of 
all he surveys; he believes that he may be the master 
of any situation in which he may be placed, and that 
he may compel nature any time to bend to his sove- 
reign will ; but events in life prove that these are after 
all false expectations" and that even though a little 
freedom may be granted to man in small matters, he 
is yet not free in the highest sense of the term. Pent 
up within the gaol, he thinks like a prisoner that he 
is free; but he is free only to drink and eat and not to 
move about. Like a falcon to whose foot a string is 
tied, he can only fly in tile limited sphere described 
by the length of the tether, but he is bound beyond 
that region. Similarly, man may vainly imagine that 
he is free to do any actions he pleases, but his freedom 
is the freedom of the tethered falcon. The Chhando- 
gya Upanishad t
lls us that it is only when we 
have known the Atman that there is freedom for 
Us in all the worlds; but if we have not known the 
.A tman , there is no freedom for us at all (5. 24. b). 
Tl\e same Upanishad tells us again a little later, that 
"hID we have mOWD th. A tmap we caD obtaiA aar. 




object we please, thus testifying to the sovereignty of 
man's will over nattlre, which proceeds from the reali- 
sation of the A tman (5. 24. c). Finally, even though 
there is no discussion in the early Upanishads of the 
conflict of motives which leads to the moral choice, 
still in the Muktikopanishad ,ve have a passage where 
we are told that the river of desire rlIns between the 
banks of good and bad, but that, by the effort of our 
will, we should compel it to move in the direction of 
the good (5. 2s)--a contribution, though a belated one, 
to the psychological aspect of the problem of freedom. 

21. What is now the Ideal of the Upanishadic Sage? 
Th Id 1 fth S It may be seen by reference to the 
e ea 0 e age. . 
progress of the argument In the 
Chapter that moral values are by the Upanishadic 
seers almost invariably linked \vith mystical values 
and that just as there can be no true mysticism unless 
it is based upon the sure foundation of moralitJ"', so 
morality to be perfect must end in the mystical atti- 
tude. In the Upanishads, there is no mere moral 
agent whose morality does not consummate in mystical 
realisation. Thus, the Upanis11adic Sage differs on the 
one hand from the Stoic Sage, who represents in him- 
self the acme of moral perfection connected with an 
intellectual contemplation instead of a mystical rea- 
lisation of the Absolute. On the other hand, he differs 
from the Christian Sage, who no dOtlbt sticks rightly to 
the "triadic norm of conduct, faith, hope, and charity, 
but who centres his hopes for mystical perfection in 
a heleros- Jesus Christ-and not in himself. The 
Upanishadic Sage believes in the possibility of greater 
or less mystical realisation for e\'ery being according to 
the greater or less worth of his character, belief, and 
endeavour: he sees the Atman in all, and sees the 
Atman alone. The Isopanishad tells us that Ie for a 

man to whom all these beings have become the 
A.tman, what grief, what infatuation, can there pos- 
sibly be, when he has seen the unity in all things?" 
(S. 26. a). He has gone to the end of sorrow, and has 
tom asunder the ether-like skin of desire that had so 
long enveloped him in darkness and despair (S. 26.b). 
All his desires have been at an end, because he has 
attained to the fulfilment of the highest desire, namely 
the realisation of the Atman (S. 26. c). As drops of 
water may not adhere to the leaf of a lotus, even so 
may sin never contaminate him (5.26. d). There is no 
feeling of repentance for him: he never bethinks him- 
self as to why it was that he did not do good actions, 
or why he did only evil ones (S. 26.e). He has come 
to learn of the nature of Reality, and has thus gone be- 
yond the reach of these duals (S. 26. f). If ever any- 
body may intend evil to him, or try to persecute him, 
his hopes will be shattered.. as anything dashing itself 
against an impenetrable rock may shatter itself to 
pieces, for, verily, the Sage is an impenetrable rock 
(S. 27). He has attained to eternal tranquillity, be- 
cause as the Upanishad puts -it, he has " collected " 
the Godhead (5. 28. a). All his senses along with the 
mind and intellect have become motionless on account 
of the contemplation of the Absolute in the process of 
Yoga (5. 28. b), and having realised the Atman, he has 
found eternal happiness everywhere (5. 28. c). How 
this mystical perfection can be attained, and how 
morality may thus culminate in mysticism, will form 
the theme of our next Chapter. 



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I ". VI. 12. 




1. In a previous Chapter we have seen how the 
PbI1oaophy J8 to MYI- Upanishadic seers arrived at the 
tiel,,,,, 8S Knowled8e 18 conception of a unitary Atman 
to Belna. who fills the whole world of 
nature as of mind, from whom the world comes into 
being, in whom the world lives. and into whom the 
world is finally absorbed. It is this conception of 
Atman which we saw to be the quintessence of the phi- 
losophical teachings of the Upanishads ; it is this con- 
ception which enables us to bridge over the disputes 
between the various contending theological schools; 
and finally, it is this conception which gives a proper 
place to the various constructions of reality in the 
ultimate explanation of things. We also suggested 
in that Chapter that the Upamshads afforded a prac- 
tical lesson for the realisation of A tman. They are 
not content with merely constructing an intellectual 
explanation of Reality, but suggest means for the prac- 
tical attainment of it. It is true that, in the very 
nature of things, the problem of Self-realisation could 
not be expected to be expounded In a deliberate fa. 
shion by the Upanishadic Seers. They only throw 
hints and suggest the way for realising the Self, only 
too co gnizap t of the fact that any description of the 
great mystic experience by word of mouth would fall 
short of reality, as much as any mediate.. intellectual, 
or expressible knowledge would fall short of immediate, 
intuitive, first-Iland experience. There is the 
same i ulf between the expression of an experience 

and the enjoyment of it, as there is between knowledge 
and being. Nevertheless, mystic experience has it- 
self to be suggested and communicated in a concealed 
fashion so as to enable the seekers after mystic life 
in their otherwise dark journey to know the lamp- 
posts on the mystic way. It is thus that we find in 
the various Upanishads mystical intimations of the 
realisation of the Self" which are hidden like jewels 
beneath an intellectual exterior, and which he alone 
who has the eye for them can discern to be of im- 
measurable value. 

2. The Upanishadic seers fully realise the fact 
that no amount of mere intel- 
1'be Lower Know- · 1 hI 
d th HI b lectual eqUIpment wou d ena e 
ledQe an e a er ... 1 h d R 
Knowledie. us to IntUItIve y appre en ea- 
lity. They draw the same dis.. 
tinction between Apara Vidya and Para Vidya, bet- 
ween lower and higher knowledge, as the Greek philo- 
sophers did between Doxa and Episteme, between 
opinion and truth. The MU:Q4akopanishad tells us that 
there are two different kinds of knowledge to be known, 
one the higher J the other, the lower knowledge. Of these 
the lower knowledge is the knowledge of the Vedas, 
of grammar, of etymology, of metre, of the science 
of the heavens; while the higher knowledge is that by 
which alone the imperishable Being is reached (5. I. a). 
The same typical distinction between the way of know- 
ledge and the way of realisation is brought out in a 
conversation between Narada and Sanatkum8ra, 
where Nirada, the spiritual disciple.. goes to his 
Teacher to learn the science of rea1isation. Asked to 
say what branches of knowledge he has hitherto 
studied, N a rada tells Sanatkumara that he has stu- 
died all the Vedas, as well as all history and mytho. 
logy; he has studied the science of the manes, mathe-" 




maties, the science of portents, the science of time, 
logic, ethics, the science of the gods, the science of 
Brahman, the science of the demons, the science of 
weapons, astronomy, as well as the science of channs, 
and fine arts. But he tells his master that grief fills 
him that so much knowledge is not competent to land 
him beyond the ocean of sorrow. He has studied 
only the different Mantras; but he has not known the 
Self. He has known erewhile from persons revered 
like bis Spiritual Teacher that he alone is able to go 
beyond the ocean of sorrow who can cross it by the 
saving bund of Atman. Would his Spiritual Teacher 
enable him to cross over tIle ocean of ignorance and 
grief? (S. I. b). This passage brings into relief the 
distinction between the lower knowledge and the 
owledge, and sets the knowledge of Self on 
such a high pedestal indeed that all intellectual know- 
ledge seems to be merely verbal jugglery, or an utter 
weariness of the flesh, as contrasted with it. Finally, 
the extremely practical character of the Upanishadjc 
Seers towards the problem of Self-realisation is ex- 
hibited in the Kenopanishad, where we are told that the 
end of life may be attained only if the Self were to be 
realised even wllile the body lasts; for if Self-know- 
ledge does not come while the body lasts, one cannot 
even so much as imagine what ills may be in store for 
him after death (S. 2. a). The same idea is urged 
with a slightly different emphasis in the Kathopani- 
shad, where we are told that unless a man is able to 
realise the Self while the body lasts, he must needs 
have to go from life to life through a series of incarna- 
tions (5. 2. b). 

3. The question now arises-if the Atman is capable 
of being .-realised even while the body lasts, why is it that 
all people .do not .realise him in their lif
, or yet 

again, if he can be realised by some, what can we re- 
gard to be their qualifications for 
 for that realisation? The Upanishads 
abound in references to the quali- 
fications necessary for the spiritual life. The first 
quality requisite for a spiritual aspirant is, the Katho- 
panishad tells us, introversion: cr Our senses have 
been created by God with a tendency to move out- 
wards. It is for this reason that man looks outside 
himself rather than inside himself. Rarely a wise 
man, who is desJIous of immortal life, looks to his 
inner Self with his eye turned inward.s" (5. 3. a). 
The same out-moving tendency of the senses is em- 
pbasised in the Svetasvataropanishad, where we are 
told that tIle individual self lives pent up in its cita- 
del of nine doors with a tendency to flutter every time 
outside its prison-house (S. 3. b). In order to bend 
the wand to the other extreme, it thus seems neces- 
sary for the spiritual aspirant at the outset to entirely 
shut himself up to the outside world so as to be able 
to look entirely within himself. This is the stage of 
introversion. After "introversion" comes "catharsis." 
The Kathopanishad tells us that unless a man bas 
stopped from domg wrong, unless he has entirely com- 
posed himself, it may not be possible for him, however 
highly-strung his intellect may be, to reach the Self 
by force of mere intellect (5. 4. a). The Ml
nishad insists upon truth and the life of penance, right 
insight and the life of celibacy, as essential conditions 
for the unfoldment of the Self within us (S.4.b). The 
Kathopanishad brings into relief the non-intellectual, 
in the sense or the super-intellectual, 
of Self-realisation, when it declares that the Self can 
be reached neither by much discourse, nor by keen 
inteUect, nor by polymathy (8. 4. c). The ISivlsyo- 
panishad in a very famous passage inculcates the same 




logophobia as in the Ka1hopanishad, when it tells us 
that knowledge is even more dangerous than ignorance, 
inasmuch as those who pursue the., path of ignorance 
go after death to a region of pitchy darkness, while 
those who pride themselves upon their possession of 
knowledge go to greater darkness still (5. 4. d). The 
MUI}.Qakopanishad points out that the Atman can 
not be realised by a man who has not sufficient grip 
and tenacity to lead the severe life of spirituality, 
nor can he be reached by a man whose life is a 
bundle of errors (5. 4. e). The same Upanishad gives 
further characteristics of the life of Self-realisation. 
II Unless a man feels disgusted with the worlds to 
which his actions may bring him, and unless he be- 
lieves firmly that the world which is beyond the reach 
of actions can never be obtained by any actions how- 
soever good," unless, in other words, he regards the 
life of Self-realisation as uniquely superior to the 
life of action, II he has no right to enter into the 
spiritual world, to seek which he must forthwith 
go in a humble spirit, fuel in hand, to a Spiritual 
Teacher who has realised the Self" (s. 4. f). We thus 
see that. for the realisation of the Self, the Upanishads 
inculcate a life of introversion, with an utter disgust 
for the world and catharsis from sins, a spirit of 
humbleness. and a life of tranquillity, truth, p en
n ce, 
insight, strength, and right pursuit. Unless these 
conditions are fulfilled, the aspirant after spiritual life 
may never hope to realise the Self. 
4. When the equipment in moral virtues is thus 
being perfected, the next step in 
NeceHJty .of IDltia- the path of Self-realisation is ini- 
tlon b,. Spiritual Tea- . . . . 
cber. tiatlon by a worthy SplIltual 
Teacher. Time and oft have the 
Upanishads inisted upon the n eces&i ty of iDitiatiOQ 

by a. .."Guru. Sat yakima in the Chhindogya Upa! 
. merely voicing the opinions of 
when. "he teUs his. teacher that he has heard 

ewhile' from. people. as revered as his own spiritual 
.teacher 'tha
 unless" one _be initiated by a Guru in 
the patl1 of Self-realisation, one cannot attain the 
goal of mystic life (5. 5. a). The Kathopanishad 
believing in the natural descent of spiritual knowledge 
from a higher to a lower level tells us that Ie unless tbe 
spiritual teacher be really of a superior calibre, spirit.. 
ual, knowledge would be hard of attainment, and 
again, tbat unless the initiation comes {rom a Spiritual 
-leacher whQ has realised his ident
ty with the Self, 
1'her.e. can be no knowJedge of the subtle p
t];l which 
 power of logic and argumentation. 
Let__us not div.ert our intellect into wrong w
ys by 
lDere logic..chopping ; for, how can we hope to attain 

Q _ the. kn9w1edge of A.tman unless we are initiated by 
'? ($. 5. b). U Arise, U says the same 
1)panisbad in. ," 
Qij1er p
age, ct Awake, and learn 
frQW. thos
 who a
e better than ye; for the path of 
tion i$ as hard to tread as the edge of a razor. 
Very wisely have sages called it an inaccessible path " 
(s. s. c). _ Th
e and other passages make it clear 
that. the knowledge of Self could not be attaUled by 
an individual striving for himself on his own gehalf; 
tor,. we are told, the knowledge is so subtle 
mystic that nobody cou
d by his OWQ individual 
effort ever hope to attain it. Secondly, it is n ecessary 
that the Teacher to whom we go to seek wisdom must 
have realised his identity with the ultimate Seli. For, 
unless the 
1'eac11er has realised such an identity, unless, 
in other words, he stands on the lofty pedestal of 
 experience J the knowledge which he can im
can never be expected to be fructified in any indivi- 
dual .. receives it., Doubt has c;>ft
tim. o..




pressed as to the necessity of ha\ing a spiritual teacher 
from whom to learn spiritual ,visdom. "Thy, it is 
contended, may we not hope to attain it by reference 
to books? Persons Wl10 put forth this objection must 
remember what Plato said about the comparative 
value of the knowledge to be obtained from books, and 
the knowledge to be obtained from a teacher by word 
of mouth. The first is entirelv lifeless; the 
econd is 
the outcome of the full-fledged life of the master, 
This makes all the difference in the world; fOl, books 
can never be expected to solve the actual difficulties in 
the path of Self-realisation, while a Teacher who has 
walked on the path may take his aspiring disciple 
from step to step on the ladder of spiritual perfection. 

5. There is a very interesting parable in the Chh8n- 
, dogya Upanishad to- illustrate 
The pa
ble of the how the disci p le is carried bv his 
bllDdfolded man. ." 
Spiritual Teacher from step to step 
on the path of Self-realisation. There we are told 
how a man was once led away from his country, 
namely the Gandh ar as, by some robbers who took him, 
with his eyes covered, to a very lonely and uninhabit- 
ed place, and there left him to roam as best he might 
in any direction he pleased; how, as he was piteously 
crying for help and instruction to be able to reach l!is 
original home, he was told by a person who suddenly 
happened to come there, cc Go in that direction: in 
that direction are the Gandharas "; and how, there- 
upon, exercising his intelligence as b
st as he eouId, 
he asked his way from village to village on his return 
journey, and finally carne back after mtlch travail to 
his original home (5. 6). This parable of the blind. 
folded man is as full of spiritual wisdom as the parable 
of the -cave in -the Republic of Plato. It exhibits in a 
very typical fashion the whole process of the original 




benightment of the Soul and its later illumination. Our 
real country is the country of Brahman, from which 
we are led away by the thieves, namely, the passions, 
into the forest of utter ignorance, with our eyes blind- 
folded by lust for unreal things. Then we cry aloud 
and piteously that some help may come, which may. 
give us more light and lead us back to Brahman. 
Suddenly, we meet with a Spiritual Teacher, probably 
as the consequence of our having previously perform- 
ed meritorious actions. The Teacher imparts to us 
knowledge of the way to our original home, and then, 
exercising our faculties as best we may, we go from 
stage to stage in the spiritual path until we reach 
back the country of Brahman which was our original 

6. There are, however, certain necessary precau- 
tions which must be observed by 
PrecaudODI to be ob- h S .. 1 T h b f h 
aerved ID ImpartlDi t e plntua eac er e ore e 
spiritual Wi.dom. imparts the mystic knowledge to 
his aspiring disciple. The Mu
Qakopnishad tells us that unless a disciple has perfomed 
such a difficult task as that of canying fire over his 
head, his Spiritual Teacher should not impart' the 
knowledge of the mystic way to him (5. 7. a). The 
passage which gives this admonition is also otherwise 
interpreted as embodying the principle that no man 
has the right of entral1ce into the mystic path unless he 
is a I' shaveling." This implies that only a Samnyasin 
can be a worthy student of the spiritual sciel1ce. We 
have no intention to discredit the order of Samnyisa. 
but we may say that other passages from the Upani- 
shads do not always describe Samnyisa as being the 
only fit mode of life for receiving mystic wisdom. 
The Chbandogya Upanishad tells us that "mystic 
knowledge may be imparted to either the eldest SOD; 




or to a worthy disciple who has lived with his master 
for a long time, but to none else. Not even a treasure 
whicll fills the whole sea-girt earth would be a suffi.. 
cient recompense for communicating mystic knowledge" 
(S. 7. b). The passage from the Svetasvataropanishad 
which is a comparatively later passage, and which in- 
troduces the word II Bhakti'J for the first time in 
U panishadic Ii tera ture J tells us that unless the disciple 
has absolute Faith (Bhakti) in God as in the Master, 
the spiritual secret should not be imparted to him 
(S. 7. c). We thus see how a Spiritual Teacher ffitlSt be 
,'eIJ1 jealous of imparting the knowledge of the 
m}rstic path. The Bhagavadglta (XVIII. 67), taking up 
the same word Bhakti, later tells us that the mystic 
knowledge should not be imparted to one who does 
not make himself worthy of it by long penance, who 
has no faith either in God or the Master, who has no 
desire to listen to the spiritual wisdom, or else who 
harbo\lrS within himself an antagonism to spiritual 

7. The actual means of meditation which a Spiri- 
tual Teacher imparts to his disci- 
Meditation by meaDS pIe is described unanimously in 
of Om. the way to Real- th U · h cis b . th 
i d e pams a as emg e sym- 
8a ODe 
001 Om. It is also to be noticed 
that Om is described as not merely the supreme 
means of meditation, but the goal to be reached 
by the meditation itself. The Om occupies in Indian 
philosophy the same position which the Logos oc- 
cupies in Chrlstology. The Upanishads repeat from 
time to time the efficacy of meditation b)l means 
of the supreme symbol, "The word which the 
V edas declare and which is the su bj ect of all aus- 
terities, desiring which men lead the life of religious stu- 
dentship, that word, I tell thee, is briefly Om.; "that 

word is the Supreme Brahman; that word is the 
S11preme Symbol; that word is the Supreme Support" 
(5. 8. a). In these terms does the Kathopanishad 
identify the means of meditation \\ith the goal to be 
reached by it ; the s)lmbol
 in short, stands for both the 
means and the end of spiritual life. The Chha.ndogya 
Upanishad declares that all speech is interwoven 
on this symbol Om, in the same manner as 
the leaves of a tree are wo\ten together on 
a stalk (5. 8. b). The MUJ;lQakopanishad tells us by 
the help of a very happy simile that U we should take 
into our hand the bow of the lJpanishads, and put upon 
it the arrow of the Soul, sharpened by devotion. We 
should next stretch it with concentrated attention, and 
penetrate the mark which is the Supreme Brahman. 
The mystic symbol Om is the bow; the arrow is the 
Soul; and Brahman is tIle mark to' be pierced. We 
s;hould penetrate it with undistracted attention, so that 
the arrow may become one with the mark I' (5. 9). 
We are told here ho\v devotion is necessary for the 
whetting of the point of the arrow, how concentrated 
attention and undistracted effort are necessary for 
making the arrow of the Soul pierce the target of 
Brahman, ho\v, final!}., the arro\v is to become so 
absorbed in the target that it ceases to exist as a 
separate entity. . If unitive life is to be expressed by 
any metaphor,-and all verbal expressions, it must 
be remembered, fall 
hort of the experience of reality, 
-the- metaphor of the arrow and the target invented 
by the MUQQakopanishad must be considered a very 
happy one, as most fittingl)T characterising the commu- 
nion of the lower and the higher selves so as to involve 
the utter destruction of the separate indi\iduality of- 
the lower self. Further, the Om has not merely an 
individual, but a cosmic, ..efficacy as well.' It not 
merely serves. to ,help the meditation of the in




person, but the Sun himself, we are told, travels the 
UI1:i"erse, singing, the symbol Om (S. ll.). Finally, 
the moral efficacy of meditation by means of O
brought out in the Pras110panishad where Sat yakima 
inquires of his teacher as to what happens to a man by 
tUs continuing to meditate by means of that symbol 
till the hOtlr of his death, and the answer is 
gi,'en that " just as a s11ake is relieved of its slough, 
similarly is tile man who meditates on Om relieved of 
his sins, and, by the power of his chants, is lifted to 
the highest world where he beholds the Person who 
informs the body, and who stands supreme above any 
living complex whatsoever" (S. II). 

8. The MiJ).Q.ukya Upanishad supplies us with 
. - - unique exaltation of Om and
Tbl Mandukyan ea. .. 1 . . fi W 
altatlOD of Om. spmtua SJ.gIl1 cance. e are told 
tllere that Om consists not mere- 
ly of the three morz A U M, which it might 
easily be seen to contain, but that it con- 
tains also a tourth mora-less part. 1-he reason for 
this four-fold division of Om lies manifestly 
the author's intention of bringing into correspond
with the parts of Om the states of consciousness 
on the one hand, and the kinds of soul on the 
other. The Om is supposed to represent in II;liniature 
the various states of consciousness, as well as the 
various kinds of soul. Thus, on the one hand, it 
stands for the state of wakefulness" the state of dream, 
and the state of deep-sleep, as well as t11e supreme 
self.-conscious state which is called the 1'urya. On the 
other hand, it stands for the different lands of so
namely the Vaisvinara, the Taijasa, the Prijiia. 
as well as the fourth, D
pt ely the A tm
D . the 

.1ess part of Om has correspondence with the 
bM?tb cN
si OD of p6

as well asY.'with the fourth dime!lsion of metaphysics, 
namely the:iAtman. The Vaisv8nara is the enjoyer 
of gross things, as the Taijasa is the enjoyer of the 
subtle. The Prijfia is described as the equivalent of 
what philosophy calls God, c. the Lord of all, the all.. 
knowing, the inner controller of all, the origin and end 
of all beings." Contrasted with these stands the 
Atman, which is the MaQQ.ukyan equivalent of what 
philosophy calls the Absolute. It is described as 
f( neither inwardly nor outwardly cognitive, nor yet 
on both sides together. It is not a cognition-mass, 
and is neither knower nor not-knower. It is invisi- 
ble, impractiable, incomprehensible, indescribable, un- 
thinkable, and unpointable. Its essence is the know- 
ledge of its own self. It neg
tes. .the whole ex- 
panse of the universe. and is tranquil and bliss- 
ful and without a second" (5. 12). The spiritual 
significance of the psycho-metaphysical correspon- 
dence of the parts of Om lies in the great help 
that is supposed to be given by meditation on it in in... 
tuiting the At man in the Turyi state of consciousness 
after a negation of the other kinds of Soul in the other 
states of consciousness. Nowhere else as in the 
MaT;\ 4ukya Upanishad do we find such an exaltation 
of Om, and the great value for spiritual life of medita- 
tion by means of that symbol. 

9. The aim of the Upanishads is a practical one, 
d we find scattered through- 
out the Upanishads certain 
hints for the practical realisation of the Godhead 
by means of Yoga. In the Svetasvataropanishad 
we are told that our body should be regarded as 
the lower stick and meditation on Praqava as the upper 
one, . and that by rubbing together these two sticks, 
,". _va to cpura out 
he fire of God that. is hiddeu 

Practice of Y oaa. 




in us (S. 13. a). The reference to the body and 
the PraJ].ava as the lower and the upper sticks 
in the process of spiritual churning which we meet 
with in this pa.ssage of the Svetasvataropanishad 
is a remarkable one, as it enables us to interpret 
correctly another passage from the Ka thopanishad, 
where a reference to the sticks is to be met with 
again, and where we are told that just as the 
earthly fire is ensconced within the two churning 
sticks like a fretus in the womb of a pregnant 
woman, and just as this fire is to be worshipped 
with offerings day after day by people who keep 
awake for that purpose, similarly in between the two 
sticks in the practice of Y oga,-namely, as we can now 
interpret the expression by reference to the Svetas- 
vatara, the body and the PraQava,-between these 
sticks is ensconced the spiritual tire, which we 
have to -worship day after day by keeping <?ur'
awake, and giving it the offerings of the psyclucal tellden- 
cies in us (5. 13. b). This passage in the Kathopani- 
shad can also be interpreted in another \\-?ay, as we 
find a little later on in the same Upanishad that the 
two sticks in the process of Yoga may also be regarded 
as the upper breath and the lower breath, the PraQa 
and the Apana, and that between the two is seated the 
beautiful God whom all our senses worship (5. 14. a). 
I.nstead of regarding the two as the body and 
the PraQava as in the Svetasvataropanishad, we might 
as well take them to mean the upper and the lower 
breaths, in between which is seated the beautiful Atman; 
and a reference from the MUQQakopanishad is also not 
wanting, where we are told that the mind for its puri- 
fication is dependent upon the Pra.t)as, and that it is 
only when t11e mind is purified after an i11itial control 
of the that the A1!man re,reals himself 
(5. 14;'. b) . 

10. The Yoga doctrine in the SvetftSvataropani- 
shad is a more develo}Jed one than 
Yo8a doctriDe In Sve- · h h U · h d d 
tas\.aW;a. m t e ot 
r pants a SJ an we 
have in the second chapter of that 
Upanishad. a classic and almost systematic descrip" 
tion of the practices and effects 01 Y oga, wh
ch may 
be said to carry the Upanishad quite near to the time 
when the Yoga doctrine came to be systernatised in a 
new school of philosophy . We are told that U we 
should hold our body with its three erect parts 
quite even, and that we should pen our mind, 
along with our senses, in the heart. We should 
concentrate upon Brahman, and, with the help of that 
boat cross all the fearful streams that bar our spiri- 
tual progress. Controlling our breath and with 
our actions quite measured, we should throw 
out by the nose our PraQa when it becomes quite 
exhausted in the process of inspiration, and we 
should regul-ate ou-r mind which is like a 
chariot to which are yoked very evi] horses. We 
should sit for the practice of Yoga on -an even and 
pure piece of ground which is free from pebbles, fire, 
and sand, and which is also free from sounds .and 
watel1' resorts. The place where we sit for practice 
should be delightful to the mind, and not jarring 
to . the eye ; and we should choose for practice a place 
in the still recesses of a cave" (5. 15. a). The Sveta& 
vataropanishad also lets us into the mystery of the 
physiological effects achieved by this practice of Yoga. 
" When the five-fold result of Yoga arising from the 
different elements, namely, earth J water, fire, air, and 
ether comes well to operate, the practiser of Yoga 
knows neither disease, nor o]d age, nor death, for verily 
his body has become full of the fire of Yoga. His 
body now becomes very light, the pulse of health 
beat. withD1 him, he becom. free from d.... .. 




complexion becomes clear, and his pronunciation 
very pleasing. He emits a smell which is holy, and 
his excretions become very slight; it is by these 
marks that one should know that the novice in Yoga 
is being well established in his practice U (5. 15. b). 
The spiritual effects of the practice of Yoga which are 
given in the Svetasvataropanishad will be discussed 
somewhat later in thIS chapter, our present concern 
being only the details of the manner of Yoga-practice, 
and its physiological effects. 

11 . The end of the practice of Yoga is evidently 
the realisation of God. But be- 
Tbe Faculty of God- f . d . h 
reaUs.doD. ore we lSCUSS t e nature ot God- 
realisation, we must answer a 
previous question-By what Faculty is it that a mystic 
is able to realise God? Is it Sense, or is it Thought, or 
is it any super-senSU01.1S and super-intellectual faculty 
of Intuition, by means of which one is able to realise 
God? The Ka thopanishad tells us that the form 
of God does not fail within the ken of our vision. 
'I Never has any man been able to visualise God by 
means of sight, nor is it l)Ossib1e for one to realise Him 
either by the heart, or by the imagination, or by the mind. 
It is only those who know this sublime truth that 
become immortal" (5. 16. a). Later writers have 
translated the above passage in a different way. They 
tell us that even though it may not be possible for us 
to "visu3lise u the form of God J still it It may be possible 
for us to realise Him by means of the heart, or by the 
imagination, or by the mind." It is true that the 
grammatical construction of the above passage does 
not come in the way of this interpretation also. 
But it must be remembered that the verse from the 
Kathopanishad which comes almost immediately after 
it makes it quite clear that it is II not possible 

to realise God either by word of mouth, or by 
the mind, or by the eye. I t is only those who know 
od is, to them alone, and to none else, is God 
revealed" .(5. 16. b). We are here told that it is not 
possible at all to realise God by means of the mind, 
which makes it quite clear that we have to uunderstand" 
in the earlier verse from the Kathopanishad the nega-- 
tive adverb in the second part, which would then im- 
ply that it is never by means of the mind that one can 
realise God. It is also note\vorthy from the later 
verse from the Kathopanishad that the nature of God- 
realisation is like that of a (( fact." You can never 
question it. You can never argue about it. You can 
never think about it. If )70t1 only know that God iS J 
then alone IS God reahsed by you. The value of a fact 
can never be disturbed by any probings into its pros 
and cons, by logical manipulation about its na- 
ture, or by any imaginative or highly-strung intel- 
lectual solutions. It thus becomes clear that neither 
Sense nor Thought enables us to realise God. But a 
further question arises-if God can be realised at all.. 
has man got any Faculty by means of which he can 
so realise Him? To that question, aI10ther verse from 
the Kathopanishad supplies an answer. It This A tman 
who is hidden in all beings is not patent to the eyes of 
all. I t is only the subtle seers who can look with the 
one-pointed and piercing faculty of Intuition (Buddhi) 
that are able to realise God" (5. 16. c). Opinions 
differ as to whether even this Buddhi can lead us to 
the vision of God. In one passage of the Bhaga vad- 
gIta (VI. 21) we are told that the happiness of God- 
realisation can be aPI)rehended by means of Buddhi; 
on the other hand, we are told in another passage of 
that same work (III. 42).. that just as God is beyond all 
senses. and_mind, similarly He is beyond even. this 
faculty. of 13uddhi or Intuition.. But. .when w.ords' fail 

 12 J 



to exactly describe the nature of the Faculty of God- 
realisation, it may become serviceable psychologically 
to It invent" a term, to call it either Buddhi or 
Intuition, and then to make it responsible far 
the vision of God. - The Upanishads, - however, 
take yet another turn, and look at the ques- 
tion of God-realisation not from the psychological 
but from the moral point of view. The MU1].Qa- 
kopanishad tells us that "it is only when a 
perfect katharsis of the whole moral being takes place 
by the clearness of illumination, that one is able to 
realise the immaculate God after meditation; for He 
can be attained neither by sight, nor by word of 
mouth, nor by any other sense, nor by penance, nor 
by any actions whatsoever" (S. 17. a). Of like import 
is that other passage from the Kathopariishad which 
tells us that ct it is only when the whole moral being is 
purged of evil that one is able to realise the greatness 
of God" (5. 17. b). We prefer to understand the reading 
" Dhatuprasada " instead of " DhatuQprasada " in the 
above passage, for to our mind the idea of Dhatri or 
Creator is absolutely irrelevant to the passage and can 
only be illegitimately smuggled into it, the purifica- 
tion of the moral being yielding quite a necessary and 
legitimate sense

12. Time and oft we are told in the Upanishads, as 
in the passage above quoted from 
The thorough Imma- the Katho p anishad that the m y s- 
nence of God. .' 
tic is able to "see" God. Another 
passage from the same Upanishad tells us that U we 
ought to extract the Atman courageously from our 
body, as one extracts a blade of grass from its sheath. 
When the A tman is t11uS drawn out, let a man know 
that he is. tIle lustrous Immortal Being-yea, the. 
lustrous>'II11.inortal Being II (5,' 18. a). TIle proces

the extraction of the .Atman from this frail body 
implies ct thorough immanence of the Atmpn- in the 
body. The Atman is. to the body what the wheat is to 
the chaff. The wheat must be separated from the 
chaff, even though the chaff may temporarily cover 
it. Even so must the .Atman be extracted from the 
body, even though, for a while, the body may serve 
as a covering for it. U Just as a razor is laid in a 
razor-case or a bird is pent up in its .nest, even so 
is this Conscious Being placed in the body up to 
the very nails, up to the very hair of the body" 
(5. 18. b). In tins wise does the KaushItaki Upanishad 
declare the immanence of Atman. The SvetiSvata- 
ropanishad tells us that just as oil is hidden in sesa- 
mum, or ghee in curds, just as water is hidden in 
springs, or fire in the churning sticks, even so is the 
Atman immanent in the body" (5. lB. c). Another 
passage from the S
etasvataropanishad tells us that 
ff just as there- is an extremeJy subtle film on the sur- 
face of ghee, even so does the Godhead who is imma- 
nent in all beings envelop the. whole universe, by 
knowing Whom alone is a man released from all bonds" 
(5. 18. d). The essence of all this teaching about the 
immarience of God is that if man may but try in the 
proper way, he may be able to realise God even 
within himself. 

13. It is just the possibility of God-realisation 
within himself that vindicates the 
Type r! · ofmy.t1cal ex- mystic's search after God b y a 
pe 8nce. 
long process of purification and 
References are not wanting in the- 
Upartishads, though we. cannot say they are to be 
met with ther
 to the fullest extent, to the visions 
and auditions" which the mystic experiences on hisspiri.. 
tua1 journey. Fo\W- types of experience.on th6 whole-are 




to be found scattet-ed in the Upanishads, which be-.r 
ely on .the 'forms, the 
oloUf.S, the SO\l1lQ.s, 
tbe -lights .which are experienced by the -mystic in the 
process of contemplation. These -we .'shall i.ndkate 
from the various Upanishads, without tlJing to &ever 
the different experiences from one another. In the 
second chapter of the S\l'etas\1ataropanishad, there is 
a classic reference to the different fonns and .]jghts 
that are experienced by the mystic on the thresholp 
of his spiritual pilgrimage. We are told that he ex- 
periences fonns such as those of (t mist and sJl1oke, 
the sun, the fire and the wind, the fire-fly and the lignt- 
ning, the crystal and the moon" (5. 19. a). An 
ly pas- 
sage from the Brihadara1;1yakopanishad tells us 
in the same strain that to the vision of the a4vaIJ
mystic -appear such forms as those of the 
ed raiment, of the red-coloured beetle, 9f 
 flame pf 
fire, ()f a lotus-flower, and of a su
p _of ijgbt. 
ning: these constitut-e the .glory of the .a9v
mystic" (5. 19. b). I-t seems, however, QD t
that the Upanishadic mystics 
re either 
rphists, or 
photists, rather than audiles. There are only few re- 
ferences to the experience of audition in U1e UpiUli- 
shads, and these a1so are not well accounted fQ
. In 
the BrfuadaraQ.yaka, as in the Maitri UpaIll$had, we 
are told that the mystic hears certain sounds within 
himself whIch are attributed by the authors of 
Upanishads to the process of digestion .that :is going 
on within the system. \i\
e are tpld that II the SP\UlP 
is a result of the processes .of dige
.tion and 
tioD, that a man is able to hear _it n,ertly .by shuttq , 
his ears, and finally that when a DUU1lS (lying he is 
able to hear the sound " (5. 20. .a). rhe CbhindQgy.a 
'UpanIshad in a slDli1ar strain teU& us .that the 
tion of the pr
nce of Realit}t witl1iP QS can be Qb a 
taiDed merely by Ihuttiq our -eaa,.a .\)y AR 

able to.' hear sounds like those of the roaring of an ox, 
or the peal of a thunder, or the crackling of fire (S. 2o.b). 
M.ystic expereince has shown that it is not merely 
by shutting our ears that we are able to hear the mys- 
tic sound, that V\ 7 e can hear it even with our ears 
quite open) and that finally even a deaf man who 
cannot hear anything else is yet able to llear this 
sound. Then, again, we cannot call the mystic sound 
a result of tIle processes of digestion and assimilation 
within us. It is true that the mvstic sound is to a 
certain extent dependent upon physiological circum.. 
stances. But to call the sound a result of those cir. 
cumstances is like putting tIle cart before the horse. 
We thus see that even though a reference is unmista- 
kebly made to the auditions experienced by a mystic, 
the Upanishadic seers are not correct in giving their 
raison d8trc, nor even in defining their exact nature. 
On the other hand, when they come to deal with the 
photic experiences, the Upanishadic mystics are evi.. 
dently at their best. "On a supreme disc set with 
gold," says the MUJ?Qakopanishad, Ct is the spotless 
and iIIlmaculate Brahman
 which is the light of all 
lights which tIle seekers after A tman experience" 
(S. 21. a). The Chhandogya Upanishad tells us that 
c, after having crossed the bund of phenomenal exis- 
tence, even though a man may be blind, he ceases to 
be blind; even though he may be pierced, he is as good 
as unpierced; after having crossed this bund, 
the. very. night becomes like day, for before the vision 
of -the aspiring mystic the spiritual world is suddenly 
and once for all illumined" (S. 21. b). Another pas- 
sage from the Chhandogya Upanishad tells us that 
before such a mystic, there is neither ever any sun.. 
set. nor any sun-rise. If Only if this be true, " says 
the author of the ,Upanishad, "may.l n
t break .my 
}MMce with. God 
I . '
When there is. neither any' sUD-:-riae 




nor any sun-set J there is eternal day before the aspiring 
soul " (5. 21. c). Finally, this same idea is reiterated 
once more in the SvetlSvataropanishad, where we are 
told that II when there is neither day nor night before 
the mystic, when there is neither being nor not-being, 

 atone is", thus testifying to the transcendence of 
God beyond both night and day, beyond both being 
and not-being, as the result of an utter cancelment of 
these in divine omnipresence (5. 21. d). 

14. The photic or auditive experiences which we 
have referred to above, though 
Tile -=me of mysdc h be 11 d h h bin 
rea l ll. don. t ey may ca e tear gers 
of a full-fledged rea1isation to 
come, do not yet constitute the acme of Self-realisa- 
tion. One very celebrated passage of the MUI}.Qakopa- 
nishad tells us that the Atman cannot be realised exeept 
by one whom tbe A. tman himself chooses: before such a 
one does the .Atman reveal his proper form (5. 22. a). 
This is verily the doctrine of Grace. It implies that 
man's endeavours after a full-fledged realisation of 
God may always fall short of the ideal, unless Grace 
comes from above. It is only when the Atman chooses 
the saint for the manifestation of his supreme glory 
that the mystic will be able to perceive Him. 
It is only then that the golden-coloured Being of the 
Cbhlndogya Upanishad who carl be seen o. the Sun, 
" with golden mustaches, and golden hair, and who 
shines like gold up to his very toes, '1 can come to be 
identified, as by the sage of the I Sopanishad.. with the 
Being within oneself (5. 22. b). It is only then that the 
Individual Spjrit can become one with the Universal 
Spirit. The Svet
vataropanishad tells us that II just 
as a mirror which is cleaned of its impurities becomes' 
lustrous and capable of' reflecting a lustrous image, 
even thus does the mystic see Himself at the l1eight \)f' 

his spiritual experience and reach the goal of his en.. 
deavour. Just, again, as with the help of a lamp one 
is able to see an object, similarly by the help of 
the Individual Self he sees the lustrous Universal Self, 
who is unborn, who is the highest reality, and who is 
beyond all existences U (5. 22. c). The mystic ima- 
gery implied in the above quotations from the SvettiS- 
vatara is made absolutely clear in the teaching of the 
great sage Maitri who imparted to his disciple II the 
highest secret of the Upanishads" when he said that 
at the acme of spiritual expreience the mystic sees 
his own fonn in a :flood of supreme light arising from 
within himself, which indeed constitutes the rea1isation 
of the immortal and fearless Atman (5. 22. d). 

15. The Upanishads abound in passages which 
try to reconcile opposite qualities 
RecoDdUatiOD of in the A tman as realised. The 
contradictions In the t!. . 
vetasvataropanlshad tells us that 
"the A tman is neither male nor 
f emale , nor is the Atman of an intermediate sex: 
what body He takes, in that body does He lie enscon- 
ced" (5. 23. a). The ISopanishad tells us that "the 
A tmaTl may be said to move and yet not to move. 
He is far as well as near. He is inside all things as 
well as outside all things." A daring mystic of tpe 
Ka thopanishad asks- Who except himself has been 
able to reali
 the Atman who rejoices and rejoices 
Dot, who can walk in a sitting posture and move about 
everywhere in a lying one? In the MUI;1Qakopanishad 
an attempt is made to reconcile the infinite greatness 
of- the Atman with his infinite subtlety: ,U Great 
and lustrous is that incontemplatable Being, and 
yet he is subtler than the subtle. He is farther 
than any far-off end, and yet quite near to us, being 
ahut up in the ca ve of our heart." In like m
n" er 




does the Kathopanishad tell us in an oft-quoted pas- 
sage that the Atman is subtler than the subtle and 
greater than the great, and is pent up within the 
recesses of our heart. On the other hand, passages 
are not wanting, as in the Svetasvataropanishad and 
the Kathopanishad, where the Atman is described as 
being of the size of a thumb and glorious like the sun ; 
or even again as being as small as the tip of a needle, 
or a hundredth part of the end of a hair divided 
into a hundred infinitesimal portions (5. 23. b). 
What is meant exactly by saying that the Atman is 
neither male nor female, that He moves and yet does 
not move, that He is both far and near, that He is 
greater than the great and smaller than the small, 
or that He is of the size of a thumb, only the mystics 
can mow. We, who judge from the outside, can have 
no idea .of how the seeming contradictions may be re- 
n the infinite variety and greatness of the 
A tmaD. 

16. The Upanishads discuss in many places the 
psychological and other effects 
E Jlects of reallsadon which the realisation of God P rodu- 
on the M)'tItic. 
ces upon the perfected Mystic. c'One 
who knows his identity with the Self and comes to 
alise that he is the .A.tman-for what reason should 
such a man enter into any feverish bodily activity, for 
his desires are fulfilled and his end is gained?" (5. 24. a). 
This is as much as to say that when the identification 
with .A.tman comes to take the place of the identifica- 
tion with body in a perfected Mystic, all his desires 
for bodily accommodation vanish immediately. Then, 
secondly I U the knots of his heart are broken, all his 
doubts are solved, and the effects of his actions are an.. 
nihilated, when once he has seen God who is higher than 
the highest JJ (S. 24. b). The doubts which had so long 

harassed his mind, and the actions from whose resWt 
he used to suffer, break away immediately; while 
one may know the perfected Mystic by this one prin- 
cipal mark, that he has left no doubts to solve. If he 
is once for all in sure possession of reality-what 
doubts can he any further have? Then, thirdly, in the 
MUJ;1.Qakopanishad, we have the great contrast between 
the want of power in the Mystic before Self-reaJisation, 
and the obtainment of power after it. H Though the 
individual Soul was lying so long with the UDiversal 
Soul on the same tree, he was yet infatuated and was 
grieving on account of his complete impotence, but 
when he has once become atoned with the Highest, 
who is the source of all power, his grief vanishes im- 
mediately, and he begins to participate in the other's 
infinite power" (5. 24. c). Fourthly, we have in the 
Taittiriya Upanishad a classic description of the 
illimitable bliss that a perfected Mystic experiences 
after his communion with the Highest-a descriptioll 
which we have had occasion to Ratice in our account 
of the beatific calculus ia a previous chapter. But 
the BphadiraI)yakopanishad, in the vein of an almost 
erotic mysticism, tells us further that the only earihly 
analogue which we Call have for the bliss of God- 
realisatioD,-indeed a very imperfect and partial ana.. 
logue after ali,-is the bliss arising from union with a 
dear wife. "Just as when a man is embraced by his 
dear wife, he knows nothing outside R.OC anything m- 
side; similarly when the individual Self is embraced 
by the universal Self, he knows nothing outside nor 
anything inside; for he has attained an end which 
involves the fulfihnent of all other ends, being verily 
the attainment of Atman which leaves no other ends 
to be f.ulfilled II (5. 24. d). We do not know how far 
to justify this analogy. But it seems after all that 

 .mi&ht b,e & difference of kind b
ween the two 




b1isses which the Brihldara
yakopanishad is compa- 
ring, instead of merely a difference of degree; or, at least, 
that the one kind of bliss is so insignificant as con- 
trasted with the other that there is as much analogy 
between them as there is between the light of a candle 
and the light of the sun. Further, all such erotic 
analogues have this defect in them, that those who 
betake themselves to sexual enjoyment may be thereby 
vainly made to imagine that they are after aU 
experiencing an iota at least of the great divine bliss. 
In our opinion, it is foolish to regard the relation 
between the Self and God as in any way analogous 
to the relation between the bride and the bride- 
groom, and still more foolish to regard it as ana- 
logous to the inverted relation between the bride- 
groom and the bride as in certain pseudo-mystic 
teachings. In fact, there ought to be and can be 
no analogue for the unique relation between the 
Self and God in the state of ecstasy. To return 
to our argument, however, fifthly, we are told 
in the Taittiririya Upanishad that the direct result 
of the enjoyment of divine bliss is that the Mystic is 
divested once for all of all feeling of fear. The one 
kind of emotion kills the other, and the feeling of bliss 
kills once for all the emotion of fear. Whom and what 
may such a perfected Mystic fear, when he finds infi- 
nite joy in all directions and at all times? It He 
becomes fearless," says the Taittiriya Upanishad, 
cc because he has obtained a lodgment in that invisi- 
ble, incorporate, indefinable, fearless, supportless sup- 
port of all" (5. 24. e). FinaJly, we are told in the 
Chhandogya Upanishad that U if su
h a Mystic should 
ever want to have 3l1Y end fulfilled at all, he should 
wait upon the A tman, and pray to him, without tlle 
slightest touch of egoism, for the fulfilment of his de... 
sire :. 
ediately is the end fulfilled fof him fOf _w

he had prayed to God U (5. 25. a). II The Atman," 
says the Chhandogya Upanishad, It is sinless, without 
age, without death, without fear, without any hunger 
or thirst, and has all his desires or ends fulfilled. This 
A tman should be sought after; this At man should be 
known. He who rea1ises the Atman in this way after 
having sought after him, for him all the worlds are 
gained, and all desires fulfilled II (S. 25. b). The 
MUQ.Qakopanishad tells us also that tea man can have 
all his desires fulfilled, and obtain any world he may 
seek, even if he only waits upon and worships a Mystic 
who has realised the Self" (5. 25. c). We thus see, on 
the whole, that the immediate effects of God-realisa.. 
tion upon the Mystic are the entire abatement of 
bodily excitement, the resolution of all doubts, the 
obtainment of infinite power, the enjoyment of illimi- 
table joy, the destruction of all fear, and the fulfil- 
ment of any end that may be contemplated by the 

17. The Upanishads have preserved for us a few 
mystic monologues which contain 
Raptures 01 mystic the essence of the raptures of S p i- 
ecata., . 
ritual experience. The Sage of the 
MU1;lQakopanishad, when he came to realise the im- 
mortal Brahman, fell into mystic raptures when he saw 
that II the Brahman was before him and behind 
him, to his right and to his left, above and below," 
and broke forth into the Leibnitzian exclamation that 
II this was the best of all possible worlds" (S. 26). 
He considered himself fortunate that he was ever 
born into this world at all, for, was it not his appearance 
on the terrestrial globe that led him, by proper means 
and through adequate stages, to the vision of the God- 
head wherever his eye was cast? The Sage Vama- 
dIVa of the Brihadira
yakopanishad came to know 




that " just as, at the origin of things, Brahman came 
to self-consciousness and then understood that it was 
verily the All, similarly, whoever among the gods, or 
the mortals, or the sages comes to self-consciousness be- 
comes verily the All"; and thus the Sage, to whom 
the infinite past was like an eternal now, broke forth into 
the exclamation that uhe it was who had lived in Manu, 
and that he it was who l1ad given light to the Sun" 
(S. 27),-even like the Maratha saint Tukaram, who, at 
a later date, exclaimed that, in bygone ages, when 
Suka had gone to the mountains to reach Self-realisa- 
tion, he was himself present to watch that Great Act 
in spirit, if not in body. The Mystic of the Chhandogya 
Upanishad declares that even as a horse might shake 
its mane, similarly had he himself shaken off all his 
sin, that even as the Moon might come out entire 
after havipg suffered an eclipse from Rahu, even so, 
having been freed from the mortal coil, had he obtain- 
ed the etemallife in the Atman (5.28). Then, again, 
the utterances of TriSailku in the Taittirlya Upanishad 
are remarkable for the grandeur of the ideas involved 
in them. After TriSai1ku had reached Self-realisatioft, 
he tells us he felt as if he was the (( Mover of the Tree." 
What is the Tree to which TriSailku is referring? It 
may be the Tree of the Body, or it may even be the 
Tree of the World. It is not uncustomary for Upani- 
shadic and post-Upanishadic writers to speak of the 
Body or the World as verily a Tree. In fact, TriSa.i1ku 
tells us that, like the true Soul that he was, he could 
move the Tree of the bodily or worldly coil. He 
tells us, furthennore, that his glory was " like the top 
of a mountain," which is as much as to say that when he 
had come to realise the Self, he felt that everything else 
looked so mean and insignificant to llim from the high 
pedestal of Atm anic experience that he felt as if he 
was on the top of all things whatsoever. TriSaDku 

tells us furthermore that" the source from 'which "he 
had come was Purity itself." May this not refer to 
the Purity of the Divine Life from which all existence 
springs? Then, again, TriSailku tells us that he was 
as it were " the Immortal Being in the Sun,"-an iden- 
tification ISivasya-wise of the Individual and Univer- 
sal Spirit. Furthennore, TriSailku says that he re- 
garded himself as II a treasure of unsurpassable value," 
referring probably to the infinite wealth of Atmanic 
experience that he had obtained. Finally, he tells 
us that he was \Terily U the intelligent, the immortal 
and the imperishable One," thus identifying himself 
with Absolute Spirit (S. 29). Finally, that greatest 
of the Mystics whose post-ecstatic monologue is pre- 
served for us in the Taittirlya Upanishad: te
1s us in a 
passage of unsurpassed grandeur throughout both 
Upanishadic as well as post-Upanishadic literature 
that when he had transcended the limitations of his 
earthly, etheric, mental, intellective, and beatific 
sheaths, he sat in the utter silence of solipsistic soli- 
tude, sInging the song of universal unity: II How won- 
derful, how wonderful, how wonderful ; I am the food, 
I am the food, I am the food; I am the food-eater, I 
am the food-eater, I am the food-eater; I am the 
maker of their unity, I am the maker of their unity, I 
am the maker of their unity," which utterances only 
mean, metaphysically, that he was himself all matter 
and all spirit as well as the connecting link between them 
both, and epistemologically, that he was himself the 
subject-world and the object-world as well as the en- 
tire subject-object relation-a stage of spiritual ex- 
perience which has been well characterised by a 
modem idealistic thinker as a stage where the differ- 
ence between the field, the fighter, and the strife vani- 
shes altogether-the cltlmination of the unitivE' song 
being couched in terms which are only too reminiscent 

i 17) 



of like mystic utterances from other lands, It I am the 
first-born of the Law; I am o]der than the gods; I am the 
navel of Immortality; he that gives me, keeps me; 
hitr1, who eats all food, I eat as food; I envelop the 
whole 1lftive
 with splendour as of the Sun" (S. 3 0 .) 

I (II) t M iIft{
ttcn'fU .. I 8W '41'4

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4 6 



A, as Apti or Adimattva,p. 36. 
Aberrations, of the Dialectic 
of Nyaya, p. 190; of con- 
sciousness, p. 127. 
Abhivimiina, meanings of, p. 
13 6 . 
Abnormal Psychology, p. 120. 
Absolute, as surpassing the 
conception of God, p. 33; 
definition of, in positive and 
negative terms, p. 206; the 
philosophical conception of, 
p. 206 ; and God, relation of, 
p. 206; Triune Unity of the, 
p. 2°9; nature of the, ac- 
cording to Ramanuja, p.2IO; 
the only Reality, according 
to Sa:nkara, p. 216; posi- 
ti ve characteristics of, p.2I9; 
negative characteristics of, p. 
219; rigoristic conception of 
the, p. 219; conception of 
the, higher than the concep- 
tion of God, p. 219; nega- 
tive-positive characterisation 
of the, pp. 219-220; nega.. 
tive, affirmative, and tran- 
scendental characterisation 
of, p. 221; only partially re- 
vealed in the forces of Na- 
ture, p. 253; the power of 
the, p. 255; as the ballast of 
the cosmos, p. 25
; as be- 
yond good and bad, p. 306. 


Absolute Monism, mystical 
lisation of, p. 278. . 
Absolutism, of Yajfiavalkya, p. 
59; and the.ory of creation, 
p. g8; the realistic theory of 
creation, a crux to, p. 208; 
and Solipsism, p. 218; and 
Supermoralism, p. 306. 
Absolutist View of Knowledge, 
p. 218. 
Achyuta, p. 205. 
Action and Knowledge, recon- 
ciliation of, p. 298. 
Activism, spiritual, the theory 
of, p. 2g6; phenomenal, the 
theory of, p. 2g6. 
i\ctionlessness, ho\\r possible in 
tbe midst of action, p. 298. 
Active life, Bacon on, p. 299. 
Ad h()c answers of Yajfivalkya, 
p. 20. 
Ad hoc method, p. 39. 
Adams: discovery of Neptune, 
p. 10 5. 
Adhishthinapanchami, p. 209. 
Adhruva, Maya compared to, 
p. 226. 
Adrastea, the (;reek equivalent 
of the Sanskrit Adrishta, p. 84. 
Advaita School of Philosophy, 
p. 179. 
Ageless ri,-er, p- 16 4- 
Agniology, spiritual, of the 
Kena, p. 24- 
Agnivem, anticipation of tbe' 
teaching, of, p. 189. 


Agnoiticism, Augustinian view 
of, p. 272; Upanishadic view 
of, p. 272; Spencer '5 view 
of, p. 272. 
Air, as the source of all things, 
pp. 7 8 -79; as the absorbent 
of all things, p. 79; as car- 
°rier of sound in MJmansa 
philosophy, p. 192; as the 
Thread, p. 211. 
Aitareya Aral}yaka: differentia- 
tion of the older and newer 
portions of, p. 15. 
Aitareya Brihmal}3.: reference 
to HariAchandra, p. 203. 
Aitareya, Mahidasa, a eugeni- 
cal philosopher, p. 45. 
Topanishad, summary of, 
pp. 25- 2 6. 
tru, the quiescent Ksh.. 
atriya king, p. 19; his doc- 
trine of reality as consist- 
ing in deep-sleep conscious- 
ness, p. 48; and G irgya, 
p. 62; his instruction to 
Glrgya concerning the na- 
ture of sleep, p. 125; the 
teaching of, p. 252. 
Ajltavlda, or the doctrine of 
Non-creation, p. 229. 
AkUa, the carrier of sound in 
the Upanishads and N ylya, 
p. 19 1 . 
Aksbita, p. 205. 
Alexander, invasion of, p. 102; 
a spectre, p. 233. 
Allegory in the Upanishads, 
p. 4 2 . 
Alpa., as contrasted with Bba- 
man, P. 53. 
Amarakosha: meaning of prl- 
tWa, p. 135. 

Analogical method, p. 37 · 
Anamnesis, or recollection, in 
Pythagoras, Plato, the Up- 
nishads, and Yoga, p. 153. 
Anandagiri on pridcAa, p. 135. 
.Anandattrtha, dualistic school 
of, p. 1,.0']; see also Madhva. 
Anatomy, Upanishadic know- 
ledge of, p. 133. 
Anatti-vida in Buddhism, p. 
l\naxagoras: his idea of the 
mixture of the elements as 
similar to that of the Upa- 
nishads, pp. 86-87 ; doctrine 
of portions, p. 104. 
Anaximander, pp. 64, 73. 
Anaximenes: his doctrine of 
air, pp. 79,103-; his theory 
of rarefaction and condensa- 
tion, p. 79. 
Anima and Animus, p. I4B. 
Animism in the I.Ugveda, pp. 
147-14 8 . 
Anrita, Miyl compared to, p. 
pafichaka, the 
fount of Nature, p. 35. 
Antarylmi-Brlhml!}8., as illus- 
trating the method of soli.. 
loquy, p. 39. 
Antarylmin, the doctrine of, 
p. 210. 
Anti-hedonism in the Upani- 
sbads, p. 293. 
Anvlrabh, meanings of, P.155. 
Aparl Vidyl, same as doxa, 
p. 3 2 6. 
Apocalypse, God-written, P.232. 
Aphoristic method, p. 35- 
Ap,pearance, doctrine of, in 
Am. and Yljftavalkya, p. 53; 


or semblance, doctrine of, 
p. 87; Creation as, p. 9 8 ; 
Nature and Soul and God as, 
P., 2 I 5 ; the moral side of the 
doctrine of, p. 232; doctrine 
of, in Parmenides, Plato, PIa-- 
tinu.c;, Berkeley, Hegel, and 
Bradley, p. 232. 
Apperception, synthetic unity 
of, p. 274. 
....c\ral}is, the two, as ensconc- 
ing the spiritual fire, p. 337 ; 
as ensconcing the beautiful 
god, p. 337; as meaning the 
Body and Pra
va, p. 337; 
as meaning the Upper and 
the Lower breaths, p. 337. 
Aral}yakas, custom of mental 
sacrifice at the time of the, 
p. 8. 
Arche of knowledge, the pro- 
blem of, p. 64. 
Archirmlrga, or the bright way 
for the dead, p. 159. 
Architectonic systems of In- 
dian Thought, p. 179. 
Argumentum ad caput, ap-- 
peal to the, p. 61. 
Aristophanes, on the apotheo- 
sisers of the Elements, p. 7 6 . 
ArjuDa, as higher by a prlde- 
ta than Bh1masena, p. 13 6 ; 
compared to a calf, p. 195. 
Aristotle: doctrine of Matter 
and Form, pp. 49,92; Meta- 
Physics, quotation from, p. 
74; on Pbilolaus, p. 80; re- 
cognition of Not-Being, pp. 
82-83; on the heart as the 
seat of the Soul, p. 131; 
U panisb adic psychology as 
qreeiug with, p. 131; doc- 



trine of Self -speectator, p. 
26 9; on Theoria. p. 275; OR 
the wise men as dictating 
the rules of conduct, p. 28 9; 
on the contemplative life, p. 
Arrow and the Target, the meta... 
_ phor of, p. 334. 
AruJft, the outstanding philo- 
sopher of the Chhandogya, 
p. 23; his allegory of juices 
and honey, p. 37; the philo- 
sophy of, pp. 53-55; a great 
psycho-metaphysician, p. 53; 
his doctrine of Substance as 
underlying aU things, p. 54; 
his Doctrine of Illusion, p. 
54; his doctrine of the iden- 
tity of Individual and Uni- 
versal spirit, p. 54; and Jai- 
vaJi, p. 62; his teaching of 
Ultimate Reality to Sveta- 
ketu, p. 216; the first of the 
Brahmin circle to receive 
spiritual wisdom, p. 62. 
Al11I}ID.ukhas, delivered to the 
jackals, p. 27. 
As If, the philosophy of, p. 227. 
Asanas, not elaborately treated 
in the old Upanishads, p. 
18 7. 
Asceticism, p. 295; and pes- 
simism, p. 295. 
Ascetic life, characteristics of, 
p. 296; potency of, for Self- 
realisation, p. 297. 
Ash-Tree of existence, p. 200. 
AAramas, to what extent exis- 
tent in Upanishadit times, 
p. 60. 
Astrology and Astronomy, iJa 
the Maitri, pp. 31,32. 


A.uras, gospel of, p. 266. 
Asurya, as connected with As- 
_ syrian, p. 157- 
Mvala, ritualistic questions of, 
p. 20; and Yljftavalkya, p. 
Atvapati Kaikeya, a syntheti- 
tical philosopher, p. 38; his 
synthesis of cosmological doc- 
trines, p. 23; his _ doctrine 
of the Universal Atman as 
Vai.vlnara, p. 47. 
A Avattha, in the Kathopani- 
shad, p. 103; the descrip. 
tion of, in the Upanishads, 
p. 19B; the description of, 
in the Bhagavadgitl, P.I99; 
as real in the Upanishads. 
and unreal in the Bhagavad- 
gltl, p. 199. 
AAvins and Dadhyach, the sto- 
ry of, p. 51. 
Atharvaveda, transition from 

igveda to, pp. 4-5; a store- 
house of the black art of the 
ancients, p. 5; conception 
of Rudra-Siva, p. 193. 
Atman, · the ballast of Nature, 
p. 4; proofs of, subjective 
and objective, p. 24; as the 
inspirer of sense-functions, 
p. 24; rea1isation of, in the 
various worlds, pp. 28-:29; 
as Turya or the fourth, p. 
36; as the source of all p0- 
wer, knowledge, and bliss, 
p. S3; as the origin of things, 
pp. 100-101; as a powerless 
being, p. 101: as the self- 
conscious aspect of the In- 
dividual Self, p. 140: as the 
substratum of creation, p. 

209: as the material cause 
of the universe, p. 209; as 
the instrumental cause of the 
world p. 209; as the source of 
activity, p. 217: compared 
to the lute-player, or 
the drum-beater, or the 
conch-blower, p. 217; origi- 
nal meaning of, in the Upa- 
nishads and Plato, p. 246; 
the ultimate category of ex- 
istence, p. 247; as the eter- 
nal Subject of knowledge,p. 
272; as the highest object 
of desire, p. 302; conception 
of, the quintessence of the 
teachings of the Upanishads, 
p. 325; as self-consciousness, 
p. 335; as the fourth dimen- 
sion of metaphysics, p. 336; 
as separable from the body, 
as a blade from its sheath, p. 
341, or as wheat from chaff, 
p. 342; as immanent in the 
body as a razor in a razor-case, 
p. 342, or as oil in sesamum, 
p. 34 2 ; reconciliation of 
opposites in, p. 346. 
Atmanism, practical, of Yi- 
jiiavalkya, p. 19. 
Attention, involving suspen- 
sion of breath, pp. 114- 11 5. 
Audile experience, p. 343. 
Augustine, on knowledge as 
ignorance, p. 27 2 . 
Austerlitz campaigns, p. 233. 
Autonomy, as the true princi- 
ple of morality, p. .291; in 
the Upanishads and the Bha- 
gavadgit., p. 29 2 . 
A vabbritha, the bath at the 
the end of sacrifice, p. 202. 


A vyakta, pp. 18 3,19 8 . 


Babylonian mythology, p. 84. 
Bacon, quotation from, on the 
chain of Nature, p. 2; and 
the active life, p. 299. 
Bidaray a t:1 a : his frequent bor- 
rowa! from the Upanishads, 
p. 205. 
Baka Diilbhya, or Gliiva Mai- 
treya, the story of, pp. 21-22. 
Baliiki and King Aj
tru, dia- 
logue between, p. 25 t . 
, the name of the body 
in Pra&1a, p. go. 
Beatific calculus, pp. 26, 301; 
beatific consciousness and 
Brahman, p. 144. 
Beatificism, the theory of, p. 
Beatitude, various conceptions 
of, p. 213. 
Beg not, the rule of life for the 
ascetic, p. 2g6. 
Being, and Not-Being, concep- 
tions of, in the 
p. 3; Aruni's idea of, 
compared with that of 
Green, p. 55; Being con.. 
ceived cosmologicaJly, psy- 
chologically, biologically, 
morally, and metaphysical- 
ly, p. 55; Being, as the begin- 
ning of all things, pp. 85- 8 7; 
Being in Parmenides, p. 10 4. 
Belief, the ner
ity of, p. 257. 
Berecynthia of the systems of 
philosophy, p. 17 8 . 
Bet-keley. Appearance .in the 
doctrine of, p. 232; quota- 


tion from the (Treatise) re- 
garding the primacy of Mind, 
pp. 1I9- I20 . 
Bhagavadgita: its attempt to 
synthesise the truths of Upa- 
nishadic philosophy, p. I; 
its theistic reconciliation of 
Samkhya and Yoga, p. 18: 
its borrowings from the Ka- 
tha) Mundaka and Sye- 
. . 
taavatarn Upanishads, pp. 
27-28; castes created accord- 
ing to qualities and works, 
P.59; conception of God as the 
A of the Indian alphabet, p. 
105; its theory that tempe- 
raments are due to the kind 
of food eaten, p. 114; descri p- 
tion of the Two Paths, P.159; 
on holding the body erect, 
p. IS7; compared to nectar, 
p. 195; and the Upanishads, 
relation of, p. 195; its theis- 
tic-mystic philosophy, p.rg8; 
and the Upanishads, anta- 
gonism between, p. 198; re- 
ligion of, not derived from 
the teaching of Ghora An- 
girasa, p. 203; and Chhin- 
dogya, a similarity, p. 204; on 
the Mutable and Immutable 
Persons, p. 207; doctrine of 
Mlya in, p. 228; and the doc- 
trine of autonomy, p. 29 2 ; 
and Kant, p. 29 2 ; reconci-- 
liation of action with action- 
lessness, p. 298; and the i*'- 
panishad, on the achieve-- 
ment of actionlessness, p. 
2gB; and Chhlndogya, enn. 
meration of virtues, p. 308: 
on the conditions of imput- 


ing spiritual wisdom, p. 334; 
its conflicting views about 
Buddhi as the faculty of 
God-realisation, p. 340. 
Bhin garkar, R. G., Dr., on the 
meaning of Asurya, p. 157. 
Bhiradvaja, on the virtue of 
Truth, p. 312. 
Bhargavl Varu
] Vidya, p. 
Bhargava Vaidarbhi: his in- 
terest in physiological psy- 
chology, p. 48. 
Bhakti, to Guru as to God, p. 
30; to God as to Guru, p. Ig8; 
in lTpanisha.dic literature, p. 
Bhivas, or ' Conditions' in Sim- 
khya phiJosophy, pp. 34-35. 
Bhikkus, order of, p. 181. 
BhIma, as taller hy a pride
than Arjuna, p. 136. 
Bhrigu, and Vam 1}3., p. 44; a 
great metaphysical psycho- 
logist, p. 50; his question to 
his father Varul}3. about Ul- 
timate Reality, p. 144. 
Bhujyu, interest in psychical 
research, p. 49; a psychical 
researcher, p. 56; and the 
daughter of Pata iich ala, the 
story of, p. 128; an occultist, 
p. 128. 
BhGman, Sanatkumara's doc- 
trine of, p. 53. 
Bhtititman, or the phenome- 
nal self, p. 31. 
Bible, a revelation like the 
Upanishads and the Koran, 
p. 8. 
Births and deaths, round of, 


Blind-folded man, parable of 
the, p. 331 ; interpretation of 
the parable, p. 332. 
Bl, indfoldness of human be- 
ings, p. 225. 
Bliss, as the source of Reality, 
p. 144; the doctrine of the 
commensurability of, in the 
lJpanishads, p. 300; ana- 
lysis of the conception of, p. 
3°0; scale for the measure- 
n1ent of, p. 300; of Self-rea- 
lisation, p. 301; as consist- 
ing in the realisa tion of de- 
sirelessness, p. 301. 
Blood-vessels of variegated co- 
lours, p. 189. 
Body, compared to a potter's 
wheel, p. 32, to a harp, p. go. 
Body and soul, relation of, pp. 
133- 134. 
Bohtlingk, on the riddle-hymn 
of the 
igveda, p. 149; on 
the idea of Transmigration 
in the 
igveda, p. 151. 
Borrowal, theory of, p. 102. 
Bradley, "A ppearance" in the 
doctrine of, p. 232; defec- 
tive view of Self-realisation 
in, p. 302; idea of Supermo- 
ralism in, p. 306;
Brahman, as created from Sat- 
ya, p. 77; meditation on, as 
resplendence, as sound. as 
support, as greatness, as 
mind, as parimara, as Not- 
Being, pp. 128"129; as the 
Self-conscious aspect of the 
Cosmic Self, p. 140; and the 
God of Fire, p. 254; and the 
God of Wind, p. 254; and 
IDdra, p. 2541 as the source 


of all physical and mental 
power, p. 255; as the sub- 
tle essence underlying all exi- 
stence, p. 256; as Atman, p. 
Brahma-stitras, and the Upa- 
nishads, p. 205; and the Bha- 
gavadgita, p. 205; different 
interpretations of, p. 205; 
reference to Niibhava Upa- 
labdhel) II. 2.28, p. 231. 
Brahmins, their relations with 
Kshatriyas, pp. 61-63; visit of 
Greek philosophers to, p. 102. 
Brain, as the seat of conscious- 
ness, p. 131. 
Bride and Bride-groom, the 
analogy of, p. 349. 
BrihadaraI]yakopanishad, a 
summary of, pp. 18-21. 
Brihadratha, the disciple of 
Sakiyanya, p. 31; and Si- 
kiyanya, pp. 63,198; the 
pessimism of, p. 294. 
Brihaspati, the author of a 
heretical philosophy, p. 31. 
Buddhi, its relation to Mind 
and Atman, p. 183; and the 
vision of God, conflicting 
views about, p. 340. 
Buddhism, roots of, in the 
Upanishads, pp. 179-182. 
Budila : his doctrine of water as 
the substratum, p. 47; re-in- 
carnated in an elephant, p.64. 
Byron, Matthew Arnold on the 
poetry of, p. 251. 


Ceird" Dr., on looking outward, 
il):ward, and upward, p. 241; 


on the field, the fighter, and 
the strife, p. 352. 
Canine Chant, an invective 
against the Brahmal)ical be- 
lief in externalism, pp. 22, 37. 
Cardinal Virtues, Pra j apati' s 
doctrine of, p. 307. 
Carl yie : description of the tree 
Igdrasil, p. 200; on appeara- 
nce p. 232. 
Caste, origin of, p. S9; system, 
earthly, modelled on the pat- 
tern of the heavenly, p. 59. 
Categorical Imperative of Kant, 
p. 29 2 . 
Caterpillar, analogy of the, p. 
58; the image of the, p. 155. 
Catharsis, or the purging of 
the inner man, p. 328. 
Causa sui, representation of 
God as, p. 41. 
Causation, as due to Atman, p. 
Centre of interest, soul as am 
anrenuc, p. 130. 
Cephalic movements, as con- 
stituting the feeling of Self, 
p. 137. 
Cerebra-spinal system, recog- 
nition of, in Tantric litera- 
ture, p. 132. 
, Ushasti: doctrine 
of PriJ.1a, p. 87- 
Chance, not the origin of things, 
p. 100. 
Chil}4ila, charity to a, as sa- 
crifice to the universal Soul, 
p. 8. 
Change, love of the idea of, p. Bo. 
Chariot I and the horses, the image 
of the, p. 338; of the body, 
descri ptioD of, p. a8. 


Charity, conditions of, pp. 310- 
311; to be practised by 
faith, p. 310; with magna- 
nimity, p. 311 ; with modesty 
and sympathy, p. 311. 
Chirvikas, the doctrine of, pp. 
lBo, 266. 
Chest, the prototype of the 
world, p. 84. 
Chhandogyopanishad, a sum- 
mary of, pp. 21-24; quoted 
most often in Vedanta-su- 
tras, p. 21. 
Chitragargyayat:1i, teacher of 
Arutft, p. 62. 
Christ, Jesus: advice to dis- 
ciples not to take thought 
of what they should speak, 
p. 9; as a heteros, p. 3 1 5. 
Christianity: on the Ideal of 
the Sage, p. 315; on the 
triadic norm of conduct, p. 
3 1 5. 
Christology and Logos, pp. 95, 
Chronos, or Time, p. 84. 
Churning out of the Fire of 
God, p. 336. 
Citadel of Nine Doors, p. 329. 
Character, beautiful and ugly, 
p. 162. 
Charaka, anticipation of the 
teaching of, p. 189. 
Childhood of man, p. 289; of 
the race, p. 28 9. 
Collecting the Godhead, p. 316. 
Colours, theory of the three, 
p. 86; t.hree priInary, p. 183. 
Combination of Elements, as 
the origin of things, p. 100. 
Commensurability of bliss, Up- 
anishadic doctrine of, p. 300. 

Common Origin, theory of,pp. 
Communion of Higher and Lo- 
wer Sel ves, p. 334. 
Comparative mythology, pp. 
102-1°3; philosophy, pp. 102- 
Comte: denial of the process 
of introspection, p. 274. 
Conch-shell, grasping of the 
sound of the, p. 217. 
Conflagration, idea of periodic, 
p. 80. 
Conscience, the candle of the 
Lord within us, p. 291. 
Conscious Self, as feeding the 
other senses, p. 134. 
Consciousness, a fleeting phe- 
nomenon, pp. 58-59; seat of, 
transferred from the heart 
to the brain, p. 131; analy- 
sis of the states of, p. 264; 
identical with Existence, p. 
269; the unity of, p. 288. 
Construction through critici- 
sm, method of, p. 100. 
Contemplative Life, Aristotle 
on, p. 299; and Active Lire, 
reconciled in 1&, p. 299. 
Corn of Wheat, reference to, 
in the Ka tha and in St. 
John, p. 154. 
Corybantes, the secret dance 
of p. 41. 
Cosmic Force, creation from, 
p. 7 6 . 
Cosmic Person, considered as 
a sacrificial horse, p. 19: 
Self, four states of, in later 
Vedanta, p. 140; Person, de- 
scription of, in the Mu

ka, the prototype of the 


varupa in the Glti, p. 
C09mogenesis, naturalistic ac- 
count of, p. 92. 
Cosmogony, Vedic, p. 3; lT pa - 
nishadic, p. 73 ff. 
Cosmological approach, found 
deficient, p. 249; categories, 
regress from, p. 250; argu- 
ment for the existence of 
God, p. 252; proof of (;od in 
Greek philosophy, p. 252; 
proof, Kant's criticism of, 
p. 253; proof, linked with the 
physico-theological, p. 257. 
Cowell: interpretation of a 
passage in Maitri, p. 138. 
Creation, as evolution, p. 30; 
theories of, p. 75; as il]u- 
sion or appearance, p. 76; 
personalistic theories of, 
pp. 92-93; as opposed to 
emanation, p. 98; realistic 
theory of, an obstacle to ab- 
solutism, p. 208; the abso- 
lutist view of, p. 222. 
Creator, required to practise 
penance, p. 93. 
Critico-historical spirit, engen- 
dered by Western thought) 
p. 179. 
Culture, relation of Greek to 
, Indian, p. 102. 
Curzon, Lord, on the non-re- 
cognition of the supremacy 
of Truth in Indian 'literature, 
p. 311. 


DR, as meaning self-control, p. 
307; as meaning charity, p. 


307; as meanlng compassion 
p. 3 08 . 
Dadhyach Atharval
1, p. 19; the 
philosophy of, pp. 51-52; and 
.:\gvins, p. 51; his doctrine 
of the Self a
pp. 51"'52. 
Daivaparimara, in t})(> Kaush 1" 
taki t'panishad, p. 5. 
Dante's conc.eption of t})f' Pur- 
gatory', p. 162. 
Darwin: discovery of natural 
selection, p. IDS. 
Death, as the arche of all 
things, p. 19; the Dark Cut- 
ter, p. 64; or Hunger as the 
origin of all things, p. 82; 
to the god of Death, p. 100; 
the Great Cutter, p. 120: 
the problem of, pp. 120-122; 
and birth, manner of, p. 
154; realistic description of, 
p. 155. 
Defined and Undefined, p. 212. 
es of Reality, doctrine of, 
pp. 23 1 - 2 3 2 . 
Deistic vie,,' of the Godhead, 
p. 18 5. 
Deism in the Y oga
stitras, p. 189. 
Delphic oracle, story of the, 
p. 2°4. 
Damocles, tht, sword of, p. 291. 
Departing Consciousness, p. 54. 
Descartes, on the pineal gland 
as the seat of the Soul, p. 
130; conception of ReaJi ty 
according to, p. 248. 
Design, argument from, p. 257. 
Desirelessness, as constituting 
the highest Bliss, p. 301; as 
the result uf Se1f-realisation, 
p. 347. 


Desires,fulfilment of, as due to the 
realisation of A.tman, p. 349. 
Destruction, process of, p. 98. 
Determinism, theological, in 
the Upanishads, p. 314. 
Deussen: his chronological ar- 
rangements of the Upani- 
shads, pp. 12-13; interpre- 
tation of "purltat" , p. 123; 
on the nipple-like appear.. 
anc.e as signifying the uvula 
p. 132; on the experience of 
the mystic, p. 133; mean- 
ing of Abhivimana, p. I36; 
meaning of Anvirabh, p. 155. 
Devaylna, history of, the con- 
ception of, p. 159; and Pitp- 
yil}8., dogmatic justification 
of, p. 161; conception of, in 
the Bhagavadgitl and the 
Upanishads, p. 196. See 
also Path of the Gods. 
Dharma, in the 
igveda.. as 
suggestive of the earliest 
trace of a theory of Karma, p. 
148; as determining future 
existence, p. 152. 
Dhl.ra1}i, as preparatory to 
Samldhi, p. 188. 
Dh itupras ida, or Dhitul)pra- 
slda, which?, p. 34 1 . 
Dhltus, the eight, p. 34; the 
seven, p. 189. 
Dhuma-mlrga, or the dark 
way, p. 159. 
Dhylna, as preparatory to Sa- 
mldhi, p. 188. 
Dialectic method, p. 37: Pla- 
tonic, Hegelian, Upanishadic, 
P. 38; in Nylya, p. 190. 
Dialogues of Plato, determina- 
tion of the chronology of,p. IS. 

Didactic tone of the Taittirlya, 
p. 309. 
Die to live, the rule of, p. 163. 
Dichotomyof SeJf by Self, p. 
Difference and N on-difterence, 
p. 216. 
Diksha of a Sacrificer, p. 201. 
Ding-an-sieh , Schopenhauer's 
stress on Will as the, p. 116. 
Diogenes , the biographer of 
Greek Philosophers, p. 102. 
Diogenes, with his tub, com- 
pared to Raikva with his 
car, p. 79. 
Disci pleship, qualifications for, 
p. 33 2 . 
Disembodied existence of Soul, 
denial of, p. 156. 
Distinction of Degree between 
physical good and spiritual 
good, p. 301: of Kind bet- 
ween physical good and spi- 
ritual good, p. 301. 
Divine Life, Purity of, p. 352. 
Divine plane, p. 142. 
Door of Division, p. 97. 
Doshas.. the Three, p. 189- 
Doubt, the resolution of, as ef- 
fected by God-rea1isa.tion,p. 
Doxa and Episteme, same as 
Aparl and Pari Vidyl, PI 
3 2 6. 
Dream, the problem of, pp. 
126- 127; and sleep, interme- 
diate states between COD- 
sciousness and unconscious- 
ness, p. 126: a state of crea- 
tive activity, p. 127: as in- 
volving novel coostraction, 
p. 121: and 
mM' , p.I3I. 


-consciousness how far to be 
identified with Self, p. 266. 
Drum, grasping of the sound 
. of a, p. 217. 
Du1)kham, Du1}kham, the cry 
of Buddhism, p. 180. 
Duty, the Categorical Impera- 
tive of, p. 292. 
Dvaita school of Philosophy, 
pp. 179, 206. 
Dvaitidvaita interpretation of 
the Brahmastitras p. 205. 


Ecstasy, Yogic and Neo-Pla- 
tonic, p. 102; raptures of, 
p. 350. 
Efficient cause, problem of the, 
p. 133. 
Egg, Primeval, as generating 
the world-system, p. 37. 
Egoistic interpretation of Yi- 
jiiavalkya's dictum, p. 304. 
Egyptian Mythology, p. 84. 
Egypt, and the idea of metam- 
psychosis, p. 146; and India, 
problem of t ransmigrati on, 
p. 152. 
Elements, as emanating from 
the Atman, p. g8; not the 
origin of things, p. 100; as 
the garment of God, p. 
Emanation, p. 75; theory of, 
pp. 97-98; as opposed to 
creation, pp. 98-99. 
Embryology, in the Garbho- 
p'1'tisbad , p. 189. 
Emoti onalism , in the MuDda- 
. . 
ta, p. 41; in the U panish ads, 
p. 19B. 


Empedocles, on Fire, Air, 
Water, Earth, p. 80; cosmo- 
logy of, compared to Upa- 
nishadic, p. g6. 
Empirical psychology, p. 113. 
Empirical reality, and trans- 
cendental ideality. p. 232. 
Encyclopredia of Religion and 
Ethics, reference to Krish
p. 20 3- 
Endosmosis, process of, P.I43. 
Enigmatic method, p. 34. 
Entelechy, p. 141. 
Ephesian philosopher, p. 80. 
Epimenides: conception of Night 
or Void as primary, p, 82. 
Epistemological Idealist, p. 231; 
Nihilist, p. 231. 
Epistemology, of the Vijfil- 
navidins, p. 181; of Absolute 
Experience, p. 352. 
Eristic, in Gorgias, p. .83. 
Erotic Mysticism, criticism of.. 
p. 34 8 . 
Eschatological kno\\'ledge, u 
most valuable to Up araisb a- 
die philosophers, p. 64; the 
highest kind of knowledge, 
p. 120. 
Eschatology, Upanishadic, pp. 
158-161; moral backbone of, 
p. 161; Upanishadic and 
Platonic, p. 162. 
Esoteric doctrine, in the Ke.- 
na, p. 25. 
Eternity, from Eternity to, p. 
77; life of, pp. 15 8 , 159. 
Etheric double, p. 143; theo- 
sophical conception of, p. 269. 
Ethno-psychological origin of 
the idea of TransJDicration, 
pp. 146,152. 


Etymological Method, p. 36. 
Eudamonism of Yijfiavalk- 
. ya, P.299; relation of, to idea... 
_ lism, p. 300. 
Eudaemonist, Yijfiavalkya as 
an, p. 20. 
Evil, power of, p. 226. 
Evil Soul, destiny of, p. 157. 
Evolute, transformed, p. 80. 
Evolution of Religion: on look- 
ing outward, and inward, 
and upward, p. 247. 
Ex nihilo, Creation, repugnant 
to the Upanishadic as well 
as to the Greek 
ind, P.76. 
Experience, photic and audi- 
tive, p. 345; first-hand, in- 
tuitive, p. 325. 
External world, knowledge of 
the, p. 217. 


Faculty of God-realisation, p. 
Faith, God and Self as objects 
of, p. 271: the necessary con- 
dition for discipleship, P.333. 
Falstaff, reborn, p. 23. 
Fatalism, p. 100. 
Fates, watering the Tree Ig- 
. drasil, p. 200. 
Father, to be worshipped as 
God, p. 310. 
Fathers, the path of the, p. 
Fatigue theory oj Sleep, pp. 53; 
112; theory of sleep of YiJ- 
ftavalkya, p. S8. 
:rear, aaalysia of, pp. II5-Ir6; 
0I1.1y a f eeling of otherness 
lodpd in UI, p. 115; the de- 

structioll of, as an effect of 
God-realisation, p. 349. 
. Fretus in the womb, the analogue 
for the spiritual fire, p. 337. 
Female kind, inordinate cu- 
riosity of the, p. 40. 
Fire, as the origin of all things. 
pp. 79-80; as exchanged for 
all things, in Heracleitus, p. 
79; as the first evolute from 
the primeval Being, in the 
Upanishads, p. 80; as the 
origin of things, in Heraclei- 
tus, p. 80. 
Fires, Five, doctrine of, p. 21; 
J aivali's doctrine of, p. 47; 
Sacrificial, rising in bodily 
form, p. 249. 
Fitche, I. H.: his view of tbe 
soul as a space-filling prin- 
ciple, p. I30. 
Fons et origo, soul as, p. 
Food and the Food-eater, 
epistemological and me- 
taphysical significance of, p. 
Force, revealed, p. 233. 
Formless Person, the beginning 
of Existence, p. 99. 
Fourth dimension, of meta- 
physics, p. 336; of psycholo- 
gy, p. 336. 
Freedom of Will, in the Upa- 
nishads, pp. 313-315: possi- 
ble, only after Self -rea1isa- - 
tion, p. 314. 
Frequency of return of Soul, 
p. ISI. 
Fundamental divisionis of 
Vedantic Schoo)s, p. 2ca6. 
Funeral occasion, description 
of a, in tbe 
eda, p. 141. 



Gandharvas, the world of the, 
29; the country of the, p. 
33 1 . 
Garbhopanishad: on embryo- 
logy, p. 189. 
Glrgi, the questioner of Yij- 
iiavalkya, p. 19; her dispu- 
tation with Yajfiavalkya,p. 
40; interested in the problem 
of immanence, p. 56; the 
Upanishadic suffragette, p. 61. 
Glrgya, the proud Brahmin, 
p. 19; doctrine of the reality 
of physical and physiologic- 
al categories, p. 48; and 
Ajataaatru, p. 62; obtains 
instruction about sleep from 
AjataAatru, p. 125. 
a, and Sailkara, p. 
228; doctrine of, p. 228; de- 
velopment of the doctrine 
of Maya in, p. 229; doctrine 
of Non-creation of, p. 230; on 
the state of Samidhi, p. 230 ; 
on the reality of the world 
and the moral law, p. 230; 
on Philosophy being superi- 
or to the conflict of schools, 
p. 27 6 . 
Geldner, on the riddle-hymn 
of the 
gveda, p. 149; on 
the idea of Transmigration 
in the 
gveda, p. 151. 
Genealogical Tradition of the 
Upanishads, p. 21. 
Genesis: description of the spirit 
of God moving upon the 
surface of the waters, p. 77. 
Ghora A!}girasa, instruction to 
, pp. 22, 202; Rot 


mentioned in the Mlhlbha- 
rata, p. 203; enumeration of 
virtues, p. 308. 
Gnomic stage of ethics, p. 288. 
God, and the Absolute, p. 33; 
the Lord of Pradhina, p. 
r85; as magic
, p. r85; as 
the Spectator of actions, p. 
186; and the Absolute, the 
relation of, p. 206; the theo- 
logical conception of, p.206; 
as all-eye and all-ear ac- 
cording to Xenophanes, p. 
208; and the Absolute in 
Ramanuja, p. 210; the Soul 
of Nature, p. 210; the Soul 
of Souls, p. 2 ro; the Soul 
of Souls, p. 212-213; and the 
Absolute, comparison of the 
conceptions of, p. 219; as 
Alpha and Omeg
, p. 248; 
cosmological argument for the 
existence of, p. 252 ; as supre- 
me resplendence, p. 255; iden- 
tified with the inner Self, 
p. 259; one, without a se- 
cond, p. 259; no gods, but 
God, p. 259; theistic concep- 
tion of, pp. 259-260; nature 
and attributes of, p. 260 ; 
-Atman as the Ultimate Ca- 
tegory of existence, p. 261: 
identical with the Self with- 
in} p. 261; the only cause of 
the world, p. 261; immanence 
and transcendence of, pp. 
261-262; ontological argu- 
ment for the existence of. p. 
269; and the Absolute, in thE' 
Minq.fik}ra Upanishad, p. 336. 
Godhead, unity of, as a later 
development of thoupt,. p. 


149; theistic view of, p. 1 8 5; 
deistic view of, p. 185. 
Godlings of nature, and Brah- 
man, the parable of, p. 253. 
God-realisation, the faculty of, 
p. 339; the nature of, as that 
of a fact, p. 339; inefficiency 
of sense and intellect for, 
p. 340; Intuition as the fa- 
culty of, p. 340; indescribable 
nature of the faculty of, p. 341. 
Gods, the path of the, p. 196; 
number of the, 258. 
God to Soul, transference of 
interest from, p. 3. 
Goethe, quotation from, p.IOI. 
Goldcn-coloured Being, descri- 
ption of.. p. 345. 
Goldsmith and gold, compar- 
ed to Soul and body, p. 58; 
the image of, p. 155. 
Good, in Plato, the Sun of the 
world of Ideas, p. 104; and 
pleasant, conflict between, p. 
293; physical, as an aspect 
of Bliss, p. 300; spiritual, as 
the acme of Bliss, p. 300. 
Gorgias, his conception of a 
real Not-Being, p. 82; on 
Not-Being, p. 104. 
Gospel conception of God, as 
the Alpha and Omega of 
things, p. 105. 
Grace, Upanishadic doctrine of, 
p. 345- 
Grasping or apprehension. the 
process of, p. 21 7. 
Great Happiness, consisting in 
the vision of the Infinite,p. 3°5. 
Greece and India: problem of 
the origin of the idea of 
lI"iBra tion, p. 152. 

Greek and Indian Philosophy 
analogies of, how explained, 
p. 101. 
Greek Mythology, p. 84; Phi 
losophy and Logos, p. 95. 
Green '5 idea of the nature of 
Spirit, compared to Aru
p. 55. 
Grierson, on the identity of 
the Krishna of the Mahl- 
. . 
bharata and the Chhindog- 
ya, p. 203. 
, the three, the common 
property of 5imkhya and 
Vedanta, p. 30; the origin 
of, p. 182. 
Guru, Bhakti to, as to God, p. 
Ig8; necessity of initiation 
by, p. 329; precautions to be 
observed by, in imparting 
spiritual wisdom, p. 332. 


, bcl
f of the Up

die philosophers in a region 
like the, p. 157; in the Upa- 
nishads and Plato, p. 162. 
Hamlet, with Hamlet out, p.65- 
Hammond, on Aristotle's loca- 
tion of the Soul, p. 131. 
Happiness, as the motive for 
actions, p. 304; true, as vi- 
sion of the Infinite, p. 304; 
Great and Small, p. 305. 
handra, in the Aitareya 
Brlhmal}3., p. 203; in the 
Purii1}3.S, p. 203. 
Hathayoga, adumbration of,p. 
Heart, as the seat of coDSCioue- 
Dess, p. 131. 



Heaven, described in the Veda as 
overflowing with honey p. 147. 
Hebrew literature, on man and 
wo-man, p. 103. 
Hedonism, spiritual, of San at- 
kumara, p. 52; anti-, of 
Nachiketas, pp. 293- 2 94. 
Hegel, appearance in the doc- 
trine of, p. 232; the dialec- 
tic of, p. 38. 
Heimskringla, the ancient 
chronicles of Scandinavia, p. 
He1a, kingdom of, p. 200. 
Heliolatory, p. 22. 
He1iotheism, p. 3 2 . 
Henotheistic Polytheism, tran- 
sition from, to Monotheis- 
tic Mysticism, p. 3. 
Henotheistic worship of Pra- 

t p. 9 1 . 
Heracleitus: the Way Up and 
the Way Down, pp. 80,98, 
104; on the exchange of fire 
for all things, pp. 79, 103; 
on Logos, p. 104; paradoxi- 
cal 1anguage of, pp. 150, 152; 
contradictions of, p. 305. 
Hercules, the choice of, bet- 
ween Pleasure and Virtue, 
p. 293; compared to Nachi- 
ketas, p. 293. 
Hesiod, p. 64; reference to the 
Theogony, p. 74: on the 
Earth as the basis of the cos- 
mos, p. 103. 
Heteronomy, p. 28 9. 
aeteros) Nature as a, p. 215. 
yagarbha, the dream as- 
pect of the Cosmic Self, p. 
140; the Logos of Indian 
Philosophy, p. 18,. 
4 8 

Historico-critical spirit, lack of, 
p. 17 8 . 
Rita!}, or arteries, spreading 
from the heart to the Pu- 
rItat, p. 124. 
Homer, p. 64; and the idea of 
Transmigration, p. 146. 
Roratory precepts, in the Taitti.. 
rIya, p. 309- 
Hospitality, as due to guests, 
p. 310. 
Human life, compared to a 
sacrificer's life, p. 201; the 
six stages of, p. 202. 
Hunger, equated \\'ith death, 
p. 82; and Thirst, compared 
to Love and Hate, p. 96. 
Hyle, the conception of, in 
igveda, p. 3. 
Hylozoism, in the 
147- 1 4 8 . 
Hypostasis, as Not-Being or 
Being, p. 54. 


I am I, of Kant, pp. 136, 269. 
Idandra, a mysterious name 
of the Godhead, p. 97. 
Idealism, monistic, of Am 1]i 
and Yaj iia valkya, p. 53; of 
the Aitareya, similar to that 
of Berkeley, p. 119; and Eu- 
daemonism, p. 300. 
Idealistic Metaphysics, p. 119; 
Theory of Knowledge, p.I82. 
Ideas, development of the Doc- 
trine of, as supplying a new 
principle for the chronologi- 
cal arrangement of the Dia... 
logues of Plato,. p. IS; Pla- 
to's theory of, p. 60,' I OS; 


world of p. 104; the Sun of 
the world of, p. 262. 
Identifications, philosophy of, 
p. 203. 
.Identitit Philosophy of Aru- 

, p. 23. 
Idols, breaking of, literal and 
metaphorical, p. 24. 
Igdrasil, in Scandinavian my.. 
thology, p. 103; description 
of, p. 200; Carlyle's descrip- 
tion of, p. 200. 
Ignoratio elenchi, p. 231. 
Illicit transformation, (Rajju... 
sarpa and 8uktikirajata), p. 
Illusion, in the doctrine of 
AmtP, p. 54; creation as, p. 
98; Maya as, p. 226. 
Image in the eye, as Ultimate 
Reality, p. 250. 
Immanence, dynamic and sta- 
tic, doctrine of, pp. 56, 61; 
famous doctrine of, pp. 211... 
212; of God even in contra.. 
dictories, p. 212;-transcen- 
dence of God, p. 261. 
Imyersonal Immortality, 
Sail.kara, p. 165. 
ImpersonaIistic Theories of 
Upanishadic cosmogony, p. 
Impotence, the power of, p. 225. 
Immortality, the Katha sur- 
charged with ideas about, p. 
28; personal and impersonal, 
p. 165; as consisting in being 
lifted to the region of the 
deity, p. 165: as absorbtion 
in God. p. 165; as companion.. 
ship of the highest ,God, p. 
165: as assimilation to God, 

p. 165; different doctrines of, 
p. 209; Riminuja's doctrine 
of, p. 213; the Navel of, p. 
Incommensurability, of phy- 
sical good and spiritual 
good, doctrine of, p. 301. 
Individual, as mirroring reali- 
ty, p. 141; as the World in 
miniature, p. 141; Soul, 
bound in chains, p. 186. 
lndra and Virochana, the fa- 
mous myth of, pp. 23, 39, 
265; and the Damsel, the 
myth of, pp. 25, 36, 255; his 
exploits as found in the 
veda, p. 27; how far histori- 
cal, p. 44; and Dadhyach,p. 
51; a contraction of ldan- 
dra, P.97; as Idandra, break- 
ing through the skull, p. 132; 
on dream-consciousness, p. 
266; on deep-sleep-conscious- 
ness, p. 26]; shrewd insight 
of, p. 268. 
Indradyumna: on Air as the 
substratum, p. 47. 
in Infinite, as bliss, p. 43; con- 
jugation of the verb to do, 
p. 200: vision of, as consti- 
tuting true happiness, P.304. 
Infinities, piliag of IDiniues 
over, p. 278. 
Infinity, deduction of Infinity 
from, p. 278. 
Initiation, Necessity of, p. 329. 
Intellect, its clain1 for prima- 
cy, pp. 117-11-8; higher than 
Will, p. 117; meditation of, 
as Br ahroan , p. 118; the 
back-bone, not ooiy of psy- 
chical functions, but of ft8.'"' 


lity itself, p. 119; centre of, 
as referred to the brain, P.I32; 
will, and emotion, relation 
of, p. 288; and intuition, re- 
lation of, p. 271; inability 
of, to apprehend Reality, p. 
326; inefficacy of, to rea- 
lise God, p. 340. 
Intellectual experience, differ- 
ent levels of, p. 118. 
Intellectualistic psychology, p. 
Intellectualism, its quarrel with 
Voluntaralism, p. I16; in the 
Upanishads, p. 19 8 . 
Intermediary Person, creation 
of the world by Atman, 
through the, pp. 94-95; the 
Logos of Indian Philosophy, 
p. 18 7. 
Inter-quotation, the only de- 
finite test for the chronology 
of the Upanishads, p. 16. 
Introspection, the psychologi- 
cal process corresponding 
to self-consciousness, P.244; 
the start of the philosophi- 
cal process, p. 248; reality 
of the process of, denied by 
Kant and Comte, p. 274. 
Introversion, the first qualifi- 
cation for self-realisation,p. 

Intuition and Intellect, rela- 
tion of, P.21I; as oompared 
with sense and thought, p. 
339; as the faculty of God.. 
realisation, p. 340. 
ImmnowU bOOy, p. I
I ntuitieftitm , higher tnd lower, 
p. 291; autonomic, p. 291; 
aesthetic, p. 191; sympatbe- 


tic, p. 292; higher, of auto- 
nomy, p. 292; in Hindu Ethi- 
cs, p. 292. 
Inversion, implied in the ana- 
logue of the bride-groom and 
the bride, p. 348. 
Ion, Plato's: explanation of 
real poetry as an effect of 
God-intoxication on, p. 9. 
i., the deep-sleep aspect of 
the Cosmic Self, p. 140. 
Isles of the Blessed, in Plato, 
p. 158; in the Upanishads, 
and Plato, p. 162. 
panishad, a summary of, 
p. 24- 
Iwara, conception of, in Yoga 
Philosophy, p. 189. 


JabaIa, the mother of Satya- 
klma, p. 311. 
Jain doctrine of Soul, p. 134. 
Jaivali, .Praviha
, doctrine of 
Five Fires, p. 21; eschato-. 
logical teaching of, p. 22; 
his doctrine of the Universe 
as exhibiting at every stage 
the principle of sacrifice, pp. 
46-47; on space as the origin 
of all things, p. 80; on space 
as the final habitat, p. 81. 
Jamblichus. the Neo-Platonist, 
p. 102. 
James, William, Prof.: on the 
seat of the Soul, p. 130; on 
the feeling of Self, as con- 
sisting in certain cephalic 
movements, p. 137. 
Janaka, the patron of Yijiia- 
valkya, p. 19; questioa a1Jou& 


the light of man, p. 40; and 
Bu4ila, p. 64; and Yij t'ia.. 
valkya, dialogue between, p. 
26 3. 
JinaAruti and the Swans, p.,8; 
and Raikva, p. 7 8 . 
Jaratklrava, aporia about Kar. 
man, p. 20; an eschatologist, p. 
56; and Yijiiavalkya, p. 181. 
Jitavedas, the god of Fire. -p.- 
Jlvanmukti, the doctrine of, p. 
223; conception of, in Ad- 
vaitism, p. 214. 
J iiinitman, p. 183. 
JOYI illimitable, as the effect 
of Self-realisation, p. 34 8 . 
Jupiter's chair, Nature's 
chain linked to, p. 2. 


Kabandhin KatyAyana : his cos- 
mological question, p. 48. 
Kahola, seeker after Realisa- 
. tion, p. 56. 
Kalakaiijas, p. 27. 
Klla, hymns to, in the Athar- 
va veda, p. 5. 
Kilidisa: description of love 
similar to that of Shakes- 
peare, p. 105. 
Kant, I am I, p. 136: distinc- 
tion between Noumena and 
Phenomena, p. 215; Refuta- 
tion of Idealism, p. 232; on 
the Cosmological proof of the 
existence of God, p. 253; on 
pure Self-consciousness, p. 
269; on God and Self as ob- 
jects of faith, p. 271; on the 
unknowable nature of Rea- 

lity, p. 271; on the synthe- 
tic unity of apperception, 
p. 274; on the ,denial of the 
process of introspection, p. 
274; and the categoric
imperative" p. 292. 
Kapila, meaning of the word, 
p. 29; controversy about the 
meaning of the word, pp. 
183, 186; same as Hiral}ya- 
garbha" and Brahman(m), p. 
18 7. 
Karman, the topic of discus- 
sion between Jaratkarava 
and Yajfiavalkya, p. 20; 
Sin cJil ya.' s doctrine of, p. 50; 
Yajfiavalkya's doctrine of, p. 
58: earliest trace of the theo- 
ry of, in the 
igveda, p. 148; 
doctrine of, in the Briha- 
diral}yaka, p. 155; as in- 
fluencing the birth of soul, 
p. 156; explicit mention of 
the doctrine of, in Kaushltaki, 
p. 162; in the Upanishads 
and Buddhism, p. I81; mo- 
ral force of the doctrine of, 
p. 182. 
Karmayoga, adumbration of 
the doctrine of, in the la, 
p. 24; roots of the philoso- 
phy of, in the iAa, p. 196; 
the philosophy of, in tQe 
Bhagavadglta, p. 196. 
Kashmir &ivism, p. 194. 
Kaiha, two strata of composi- 
tion in,pp. 27, 28. . 
Katharsis, in alimentation p. 
114 ; moral 328. 
Ka'f.hopanishad, a SUtl1n)8tJ' 
0(, pp.. 27-29; and the 
public of Plato, p. a6a.. " 


Klty.lyanI, the materialistic 
wife of Yljfiavalkya_ p. 19; 
the woman of the world, p. 
. .61; the material choice of, p. 
Kausalya AAvalayana: his in- 
terest in the metaphysics of 
psychology, p. 48. 
Kaushltaki Upanishad, a sum- 
mary of, pp. 26-27; the grand 
eschatological allegory in_p. 
42; the philosopher of the, 
'as inventor of the doctrine 
of the identity of Prl
Brahman, p. 45, an ancient 
Satylgrahin, p. 45, the au- 
thor of the doctrine of 
I Three Meditations', p. 45: 
OD the primacy of Prl
, p. 
Keith A. B., Prof., on the idea 
of Transmigration as deter- 
mining the age of an Upani- 
shad, p. I5; on the absence 
of the idea of Transmigration 
in the older portion of the 
Aitareya, p. 15; on Egyp- 
tian Transmigration, p. 153. 
Kenopanishad, a summary of, 
pp. 24- 2 5. 
Khapushpa, or the postulation 
of negation, p. 230. 
Knot, ignorance compared to a, 
p. 225. 
Knowledge and works, a re- 
conciliation of, pp. 24,2gB; 
synthesis of p. 192: recon.. 
ciliationJ of, in Kunllri1a, 
Knowledge, the i 
theory of, p. 182; instrument 
of, p. 190; superiority to 


works of, in &i1kara, p. 193: 
absolutist view of, p. 218; 
lower and higher, p. 3 26 ; 
intellectual, as merely ver- 
bal jugglery. p. 327; more 
dangerous than ignorance , 
p. 3 2 9. 
Knowability of Atman, mean- 
ing of, p. 273. 
Koran, a revelation like the 
Upanishads and the Bible, 
p. 8. 
Koaas, as having an ideal 
tenceJ p. 143. 
Kramamukti, meaning of the 
doctrine of, p. 209; incon- 
sistent with Advaitism, p. 
21 4. 
 the son 9f Devaki, p. 

2; compared to a milk- 
man, p. 195; tranSfigured 
personality of, p. 197: the 
son of Devaki, in the Upa- 
nishads and the Mahlbhl- 
rata, p. 201; the divine hero 
of the Mahlbharata, p. 20IJ 
the disciple of Ghora 
rasa, p. 202; the SOD of Va. 
sudeva, founder of a new re- 
ligion, p. 203; controversy 
about the personality of. 
pp. 201-205. 
Ksha ni1c
", Ksha Pi1tatn , the 
. . 
cry of Bud dhism , p. 181. 
Kshatriyahood, itS relatioD to 
B fAh min hood, pp. 61-63. 
Kumlrila, on a bird ftying on 
both the winss together, p. 
1931 on the reconciliatiOft of 
worb and knowledge, p. 193. 
Kilno Fischer, on the "Attri- 
'. of S
oa,. p.. . 


KusumlftjaH, identification of 
Mlya. and PraJqiti, p. 227. 


Lateral Ventricle, p. 133. 
Law, first-born of the, p. 150; of 
God, and of Man, p. 19 1 ; 
instruction to respect the, p. 
309; first-born of the, p. 353. 
Uibrdtz: his theory of repre- 
sentation already present 
in the Chhlndogya, p. t4I; 
quotation concerning his 
theory of microcosm, P.I4 t ; 
on the best of all possible 
worla, p. 350. 
Leverrier: discovery of Nep. 
tune, p_ 105- 
, IS the source of eternal 
mitery, p. 294- 
Life-force, as lying at the root 
of things, p. 75; creation 
from, p. 16. 
Light of man, probletn of the, 
p. 40; Janaka and Yljfia- 
valkya on the, p. "4- 
LingaAarira, doctrine of, adum. 
brated in Pippallda, p. 49; 
ib Slft\lthya lAd Vedlnta.. 
p. 184: 
'ation of the, to 
Purusha, p_ IB.t.; with se- 
vellteen pIltB, p. r84: tIae 
conoeption of the, p- 183- 
Litl! t& ., the role of, p. 165. 
LwalilAtt un, problem 
, in 
the U
, p. t3a. 
Lo8tc-dllJppbtg, p. 330. 
 ttae UpudIbadI, 
Local, in Gfttk aad Chri8- . 

, Pi 95: and dill 

World..Person, p. 95: com... 
pared to Vlk, p. 104; in 
Heracleitus, p. 104; in the 
Stoics, p. 104; in IndiaD 
Philosophy, p. 187; in Chris. 
tolosy, p. 333. 
Lotze, on the seat of the soul, 
pp. 130-131. 
Love and Hate, in Empedo- 
cIs, p. 96. 
LUlDinosity, all, as due to God, 
p. 2
Lute, grasping of the sound 
of a, p. 217- 


M, as Mitt. or Apia. p. 86. 
Macdonell, Prof...., on the 
borrowal of the idea of traaa- 
mfKration by the Indian M- 
yanB from the abori«in es, p. 
146; transmigration aDd the 
moral principle of requital, 
p. I
; probable derivatioo 
of tbe idea of transmigra- 
tion by Pythagoras from 
Indian philOlOphy, p. 146. 
Macroooem, p. 88; of the Viii. 
verse, p. 96; and MakraD... 
throps, p. 141. 
Madhuvidy" or the DoctriAe 

, p. 5I;mde 
veda, and the B rihadRa .. 
yaka, p. 51. 
Madhva, the dualistic ICIIDaI 
of, p. 205; aIId R....... 
compuilaa of the vi.- .,aI, 
p. 209: conception of beati- 
ta1Ia, p. 213- 
MadIawiIm, in the V p.IWdI , 
p. 207. 


Mabibhirata, Uil of the word 
prlei.. p. 136; no mention 
of Ghora Angirasa in, p. 
2°3; on the parentage of 
KrishJ?3., pp. 201, 202. 
Mahat Atman, in two passa- 
ges of the Katha, p. 183; as 
intermediate between Bud- 
dhi and A vyakta, p. 197. 
Maine, Sir Henry: on the 
Greek origin of all culture, 
p. 73. 
Maitreyi, the spiritual wife of 
Ylj fiavalkya, p. 19; the type 
of spiritual woman, p. 61; 
the spiritual choice of, P.303. 
Maitri, the teacher of Sakii- 
yanya, p. 31; two strata in 
the, p. 31; Upanishad, a 
summary of, pp. 31-33; a 
great God-realiser, p. 45; 
on the highest secret of 
the U
n1Rh adsJ p. 346. 
Makranthropo&, a better word 
than Makrocosm, p. 14 1 ; 
reference to, p. 148. 
Malas, the Four, p. 189. 
Manasaspati, Brahman that 
resides in the brain, p. 13 2 . 
)J2nifes t Bodies, p. 143. 
Manomaya Purusha, Self that 
resides in the heart, p. 13 2 . 
Manu, p. 49; his doctrine of 
water as the first creation 
of God, p. 77; on the five 
kinds of sin, p. 309. 
MltariAvan, the god of Wind, 
p. 2S.. 
Materialists: on the bodily con 
sciousness as Self, p. 269. 
Matter aad Fonn.. .Ari&tDt1e's 
doctrine of, pp. 49-93. 


Matthew Arnol", on the poe- 
tries of Byron and Words- 
worth, 251. 
Max Miiller: explanation of Bt- 
1}8. as a harp, p. go; interpre- 
tation of Puritat, p. 123; on 
the nipple-like appearance as 
the uvula, p. 132; on the ex- 
perience of the mystic, p. 
133; meaning of Abhivimi- 
na. p. 136; interpretation of 
a passage in Maitri, p. 138; 
meaning of Anvirabh, p. 155. 
Miya. a Vedantic metamor- 
phosis of the Simkhya Pra- 
kriti , pp. 30,185; considered 
phonetically, philologicaHy, 
and philosophically, p. 104; 
three theories about the ori- 
gin of, pp. 223-224; not a 
fabrication of Sai1kara, p. 
223; if springiug out of the 
Sunyavida of the Buddhists, 
p. 223; developed by Sanka- 
ra from the Upanishads, p. 
224; to be found in ideas 
rather than in words, p. 224; 
manifold conceptions of, in 
the U paPjs1)9ds , pp. 225-228; 
as "power", compared with 
the "attributes" of Spinoza 
p. 227 ; vicissitudes in 
the historical development of 
the doctrine of, p. 228; in 
the Bbacavadgltl, as magi- 
cal power, p. 228; in Gau- 
qapida, p. 229; elaboration 
of the theory of, by San- 
kara, P.230; ine"PlicabJe na- 
ture of, p. 230; RiDllnuja'. 
cri tieism of the doctriae of, 
p. 231. 


Measurement ,of Bliss, unit of, 
p. 300. 
Medicine, and Yoga, p. 19<>. 
Medinlkosha: on pride&i, p. 135. 
Meditation, environment for 
the practice of, p. 188; by 
means of Om, the way to 
Realisation, p. 333. 
Mediumship, the phenomena of, 
p. 12 7. 
Mendicants, order of, p. 182. 
Mental states, classification of, 
pp. 118-119; plane, p. 142. 
Meshes, Miyi as, p. 227. 
Metaphors, realistic and illu- 
sionistic, p. 184. 
Metaphysical conflicts, p. 146; 
clue to reconciliation of ,P.276. 
Metaphysics of Aristotle, quota- 
tion from, p. 74; of Absolute 
Experience, p. 352. 
Metempsychosis, in Pythago- 
ras, without any explanatory 
background, p. 146. 
Methods of Upanishadic Phi- 
losophy, pp. 34-40. 
Microcosm, of the Intennedia- 
ry Person, p. 96; and Macro- 
cosm, pp. 14°-141. 
M1mlnsi doctrine of Air as 
the carrier of sound, pp. 
191-192; and Upanishads, pp. 
19 2 - 193. 
. MJmlnsakas, their view that 
the Vedas are Apaurusheya, 
pp. 9-10; their discussion 
with the Naiyyiyikas re- 
garding the Apaurusheyat- 
va of the Vedas, p. 9; doc- 
trine of Sphofa, p. IOS; ul- 
tra-,' p. 193; moderate-, 
p. 193- 

Mind, dependent on alimenta"- 
tioD, p. 113; compared to 
the lute, or the drum, or 
the conch, p. 217; inst!u- 
ment of the activity of At- 
man, p. 217; con1pared to a 
chariot, p. 338. 
Mirror, the Atman as a, P.345. 
Mode, Miya as, p. 227. 
Monadic plane, p. 142. 
Monism, school of, p. 178; 
Pure, school of, p. 178; as 
the synthesis of Dualism, 
and Qualified Monism, p.2I5; 
Qualified, school of, p. 178 ; 
Qualitative, p. 210; Trini 
tarian, p. 194. 
Monologic method, p. 38. 
Monologues, post-ecstatic,pp. 
35°-35 2 . 
Monotheism, springing out of 
Polytheism, pp. 258-259- 
Monotheistic ReJigion, of 
Kr ish J]3., p. 2 °3- 
Moon, situated at a greater 
distance than the Sun, p. 158. 
Morae of Om, A, U, M, p. 335. 
Mora-less part of Om, p. 335. 
Moral ladder to realisation,p. 
52; problem, the connecting 
link between metaphysics 
and mysticism, p. 288; stan- 
dard, theories of, as abstract, 
p. 288; ideal, theories of, as 
concrete, p. 288; o1igarchy
the voice of, p. 29<>; good, as 
the Summum bonum, P.299; 
good, and wordly good, 
p. 299; agent, as beyond 
good and bad, p. 306; Self, 
psychology or the, in' the 
Upaaishads, p. 314. 



Morality, and Intellect, rela- 
tion of, p. 287; metaphysics 
and mysticisIn, relatiop of, 
p. 287; based upon Atma- 
nic experience, p. 288; link- 
ed with mysticism, p. 315. 
Morphic Experience, p. 343. 
Moscow Retreats, p. 233. 
Mother, to be worshipped as 
God, p. 310.. 
Motives, conflict of, not elabo- 
rately treated in the Upani- 
shads, p. 315; as treated in 
the Muktika, p. 315. 
Mover of the Body, p. 32. 
Mrigatrishl}ika, postulation of 
negation, p. 230. 
MUI}qaka and MiiT:1q.dkya, sum- 
maries of, pp. 29,33. 
Mutuum C
mmercium, p. 51. 
Mystery to Mystery, p. 234. 
Mystic experience, the faculty 
of, p. 271; as a clue to the 
reconciliation ot the different 
philosophical schools, P.276; 
concealed nature of, p. 326; 
four types of, pp. 342-345; 
the acme of, p. 345; raptures 
of, p. 350. 
Mysticism, the culmination of 
all Philosophy as of Upani- 
shadic, p. 65; and morality, 
problem of, p. 278; and pseu- 
do-mysticism, p. 348; erotic, 
limitations of, p. 348. 
Mystics, and the spiritual pil- 
grimage, p. 278; worship of, 
for the obtainment of any 
end, p. 350. 
Myths, of three different kinds: 
moral, aetiologital, and 
transcendental, pp. 36"-31; 

the function of, in philoso- 
phy, p- 253; allegorical 
meaning of, p. 253. 
Mythical Method, p. 36. 
Mythology, Comparative, p. 200. 


NAbhiva UpalabdheQ, p. 231. 
Nachiketas and Death, story 
of, p. 28; pupil of Yama,p.39 ; 
and Yama, dialogue betv.lecn, 
pp. 121-122; and St. John, 
p. 154; the pessimistic cry of, 
p. 180; and Hercules, p. 293 ; 
a true anti-hedonist, p. 294. 
Nail-scissors, a pair of, p. 216. 
Naiyyayikas: their view that 
the Vedas are PauntSheya, 
p. 9; their theory of the uni- 
versal, Saitkara's criticism of 
p. 104. 
Niika Maudgalya, propounder 
of the study of the Vedas as 
the supreme virtue, p. 45; 
on the virtue of the study of 
the Sacred Books, p. 310. 
Name and Form, p. 8S. 
Napoleon, a Spectr
, p. 233. 
Nirada, and Sanatkumara, pp. 
23, 88, Ig8; enumeration of 
the sciences he has studied, 
p. 326. 
N arayal]3., the Cosmic God, p. 
Nasadiya Stikta: doctrine of 
Night as the primeval exis- 
tent, p. 82. 
Natural Selection, the princi- 
ple of, discovered by Dar- 
win and Wallace simulta- 
neously, p. - 105. . 


Naturalism and eos", ogenesis, 
p. 9 2 . 
Nature, not the origin of things, 
p. 100: brought to maturity 
by God, p. 100: organic and 
inorganic, sovereignty of 
God over, p. 208. 
N ecessi ty, doctrine of, p. 84: 
not the origin of things, 
p. 100. 
Negation, and affirmation, p. 
219; postulation of, p. 230. 
Negative Theology, of Yajfta- 
valkya, pp. 50, 56. 
Nemesis, of the idea of the spa- 
tial extension of the Sou1, 
p. 139. 
Neo-Platonism, and Yogic ecs- 
tasy, p. 102. 
Neo-Upanishadic period, su.. 
perior moral interest in, p. 
Neptune, discovered by Adam 
and Leverrier at the same 
time, p. 105. 
Neti Neti, as having a nega- 
tive as well as a positive 
content, p. 220: negative 
connotation of, p. 220; posi- 
tive connotation of, p. 221. 
N 1 1m ism atics, p. 102. 
New Psychology, p. 128. 
N ietzsche : idea. of Supermora- 
1ism In, p. 306. 
Night, the 'archei in Eptmeni- 
des, p. 82; as the primary 
existent in Greek thought, 
p. Sa. 
N i'hi1j
m , Buddhistic, p. 223. 
Nimitta-pa ftch
m ), p. 2og. 
Nipple-like gland, the seat of 
the IDImorta1 Bebti, p. 16; 

question as to whether it is 
the uvula or the pituitary 
body, p. 13 2 . 
Niyama. as the preliminary of 
Yoga, p. 188._ 
Nominalism of Aru
, p. 54; 
in the Chhindogya, p. 87. 
Non-creatioDt the doctrine of, 
in Gau qap ida, p. 229. 
Nomas, wateririg the Tree of 
Existence, p. 200. 
Not-Being, as the creator of 
Being, p. 37; creation from, 
p. 76; the primary existent, 
pp. 81-83; absolute and rela- 
tive, p. 83; in Gorgias, P. 10 3; 
in Buddhism, p. lBo. 
Noumena and Phenomena, in 
Kant, p. 215. 
N umbers, Pythagorean theory 
of, p. 104. 
Nyagrodha tree, parable of the, 
p. 25 6 . 
Nylya Philosophy, Pur Itat 
theory of sleep in, pp. 124- 
191 ; on dialectic and its 
aberrations, p. 190. 
hika, and the Upa- 
nishads, p. 190; and the in- 
strument of knowledge, p. 
Occasionalism, Upanishadic, p. 
Occultism, p. 133. 
Occultist Philosophy, and 
Theosophy, p. 143. · 
Oldenberg : mystical interpre- 
tation of a Vedic passage , 
p. ISI. 
Om, the genesis and function 
of, p. aI; the symbol parti 


tioned in three diflerent mo- 
rae, p. 33 ; meditation on, at 
the time of death, p. 205; 
and the Logos, p. 333; as the 
symbol of meditation, P.333; 
the manifold importance of 
meditation by, p. 334; as 
both the means and end of 
spiritual life, p. 334; the 
cosmic efficacy of, p. 334; 
the moral efficacy of medita- 
tion by, p. 335: the MI
kyan analysis of, p. 335; 
the moral-less part of, P.335; 
as representing states of 
consciousness as well as as- 
pects of soul, p. 335; inter- 
pretation of the constituent 
syllables of, p. 335. 
Ontological argument, for the 
existence .of God, p. 26g. 
Opinion and Truth, the same 
as Aparl Vidya and Pari 
Vidyl, p. 326. 
Opinion of wise men, as sup-- 
plying rules for moral 
conduct, p. 29<>. 
Order, argument from, p. 251. 
Origin of the world, various 
opinions about, p. 100. 
Orion, consciousness cogni- 
tively present to, p. 130. 
Orpheus, and the idea of Trans- 
migration, p. 146. 
Orphic Cosmogony, compared 
to Upanishadic, p. 84. 


Paingya, p. 26; as the hench- 
man of Kaushltaki, p. 46. 
" theory of, p. 142. 


Pafich1karaua.: its relation to 
, p. 86. 
Pandora's box, p. 142. 
Parables and myths, allegori- 
.. cal meaning of, p. 253. 
Parable of the Cave, and the 
Parable of the Blind -folded 
man, p. 331. 
Paralle1ism, independent, bet.. 
ween Upanishadic and 
Greek Philosophies, pp. 101- 
Piiamirthika view of Real.. 
ity, pp. 215,231. 
Pari Vidyi, same as Epis- 
, p. 326. 
Par Ikshit , the sons of, p. 128. 
Parimara, meditation on Brah- 
man as, p. 129. 
Parmenides, on Being, pp. 82, 
104; attack on the. Ideal 
theory, p. 104: appearance 
in the doctrine of, p. 232. 
PaAu, Pati, and Pda, philo- 
sophy of, p. 19+ 
Pataftcha1a, the daugbter of, 
possessed by a Gandharva, 
p. 128. 
Path of the Gods, and the 
Path of the Fathers, p. 26; 
later development in the 
conception of, p. 163. See 
also Devayana and Pitp.. 
Paul, St., OD God as speaking 
through him, p. 9. 
Paulomas, p. 27. 
Paurusheya-Apal1rusheya Vi- 
da, pp. 9. 10 . 
PauruAishp.. propounder of 
Penance as the supreme vir.. 
me, p. 4S. 


Penance, as principal virtue 
with Taponitya Pauru!iish- 
;i, p. 310. 
Pericardium: its place in the 
Upanishadic psychology of 
sleep, p. I31. 
Persian Mythology, p. 84. 
Persoll, with sixteen parts,Pip- 
palada's doctrine of, p. 49; 
creation by the, p. 76; the 
Intermediate, pp. 94-95; as 
the origin of things, p. 100; 
in the eye, turning away at the 
time of death, p. 155; 
sixteen parts, idea of, the 
precursor of the Linga&trIra, 
p. 184; the constituents of, 
p. 184; without parts, p. 184. 
Persons, the Mutable and Im- 
mutable, in the Bhagavad- 
giti, p. 2°7. 
Personal, Immortality in Ra- 
manuja pp. 165,214; eqa- 
tion of Philosophers, p. 179; 
existence, continuance of, p. 
214 ;-impersonal theory of 
creation, p. 99. 
Personalistic theories of Upa- 
n shadic cosmogony, p. 75; 
theories of creation, p. 92; 
Pessimism, in Buddhism, p. 
182; and anti-hedonism, p. 
294; the logical outcome of 
anti-hedonism, p. 295. 
Phanes, the shining God, pp. 
Phaedrus : the charioteer and 
the horses, p. 104. 
Pharynx, p. 133. 
Philolaus: his doctrine of Space 
as the 'arche' of all things, 
pp. 80, 1 °3. 

Phrenician Mythology, p. 84. 
Photic experience, p. 343. 
Physico-theological argument 
for the existence of God, p. 
257; personal and imperso- 
nal aspects of, p. 258. 
Physiological categories, re- 
gress from cosmological cate- 
gories to, p. 250. 
Physiology, rise of, p. 18g; 
and Yoga philosophy, p.IgO. 
Pilate: on the nature of 
Truth, p. 313. 
Pineal gland, as the Seat of 
the Soul, p. 131. 
Pippalada, philosophy of, pp. 
30-31; a synthetical philo- 
sopher, p. 38; doctrine of 
Rayi and Pra1}3., p. 49; his 
notion of dual existence, p. 
9 2 . 
Pitriyi1]a, or the Way of the 
Fathers, history of the con- 
ception of, p. 159; concep- 
tion of, in the Bhagavad- 
gIta and the Upanishads, p. 
19 6 . 
Pituitary body, as the nipple- 
like appearance, p. 132; si- 
tuated above the bones of 
the hard palate, p. 133. 
Planes, the Theosophic con- 
ception of the Seven, p. 142; 
of Consciousness, as corres- 
ponding to the Bodies of 
Man, p. 142. 
Plato, in the Ion, on real poetry 
as originating in God-into- 
xication, p. 9; his enigmatic 
description of a man and no- 
man, p. 35; the dialectic of, 
p. 38; description of the 


Corybantes's dance, p. 41; 
on wonder as the root of 
philosophy, p. 63; recogni- 
tion of Not-Being, pp. 82- 
83; description of the body 
as a harp, p. 90; absence of 
reference to Indian Philoso- 
phy in, p. 102; reference to 
Parmenides, p. 104; and the 
Phaedrus Myth, p. 1°4; on 
the Good as the Sun of the 
world of Ideas, pp. 104, 262; 
theory of Ideas, pp. 60, 104; 
recognition of an Innnortal 
Sou1, p. 129; the Soul en- 
dowed with the power of 
motion, p. 133; on recollec- 
tion, p. 153; on the Isles of 
the Blessed, p. 158, 162; on 
the Hades, p. 162; concep- 
tion of the Tartarus in, p. 162; 
appearance in the doctrine 
of, p. 232; and the ppani- 
shads, conception of Atman, 
p. 246; on the comparative 
value of Books and Tea- 
chers, p. 331; on the Parable 
of the Cave, p. 331. 
Platonists of Alexandria, p. 
Plotinus, appearance in the 
doctrine of, p. 232. 
Pluralism, the school of, p. 
17 8 ; numerical, p. 210; its 
conflicts with qualified 
Monism and Monism, p. 246. 
Poetical Method of Philosophy, 
employed in the Upani- 
shads, pp. 40-43; its defect, 
p. 40; its application, p. 4 1 . 
Poetry, Upanishadic: mysti- 
cal, moral, metaphysical, p. 


41; not nature poetry, or 
love poetry, or heroic p0e- 
try, p. 41. 
Polytheism, regress from, to 
monotheism, pp. 258-259. 
Positive Theology of Sa
pp. 50,59. 
Positive characterisation of 
the Absolute, p. 219. 
Power, and Impotence, contrast 
of, p. 348; in the Universe, 
as dQe to Brahman, p. 255. 
Prabhakara, on the superio- 
rity of Works, p. 193. 
Prachinagila: his view of hea- 
ven as the substratum of all 
things, p. 49. 
Prade&l.matra, controversy 
about the meaning of, pp. 
135- 1 37. 
Pradhana, ruled by 
od, p. 
30; or Pralqiti, p. 185. 
Praj ipati, the teacher of In- 
dra and Vi rochan a, p. 39; 
-Kratu on the Mover of the 
body, p. 133; instruction to 
Indra and Virochana, p. 
265; on the true nature of 
Ultimate Reality, p. 268; on 
the cardinal virtues, 'p. 307. 
Praj fia, the third foot of At- 
man, p. 36; the deep sleep 
aspect of the Individual Self, 
pp. I4°,335. 
Prajfiana, p. 181. 
Prijfia-Atman, p. 58. 
Pr akriti , the eight-fold, p. 34; 
the three-fold, p. 86; in the 
Upanishads and Samkhya, p. 
182; and Maya, p. 185; as 
God's _ magic power, p. 185. 
Pralhida, the sons of, p. 27. 


Pr1l}a, oblation to) 88 real sa- 
crifice, p. 7; parable prov- 
ing the supremacy of, p. x9 ; 
as the principle of life, II the 
principle, of consciousness, as 
ultimate reality, p. 21; as 
life-force, or cosmic-foroe. p. 
81 ; controversy of, with the 
organs of sense, in the CIl- 
handogya, Kaushltaki, .and 
PraAna, pp. 88-g1; a bio. 
psycho-metaphysical concep- 
tion p. 91 ; identified witJa Jife, 
with consciousness, and with 
Atman, p. 91 ; compared to a 
queen-bee, p. 91; a pJUloso.. 
phica1 apotbeois of, p. 92; 
purification of, as necessary to 
the realisation of Atman.p
Aita, p. 205. 
Prll}a.yima, in the U panishlds, 
p. 188. 
Pragnopanishad, a S UJ1m'lry 
of, pp. 30-31. 
Pratardana, p. 26; a free thin- 
ker of antiquity, p. 46; ori- 
ginator of the doctrine of 
Praj iiltman, p. 46; giving 
name to a sa.criftce 
after him, p. 115. 
Pratyihira, p. 18 7. 
Prltibh lsika view, p. 23
Prayer to the Atman, for the 
fulfilment of any end, pp. 
Preceptor, to be worshipped 
as God, p. 3 10 . 
Principle, the definition of the, 
p. 145. 
Projective identification of 
the Thou and the Absolute, 
p. 218. 

Prose-poetry, co
toDS of, 
in the Upanishads, p. 42. 
Psalms of the Bible, compara- 
ble to Hymns to Varu
, p. 3. 
Psychical Research, early. pp. 
Psychological Approach to 
Reality, the final approach, 
pp. 241, 249; categories, su- 
periority of, to cosmological 
and physiological categories
p. 252; doctrines about the 
nature of reality, p. 263; 
temperaments: Sattva, Ra- 
jas, and Tamas, p. 308. 
Psycho-metaphysical interpre- 
tation of Om, p. 336. 
Psychology : empirical, abnor- 
mal, and rational, p. 113; 
olane seMe, p. 129; in the 
Upanishads, pp. 113-166. 
Purgatory, in Dante, p. 162; 
the World as a, p. 163. 
PurIfication, justification of 
the process of, p. 342. 
Pur It at, the connecting link 
between Nyiya-Vai 'eshik aand 
the Upanishads, p. 190; 
- translated as perikardium, p. 
123; as the surrounding bo- 
dy, p. 123; corresponding to 
the pineal gland of Descar- 
tes, p. 123; as a kind of mem- 
braneous sac round the 
heart, pp. 123-124; entrance 
of mind or soul in, as caus- 
ing sleep, p. 191. 
Purity of Divine life, p. 352. 
Purusha, as puriAaya, p. 36; 
not the origin of things, p. 
101; as the Highest Exis- 
tence, pp. 183. 191. 


Purushastikta: formulation of 
the caste-system in, p. 59; 
reference to, p. ISO; descrip- 
tion of the Cosmic Person 
in, p. 197. 
pmva Mlmansa.: on superiority 
of Works to Knowledge, p. 
19 2 . 
Pythagoras, his visit to India, 
p. 102; theory of Numbers, 
p. 104; doctrine of Transmi- 
gration, p. 1°4; question of 
the dependence of, on Indian 
Philosophy for the idea of 
Transmigration, p. 146; idea 
of Metempsychosis in, with- 
out any explanatory back- 
ground, p. 146; on recollec- 
tion, p. 153. 
Pythagorean description of 
the body as a harp, p. 90. 


Questionnaire, GIrgi's, p. 4. 
Quietism, as an ethical theory, 
p. 29 6 ; the positive side of, 
p. 296; and Self-realisation" 
p. 2g6. 
Quietistic Life, as a recoil from 
the empty world of sense, 
p. 2g6. 
Quintuple existence, the doctrine 
of, p. 16. 


Racial Experience, as trans- 
mitted to the Individual, p. 
Rlhu and the Moon, the ana- 
1<JIY of, p. 351. 


Raikva, the philosophy of, p. 
22J his doctrine of Air as the 
substratum, p. 41; the phi- 
losopher with the car, p. 
78; scratching his itch, p. 78; 
the philosopher of Air, p. 18; 
correspondence of Macrocosm 
and Microcosm, p. 88; doc- 
trine of PriDa as the final 
absorbent, pe 88. 
Raison a8lre, of mystic sound, 
p. 344- 
Rljasa qualities, description of, 
pe 32. 
Rijasa temperament, p. 114; 
cardi"aJ virtue of the, p. 308. 
Rajendralal Mitra, m eanif' g of 
Abhivimlna, p. 136. 
RaJjusarpa, illicit transforma- 
tion, p. 230. 
Rarefaction and Condensation, 
in A".
m enes. p. 19- 
Rlmadlsa : on the Two Paths, 
p. 161. 
Rlmlnuja : on the Elements 
as Deities, p. 75; view of Im- 
mortality, p. 165; the qua- 
lified-monistic school of, p. 
205; and Madhva, partial 
s imjl
ri ty of the views of, p. 
209: view of the Absolute, 
p. 210: and Madhva, differ- 
ence between the views of, 
p. 210: idea of God, p. 210; 
conception of Beatitude, p. 
213; aDd Madh va, difference 
from .&iakara, p. 21 4: his 
objections against the doe.. 
trine of Mlyl, p. 23 1 . 
RlmtJrtha, interpretation of a 
passa.e ., in Maitri. p. 138. 
RafIdI, . lYe JdDda of, p. 35. 


Raptures of Mystic Ecstasy, 
p. 35°. 
Rashdall, Canon: his criticism 
of the theory of Self-realisa- 
tion examined, p. 302. 
Rational Psychology, p. 129. 
Rlthltara, the propounder of 
Truth as the Supreme Vir- 
tue, p. 45. 
Rayi and PriJ}a, Pippalida's 
doctrine of, p. 49; correspon- 
ding to Matter and Spirit, p. 
9 2 . 
Real of Reals, God as the, p.'213. 
Realisation of God, the end of 
mystic life, p. 19 8 . 
Realistic theory of creation, p. 98. 
Reality, as milTored in the 
Individual, p. 141; and Un- 
reality, p. 212; development 
of the consciousness of, p. 
247;' as a cosmo-theo-psycho- 
logical problem, p. 248; and 
Truth, p. 311. 
d absurdum, p. 134. 
Refutation of Idealism, by 
Kant, p. 232. 
Regressive Method, p. 40. 
Reg,essU8 ad infinitum, p. 40. 
Rejoicing, place of, p. 97- 
Religious Consciousness, evo- 
lution of, from objective to 
subjective, p. 2. 
Renunciation, life of l p. 295. 
Representation, theory of, in 
Leibnitz, p. 141. 
Republic of Plato, and the 
Kathopanishad, p. 262. 
Revelation, the meaning of,p. 
8; not any external message, 
but a divine aftlatus from 
within. a result of ibsptratiOD 

through God-intoxication, p. 9; 
Upanishadic view of, p. 10; 
mistaken notion of, p. 178. 
Rhode, Herr: on the ethno- 
psychological origin of the 
idea of Transmigration, p. 146. 
Riddle-Hymn of the 
p. 154. 

igveda, a great hymnology 
to the Forces of Nature, p.2; 
a great work of emotion and 
imagination, p. 4; hymns to 
Varu1]a, p. 4 1 ; mention of 
Vamadeva, p. 49; reference 
to the sage Dadhyach, p.Sl; 
reference to the Madhuvid- 
ya, p. 51; reference to. the 
Nasadlya Sfikta, p. 82; the 
riddle-hymn of the, I. 164, 
as breathing a sceptico-mys- 

 tical atmosphere, P.149; idea 
of transmigration in, pp. 147, 
149; and the Upanishads: 
conception of the Two 
Birds, p. 150; conception of 
Rudra-Siva, p. 193- 
ROth: on the riddle-hymn of 
eda, pp. 149, 151; 
on the idea of Transmigra- 
tion in the I.Ugveda, p. 151. 
Rudra, the only Creator of a1J 
things, p. 1011 identified 
with Siva, or 1M, p. 194. 
dra-Siva, conception of, in 
igveda and the Atha- 
rvaveda, p. 193. 


Sacred books, the Study of, as 
the principal virtue in N Aka 
Maudgalya, p. 310. ". 


Sacrifice, the chief topic of the 
, p. 6; mental, a 
new conception fonnulated 
in the days of the Aral}ya- 
kas, and the Upanishads, p. 
8; conception of, in Pratar- 
dana, p. 115. 
Sacrificer's life, stages of a, 
pp. 201-202. 
Sadabhava, Buddhistic doc- 
trine of, p. 180. 
Sadasadanirvachan Iyatva, In- 
explicability, p. 230. 
Sage, Ideal of the, in Stoicism, 
Christianity, and the Upa- 
nishads, pp. 28 9, 315. 
Saibya Satyakama: his inter- 
est in Mysticism, p. 48. 
St. John and Nachiketas, p. 154. 
Saivism, in the Sveti
p. 29; and Theism, p. 100; 
roots of, in the Upanishads, 
pp. 192-193; Kashmirian, p. 
194; Southern, p. 194. 
Sakalya, the disputant of Ya- 
j fiavalkya, p. 19; Yaj fiaval- 
kya's imprecations on, p. 38; 
his interest in ritualism, p. 
56; and Yijiiavalkya, dia- 
logue between, p. 259. 
Sakayanya, the philosophy of, 
p. 31; and Brihadratha, p. 
63; the teacher of Brfua- 
dratha, pp. IgB,295. 
Samichara, in Gauq.apada, p. 
Samidhi, the highest stage of 
Yoga, p. 188; the state of, 
p. 23°. 
Sambhfiti and Asambhuti tri- 
plets, p. 34; Sam bhuti as 
mea11 i l1 g emaDI.tion, p. gB. 


Siimkhya, and Vedanta, rela- 
tion of, in the Sveta
p. 30; its borrowal of the 
conception of three colours 
from the Upanishads, p.87; 
question as to whether Pu- 
rusha is the origin of things, 
p. 101; borrowal by Neo- 
platonism of the Three Quali- 
ties from, p. 102; roots of, in 
the Upanishads, pp. 182-187; 
in the making, p. 183; fu- 
sion of, with Yoga and Ve- 
danta, p. 185; theistic, in 
the Upanishads, p. 185; the 
locus classicus of I in the 
Upanishads, p. 185; and Ve- 
danta, parting of the ways 
between, p. 186. 
Samnyasa, and Spiritual Realisa- 
tion, relation betwec
1 p. 33 2 . 
Sanatkumira, the teacher of. 
Narada, pp. 23, 88, 114; 
the philosophy of, pp. 52-53; 
on Truth as consisting in the 
attainment of ReaJity, P.313. 
Sanq.ilya, the bon mots of, p. 
22; the philosophy of, pp. 
50-51; his doctrine of Ta.j
jal an, p. 50. 
Sani, Rihu, and Ketu, mention 
of, in the Maitri, p. 3 1 . 
Sankara: on the Elements as 
Deities, p. 75; his interpreta- 
tion of creation out of Not- 
Being, p. Sr; criticism of the 
Naiyyayika theory of the 
Universal, p. 104; his inter- 
pretation of prade
pp. 135-136; his interpretation 
of abhivimana, p. 136; on the 
Ko&is, p. 143; on the relation 


of beatific consciousness to 
Brahman, p. 144; his view 
of Immortality, p. 165; on 
Sadabhava as Buddhistic 
doctrine, p. 180; on the su- 
periority of Knowledge to 
Works, p. 193; the' monis- 
tic school of, p. 205; his con- 
ception of beatitude, p. 213; 
the fundamental propositions 
of the philosophy of, p. 215; 
his view of creation, p. 222; 
his view of Immortality, p. 
223; and .Stinyavada, p.223; 
his elaboration of the theory 
of Miya from the Upani- 
shads, and GaucJa.pada, p. 
228; his criticism of the Sun- 
yavadins, p. 231; his criti- 
cism of the Vijfiinavadins, 
p. 231; on the phenomenal 
reality but noumenal un- 
reality of the world, p. 231; 
charge on, as idealist-nihi- 
list, p. 232. 
Sintl t m 3-D , p. 183. 
Sirira Atman, p. S8. ' 
Sarkarakshya: on Space as the 
substratum, p. 47. 
Sarvajit, the title of the phi- 
losopher KaushItaki, p.26. 
, postulation of 
negation, p. 230. 
&tapatha B rlhma l}S.: on Yij- 
ftavalkya being a pupil of 
Aru,p, p. 23. 
Slttvika temperament, p.II4; 
cardinal virtue of, p. 308. 
Satylgraha, attitude of, P.295. 
Satya, the ultimate concrete 
existeace, born from Water, 
- at. 'I' 

Satyakama Jib ala, the story 
of, p. 22; on the person in 
the eye as constituting Rea- 
lity, p. 250; and Truth, p. 3 11 ; 
on the necessity of finding a 
Guru, p. 330. 
Sat yam, syllabic divi
ion of, 
p. 77. 
Satyavachas Rathltara: on 
the virtue of Truth, p. 310. 
Satyayaj fia, on celestial fire 
as the substratum of things, 
p. 47. 
 Gargya, an abnor- 
mal psychologist, p. 48. 
Sauva Udgltha, an invective 
against the Briihmaxpcal be- 
lief in externalism, p. 22. 
Scandinavian chronicles of 
Heimskringla, p. 24; mytho- 
logy, p. 200; mythology,com 
pared to that of the Upani.. 
shads and the Bhagavadgita, 
p. 201; mythology, and the 
descri ption of the I gdrasil, 
p. 1°3. 
Sceptico-mysticism, of 
da I. 164, p. 149. 
Scholastic superstition, burt- 
ful imprint of, p. 27 6 . 
Schopenhauer, his stress on 
Will, p. 116; quotation from 
liThe World as Will and, 
Idea", pp. 116-117; on moti- 
vation as being the S9tne 
as stimulation or mechani- 
cal process, p. 117; on Will 
as filling the whole world, p. 
111; as the apostle of pessi- 
mism, p. 294. 
Schrader, Dr., his disoovery of 
four deS .U
 p. SI. 


Science, Philosophy, and Re- 
ligion, reconciliation of, pp. 
Scott ud Amundsen, as reach- 
iDg the North Pole at the 
same moment, p. 105. 
Seal, Brajendranath, Dr., re- 
ference to the 'Positive Sci- 
ences' , p. 131. 
Seat of the Soul, the question 
of the, pp. 130-131. 
Self, as a centre of interest, p. 
129; continuance of a blood- 
less, p. 129; immanent in 
the whole body, p. 134; em- 
pirically real, but transcen- 
dentally ide
, p. 221; and 
the Absolute, identity of, p. 
221; as the Utlimate Reality, 
pp. 248,.264; as dream-con.. 
sciousness, p. 266; as deep- 
sleep consciousness, p. 267; 
as mere consciousness of body, 
p. 266; as appearing in his 
own form, p. 268; and the 
Absolute, relation of, p. 275; 
as the supreme light of man, 
p. 275; as both the subject 
and object of knowledge, p. 
275; and God, the unique rela- 
tion of, p. 348. See also Soul. 
Self-consciousness, pure, fourth 
state, p. 139; the concep- 
tion of, as superior to that 
of super-consciousness, .p. 
140; primary reality, accord- 
ing to Descartes, p. 148; 
prior to consciousness of 
God, p. 247= the basis of 
Ultimate Reality, p. 27o;the 
significance pf, p. 270-276; 
to be reached only in mystic 


realisatioD, p. 210; the mystI- 
cal significance of p. 2'fJ. ; 
the metaphysical signifi.cance 
of, p. 271; the epistemological 
significance. of, p. 271; as 
the ultimate category of 
existence, p. 273. 
Self-murderers, going to Ha- 
des, p. 157. 
Self-realisatioD. the bliss of, 
p. 3°1; the meeting-point of 
the ethical and mystical pro- 
cesses, p. 302; as not limited 
to the realisation of the 
U faculties" of man, p. 3 02 ; 
true meaning 
f, p. 302; as 
unfoldment of Atman, p. 302 ; 
and egoism, p. 304; ethical 
and mystical sides of, p. 
304-305; intimations of, p. 
325 ; super-intellectual cha- 
racter of, p. 328; qualifica- 
tions fOf, p. 328; inefficacy 
of any individual effort for, 
p. 330; helpfulness of the 
Spiritual Teacher for, P.33I; 
difficulties in the path of, 
not to be solved by books, 
p. 331; Yoga as a means of, 
p. 336; effects of, on the 
mystic, pp. 347-50. 
Self-spectator, of Aristotle, p. 
Sense-centres, as referred to 
the brain, p. 132. 
Senses, the out-moving ten- 
dency of, p. 329; inefficacy 
of, to realise God, p. 340. 
Seventeen Parts, of the Linga 
Sarlra, p. 184. 
Sex, explanation of the duality 
of, pp. 93-94. 


Shakespeare : Falstaff reborn, p. 
23; reference to the "Two 
Gentlemen," p. 105; descrip- 
tion of love similar to that 
of Kalidasa, p. 105. 
Shavelings, Upanishad ad- 
dressed to, p. 29; and Self- 
realisation, p. 332. 
Sheaths, doctrine of, in the 
Taittir1ya, p. 26; of the Soul, 
pp. 14 1 - 1 42. 
Shelley: Adonais, quotation 
from, p. 166. 
Sin, confession of
 p. 41; the 
"shaking" of, by means of 
Self-realisation, p. 351; enu- 
meration of five kinds of, 
p. 309; the conception of, in 
Manu and Yajiiavalkya, P.3 0 9. 
Sixteen Parts, of the Purusha, 
p. 18 3- 18 4. 
Sleep, a twilight condition, p. 
58; four different theories of, 
pp. 122-126; caused by fati- 
gue, p. 122; by the soul get- 
ting lodgment in the arte- 
ries, p. 123; by the mind 
being merged in Pra
a, p. 
124; by the mind being unit- 
ed with the True, p. 12 5; 
compared with death, p.I22; 
compared with ecstasy, p. 
125; in Nyaya philosophy, 
due to the motion of the 
Mind to the Puritat, p. 191. 
Sleeping conseiousness 
Ultimate Reality, p. 25 2 . 
Slough of a snake, the image of 
the, p. 156. 
Small Happiness, consisting in 
the obtainme.nt of ordinary 
ends, p. 305. 

Snowless region, pp. 158-159. 
Society, and the Moral Law, p. 
Socrates: on the non-accept- 
ance of fees, p. .20. 
Soham Atma, doctrine of, p. 
53; realisation of, p. 305. 
Soliloquy, method of, p. 38; 
Yiijiiavalkya's p. 39; Ya- 
ma s, p. 39. 
Solipsism, Yijfiavalkya's, p. 
57: and Absolutism, p. 218. 
Solipsistic Solitude, of the Mys- 
tic, p. 352. 
Soma libation, pouring of, p. 
Song of Universal Unity, p. 
Sophistic view of Wisdom, 
Yijfiavalkya's, p. 20. 
Sorites of categories, in Sanat- 
kumara, p. 52. 
Soul, endowed with the power 
of motion, p. 133; as the 
the mover of the body, p. 
133; Jain doctrine of, p. 134; 
history of the spatial exten- 
sion of, pp. 134-137; both 
infinitely large and infinite- 
ly small, pp. 137- 139; as 
transcending all spatial li- 
mitations, p. 139; movement 
of, at the time of death, p. 
155; as a creative entity, p. 
156; compared to a Phoe- 
nix, p. 156; ascent or decent 
of, based on a moral founda- 
tion, p. 161; the denial of, in 
Buddhism, p. 180; Indivi- 
dual and Universal, relation 
of, in the dualistic system, p. 
207.; original benishtment of, 

GX R'D&:r hfDEX 
p. 332; later illumination of
p. 332. See also Self. 
Sound. seven different kinds 
. of, p. 33; mystical, not the 
result of ,the process of di- 
gestion, p. 344. 
Space, as the origin of all- 
things in Pravihal}a Jaivali, 
pp. 80-81; as the highest rea- 
lity, p.81 ; in Philolaos,p. 103. 
Spencer, on racial and indivi- 
dual experience, p. 143. 
Sphota, MImansaka doctrine 
of, p. 105. 
Spinoza: his ironical compari- 
son of God and Dog, p. 125; 
"Attributes" of, p. 227; on 
God as the Primary Reality, 
p. 248. 
Spiritual Development, analogi- 
cal to psychological, p. 288. 
Spiritual Experience, ladder 
of, p. 276; first stage of, as 
mystical apprehension of the 
glory of the Self, p. 216; se- 
cond stage, wherein is per- 
ceived the identity of the 
'1' \vith the Self, P.277; third 
stage, identity of the Se1f 
with the Absolute, p. 277; 
fourth stage, identification 
of the fI' with the Absolute, 
as well as the 'Thou' with 
the Absolute. p. 278; fifth 
stage, experience of Brah- 
man as the An. p. a78. 
Spiritual Pilgrimage, and the 
Mystics, p. 278. 
. Spiritual Plane, p. 142. 
Spiritual Teacher, necessity of 
a. p. 329; qualifications of a, 
p. 33°. 


Spiritual Wisdom, precautions 
for imparting, in the Upani- 
sha f1 s and the Bhagavadglti, 
p. 332. 
State, and the Moral Law, p. 
States of Consciousness, the 
four, pp. 139-14°. 
Stoicism and Logos, p. 104; and 
the Ideal of the Sage, P.3I5. 
StutaAastras, hymns of praise, 
p.. 201. 
Subject-Object relation, p. 352. 
Subjective Modification, p. 230. 
Subjectivity of sense-percep- 
tion, p. 30. 
Sublimity, in Nature, p. 43; 
Transcendental, p. 43; Sub- 
jective, p. 43. 
Sub Specie Aetcrnitatis, 
Sankara, p. 215. 
Substance, from the Cosmolo- 
gical point of view, p. 54. 
Substratum, a scientific search 
of, in the Upanishads, p. 3; 
search after the, p. 74; va- 
rious conceptions of, pp. 76- 
9 2 . 
Suddhldvaita interpretation of 
the Brahma-sutras, p. 205. 
Sudhanvan, becoming a spirit, 
p. 128. 
&dras and Scriptures, p. 33. 
Suka and Self-realisation, p. 
in Bhiradvija, interested 
in the metaphysics of psy- 
chology, p. 48. 
Suktikirajata, illicit transfor- 
mation, p. 230. 
Summum Bonum, conception 
of, p. 190; the moral good 


SwaraJya, the true meaning 
of, p. 305. 
Sympathetic nerves, p. I33. 
Symposium, in King JaDI." 
ka's court, p. 38. 
Synthesis, logical, idea of, p. 
24; of D na 115m and Qua.. 
lified Monism In Monism, p. 
21 5. 
Synthetic Method, p. 38. 


as, p. 299; as consisting In 
mystical realisation, p. 305. 
Sun, as a great Bee-hive bani- 
ing in space, p. 22; the binh 
of, from the Universal Eg, 
p. 83. 

yavida, Sankara's crItI- 
cism of, pp. 223, 231. 
Superconscious state of con- 
sciousness, a solecism, p. 139; 
conception of the, in 
psychology, p. 14<>. 
Superimposition, doctrine of, 
p. 230. 
Supermoralism, European and 
Indian, p. 306; of Nietz- 
sche, as affecting the super- 
man, p. 306; of Bradley, as 
affecting the Absolute, p. 
306; of the Upanishads, as 
the ethical counterpart of 
Absolutism in Metaphysics, 
p. 306. 
Sushumna, p. 33. 

ushkabhriitgira, p. 26; his 
philologico-philosophical con- 
tribution, p. 46. 
Svabhava, or Nature, p. 185. 
Svapiti, as Svamapltobhavati, 
p. 3 6 . 
Svapnika view, p. 232. 
Svetaketu, Aruni's instroction 
to, p. 54; and ]aivali, dis- 
course between, pp. 120-121; 
his request for the final in- 
struction, p. 216. 
vatara: revelation of the 
Upanisbad to the Sage of 
the name, p. II; a sum- 
mary of, pp. 29-30; author 
of the Upanishad of that 
l1aQ1e, p. 45. 


Tabula '-asa, p. 276. 
Taijasa, the second foot of 
Atman, p. 35; the second 
state of (dream) conscious- 
ness, pp. 139-140; the dream 
aspect of soul, p. 335. 
Taittirlyopanishad, a summary 
of, p. 26. 
Tajjalln, reality described as, 
p. 34; search after the, p. 73; 
the aypnc funnwa of the 
Chhlndogya, p. 253. 
Timasa qualities, full descrip- 
tion of, p. 32; temperament, 
p. 114: temperament, car- 
dinal virtue of, p. 308. 
Tlnrie books, recognition of 
the cerebro-spinal system,p. 
I3 I . 
Taponitya Paum8ishti: on the 
virtue of Penance, p. 3Io. 
Tartarus in Plato, p. 162. 
Tejobannltmikl Pralqiti, p. 
Tennyson:'In Memoriam' quo- 
tation from, p. 166. 
Tests, for the chronological ar- 
rangement of the Upani- 
shads, pp. 13"16. 



Thales, pp. 64,73 ; Water as the 
 of things, pp. 76-77; 
theory of Water, p. 103; story 
of the visit of, to India, p. 102. 
Thaumaturgy of Thought, P.129. 
Theism, and Creation, p. 75, 
99; Saivite, p. 100; and 
the Godhead, p. 185. 
Theogony of Hesiod: search 
after the Ultimate Cause, p. 
Theological, Approach, p. 247; 
categories, regress from, pp. 
251-252; categories, as sub- 
servient to psychological, 
pp. 259,261. 
Theonomy. a sort of heterono- 
my, p. 290. 
Theopathy, as supplying rules 
of moral conduct, p. 291. 
Theophobia, as supplying rules 
of moral conduct, p. 291. 
Theoria, of the gods, p. 42; io 
Aristotle, p. 275. 
Theosophists, modem, their 
emphasis on the Bodies of 
Man, pp. 141-142; on the 
"etheric double," p.. 26g. 
Thirteen Upanishads, their 
classification, p. 16. 
This and That, p. 212. 
Thought-power) pp. 128-129. 
Thread, and Thread-puller 
or T h rea d-C 0 n t roIl e r , 
Yajnavalkya's doctrine of, pp. 
57, 211. 
Three Births, doctrine of, pp. 
49-50. - . 
Three Meditations , doctrine of, 
p. 45. 
ThWlderDolt, God com
to a. tt. "t.. - : 

Time, not the origin of things, 
p. 100 ; of Time, p. 100. 
Torch-bearers, and the Spiri- 
tual Pilgrimage, p. 27 8 . 
Transcendence of God, p. 261. 
Transfigurated Personality of 
Krishl}3., p. 197. 
Transmigration, development 
of the idea of, as a basis 
for the chronology of the 
Upanishads, p. 15; a delu- 
sion, p. 59; Pythagorean and 
Indian, p. 104; problem of, 
the crux of early Indian 
thought, p. 145; idea of, 
Aryan or Aniryan? p. 146; 
ethno-psychologica1 origin of 
the idea of, p. 146; in 
I.Ugveda, Xth MaWaJa" p. 
147; in 
 i g v e d a ,1st 
MaWaJa" p. 149 ; three 
stages of the develop- 
ment of the idea of, in the 

eda, p. 152; origin of the 
idea of, explained on the 
principles of Ethnic Psycho- 
logy, P.I52; idea of, not un- 
Aryan, P.152; in the Katha, 
p. 153; in the Brihadaral}yaka 
p. 154; locus classicus of, 
in the Upanishads, p. 154. 
Tree, of the Body, p. 351; of 
the World, p. 351. 
Trinitarian Monism, p. 87; Sai. 
vite, pp. 29,194. 
Trltai1ku, his post-illumination- 
at discourse, p. II ; the mys- 
tical utterances of, p. 26; 
a mystical philosopher, p. 45; 
grandeur of his ideas, p. 351. 
Triune Unity, realisation of, 
p. 505. 


, Aruni's doc- 
trine of, pp. 54, 104; its rela- 
tion to Paftch lkaral}8., p. 86. 
Truth, as veiled by a vessel of 
gold, p. 225; and Law, as 
on a par with Happiness 
and Prosperity, p. 299; ,'the 
principal virtue, with 
Satyavachas Rithttara p. 
310: as counterpart of 
Reality, p. 311; and Sat- 
yakima Jlbila; p. 311; Lord 
Curzon on the absence of 
the supremacy of, in Indian 
Scriptures, p. 31 I; and. the 
sage Bhiradvaja, p. 312; as 
saving a man from death, 
p. 312; the ultimate victory 
of, p. 312; belief in the 
power of, p. 312; God as the 
repository of, p. 312 ; as the 
moral correlate of the reali- 
sation of the Absolute, p. 
313; popular and philoso- 
phical, p. 313; the rea1isation 
of, as consisting in the rea- 
lisation of the Ultimate, p. 
313; contrast of the ideas 
of Pilate and Sanatkumira 
about, p. 313. 
Tukirlma, as the Spectator 
of Saka's rea1isatiOl1, p. 351. 
Tu quoque argument, p. 38. 
Turlya, doctrine of, p. I0.5; 
the self-spectacuIar state, p. 
 fourth dimeDSion 
of psychology, p. 336. 
Tvasht.ri, the three-headed son 
of, p. a7. 
Two Birds,: the conception of, 
-in tI1.e 
eda and the Upa- 
_ads. p. 149. 

Two Gentlenlen, Shak espea- 
rean description of love in, 
p. lOS. 
Two Souls, development of 
the idea of, p. 14. 


V, as Utkarsha or Ubbayat- 
va, p. 36. 
Uddilaka, his vie\,' of the 
earth as the substratum of 
all things, p. 47; and psy- 
l reaearch, p. 49; in- 
terested in the problem of 
immanence, p. 56 ;-Aru
and Yajiiavalkya, dialogue 
between, p. 210. 
Ultimate Reality, problem of, 
in the Upanishads, p. 24 6 ; 
various views about, p. 263; 
psychological doctrines ab- 
out, p. s63; not identical 
with bodily consciousness, 
p. 265; not identical with 
dream-conscioumess, p. 265; 
not identical with deep- 
sleep consciousness, p. 265; 
identical with .Self-conscious- 
ness, p. ,265; as the serene 
Being who .appears in his 
own form, p. 268; 0l!-tologi- 
caJ characterisation of, p. 269. 
Umi, a heavenly damsel, p. 
Unattachment, weapon of, p. 
Unitive Experience, p. 352: 
- Life, appropriate metaphor 
to express the nature of, p. 
334; Song, the c WlT'
of the, p. 352. 



Universal Egg, the myth of a, 
p. 83. 
Unknowable, God and Self as, 
according to Kant, p. 271; 
in the Upanishads, Augus- 
tine, and Spencer, p. 272. 
Unmanifest bodies, p. 143. 
Unreality, encircled by Reali- 
ty, p. 77. 
Upadana-paiichamI, p. 209. 
Upakosala, the story of, p. 22; 
and his teacher Jab ala, p. 
Upalambha, in Gauq.apada, p. 
Upanishadic view of Revela- 
tion, p. 10; period, the up- 
per and the lo\\:er limits of, 
p. 18; philosophy, the nle- 
thods of, p. 34; philosophy, 
the problems of, p. 63. 
Upanishads, and the 
p. 2; and the Atharvaveda, 
p. 4; and the Brahma1}CLS, 
p. 6; the older batch, 
p. 13; four newly discovered, 
p. 12; newer batch, p. 12; 
chronological arrangement 
of, pp. 12-18; groups of the, 
p. 16; poetry of the, p. 40; 
classification of the philo- 
sophers of the, pp. 44-59; 
the Berecynthia of the sys- 
tems of Indian Philosophy, 
p. 17 8 ; relation of the, to 
the Brahma-sutras. p. 205; 
core of the teaching of, 
p. 24Q- 
Upasadas, the name of certain 
ceremonies in a sacrifice, p. 
Upisana, mention of, p. r9B. 

Ushasta, interested in Ulti- 
mate Reality, p. 56. 
UttaramImansa : superiority 
of Knowledge to Works, 
p. 192. 
Uvula, as the nipple-like ap- 
pearance, p. 132. 


VaiSeshika : enumeration of 
Dravyas, p. 191; catalogue 
of tHtimate Existences in, 
p. 19 2 . 
Vaisvanara, the first foot of 
Atman, p. 35; who is prade- 
Samatra and abhivimana, p. 
47; the first state of (wak- 
ing) consciousness, p. 139; 
the wakeful aspect of Soul, 
'Tak, and the Logos, p. 104- 
Valakhilyas: their question re- 
garding the Mover of the 
Body, p. 133. 
Van1adeva: his philosophy of 
Three Births, p. 25; curious 
personality of, p. 49; expla- 
nation of his doctrine of 
Three Births, PP .49-5°; ut- 
terances of, as suggestive of 
the idea of Reminiscence, p. 
153; his mystic ejaculations, 
pp. 35 0 -35 I . 
Vamana.. the dwarf God or 
beautiful God, seated bet- 
ween the upper and lower 
breaths, p. 337. 
Vandhyaputra, postulation of 
negation, p. 230. 
Varivarti, as implying fre- 
quency of return, p. 152. 


, hymns to, compared 
with the devotional psalms 
of the Bible, p. 4; hymn to, 

eda VII. 88, p. 4 1 . 
Vasudeva, the father of Krish- 
I}a in the Mabibhirata, p. 
Vedlnuvachana, meaning of, 
Vedlnta, monistic, qualified 
monistic, and dualistic, 
p. 205; philosophy, funda.. 
mental conceptions of, p.206. 
Vedanta-siitras: more frequent 
reference to Chhlndogya 
than to Brihadaral}yaka, p. 
Vedinta, later: four states of 
the Cosmic Self in, p. 140. 
Vedlntins: their view that the 
Vedas are "Apaurusheya" in 
the sense of being inspired 
by God, p. 10. 
Vedintists, ultra-, on the su- 
periority of knowledge, p. 
Vedic Hymns, to call back the 
departed soul, p. 148. 
Vedic prayer, spirit of, p. 299. 
Veil, conception of a, p. 225. 
Ventricle, p. 133. 
Verity of Verities, AtJJ1an as 
the, p. 212. 
Vij ftIna, p. 181. 
Vij6loav Kt1jps , the metaphysics 
and espistemology of, p.ISI; 
&nJwa's criticism of, p. 
83 1 . 
V.naUum Subse.ntUJle, p. 51. 
Virij, as intermediary bet- 
ween the Atrn9J1 and the 
World, p. 15; as the w ild". 

state of the Cosmic Self, p. 
14°. and Indra, the myth 
of, p. 265. 
Virtues, in the Chhindogya and 
Bhagavadgitl compared, p. 
2°4; enumeration of, in the 
Upanishads, pp. 3 0 7-3 12 . 
Vigish*ldvaita school of phi- 
losophy, pp. 179, 206; roots 
of, in the Upanishads, pp. 
2°9- 21 4. 
u and Niriyat}a, identi- 
fication of, p. 203. 
Vision and Audition, as mysti- 
cal experiences, p. 342. 
ViAvariipa, roots of the con- 
ception of, p. 197- 
Vivekinanda, Swami, his idea 
of the superconscious, P.I39. 
Void, the existence of a, p.I80. 
VolWltarism: its quarrel with 
Intellectualism, p. 116. 
Vyivahirika view of Reality, 
pp. 215,231. 


Wallace, discovery of Natural 
Selection, p. 105. 
War of the Senses, story of the, 
p. 14- 
Ward, James, Professor, on a 
psychology ohtJe Seek, p. 129. 
Water, as the source of aU 
tbings, fp. '16-77; in the 
Genesis, p. 77; the first exis- 
tence in Manu, p. 77.'( 
Way Up and Way Down, pp. 
80,98. l 0 4. 
Way of the Gods, in 
and the Upanishads, p. 159. 



Way of the Fathers, in 
and the Upanishads, p. ISg. 
Weariness of the flesh, p- 196. 
White Mountains, p. 43. 
Will, as ding-an-sich, p. 116: 
its relation to Intellect, p. 
117; the claim for the pri- 
macy of, pp. 116- 11 7. 
Woman, her position in 
Upanishadic times, p.. 61: 
the origin of, p. 94- 
Wonder, as the root of all phi- 
losophy in Plato, 63. 
Word, and Non-word, p. 32. 
Wordsworth and Byron, poe- 
tries of, p. 25 1 . 
Works and Knowledge, syn- 
thesis of, p. 192: reconcilia- 
tion of, in Kum1ri1a, p. 193. 
Works, superiority of, to 
knowledge in Prabhikara, 
p. 193. 
World, as a grand Purgatory, 
p. I63;-Person, intennediate 
between .A.tman and the 
world, p. 95; as the In- 
dividual writ large, p. I4 I . 


Xenophanes, description of 
God as all-Eye and all-Ear, 
p. 208. 
Xenophon, on the choice of 
Hercules, p. 293- 


YIJftavalkya, full description 
of the character of, pp. 19- 
20 : his disputation with 
kkal ya, p. 19; his bip- 

my, p. 19; the oot-standing 
Philosopher of the Brih- 
ad ira l]Yaka, p 23: his me- 
taphors of the drum, the 
conch, and the lute, p. 37; 
a synthetical philosopher, p. 
38; his doctrine of the Light 
of man, p. 40: and GIrgi: 
on the doctrine of Final Sup- 
port, 40: and his adversaries. 
p. 56; philosophy of, pp. 55- 
59; a great psycho-metaphy- 
sician, p. 55; his doctrine of 
Atman, pp. 56-57; his argu- 
ment from order, p. 57; his 
negative theology, p. 57; his 
doctrine of Karman, p. 58; 
his absolute ide aJi
p. 59: on the nature of Kar- 
man, p. ISI; and Uddllaka 
Aruni: doctrine of the An- 
taryimin, p. 210; and Jana- 
lea, dialogue between, P. 26 3; 
on Self-consciousness, P.273: 
and Janaka, interpretation 
of the doctrine of the Light 
of man, p. 274: and Aristo- 
tle, p. 275; his eudaemonism, 
p. 299; and the partition of 
his estate, p. 3°3; and the 
doctrine of Self-realisatioD, 
p. 303 :-Smriti, on the five 
kinds of sin, p. 309. 
Yama : his philosophical 
monologue, p. 39: and 
Nachiketas, dialogue be- 
tween, pp. 121-122; the world 
of, as described in the 
veda, p. 141. 
Yama, as the preliminary of 
y., p. 188. 


Yatovi, interpretation of, aC- 
cording to &itkara, Madhva 
and Ram anuj a., p. 209. 
Yoga, on recollection, p. 153; 
nlentioned along with sam- 
khya, p. 182; locus classicus 
of, p. 187; doctrine of Self- 
spectator, p. 188; eight-fold 
scheme of, p. 189; as the 
Way to Spiritual Realisa- 

tion, p. 189; the physiologi- 
cal basis of, p. 189; roots of. 
in the Upanishads, pp. 1 8 7- 
190 ;-sutras, deism in, p. 
18 9; as precursor of physio- 
logy and medicine, p. 190; 
conditions of the practice of, 
33 8 ; physiological effects of, 
pp. 188, 338 ; spiritual effects 
of, pp. 339, 347. 


. . 

I. 2. 1-2. On Death as the pri- 
mary existent, p. 82. 
I. 2. 4"5. The Vedas as pro- 
duced by the God of Death 
from his wife Speech, p. 12. 
I. 3. 28. Maya conceived as Not- 
Being, Darkness, and Death, 
pp. 225- 226 . 
I. 4. 1-4. Generation from At- 
man of the duality of sex, 
pp. 93-94. 
I. 4. 2. Fear proceeds 0 n I y 
from a Second, p. 115. 
I. 4. 7. The immanent God 
still unseen, p. 261. 
I. 4. 8. The Atman as the 
highest object of desire and 
love, p. 302. 
I. 4. 10. The worshipper of the 
Deity as separate from hin1- 
self is the beast of the gods, 
p. 222. 
I. 4- 10. On the intro j e c t e d 
identity of the I and the 
Brahman J p. 277 · 
I. 4. 10. Vamadeva's ejacula- 
tion that he lived in the 
Manu and the Sun, p. 35. 
I. 4. II. On the relation of 
Brahmins and Kshatriyas, 
pp. 61-62. 
I. 4- 11-15. An unorthodox 
Theory about the origin of 
castes, PP. 59- 60 . 

I. 4. 17. The doctrine of Quin- 
tuple Existence, p. 16. 

II. I. 1-15. The Sleeping Con- 
sciousness as the Ultimate 
Reality, pp. 251-252. 
II. I. IS. On the superiority of 
the Brahmins to the Ksha- 
triyas, p. 62. 
II. I. 15-17. Sleep occurs when 
the Soul rests in the space 
inside the heart, p. 125. 
II. I. 19. Sleep caused by the 
Soul's lodgment in the Pu- 
ritat, p. 124. 
II. I. 19. In sleep, the Soul 
moves by the Rita Naqls 
to the Puritat, p. 191. 
II. I. 20. All things spring like 
sparks from the Supreme 
Soul, pp. 212-213. 
II. 3. r-6. God as the Verity 
of Verities, p. 213. 
II. 3. 6. Attempt at a posi- 
tive interpretation of ,. NeU 
Neti," p. 321. 
II. 3.6, Description of photic 
and morphic experiences, 
p. 343. 
II. 4. 2-5. Everything is dear 
for the sake of Atma ft 
p. 303. 
11.4.5. On the mystical viIiaa 
of the Self, p. 176. 


II. 4. 6-9. The grasping of all 

gs by the grasping of 
Atman, p. 217. 
II. 4. 10. On the Vedas and 
Sciences having been breathed 
forth by the great Primal 
Being, p. 10. 
II. 4. 13, 14. It is not possible 
to know the Knower, p. 217. 
II. 4. 14. Maya as semblance an 
as-it-were, an appearance, p. 227. 
II. 4. 14. It is impossible to 
know the Knower, p. 273. 
II. 5. 15. All things centred in 
the Supreme Soul, p. 212. 
II. 5. 18. On the etymology of 
, purusha,' p. 36. 
II. 5. 19. Maya as the power 
of God I p. 226. 
11._5. 19. On the identity of 
Atman with B ra n lT'9 n , p. 277. 

III. 2. 13. The nature and sig- 
nificance of Karman, p. 181. 
III. 3. I. On the possession 
of Patafichala's daughter by 
an aerial spirit, p. 128. 
III. 4. 2. The impossibility of 
mowing the Knower, p. 273. 
III. 5. I. The spiritual life, a 
life of child-like simplicity, 
p. 2g6. 
III. 6. I. On the regressus ad 
infinitum in Girgi's ques- 
tionnaire, p. 40. 
III. 7. The famous Doctrine of 
the Antaryimin, p. 211. 
III. 7. 23. The Self as the Ul- 
timate Seer, Hearer, aDd 
Thinker, p. 273. 
III. 8. 2. The two missiles of 
Gill!, p. 61. 

III. 8. 8. Negative cbaracter- 
isation of the Absolute, 
p. 220. 
III. 8. 9. Poetical description 
of the Order in the Universe, 
p. 43. 
III. 8. 9. A physico-theological 
proof for the existence of 
Brahman, p. 258. 
III. 9. I-lO. The absolute unity 
of the Godhead, p. 259. 
III. 9. 26. The negative mea- 
ning of "Neti Neti," p.220. 
III. 9. 28. Appeal to the tran- 
smundane problem of the 
persistence of the Self after 
bodily death, p. 64. 
III. 9. 28. On the question about 
the root of human life, p.lto. 

IV. I. I. Yijiiavalkya's de- 
sire for both cows and 
controversy. p. 299. 
IV. Y. 2-7. The various tenta- 
tive views about the nature 
of Ultimate Reality, p.263- 
IV. I. 7. One should not take 
away money without im- 
parting instruction, p. 300. 
IV. 2. 4. On the superiority of 
the Brahmins to the Ksha. 
triyas, p. 63. 
IV. 2.4. The negative meaD- 
Ding of "Neti Nea," p. 220. 
IV. 3. 
-6. Se1f-coDSCiOUSDel 
the ultimate category of 
existence, pp. 214--275. 
IV. 3. 9- 18 . Dream as a twi- 
light state of c0DSCi011lDell 
p. 126. 
IV. 3- 19. The Fa. theory 
of Sleep, p. III. 


IV. 3. 20. A description of the 
blood-vessels of various co. 
lours, PP.189-190. 
IV. 3. 21. Rea1isation of the 
Self involves the fulfilment 
of all desires, p. 303. 
IV. 3. 21. The erotic analogy 
for the experience of the 
happiness of God, p. 348. 
IV. 3. 23-3 1 . The Seer sees and 
yet does not see, p. 218. 
IV. 3. 37-38. The welcome and 
send-off of the Soul by the 
Elements, pp. 154-155. 
IV. 4. 1-2. Description of the 
passing Self, p. 155. 
IV. 4. 3-5. The Self throws off 
this body, and takes on a new 
one, according to his Kar- 
man.. pp. 155- 1 5 6 . 
IV. 4. 5. A transcendental des- 
cription of the Absolute, 
p. 221. 
IV. 4. 5. Man as a conglome- 
ration of desire, will, and 
actioD, p. 313. _ 
IV. 4. 6. Desire for Atman is 
desirelessness, p. 3°3. 
IV. 4. 6-7. A man without de- 
sire obtains Brahman, and 
becomes immortal, p. 15 6 . 
IV. 4. 6-7. The Body, called the 
slough of the Soul, p. 223. 
IV. 4. to. The worshippers of 
false knowledge enter into 
pitchy darkness after their 
death, p. 157. 
IV. 4. II. The ignorant go to 
joyless regions after death, 
p. 151. 
IV. 4. 12. On the identity of 
the I and the Atman, p. 277. 


IV. 4. 12. Cessation of feve- 
rish activity after the rea- 
lisation of God, p. 347. 
IV. 4. 21. Too n1any words, a 
weariness of flesh, p. 296. 
IV. 4. 22. One disgusted with 
the world should take to 
the life of a mendicant, p.IS1. 
IV. 4. 22. The negative mean- 
ing of "Neti 
eti," p. 220. 
IV. 4. 22. A contempt for 
wealth, progeny, and fame 
in the interest of spiritual 
realisation, p. 295. 
IV. 4. 22. 'The Atlnan grows 
ncither great by good ac- 
tions, nor small by evil ac- 
tions, pp. 306-3°7. 
IV. 4. 23. A real Brah
in is 
he who sees the Atman 
everywhere, p. 297. 
IV. 4. 23. The \vise sage gro\\'s 
neither great by good ac- 
tions, nor small by evil ac- 
tions, p · 307 · 
IV. 5. 15. The negative mean- 
ing of "Neti Neti,"pp.22o-22Ii 

V. 2. 1-3. Self-control, Charity, 
and Compassion as the 
cardinal virtues, p. 308. 
V. 5. I. On \Vater as the pri- 
mal existent, pp. 7 6 , 77. 
V. 5. I. On the cryptical mean- 
ing of the three syllables of 
, Sat yam " p. 77. 
V.6. I. The Soul, as small 
as a grain of rice or barley, 
pp. 135- 13 6 . 
V. 9. I. Description of the 
Internal Sound, p. 343. 
v. 10. I. Ascent oi the de- 


parted Soul to the snowless, 
sorrowless region through 
the wind, the sun, and the 
moon, p. 158. 
V. 14. 8. On the dignity of cs- 

chatological knowledge, p. 64. 

'71. 2. 5-7. On the superiority 
of the J{shatriyas to the 
Brahmins, p. 62. 


I. I. 10. Maya as Ignorrance, 
p. 225. 
I. 2. 8. The Saint as an im- 
penetrable rock, p. 316. 
I. 3. 3. Speech involve's sus- 
pension of breath, p. 114. 
I. 3. 5. Voluntary action in- 
volves suspension of breath, 
pp. 114- 11 5. 
I. 3. 12. Fulfilment of aU de- 
sires after God-realisation, 
p. 350. 
I. 5. 1.3. The Sun verily sings 
Om, p. 335. 
I. 6. 6. The golden-coloured 
Being seen on the Sun, p. 345. 
I. 9. I. On Space as the final 
habitat of all things, p. 81. 
I. II. 5. On PraI}3. as the Ulti- 
mate substratum, pp. 87-88 

II. 20. 2. Man lifted up to the 
region of the Deity he wor- 
sbips during life, p. 165. 
II. 20. 2. Madhva's conception 
of Immortality, p. 209. 
II. 23. I. Reference to the four 
different Mramas, p. 60. 
11. 23. 3. All speech as per- 
meated by Om, p. 334. 

III. I-II. The intermundane 
region described as a bee- 
hive p. 42. 

III. II. 2-3. I'he aspIrIng mys- 
. tic experiences Eternal Day I 
p. 345. 
III. II. 5-6. Mystic Knowledge 
Inore valuable than the 

=arth full of treasure, p. 333. 
III. 13. Light or Sound within 
l11an as the Ultiluate Rea- 
lity J pp. 250- 2 5 1 . 
Ill. 13. 8. Description of the 
Illt<:rnal Sound as of the 
roaring of an ox, or the peal 
of a thunder, p. 344. 
III. 14. I. 'The Absolute as 
'fajjalan, p. 73. 
III. 14. 1. Cosmological defini- 
tion of the Ultin1ate Reality 
p. 253. 
III. 14. I. On the vision of the 
Brahman as the All, p. 27 8 
III. 14.3. The Soul as smaller 
than a mustard seed, and as 
greater than the sky, pp. 
13 8 - 1 39. 
III. 14. 4. " I shall reach Brah- 
man after throwing off the 
bodily coil," pp. 221-222. 
III. IS. I. The Universe con.. 
ceived as a huge chest, p.B4. 
III. 16. Mahidasa Ai tareya ,and 
the question of the prolonga- 
tion of life, p. 45. 
111.17. 1-6. K,"ish
 a,nd Ghora 
Al}girasa, p. 202. 


III. 17. 4. The list of virtues 
according to (;hora A1)gira- 
sa, p. 309. 
III. 18. I. Meditation upon 
mind as the lTItimate Rea- 
lity, p. 292. 
III. 19. 1-3. The nlyth of the 
Universal Egg, p. 83. 
III. 19. 4. Meditation on the 
Sun as Brahman, p. 128 

IV. 3. 1-2. On l\ir as the final 
absorbent of all things, 
PP.7 8 -79. 
IV. 3. 3. On Pral)a as the tinal 
absorbent, p. t'8. 
IV. 3. 4. On .
ir and IJral)a as 
the absorLcnts in the 111 a- 
ctocosrn, and 111icrocOSt11, p.SS. 
IV. 4. 1-5. '[ruth a
virtue, illustrated by the 
story of Satyakama, pp. 311- 
IV. 5.3. Meditation on Brah- 
man as resplendence, p. 128. 
IV. g. 3. Necessity of a Spiri- 
tual Teacher, p. 330. 
IV. 10.15. 1"he image reflect- 
ed in the human eye as the 
Ultimate Reality, pp. 249-25°. 
IV. 14. 3. Sin does not touch 
a Saint, p. 3 16 . 
IV. 15. 5-6. Final ascent of the 
Soul by the path of light, 
p. 160. 

v. I. 6-15. On the controver- 
sy between Pral)a and the 
Organs of Sense, pp. 88-90. 
v. 3. 1-4. I{no\\'ledge incon1- 
plete without eschatological 
knowledge, pp. 120-121. 


V. 3. 7. On the supcliority of 
the Kshatriyas to the Brah- 
mins, p. 62. 
V. 10. 1-5. The path of the 
Gods and the path uf the 
Fathers, p. 196. 
V. 10. 1-6. Ascent and descent 
of the departed Soul by the 
path of Darkness, pp. 160-161. 
V. 10. 7. 'fhe quality of cha- 
racter as determining tile 
nature of rebirth, p. 162. 
V. 10. 8. l'he fatE of cr
10\\' in the scale of evolution, 
p. 162. 
V. 10. 9. 'The fiyc cardinal sins, 
p. 309. 
'.t. 18. 1. The 5< \ul is uf the 
Ineasure of a span, p. IJ5. 
\l. 19- 2 4. On the 11111('r Sacri- 
fice, p. S. 

VI. I. 2-7. Brahlllan alone is 
real, everything else is a 
modification and a name, 
p. 216. 
VI. I. 4. 1\1aya as a \\:ord, a 
mode, and a name, p. 227. 
VI. 2. I. "Being" born fron1 
"Non-Being," p. 180. 
VI. 2. 1-4. "Being" as the 
source of Fire. \rater a 11 d 
Earth. p. 85. 
'V'1. 3.2. 3. On tIlt.' tripartition 
each of Fire, \Vater, and 
Earth, p. 85. 
VI. 4. I. The three Gu
Samkhya philosophy adum- 
brated in the description of 
the Three Colours, p. 182. 
VI. 4. 1-4. The doctrine of 
J( pp. 85--86. 


VI. 4. 5. On the Sages of old 
having learnt spiritual wis- 
dom from their Masters, 
pp. 11-12. 
VI. 5. I. The subtle part of 
food as forming the mind, 
p. 114. 
VI. 5.4. Mind as manufactured 
out of food J p. 113. 
VI. 6. 1-2. 
rhe subtle part of 
food is transformed into 
mind, p. 114. 
VI. 7- I. On a fasting-philoso- 
phy, p. 45. 
VI. 8. I. In sleep, man is unit- 
cd with the Real, p.. 125. 
VI. 8. I, 2. Sleep occurs when 
the mind settles down on 
breath, p. 124. 
VI. 8. 1-3. On the etymology 
of 'svapiti', 4asisishati' and 
'pipasati,' p. 36. 
VI. 8. 4. On Fire as the first 
evolute from the Primal Be- 
ing, p. 79. 
VI. 8. 7. Identity of Self and 
Brahman, p. 222. 
VI. 8. 7. On the projected 
identity of the Thou and 
tbe Brahman, p. 278. 
VI. 9. 3. The perpetual round 
of births and deaths for low 
creatures, p. 162. 
VI. 9-10. Doctrine of Imper- 
sonal Immortality, p. 165. 
VI. 12. God as the subtle es- 
sence underlying all things, 
pp. 256-257. 
VI. 13. 1-3. God as the Salt of 
life, pp. 261-262. 
"I. 14. 1-2. The story of the 
man from Gindhira, p. 33 1 . 

VI. 16. 1-2. The efficacy of the 
heated axe for the moral or- 
deal, p. 312. 

VII. I. Niirada's request for 
initiation, p. 198. 
VII. I. 2-3. The ocean of grief 
can be crossed only by the 
knowledge of Atman, P._327. 
VII. 3. I. Mind as the Atman 
in us, and as the Ultimate 
Reality, p. 292. 
VII. 4. 2. On the primacy of 
the Will over the Intellect, 
p. 116. 
VII. 5. I. On the primacy of 
the Intellect over the Win, 
pp. 117- 118 . 
\''11.. II. 2. Meditation on Brah- 
man as lustrous, p. 128. 
VII. 12. I. Space as the high... 
est Reality. p. 81. 
VII. 12. I. AkaAa as the Car- 
rier of sound, p. 191. 
VII. 15. I. On PraJ;13. as the 
navel of existence I p. 88. 
VII. 16, 17.. Truth means ul- 
timately the r eaIiS8- tion of 
God, p. 313. 
VII. 22"'25. Description of 
Bhiiman, p. 305. 
VII. 23"'25. Meaning of Swl- 
rijya, p. 43. 
VII. 26. 2. Purity of mind de- 
pends upon purity of food, 
p. 114. 

VIII. I. 1-3. The City within 
described as exactly like the 
City without, p.. 43. 
VIII. t. 1-3. The microcosm and 
the macrocosm, p. 141. 


VIII. I. 6. No true freedom 
without the knowledge of 
Atman, p. 314. 
VIII. 2. 10. Sovereignty of 
man's will after God-realisa- 
tion, pp. 314-315. 
VIII. 3- 1-3. Maya as Untruth. 
p. 226. 
VIII. 3.2. In sleep, there is no cons- 
ciousness of Brahman, p. 126. 
VIII. 4. 1. The Self as the eter- 
nal bund of existence, p.2S8. 
VIII. 4. 2. The sudden illumi- 
nation of the Spiritual World 
in the night of existence, 
p. 344. 
VIII. 6. I. A description of 


the blood-vessels that pro- 
ceed from the heart, p. 189. 
VIII. 6. 3. Sleep caused by the 
entrance of the Soul in the 
arteries, p. 123. 
VIII. 7. I. The obtainment of 
all the worlds after God- 
realisation, p. 350. 
VIII. 7-12. The great parable 
of Indra and Virochana to 
discover the nature of the 
Self, pp. 265-268. 
VIII. 12. I. The Absolute as 
beyond happiness and sor- 
row, p. 306. 
VIII. 13. I. Release from the 
eclipse of desire, p. 351. 


Santi. The Atman and Brah- 
man as two Infinities, P.277. 
2. Exhortation to spend a life 
of activism, p. 297. 
2. Freedom from action at- 
tained by doing actions, p. 196. 
3. The soul-murderers go to 
demoniac regions. p. 157. 
4, 5. Atman as speedful and 
not-speedful. p. 347. 
7. No infatuation and grief 
for the God-realiser, p. 3 16 . 
9. Knowledge as more dan- 
gerous than ignorance for 
realisation, p. 329. 

9. The worshippers of false 
knowledge enter into pitchy 
darkness, p. 157. 
9-11. Reconciliation of Vidyl 
and Avidya. p. 192. 
9-11. Reconciliation of the 
claims of Action and Know- 
ledge, p. 298. 
10. The continuity of philoso- 
phical tradition, p. I I. 
15. Maya as a ,,reil, p. 225. 
16. Realisation of the Per- 
son without as tIle Person 
within, p. 345. 


I. 2. 8. The Ultimate Reality 
as the mind of mind, the 
eye of eye, and the ear of 
ear, p. 26 4. 

I. 3. The continuity of philo- 
sophical_ tradition, p. II. 
I. 3. The Atman as beyond the 
Known and beyond the Un 
known, p. 272. 


II. 3. Cognoscendo ignorari, et 
ignorando cognosci, p. 272. 
II. 13. Exhortation to realise 
the Self \\Thile the body l
p. 3 2 7. 

III. IV. All physical and men- 
tal power as due to the 
power of Brahman, PP.2S4- 


I. 1-3. Creation _ of the Uni- 
verse by the Atman through 
the Intern1ecHary Person, 
pp. 95-97. 
III. 2. Intellectualistic classifica- 
tion of mental states, p.IIS. 

III. 3. On Intellect as the 
final reality, p. 119. 
III. 3. All existence is based 
on Intellect, p. 181. 
III. 3. Self-consciousness as the 
Absolute, pp. 269-27°. 


I. 6. 1"2. The passage of the 
Soul from the heart to the 
skull through the nipple-like 
part between the bones of 
the palate, p. 132. 
I. 7. On the doctrine of " Quin- 
tuple Existence" being bor- 
rowed from the Brihadaran- 
. . 
yaka, p. 16. 
I. 9- An enumeration of dif- 
ferent virtues, p. 310. 
I. 10. The post-illuminational 
discourse of TriSaitku, p. II. 
I. 10. Tri
nku's Self-experience 
as the Mover of the Tree, p. 352. 
I. II. Exhortation to follow 
the good actions of the el- 
ders, or presbyters, p. 290- 
I. II. I. Reference to the two 
AAramas of the Student and 
the House-holder, p. 60. 
I. II. I. Exhortation not to 
neglect Truth and Law, as 
well as Happiness and Pros- 
perity, p. 299- 

I. II. 1-3. 'fhe parting advice of 
the T
acher to his Pupil, 
pp. 3 10 -3 11 . 

II. I. The Theory of the ema. 
nation of the Elements from 
Atman, p. 98. 
II. I. All inorganic nature 00111 
from God, p. 258. 
II. I. The Absolute as Ex- 
istence, Consciousness, and 
Infinity, p. 269. 
II. 2-5. The five Sheaths of the 
Soul, p. 142. 
II _ 4. Destruction of fear 
after God-reaIisation, p. 349- 
11.4. The Atman as unspeakable, 
and unthinkable p. 272. 
II. 6. Creation of dualities, 
p. 93. 
II. 6. Meditation on B rabmlD 
as Not-Being or Being, p.I
II. 6. The entry and imman- 
ence of God even in contra. 
ries, p. 212. 


II. 7. Lodgment in the fearless 
God confers fearlessness, 
p. 349. 
II. 7. Being described as born 
from the priInal Not-Being 
p. 81. 
II. 1. On the feeling of other- 
ness as causing fear, p. 115. 
II. 8. Identity of the Person 
in the Man and the Person 
in the Sun, p. 222. 
II. 8. God as the source of 
terror, p. 29 I. 
II. 8. The beatific calculus, 
p. 3°0. 
II. 9. The Saint goes beyond 
the reach of duals, p. 316. 
II. 9. The Sage has no cause 
for repentance, p. 316. 


III. r. The Absolute as the 
origin of life, and the end of 
things, pp. 73-74. 
III. I. All organic nature born 
from God, p. 208. 
III. I. Cosmological definition 
of the Ultimate Reality, 
pp. 25 2 - 2 .53. 
III. 1-6. Matter, Life, Mind, 
Intellect, and Bliss as forms 
of Brahman, pp. 144-145. 
III. 10. 3-4. 
Ieditation on Brah- 
n1an as support, gr{:atness, 
mind, and 'pari mar a', 
pp. 128- 12 9. 
III. 10. 5-6. The song of Uni- 
versal to" nity, p. 353. 
III. 10. 6. God as the Devour- 
er of the Devourer, p. 100. 


I. I. On the superiority of 
the Kshatriyas to the Brah- 
mins. p. 62. 
I. 2. Man's birth as depend- 
ing upon bis Karman and 
Knowledge, p. 162. 
I. 4. A belated description 
of the path of the Gods, 
pp. 16 3- 16 4. 

II. I. Satyagraha, p. 295. 
II. I. On Pra
 as the Ulti- 
mate Reality, p. 88. 
II. s. On the Inner Sacrifice, 
p. 8. 
11. 5. On the sacrifice taught 
by Pratardana, p. 115. 

III. 1-9. Identification of PriI)a 
with Life, Co DSCio usness, 

and Atrnan, pp. 91-92. 
III. g. Man as a mere puppet 
in the hands of God, 
p. 3 1 4. 

IV. 1-18. The Sleeping Con- 
sciousness as the r'"ltimate 
Reality, pp. 251-252. 
IV. 1-18. On the superiority 
of the Brahmins to the Ks- 
hatriyas, p. 62. 
I"". 19. A description of the 
blood-vessels tha t proceed 
from the heart to the Pur1- 
tat, p. 189. 
IV. 20. The Self as Lord of 
all the bodily faculties, P.I34. 
IV. 20. Thorough immanence of 
the Atman in the body, 
p.L- W . 



I. I. 3. The givers of barren cows 
go to joyless regions, p. 157. 
I. I. 5-6. Like corn man ri- 
pens, and like com he is 
born again, p. 154. 
I. 1.20. Denial of the existence of 
Soul after bodily death, p. 180. 
I. I. 20-29. On eschatological 
knowledge as the highest 
good, pp. 121-J22. 
I. I. 26) 28. The pleasures of 
the senses, p. 180. 
I. I. 28. Want of delight in the 
life of worldly pleasures, p. 294. 
I. 2. 1-2. The conflict of the 
good and the pleasant, P.293. 
I. 2. 3. Refusal of Nachiketas 
to be chained in the life of 
pleasures, p. 293. 
I. 2. 4, 5. Maya as blindfoldness, 
p. 225. 
I. 2. 7- The first-hand report, 
knowledge, and realisation of 
Atman as miraculous, 
pp. 195- 1 9 6 . 
I. 2. 7. The Knower of At- 
man a miracle, p. 272. 
I. 2. 8-9. The Teacher must 
ha ve realised his identity 
with the Self, p. 330. 
I. 2. 14. The Absolute as mo- 
rally transcendent, p. 306. 
I. 2. 15. Om as the Word de- 
clared by the Vedas, p. r96. 
I. 2. 15-17. Meditation on Om 
as the 
upreme way, p. 334. 
1.2. 18. Atman as unborn. eter- 
nal, and indestructible, p. 195- 
I. 2. 19. Atman neither kills, 
DOr Is ever 1ri11er1 , p- 195. 

I. 2. 20. Soul as subtler than 
the subtle, and greater than 
the great, p. 138. 
I. 2. 20. Atman as both large 
and small, p. 347. 
I. 2. 20. God's greatness rea- 
lised after a catharsis of the 
moral being, p. 341. 
I. 2. 21. Atman as moving in 
a sitting posture, p. 347. 
I. 2. 22. The Soul as omnipre- 
sent, p. 328. 
I. 2. 23. The Self not reached 
by much learning, p. 328. 
I. 2. 24. Cessation from sin, re- 
quisite for Sel" f-realisation 
p. 328. 
I. 3. I. On the relation of the 
Individual Soul and the Uni- 
versal Soul, p. 14. 
I. 3. I. Description of the Two 
Souls, p. 207. 
I. 3. 10-11. The Purusha as 
the Highest Category of exis- 
tence, p. 183. 
I. 3. 10, II. There is nothing 
above the Purusha, p. 183. 
J. 3. 12. God realised by the sub- 
tle faculty of Intuition, p. 340. 
I. 3. 13. Description of Jtilnit- 
man, Mahat Atman, and 
Santa Atman, p. 183. 
I. 3. 14. Mystic way as sharp 
as a razor's edge, p. 330. 
I. 3. 15. Mixing up of negative 
and positive characteristics 
of the Absolute, p. 220. 

II. 4. I. Introversion requisite 
. for Self -re,a]iN tion, p. 328. 


II. 4. 2. May. as unreality and 
uncertainty. p. 226. 
II. 4. 8. Spiritual Fire to be 
worshipped day after day, 
p. 337. 
II. 4. II. Perception of dif- 
ference leads one from death 
to death, p. 216. 
II. 4. 12. The Soul is oi the 
measure of a thumb, p. 135. 
II. 5. 3. The Dwarf God en- 
sconced between the upper 
and the lower breaths, p. 
II. 5. 4- 8 . On the persistence 
of the Self in sleep and after 
bodily death, p. 64. 
II. 5. 7. Rebirth of Souls in 
inorganic or live matter ac- 
cording to works, p. 181. 
II. 5. 9. On Fire as assuming 
all forms in the Universe, 
p. 79. 
II. 5. 9, 10. The Universal At- 
man as both immanent and 
transcendent, p. 262. 
II. 5. II. God, the Sun of the 
World, as untouched by the 
defects of vision, p. 262. 


II. 5. II. Adumbration of the 
deistic conception of God as 
in Yoga doctrine, p. 18 9. 
II. 5. IS. God as supreme res- 
plendence, p. 256. 
II. 6. I. Description of the 
eternal Asvattha tree, P.19 8 . 
II. 6. 2-3. God as a fearful 
Thunderbolt, p. 291. 
II. 6, 4. \\rant of Realisation, 
the cause of reincarnation, 
p. 32 7 · 
II. 6. 9. God not r
aliscd by 
Sight or by l\Iind, p. 339. 
II. 6. 10-11. Yoga as equani- 
mity of the senses, mind, 
and intellect, p. 188. 
II. 6. 10-1 I. 
lental equanimI- 
ty reached in the process 
of contemplation, p. 316. 
11. 6. 12. God revealed only to 
those who knO\\" that God is, 
p. 340. _ 
II. 6. 17. Atman as of the size 
of a thumb, p. 341. 
II. 6. IZ: On the extraction of 
the Atman from the body, 
as of a blade from its sheath. 
p.' 347. 



I. I. 3. On the "arche" of 
knowledge, p. 64. 
I. I. 4-5. The higher and the 
lower knowledge, p. 326. 
I. I. 6. The Soul as omnipre- 
sent, p. 138. 
I. I. 6. Mixing up of negative 
and positive characteristics of 
the Absolute, p. 220. 

I. I. 7. The universe thrown 
out and re-absorbed by the 
Immutable Brahma11, p. 222. 
I. 2. I. On the following of the 
sacrificial routine, p. 7. 
I. 2. 7-11. Sacrifices are like 
unsteady boats, p. 7. 
I. 2. 12. Disgust for the world 
and humility, Decessary for 


the reaIisation of the Self, 
P ')') 9 
. ;:)- . 

II. I. I. Manifold beings as only 
scintillations frOlTI Brahman, 
p. 222. 
II. I. 2-9. Creation of the 
world from the formless IJ cr - 
son, p. 99. 
II. I. 4. 1\ description of the 
Cosmic Person, p. 197. 
II. I. 10. Identity of tbe Self 
\vi th the Suprcn1e PC:fSOl1, 
and th(' l7niycrsl', p. 222. 
II. I. 10. l\'lfiya as a I\. not, 
p. 225. 
II. 2. 3-4. ()nl as the how, Soul 
as t he alTO"., al1c1 Brahnlall 
as the Hlark, }J. 3J4. ._ 
11. 2. 5-i. l\1cditatioll 011 At- 
man a
 the Buud of 1rn- 
mortality, p. 296. 
II. 2. 8. 1'he breaking of the 
knots of the heart after God.. 
realisation, p. 347. 
II. 2. 9. Brahman as an Im- 
maculate light set in a disc 
of gold, p. 344. 
II. 2. II. The vision of Brahman 
as above and below, to the 
right and to the left, p. 350. 

III. I. I. The idea of the rela- 
tion of the Two Souls, p. 14. 
III. I. I. The deistic concep- 
tion of God as an onlooker, 
p. 18 9. 
III. I. I. The dualistic con- 
ception of the relation of 
the Self and God, p. 207. 
III. 1. 2. The acquisition of power 
after God-realisation, p. 348. 

Ill. I. 3. 1
he idea of Immor- 
tal Life as "assimilation" to 
Divinity, p. 165. 
III. I. 3. T{amanuja's doctrine 
of Immortality, p. 213. 
III. 1. 3. Doctrine of Supermo- 
raHsm, p. 306. _ 
III. I. 4. Life in Atman, a life 
of intense spiritual activity, 
p. 297. 
III. I. 5. Truth, penance, and 
insight necessary for Self- 
realisation, p. 428. 
I II. I. 6. The triumph of 
'T r 11 t h, P...: 3 I 2 . 
III. I. 7. Atman as great and 
sn1all,as far off and near,p.347. 
Ill. I. 8. God rcalised after a 
ca tharsis uf the moral be- 
Ing, p. 341. _ 
Ill. I. 9. 
rhe Atnlan reveals 
Himself after the purifica.. 
tion of mind, p. 347. 
Ill. I. 10. The fulfilment of 
any end after the vision of 
God, p. 350. 
III. 2. 2. The annihilation of de- 
sires by the realisation of 
God, p. 316. 
III. 2. 3. The doctrine of 
Grace, p. 345.:. 
III. 2. 4. The Atman cannot 
be reached by a life of 
weakness and error, p. 329. 
III. 2. 5. The liberated Soul 
mingles with the whole Uni- 
verse, p. 166. 
III. 2. 6. Enjoying the com.. 
panionship of God after 
death, p. 165. 
III. 2. 6. Doctrine of Kralnamu... 
kti, p. 214. 



III. 2. 7-8. The Idea of Im- I I I. 2. 10. I'he carrying of 
mortal life as A tonment to fire oyer one's head requi- 
Divinity, y. 1 6 5. site for one's initiation, 
III. 2. 8. Sankara's doctrine of p. 33 2 . 
Impersonal Immortality,p.223. 
, - , 

I. I. An Aporia regarding the 
origin and substance of 
things, p. 74
I. 2. Enumeration of contem- 
porary theories of creation, 
p. 100. 
I. 4. Reality cryptically com- 
pared to a great Circunl- 
scribing Fel1y, p. 34. 
I. 5. Nature cryptically des-- 
cribed as a vast expanse of 
water contributed to by fiye 
different streams, p. 35. 
I. 6. Immortality _means the 
union of the Atn1an and 
the Mover, p. 222. 
I. 8. The Universe as con. 
trasted with Isa, p. 19-1. 
I. 9. Triune unity of Brah- 
man, p. 210. 
I. 10. The cessation of the 
world-illusion due to the po.. 
wer of God, p. 226. 
I. 12. The Enjoycr, the En- 
joyed, and the 
over as the 
constituents of the Abso- 
lute, p. 210. 
I. 14. Mention of the process 
of Dhyana, p. 188. 
I. 14. Spiritual fire as churned 
out of the two sticks of th(! 
Body_and the PraI)ava, p. 33,'. 
I. 15. Atman immanent in 
the bod y, as oil in sesa- 
mum, p. 342. 

II. 8-10. Requirements of the 
practice of Yoga, p. 338. 
11.8-15. A classic description 
of the practice of Y og
pp. 187-188. 
II. I I. Description of phutic 
experience', p. 343. 
II. 12-13. The physiological ef- 
fects of Yoga, p. 339. 
II. 14-15. ,rision of the 
C'on1pared to the \Tision of a 
lustrous :\lirror, p. 346. 
II. 17. The immanence of God 
in the t
 n1" erse, p. 262. 

III. I. 
Iaya as the 
Ieshes of 
God, p. 22.j. 
III. 2. Rudra, the Creator and 
Destroyer of all things, p. 102. 
III. 2. Rudra, as the only one 
God, p. 194. 
III. 2 J 3. The One God creates 
the heaven and the earth, 
pp. 259- 260 . 
III. 3. God as all eye, and all 
ear J p. 208. 
III. 4. Rira 
yagarbha as first- 
born of God, p. 186. 
III. 9. God standing like a 
motionless Tree in the hea- 
ven, p. 9. 
III. 9. Personalistic description 
of God, p. 208. 
III. 14. The transcendence of 
God, p. 262, 


III. 18. The out-moving ten- 
dency of th
 Self, p. 328. 
III. 19. The AtInan alvlays the 
subject of kno\\11edge. and 
never the object, p. 273. 

IV. 5. On the relation of the 
Individual Soul, and the Uni- 
versal Soul, p. J 4. 
IV. 5. The Prakriti as made of 
red, \vhite, and dark colours, 
p. 182. 
IV. 5. I'he Supreme Soul lives 
apart from Prakriti, while 
the Individual Soul is caught 
in the meshes of her love, 
p. 186. 
IV. 9. The Individual Soul as 
enchained by the magic po- 
wers of the Universal Soul, 
pp. 18 5- 18 6. 
IV. 9. Maya as the power of 
God in the crea tion of the 
world, p. 227. 
IV. 10. God compared to a 
spider, p. 185. 
IV. 10. Maya as Prakriti, p.227. 
IV. II. One attains to tran- 
quillity by II collecting "t he 
Godhead, p. 316. 
IV. 12. Hirat:Jyagarbha, as the 
first creation of God, p.186. 
IV. 16. God as a subtle film 
enveloping the Universe, 
p. 342. 
IV. r6. Saivite description of 
the Godhead, p. 194. 
IV. lB. God experienced as be. 
yond both night and day, 
p. 345. 
I V. 2
. A eudemonistic pra... 
yer to Rudra, p. 299. 

V. 2. Reference to the tawny- 
ishi, as the first- 
born of God, p. 186. 
V. 3. CJOd as the spreader of 
the meshes, p. 194. 
v. 3. Maya as the Meshes of 
God, p. 227. 
V. 5. Nature brought to ma- 
turity by God, p. 100. 
V. 5. God as p{esiding over the 
process of development, p. 185. 
V. 8-9. Atman smaller than 
the hundreth part of a hair 
divided hundredfold, p. 347. 
V. 10. Atman realised as nei- 
ther male-nor female, P.346. 

VI. 1-12. The nature of the 
Supreme Godhead, and His 
identification with the Self, 
pp. 260-261. 
VI. I. The whirling of the 
wheel of the Universe due to 
Rudra, p. 102. 
VI. 2. God as the Time of 
Time, p. 100. 
VI. 2. The Elements cannot 
be the Itarche" of things, pp. 
VI. 2. The Five Elements as 
the handiwork of God, P.I9I. 
VI. 5. God as the cause of the 
combination of Elements, 
p. 101. 
VI. 5. Upisanii, or the men- 
tal worship of God, p. 198. 
VI. 9. Rudra as the Supreme 
Cause and Lord of Souls, 
p. 102. 
VI. 10. God as the Magician, 
and Prakriti as his Magic 
Power, p. 185. 


VI. II. The Elements as in- 
formed by God, I1p. laO-JOY. 
VI. II. God as the Spectator, 
p. 186. 
VI. 1 I. l"he One God as inl- 
manent in the \\'hole LTni- 
verse. p. 208. 
VI. 12. Rudra as the Mover of 
theunmoving n1anifold, lJ. 102. 
VI. 12. Highest hap pin e s s 
arises by seeing God within 
oneself, p. 316. 
VI. 13. Mention of Samkhya 
and Yoga together. p. 182. 
VI. 16. God described again 
as the Time of Time, p. 100. 


VI. 16. God as the Lord of 
Pradhana, p. 185. 
VI. 18. Brahma a,.,; the first 
creation of God, p. 187. 
VI. 20. There can be no end 
to sorrow without the know- 
ledge of God, p. 316. 
VI. 21. The revelation of the 
1T pan ish ad through the Grace 
of God, p. II. 
VI. 22. 23. Faith necessary 
for the communication of 
mystic knowledge, p. 333. 
VI. 23. Bhakti to God as to 
Guru, p. Ig8. 


I. 3-13. Rayi and Pri
ceived in the manner of 
Aristotle's Matter and Form, 
pp. 9 2 -93. 
I. 16. Maya as crookedness, 
falseness, and i 11 u s i 0 11 , 
p. 226. 

II. 1-12. On the supreme im- 
portance of Pral}a, pp.gO-gI. 

1\'. 2. Sleep caused by the ab- 
sorption of the Senses in 
the Mind, p. 123. 
IV. 4. The Mind, \vhich is the 
Sacrificer, is carried to Brah- 
man every day, p. 125. 
IV. 5. Dreams as both lJfoduc- 
tive and r e pro due t i v e , 
pp. 126- 12 7. 
IV. 6. Mind is merged in an 
ocean of 1 ight in deep sleep, 
p. 123. 

V. 1-5. Meditation on Om re- 
moves the slough of sin, 
p. 335. 

VI. I. Untruth, as drying up 
a man from the very roots, 
p. 3 12 . 
VI. 2. The Purusha with 
Sixteen Parts, p. 183. 
VI. 4. The Constituents of the 
Person wi th Sixteen Parts, 
pp. 18 3-1 8 4. 
\'1. 5. Destruction of Name 
and Forn1 in the final mer- 
gence in the A b sol ute, 
p. 165. 
VI. 5. The parts are to the 
Person as rivers are to the 
Ocean, p. 180. 
VI. 6. The parts of Purusha 
are centred in Him as spokes 
in thf navel of a '\'\\(
el, p.18S. 



I. 1-7. On the superiority of 
the Brahmins to the Ksha- 
triyas, p. 63. 
I. 7. Brihadratha's request 
for initiation 1 p. 19 8 . 
I. 2-7. The pessimism of Bri- 
hadratha, p. 294. 
I. 2. An enumeration of the 
seven Dhlitus, p. 189. 

II. 1-3. Vision of one's Self in 
a flood of supreme light, 
p. 346. 
II. 3-4. The Soul as the Mo- 
ver of the body-chariot, 
pp. 133- J 34. 

II. 8. Internal sound as the 
result of the processes of di- 
gestion and ass i mil a t ion, 
p. 343. 
. The Sound within man 
as the Ultimate Rea1ity, p. 
25 1 . 

VI. I. The inner Self governs 
all external existence, p. 120. 
VI. 30. Thought as the root 
of all mental processes, p. 118. 
VI. 38. The Soul described as 
ei ther atomic, or of the size 
of a thumb, a span, or the 
whole body, p. 138. 


1-12. Om as the representa- 
tion of the various States of 
Consciousness, and the va- 
rious Aspects 0 f Sou I , 
p. 33 6 . 
2-7. The four States of Con- 

sciousness and the four Aspects 
of Soul, pp. 139-14°. 
6, 7. God and the Absolute, 
p. 21 9. 
9- I I. On the meaning of the 
parts of Om, p. 36. 


T. T EXT S. 

A handy edition of the texts of the Upanishads can be had at 
the Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, entitled Twenty-eight UPanishads, 
which contains almost all of the more prominent lJpanishads, ex- 
cluding the Maitri. Another edition of the Twenty-eight Upa- 
nishads is published also at the Venkateshwar Press, Bombay. The 
Anandashram Press, Poona, has published an edition of Thirty-two 
Upanishads, which excludes the famous ten Upanishads, with an 
inclusion, however, of Kaushitaki and Maitri along with other 
Minor Upanishads. This edition of Minor Upanishads is printed 
with the commentaries of Naraya
 and Sankarananda. - Jacob 
has brought out an edition of the E'leven Atharva1fa Upanishads in 
the Bombay Sanskrit Series, which also contains Upanishads be- 
yond the ordinary ten. An excellent edition of the Miscel1aneous 
Upanishads can be had at the Adyar Library, Madras.. edited by 
the Director of the Manuscripts Library. Dr. Schrader, who was 
the Director of that Library in 1912, brought out an edition of 
the Samnyasa Upanishads during that year, but when he was re- 
quired to go to Europe during the war, his place was taken up by 
his successor A. Mahadev Shastri, who has recently brought out 
editions of the Yoga Upanishads in 1920. Vedanta Upanishads 
in 1921, and Vaish"!'lva Upanishads in 1923. It seems only one 
volume on Salva Upanishads from out of the original plan yet re- 
mains to be edited. All the Upanishads have been edited with 
the commentary of Upanishad-Brahmayogin. The get-up of the 
volumes leaves nothing to be desired, and we cannot recommend 
to our readers a more beautiful or more handy edition of the Minor 
Upanishads than the edition of the four volumes brought out from 


As regards the Hundred and Eight Upanishads, there was an 
edition brought out by Subrahmanya Shastri at Madras in 1883. 
Later on, the Tattvavivechak Press, Bombay, brought out an 
edition of the same Hundred and Eight Upanishads, while a handy 
edition of the H'ltndrcd and Eight Upanishads can now be had even 
at the Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay. In the absence of a more 
reliable edition, we can recommend this to all students of 
Upanishadic literature, who care for the canon of the Upanishadic 
literature" in extenso." There are a number of other Upanishads 
which exist beyond the so-caned Hundred and Eight, which have 
been catalogued in the volume on the bibliography of the 
Upanishads published at Adyar, as well as with greater fulness and 
precision in the "(:reative Period of Indian Philosophy" by 
S. K. Belvalkar and R. D. Ranade. 

It is strange that there should not have been even a single ex- 
ceedingly reliable edition of the Texts of the Upanishads. We 
recommend the production of such a one to all those who are in- 
terested in the literary side of the lJpanishads. Lanman's dictum 
( II Beginil1gs of Hindu Pantheism" ) remains only too true that 
U a critical text of all the old lTpanishads conveniently assembled 
in one volume \\'ith a philologically accurate translation and various 
useful appendices is still one of the pressing needs of Indology." 

Colonel Jacob has laid all students of Upanishadic literature 
under immense obligations by editing a Concordance to the Princi- 
pal (56) Upanishads, along with the Bhagavadg'ita. This piece 
of literary work is exceedingly creditable to one who was serving 
in the Indian Army. One wishes that there were more happy 
surprises of that kind from the Indian Anny , 


All the great Schools of Vedinta Philosophy have had their own 
commentaries on the Upanishads, as on the Brahma-Siitras, and 
the Bhagavadgitl. The Commentaries of 
nkara on the various 
U ps\nis hads have been printed in the Anandasram Press, POOIla, a 



also in the collected edition of his works printed at Vanivilas Press. 
They are also edited in one volume by H. R. Bhagavat, Poona. 
Sa:i1kara's commentary on the Karikas of Gauq.apiida, which are 
themselves a commentary on the MaJ)qukyopanishad, is most 
famous, as well as his commentary on the Brihadaranvaka. This 
... . . '" 
last has been again commented on by Sure
varacharya in his 
Vlrtika. Doubt has sometimes been thrown upon Sai1kara's 
commentary on the Svetasvatara Upanishad; but his commenta- 
ries on the other Upanishads have been regarded as authentic. 
There has been a very good one-vo1ume edition of the principal 
Eleven Upanishads commented on by Swami Achintya Bhaga\\7an 
and printed at the Nirnayasagar Press, 1910, which follo,vs in 
substance the commentary of Sai1kara on the Upanishads. If 
one wishes to have an epitome of Sai1kara's commentaries on the 
Upanishads, one can have it in this edition of Swan1i Achintya 
Bhagawan. The edition is also beautifully printed and is handy. 
Another running commentary on the substance of the various 
Upanishads, following the Advaita school of Philosophy, is entitled 
.. Anubhfrtipraki&i, " and has been written by the famous Madha- 

The Commentaries of Ramjjn
i(J, on the Upanishads are not 
so well-known as his commentary on the Brahma-Sutras. There 
is a mention of the existence of his commentaries on the Upani- 
shads in an edition printed at Madra..c;;, which is however, in any 
case, not very accessible. On the other hand, the commentaries 
of Ranga Riminuja on the various lTpanishads follo\ving the 
Vigishtidvaita school of thought are better known. The Anan- 
dashram Press has printed Ranga Riminuja's commentaries 
on the Bribadaranyaka, the Chh
ndogya, the Katha and the 
Kena Upa.nishads. The last two Upanishads with Raitga R
nuja's commentary have been also edited by Shridharashastri 
Pathak, of the Deccan College, Poona. 

The Commenta.,ies of Madhva on the Upanishads can be had 
in the Sarvamfila Series edited at the Madhavavilas Book DepBt, 



KumbhakonalTI. Extracts from Madhva's commentariES along 
"Tith the original Upanishads and translations have been pnb.. 
lished at the Panini Office, Allahabad. 

The Brah11ta-sut1'as thcnlsclvcs are an aphoristic summary of 
the Upanishads, borrowing \vords and ideas fron1 them, and link. 
ing them together in a theologico-philosophical cOl1text. It is 
the commentaries of the great "feachrrs on the Brahma-sutras, 
which are, however, more famous than the con1mentaries on the 
Upanishads themse]vE's. These COn11TICntarics constitute the later 
Vedanta proper, and use the scholastico-logicaJ n1ethod, as has been 
pointed out in the Preface, instead of the mystico-intuitional one. 


The most important work that has been hitherto done on tbe 
Upanishads is the \\'ork of Translation. Through a long period 
of years the Upanishads have afforded a temptation for tbe 
aspiring Translator to try his hand at in various languages. The 
first kno\vn translation of the IT panishads was done into Per5ian 
during the years 1656-1657 by the Pandits in the court of Dara. 
the son of Shah Jahan. 'The first notice of the Upanishads to the 
Western world ,vas through AnquetiJ du I)erron's translation cn- 
titled the II ()upnck 'hat," two volumes, Strassburg, 1801-1802, 
which was a rendering into Latin of the Persian translation above 
referred to. The substance of the Latin translation appearedl in 
French in the year 1832 in J. D. I..anjuinais's cc Recherches SUI les 
Langues,la Litteratllrc, la Religion' et la Philosophic des Indicna, U 
1832. Ram Mohan I{oy published his translation of the I
Kena, Katha, and MUl]q.aka Upanishads during the same year. 
namely, 1832. Exactly fifty years later, the Oupnek 'hat was 
translated into German at Dresden, 1882. It may thus be seeIl 
how the Sanskrit Upanishads were rendered into Persian at th
time of Dara, how the Persian translation in its turn was rendered 
into Latin by Anquetil du I)erron in 1801-1802, and how the 14atm 
translation was itself rendered both into the French and German 
languages during the course of the last century. 



One of the earliest translators of the Upanishads into English 
was Roer, who published his translations of nine Upanishads, lSa, 
Kena, Katha, Prasna, MUI)q.aka, MaI)q.ukya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, 
and Sveta
vataIa at Calcutta in 1853. His translation of the Bri- 
hadaral}yaka came also later on. Max Muller was the first syste- 
matic translator of all the chief Upanishads at the Clarendon 
Press in two volumes, 1879-1884. Whitney published a review 
of this translation in the 4
crican] ournal of Philology in 1886, 
in an essay entitled " The Upanishads and their latest Transla- 
tion JJ. Paul Deussen's montunental (( Sechzig upanishad's 
des Veda, " pp. 946, was published at Lcipzig, 1897, and con- 
tains a translation of all the fifty Upanishads included in the Oup- 
nek'hat, as well as ten other AtharvaI?a Upanishads. It is un- 
fortunate that Deussen '
 translation has not yet been rendered 
into English. 1 t contains very useful introductions to all the U pa- 
nishads, as well as to each section of them. This \\'ork was re- 
viewed by Bohtlingk in an essay entitled H Bemerkungen zu 
einigen Upanishadel1" in 1897, where he pointed out a number 
of points in which he differed from Deussen. 

G. R. S. Mead's translation of the Upanishads in collaboration 
with J. C. Chhattopadhyaya in 18 9 6 , in t
.o volumes, was pub.. 
lished by the London l'heosophical Society. \Tolume I. contains 
translations of the lSa, Rena, Katha, Prasna, MU1?4aka. and 
q.Ukya Upanishads, and Volume II, of the Taittirlya, Aitareya and 
Svet3Svatara Upanishads. Mead's translation excited such d.D 
interest in the European world that it was translated both into 
the French and Dutch languages in 1905 and 1908. S. Sitaram 
Shastri and Ganganath Jba's Translation of the UpanishadS in 
five volumes with Sai1kara 's commentary (Natesan, Madras, 
18g8-Ig01) contains texts of the lSa, Kena, MU1}q.aka, Katha, 
na, Chhandogya, Aitareya and Taittirjya Vpanishads, and 
is so neatly done and so finely printed that it perforce invites tbe 
study of the beginncr in Upanishadic literature. One \\'ishes \
much that Natesan might add the translation of tbe five remain- 
ing Upanishads, Mat]qfikya, Brihad'A.rat)yaka, Sveta
vatara, Kau.. 


shItaki, and Maitri to the already translated eight, so as to make a 
fine set of volumes of the Translations of the chief Upanishads 
along with Texts. Sitanatha Tattvabhushan's Translation of 
the Upanishads in three volumes, Calcutta, 1900, contains all the 
thirteen principal Upanishads except Maitraya1)i. S. C. Vasu 
has edited the 1&1, Kena, Katha, Prasna, MU1)qaka, and Mal}- 
gOkya Upanishads with extracts from Madhva's commentary, 
Panini Office, Allahabad, 1911. He has translated the Chhan- 
dogya and the Brihadarat)yaka lJpanishads like\vise with extracts 
from the commentary of Madhva. Tukaram Tatya has brought 
out an eclectic edition of the Translations of the Twelve principal 
Upanishads which includes the translation of the lSa, Kena, Katha, 
PraAna, M u1)q.aka, Ma1)q.fikya, Aitarcya, Taittiriya, Svetasvatara 
and Brihadara
yaka Upanishads by R6er, of the Chhandogya by 
Rajendralal Maitra, and of the I{aushltaki by Cowell. The Maitri 
is unrepresented in this volume. R. E. Hume 's translation of 
the Thirteen Principal Upanishads, Oxford, 1921, is the latest, 
most handy, and most serviceable of all. Mr. Hume has profited 
by the translations of all his predecessors, while his Bibliography 
is remarkably clear and useful. Our own BibJiographical Note 
owes not a little to him. 

Of the translations of the Upanishads in the Vernaculars, there 
are many. We might mention C. G. Bhanu's translation of the 
various Upanishads in Marathi along with the commentary of 
Sai1kara in a series of volumes, and H. R. Bhagavat's text and 
translation in Marathi of various Upanishads in two volumes, the 
first containing the more important and classical Upanishads, and 
the other a few of the minor Upanishads. Vishnu Shastri Bapat's 
translation of the Upanishads in Marathi as well as his translation 
of the Bhashya of Sankara on the Upanishads are the most pains- 
taking of Marathi translations. There are translations of the 
Upanishads in every language of India, and particularly the Ben- 
gali. The Bibliography would be inordinately swollen if we were 
entien all the translations in the various languages. 



As regards the translations of single Upanishads in serial order, 
we might mention first Aurobindo Ghose 's translations of the 
, Katha, and other Upanishads, which arc interspersed with 
the philosophical reflections of the author. Prof. M. Hiriyanna's 
translations of the Kena, Ka
ha, and other IJpanishads with the 
commentary of Sankara have appeared recently, while the Keno- 
panishad has been transliterated and translated by Oertel, Pro- 
fessor at Yale, 1894- The Kathopanishad seems to find parti- 
cular favour with translators, and there are numerous transla- 
tions of it in various languages. Thus Paul Regnaud published a 
translation of the Kathopanishad in French, Paris, 1898, \\rhile 
the same Upanishad was also translated into Swedish by 
Butenschon, Stockholm, 1902, and into Italian by Belloni-Filippi, 
Pisa, 1905. Whitney's translation of the Kathopanishad, Boston, 
18go, is a remarkable piece of \\'ork, in which he proposes a num- 
ber of textual emendations, and adds a critical introduction. 

Johannes Hertel has recently published a critical edition of the 
MUI}q.akopanishad, Leipzig, 1924. Hertel's is an ambitious 
method of editing. He goes into questions of Metre and Language, 
differen tiates the Traditional from the Original text, then gives a 
Restored text, and then discusses the contents, the origin, and the 
age of the Mu
qakopanishad, along with its references to Jainism. 
After this prelude, Hertel prints the text of the MUI)q.akopanishad 
by the anastatic method, borro\ving it froD1 the Bibliotheca Indica. 
Hertel may have been inspired to adopt his method of the discus- 
sion of the 
lul)q.akopanishad from attempts like that of Father 
Zimmermann on the MahanarayaI]a Upanishad, \vhich \\?as his 
Ph. D. Thesis, in which he discusses the Sources and the Relation 
between the different recensions of that Upanishad. Prof. Zimmer- 
mann goes into the text-parallels of the lTpanishad, and the relation 
of them, and then proceeds to point out the contents and the 
sources of the Upanishad, and then ends \\,ith an ammgcment of 
matter. In fact, such a method of procedure should be made ap- 
plicable to every Upanishad. 


M. N. Dvivedi.s translation of the MaI)q.fikya Upanishad 
with the Karikas of Gauqapada and the Bhashya of Sai1kara, 
1894, is remarkable in many respects. It was the first notice of 
that great Herac]eitian philosopher Gauq.apada in English. 
Recently an amount of literature is coming out on Gauq.apada and 
on his relation to the Madhyamika Sfitras. Prof. Vidushekha:ra 
Bhattacharya, Shantiniketan, is making a special study of Gauq.a- 
pada, and one feels no doubt that when Gauq.apada is rendered 
well into English, his relation to the Madhyamika Sutras is pointed 
out, and a survey is taken of his contribution to Philosophy, he 
is bound to startle the world of thought. As regards the Tait- 
tirtya Upanishad, A. Mahadeva Shastri has brought out a classical 
edition of that Upanishad with an English translation and the 
Commentaries of Saitkaracharya, Surcsvaracharya, and Vidya- 
yaJ pp. 791, Mysore, 1903, which would be most serviceable 
to all the students of that Upanishad. 

Otto Bohtlingk has done very classic work in turning out the 
editions of two of the biggest Upanishads, namely the Brihadaral}- 
yaka and the Chhandogya, the one printed at St. Petersburg, and 
the other at Leipzig. It is remarkable that the two editions were 
printed simultaneously, and appeared in the same year, namely 
1889- While both the editions have been carefully edited, the 
Chhandogya has particularly a very beautiful appearance. The 
principle of paragraphing is retained in both the Upanishads, and 
Bohtlingk has emended the text in various places, though not 
always successfully. For example, for the reading Vijitaya 
(Chhandogya IV. I. 4) Bohtlingk substitutes Vijitvaraya, and 
for Tajjalaniti, he reads Tajjananiti (Chhandogya 111.I4.1:), 
of which the ,first is unnecessary, and the second awkward. 
'Nevertheless, the editions of the Brihadara
yaka and the Chhan- 
dogya edited with text and translation by Bohtlingk have re- 
mained quite classical, though they are somewhat inaccessible in 
India. BohtIingk soon followed this achievement by his edi- 
tions of the Katha, Aitareya and Pra
a Upanishads, with their 
texts in Devanagari, and translation and notes in Genna.n, Leip- 



igJ 18 9 1 . Whitney published a review of B6htlingk's transla- 
tions of the various Upanishads in the American Journal of Phi- 
lology, subjecting them to a very detailed examination, and Boht.. 
lingk replied to these criticisms in I8gr. All this is a matter of 
literary give and take, which would certainly be enjoyed by those 
who take a philological interest in the Upanishads. 

E. B. Cowell's translations of the Kaushitaki and the Maitri 
Upanishads with the commentary of Ramat"irtha (I86r,1870), 
have also remained classical works on those two L"panishads. 
A. Mahadeva Shastri's edition of the Amritabindu and Kaivalya 
Upanishads, text and translation, is a handy little volume. 
Narayanaswami Iyer has translated Thirty Minor Upanishads 
at Madras, 1914. Finally, S. K. Belvalkar's "Four Unpublished 
Upanishads," containing texts and translations of the Bashkala, 
the Chhagaleya, the Arsheya, and the Saunaka lJpanishads ( 1925 ), 
of which the first was printed by Dr. Schrader but the rest were 
only in MS. form in the Adyar Library, has been published by 
the Academy of Philosophy and Religion, and can be had at its 
Poona Branch, Poona, India. 

IV. S E LEe T ION S . 

One of the earliest of books of Selections from the l:panishads 
was by Paul Regnaud entitled M ater'iaux pour sert'1" a l' histoire 
de la Philosophie de l'I nde, Paris, 1876. I t contains numerous 
passages from the original Upanishads in transliterated form to- 
gether with French translation and topical arrangement. Reg- 
naud had intended this book for a short account of the ancient 
philosophy of India. Another book on Select£ons from the Upa- 
nishads in English by John Murdoch, 
Iadras 1895, is intended 
not so much to illustrate the philosophy of the lTpanishads, as to 
prove the superiority of Christianity to the philosophy of Hin- 
m. L. D. Barnett's Some Say-ings from the l./pant"shilds 

ndon, 1905, as well as his B,ahma-Knowledge, London 1906, are 
sprightly little volumes which take us to the heart of Upanishadic 


teaching. Deussen 's Die Geheimlehre des Veda, Leipzig, 1907. 
is intended as a summary of the uSechzig Upanishad's" and contains 
selections from fourteen Upanishads. Hillebrandt, the famous 
Vedic scholar, has produced a work of selections entitled Aus 
Brahma,!as und Upanishaden, Jena, which contains typical pas- 
sages from the Brahma
as as well as the Upanishads to illustrate 
the early philosophy of India. Hillebrandt does not make a 
sufficient differentiation between the Brahmat:J3.s on the one hand 
and the Upanishads on the other, and hence finds II ritual 
and superstition freely mixed with pure ideas of philosophy" in 
his little volume. He says that he is satisfied that he has many 
agreements with Oldenberg, particularly \\7hen the latter says that 
the philosophy of the Upanishads cannot, in any way, be com- 
pared to the philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer, and is there- 
fore open to the same criticism which we have made against Old- 
enberg in the Preface. As a sprightly little volume, Johannes 
Hertel's Die Weisheit der Upanishaden, Munchen, 1921, is more sti.. 
mulating than Hillebrandt's selections, though occasionally one- 
sided. Hertel brings together selections from the I
, Kena, 
Katha, Chhandogya, B:rihadara
yaka., Aitareya, and Kaushltaki 
Upanishads, and says that he wants to present the Upanishads in 
readable German, not that his book is intended specifically 
for Indologists. Hertel's work whets thought, even though his 
conclusions are not always satisfactory. We have noticed in the 
Preface how in two little points we disagree with the meaning 
which Hertel finds in the Kenopanishad. Hertel gives introduc- 
tions to all his selections, which makes the book more valuable than 
Hillebrandt's, which does not contain such introductions. Paul 
Eberhardt's Der Weisheit letzter Schluss, Jena, 1920, is also a 
book of selections from the Upanishads, and contains thirty- 
seven passages topically arranged. The author of the present 
work has also an intention of bringing out an edition of Selec- 
tions from the Upanishads from the specifically spiritual point of 
view. It was Ram Mohan Roy's deliberate opinion that Selections 
from the Upanishads published and largely circulated wCfId 
contribute more than anything else to the moral and religious 



elevation of his countrymen, and it may seem as if the spiritual 
Selections from the Upanishads \vhich the author of the present 
work intends to bring out will satisfy this urgent need. 

v. REF ERE NeE S . 

''[he references to Upanishadic literature are vast and various. 
We can tabulate here only the principal anlong thcln under three 
different heads, references in the Histories of I..iterature, refer- 
ences in the Histories of Religion, and references in the Histories 
of Philosophy. Weber's lndische Studicn Vols. I. and II. con- 
tain series of articles on almost all of the lTpanishads in this vol- 
ume, with the exception of the Aitareya and the Brihadarar:. 
yaka. We have also a treatment of the Upanishads in his His- 
tory of Indian Literature, as well as in 
lonicr \\:illiams's Ind£an 
Wisdom. Other references to the philosophy of the Upanishads 
are to be found in Leopold van Schroeder's Ind£ens Litcratur ttnd 
Cultur, 1887, in Prof. Macdonell's [listory of Sanskrit Literature, 
pp. 218-243, as well as in \\linternitz's Geschichte der 1'ndischen Lit- 
teratur Vol. I., pp. 210-229. All these try to sum up concisely the 
teachings of the Upanishads, and indicate their general place in 
the history of Sanskrit Literature. 

So far as the Histories of Religion are concerned, we may men- 
tion Hopkins's Religions of India, and Geden's Studies £n Eas- 
tern Religions, as well as his later Studies in the Religions of the 
East. These indicate the religious place of the Upanishads in 
Indian thought. 

Among Histories of Indian Philosophy we might make special 
mention of Prof. Radhakrishnan's Ind1:an PhilosoPh)' Volume I., 
and Das Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy \Tol. I., which con- 
tain recent pronouncements on the philosophy of the Upanishads. 
Strauss's lndische Philosophie contains a treatment of the philo- 
sophy of the Old Upanishads at pp. 42-61, and of the New Upa- 
nishads at pp. 62-85, which would amply repay perusal. 


Among other references to Upanishadic literature, we might 
make mention of Prof. Kcith 's chapter on the Upanishadic 
Period in the Cambridge History 0.( India Vo1. I, chapter 5, wherein 
he points out that the theory of Transmigration was a new theory 
in the lTpanishadic days, having been entirely absent in the Brah- 
a period. He also suggests that it would not be correct to 
suppose that the Brahman Doctrine was the reaction of the noble 
class against the devotion of the priests to the ritua]. On the 
other hand, he points out that it must have been through policy 
that the Brahn1ins ascribed the Brahman doctrine to the noble 
class (pp. 142-144). We have pointed out in the third chapter 
of this book how the idea of Transmigration could be traced even 
to the Vedic days; hence it was not entirely new to the Up- 
nishads. Also, we have suggested at the end of the first chapter 
that the doctrine of Brahman could be regarded neithcr as Brah- 
manic nor as Kshatriyan, and that anybody, who came to " know', 
to whatever class he Inight have belonged, was regarded as a Sage. 
To attribute policy to the Brahmins would not be a satisfactory 

A last reference to Upanishadic literature we should make men- 
tion of is an Article on the Upanishads in the Encycyclopaetlia o.f 
Religion and Ethics by the Rev. A. S. Geden, the Translator of 
Deussen'5 Philosophy of the Upanishads. The cditOJ' of the 
Encyclopaedia could not have pitched upon a more suitable per. 
son to write the article on the II Upanishads." The article also con- 
tains a useful little Bibliography at the end of it. 

VI. E S SAY SAN D W 0 R K S . 

There are a number of important essays and systematic trea- 
tises connected with either a part or the whole of Upanishadic 
Philosophy. We must begin by noting a somewhat bril1iant 
idea in Otto Wecker's Dcr Gebrauch der Kasus in der iilteren Upa- 
nishad-literatur, Tiibingen, 1905, wherein by a consideration of 
the various cases in ten of the principal Upanishads he comes at 
a chronological order of the Upanishads relative to tbe age of 



ni. This is rather an important idea; for, Pa
ini seems to 
have flourished before the Upanishadic era had faded away, and 
therefore, some Upanishads wherein the PaI?inian uses do not occur 
may safely be taken to be pre-Pa1)ini, while others where they do 
occur may be taken to be post-Pal)ini. With this important hint, 
Wecker arranges the Upanishads in four groups; Group one con- 
sists of the Brihadara1)yaka, the Chhandogya, and the Kaushi- 
taki ; Group two, of the Aitareya, the Taittiriya, and the Katha; 
Group three, of the Kena, and the Isa ; Group four, of the Svetasva- 
tara and the Maitri. The first t\\yo are evidently pre-Pal)ini, the 
third possibly pre-Pa1)ini, whi]e the last is post-PaI)ini. In fact, this 
procedure of Wecker, in which he tries to arlive at a date of the 
Upanishads from a gramn1atical point of vie\\' i
 far more valid than 
that which avails itself of the presence or absence of the idea of 
Transmigration which 
'e have noted in the first chapter of this work. 
One wonders why the idea of Incarnation has not been similarly 
requisitioned for such purposes. In an essay on The Dra11latt'c 
Element in the Upanishads in the l\lonist, 19 10 , Charles Johnston 
discusses certain dialogues from the Brihadarat:lyaka, the Chhan- 
dogya, and other Upanishads. A. H. Ewing writes a study in 
Upanishadic psycho-physics by considering the H'indf,t conception 
of the function of Breath. Dr. Betty Heimann offers a review of 
the Upanishadic speculations on deep-sleep in his Die. Tiefschlaf- 
Spekulation de" alten U panishaden, 19 22 , \\"hile Rumball has \\'rit- 
ten an essay on The Conception of Sin t'n th
 Upanishads, Open 
Court, 1909. We thus see how a searching analysis of the Upa- 
nishads has been made in the interest of the different studies 
pursued by Scholars. 

Similar is the case with certain other essays on Upanishadic 
subjects. We have already pointed out in our Preface how in 
his Die Sainkhya-PhilosoPhie, Leipzig, 18 94, Richard Garbe 
goes into a detailed survey of the relation of the Upanishads to 
the Samkhya systel1
 and comes to the conclusion that the Sim- 
"khya system originated in the mid-Upanishadic period. Dr. 
Macnicol 's chapter on the Theism of the 'lJpanishads in his work 


on Indian Theism is a very clever analysis of the theistic teach- 
ing of the Upanishads. Macnicol 's thesis is that we may suppose 
that the Upanishads maintain the theistic theory, because, as he 
iays, the doctrine of Maya. is unknown to the Upanishads. Mac- 
nicol comes to the conclusion that the Upanishadic theory of 
God is theistic-mystic, instead of pantheistic: "Dr. Caird in his 
luminous exposition of the closely parallel speculation of Plotinus 
has distinguished the body of ideas to which it appears to me the 
re1lection of the Upanishads belongs as Mysticism from what is 
properly to be denominated Pantheism" (p. 59). We cannot 
go with Dr. Macnicol when he says that the Doctrine of Maya ii 
unknown to the Upanishads; but we do agree \\ith him when he 
speaks about the mystic trend of Upanishadic doctrine, though 
a mysticism need not always be a mere theism. Professor John 
McKenzie's Hindu Ethic$, Oxford, contains an excellent essay 
on the Ethics of the Upanishads ( pp. 67-99). We entirely agree 
with Mr. McKenzie that the Upanishadic ethical thinking is c<;>n- 
ducted in full view of the wider implications of human existence, 
namely, in other words, that the Upanishadic Ethics reposes on a 
solid Metaphysical basis: but we do not agree that the Upanishadic 
morality is ultimately unrea.l, or only Antinomian. A survey of 
the various views on Upanishadic Ethics in our Chapter VI 
would surely disprove all such partial views. 

Of the strictly philosophical essays on Upanishadic subjects, we 
have, in the first place, Josiah Royce's essay on the Mystical Con- 
ception of Being, as illustrated primarily from the Upanishads, in 
his World ana the Jnditti.dual. Royce tells us that he dwells so long 
on the Upanishads, because, as he says, ., they contain already 
the entire story of the mystic faith so far as it had a philosophical 
basis" (p. 175). Royce characterises the mysticaJ method as 
immediacy, and though he is not himself in sympathy with mys- 
ticism, nobody could have explained the mystic position better 
than Royce has done. Prof. Radhakrishnan's Reign of ReligiofJ ill 
CoJUeM/>ofa,y Philosophy, McMillan, 1920, ends with a chapter 
on I (Some suggestions for an approach to Reality based on the 



 ". We might see from this how Prof. Radhakrishnan 
himself r
gards the {Jpanishads as capable of giving us a point of 
view in contemporary thought. Prof. G. H. Langley, of Dacca 
University, writes an essay on the Conception 0./ the L"nit'et'sa I 
'n the U pan
.shads, and £ts identity with the I ndt'vidual 
Spirit in the Indian Philosophical Review, edited by A. G. V/id- 
gery and R. D. Ranade, April, 1920. Herein also he points out 
how the Upanishads differ from Kant. Not that Kant himself, 
according to Prof. Langley, is ultimately right, "for Kant re- 
gards that the Self in synthesising the given intuitions distort5 
the representations of the real object which give rise to them. 
On the other hand, Croce must be regarded as nearer the truth 
than Kant, when he says that the Self in synthesising is not dis- 
torting that which is given in experience, but is exercising only 
the essential function of spirit in revealing its true nature" (pp. 
126-127). Finally, Dr. Barua in his Pre-Bf4ddhistic PhilosoPhy, 
Calcutta, 1921, goes into a very detailed analysis of all the Thin- 
kers of India before the days of Buddha, and naturally has to con- 
sider in extenso the teac hings of U panishadic philsophers like 
Uddalaka, Yajfiavalkya, Pippalada, and others. The great difficulty 
in the case of these Upanishadic Philosophers is, ho,,'eyer. to clinch 
their personalities and doctrines, and if this could be successfully 
done,a volume on the C I Philosophers of the l?panishads" could 
well be written on the lines follo\ved by Dr. Burnet in his Early 
Greek Philosophy. Rudiments of such a possible \\'ork ha,'e l
already indicated in the first chapter of the present ,'olume. 

It is to the great credit of the Christian 
Iissions in India that 
they should have instituted research in various departInents of 
Indian thought, and the Upanishads have not escaped their close 
attention. Even though the views that th
y take are bound to 
be in the interest of Christianity, nobody could question the la- 
bour they bestow upon the subjects they deal \\ith. Slater's 
book on Studies in the lJpan.ishads, l\Iadras, 18 97, is a very 
good and clever production; only Slater does not suppose that the 
Upanishads are capable of supplying the idea of a universal religion : 



II If the dream of a univewal religion be true-and we have but 
one science of the universe; and if the Fatherhood of God and 
the Brotherhood of man be true, there can be but one bond of 
spiritual union for such a family-that religion cannot possibly 
be based on the Upanishads. If you make them your religion, 
then you must be content to see it confined to a small corner of 
the globe, and to a select coterie even in that corner. For if, as 
it has often been urged, this ancient system can be properly un- 
derstood only in the original Sanskrit, then true religion at its 
highest, depends, not only 011 superior intellect, but also on special 
linguistic talent, and talent to study a dead language I The 
thing, at lowest, is impracticable" (pp. 72). We fail to see 
what connection the idea of a universal religion has with language; 
it has to do only with spirit, and not with the expression of it in 
any language. H. D. Griswold's treatise on Brah1nan.' a study in 
the History of Indian PhilosoPh.y discusses at Jength the doctrine of 
Brahman in the Upanishads, and considers its religious, ethical, 
and philosophical consequences. Urquhart's Upanishads and 
Life, Calcutta, 1916, the argument of which work he also pursues 
further in his larger book on Pantheism and the Value oj Life, dis- 
 the theism and the pessimism of the Upanishads, their 
metaphysical inadequacy, their religious and ethical effects, and 
ends with the message of Christianity for Inclia. 

Of the more systematic works on Upanishadic Philosophy as 
a whole, we have to mention first A. E. Gough's Philosophy of 
the Upanishads, London 1882, which is probably the earliest of 
the kind, and which is a brilliantly written work, though it has a 
somewhat unsympathetic tone. Gough's view about the rela- 

tion of Sailkara to the Upanishads is that his philosophy may be 
supposed to be a legitimate outcome of the teachings of the Upa- 
nishads-an opinion which has been challenged by critics who 
point out that Sankara '5 philosophy is not the legitimate outcome 
of the teachings of the Upanishads. Deussen's Philosophy of 
,he Upanishads, which has been translated by the Rev. A. S. 
Geden, 1906, is the next most systematic work on the Up 
Qisbad! . 



Having spent a number of years on his II Sechzig Upanishad's", _ 
Deusen could speak with a master's voice on the central teachings 
of the Upanishads. Deussen's work is entirely indispensable to 
students of Upanishadic thought. Prof. Radhakrishnan 's Phi- 
losoPhy of the Upanishads, a separate print from his Indian Phi- 
losophy Vol. I., which has lately appeared, is a masterly and 
running survey of the teachings of the Upanishads, and comes 
from the hand of one who is deeply read in Western thought. 
Dr. S. K. Belvalkar and R. D. Ranade '5 C,eative Period of 
lndian Philosophy which will be published under the patronage 
of the University of Bombay, has been in the Press for some time 
past, and gives a detailed analysis of the contents of the various 
Upanishads arranged in their chronological and stratificatory 
order. There is also a very exhaustive survey in that book of a 
Century of Minor Upanishads, most of which have never been 
hitherto translated, and some of which have never been even 

There remain
 however J two masterl}' treatises on the Philoso- 
phy of the Upanishads, one by Oltramare and the other by Olden- 
berg. Oltramare's L 'Histoi,e des Idees theosophiqes dans 
l 'Inde, Paris, 1907, contains a full account of lTpanishadic phi- 
losophy in French, pp. 63-131. Oltramare first discusses such 
topics as Brahman, the Individual Soul, and the Identity of the 
Brahman with the Individual Soul. Then he proceeds to tell us 
how to know the Individual Soul is to know Brahman. He proceeds 
next to the question of the individualisation of Brahman, as ,veIl as 
the relation of the World to Brahman and Soul. Further,Oltramare 
proceeds to discuss the doctrines of Samsara and Moksha. Under 
these headings, he discusses such problems as the 1tfechanism of 
Metempsychosis, Works and Salvation, Knowledge and Salvation, 
and finally, the Meaning of Salvation. Lastly, he winds up by 
discussing the new tendency of religious thought in the Upa- 
nishads, as well as by an examination of the intellectual and moral 
influence of the Upanishads. Oldenberg'5 Die Leiwe _ 
Upafffshadm flna au An/lng, des ButUlhisMtu, GOttingen, IgIS, 


pp. 374, is entirely worthy of the veteran scholar. In part 
one of this \\'ork, Oldenherg discusses the old 1T panishads ; in part 
two, the ne,v Upanishads and the beginnings of 5arhkhya and Yoga; 
while in part three, he discusses the beginl1i
gs of Buddhism. After 
a preliminary chapter discussing such topics as the Land and 
Folk, the pre-historic back-ground, the Vedic gods, Death and 
the other world, and so forth, Oldenberg goes to the central con- 
ceptions of the Upanishads, namely those of Brahman and Atman, 
and their identification. He then discusses the problem of the 
relation of the Absolute to the World, and the meaning of the 
One and the Many. He proceeds next to discuss the question of 
the Absolute in itself, and the problem of the Personal and the 
ImpersonaJ. He then applies himself to the question of If Seelen- 
wanderung", as well as to that of the Worth of Existence. He 
proceeds to discuss the question of Emancipation, the relation of 
Knowledge and Works, and the problem of the knowability of the 
Absolute. He ends his first part by a review of the literary form 
of the Upanishads, namely the prose and poetry of the Upani- 
shads, their dialogues, and such other similar matters. In part two, 
he considers the beginnings of SaIhkhya and Yoga, wherein he 
discusses such problen1s as the GU1]as, the Purusha and the Pra- 
lqiti, the discipline of Pra
a, the Asanas, and Miracles. In part 
three, he discusses the origin of Buddhism in a survey spreading 
over about sixty pages. We might easily see from these contents 
of Oltramare 's and Oldenberg's works that, like their great pre- 
decessor in the field, Deussen '5 Philosophy of the Upanishads, 
they are fully philosophical in tone, and grapple with the central 
problems of Upanishadic thought. But they aim less at construc- 
tion than at mere exposition, and they have been written from 
the standpoint of the philosophy of the past. I t might be easily 
seen, therefore, how a constructive presentation of Upanishadic 
Philosophy from the standpoint of contemporary thought was 
the necessity of the hour. 


22. ( loth line from the bottom) heliolatory, reall heliolatry 
63. (3 rd line from the bottom) roof of philosophy in Greec "ad 
root of philosophy in Greece 
75 fl. For Cosmogony, insert Heading Chapter II: Cosmogony 
8 '" , \If 
I. TO 0' ,ead TO #'7 011 
95. (3 rd line from the top) whatoever read whatsoever 
. I , , 
153. O(JIo(
""trlr read e(JI8(IrlJIPF'f 
223 ( 18th line from the top) problem ,ead the problem 
228 ( 7 th line from the top ) 
nkara read Sankara 
277 ( 5th line from the bottom) it is read the Atman ic; 
295 ( loth line from the bottom) to us nearer read us nearer to 
304 ( loth line from the top) drash!avyo read drasn!avyaI,J 
306 ( 10th line from the top) Neitzsche ,ead Nietzsche 
330 ( 14th line from the top ) There ,ead there 
344 ( I5th line from the top) unmistakebly read unmistakably 
106 IfiO II. 5 '50 II. 5. 9 
112 (e) .. VI. I ( e) .. VI. S 
17 0 '. II. 15-17 ,. II. I. 15- 1 7 
17 2 '50 II. 2.12 '10 II. 4. 1
'" I. 2.21 a I. 2.22 
175 ,.. IV. -4. 9-7 ,. IV. 4. 6-7 
177 wt. VI. 6.10 .t. VI. 9- 10 
235 .. VI. .5. .. V.
.. VI. 10 .. IV. 10 
.. VI. 9. 
. IV. 9 
.. VI. I. 
. VI. II 
137 t. 9, II. t. 9- 1 1. 
23 8 150 I. I. IS . '50 I. a. 15 
. VI. 2. 
. VI. 5. 

. VI. 53 
.VI. 23 

. VI. I. 1 
. VI. II 
143 ,. II. 8.8 
. Ill. 8.8 
279 q.. 11.6 tf. 11.8. 
. III. 2.3 
. III. 2,3. 
28 3 150 II. 5- 11 'I?; II. 5.11 

. X. gOI 
. X. gO.I 
18 4 
 I. 2. 8 
 I. 2-8 
185 5t. VIII. 7.IZ .t. VIII. 7-12 
tIO I. 21 
 I. 2.1 
3 1 0 ,. IV. 3. :J 'I. IV. 3.21. 


The Academy of Philosophy and Religion has undertaken the 
preparation and publication of an Encyclopccdic History of Indian 
Philosophy in sixteen voluD1es, nluch like the Cambridge Modern 
J-listory, or the Cambridge History of English Literature, making 
use of the specialised labours of the many great savants of Philo- 
sophy in India, and bringing their researches to a focus in the 
Encyclopredic History, the volumes of which may be set down 

Vol. I. 'fhe Philosophy and Religion of the Vedas. 
Vol. II. A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy 
(Now out.) 
V 01. III. Philosophy and Religion of the Mahabharata, and the 
Vol. IV. The Philosophy of Buddhism. 
Vol. V. The Philosophy of Jainism. 
Vol VI. Philosophy of the Dar
nas: Samkhya, Yoga, and 
Vol. VII. Philosophy of the Dar
nas : Nyaya and Vai
Vol. VIII. The Philosophy of Advaitism. 
Vol. IX. Non-Advaitic Vedanta. 
Vol. X. Indian Mysticism: Mysticism in Mabarasht ra (In the 
press ). 
Vol. XI. Indian Mysticism: Mysticism outside Maharashtra. 
Vol. XII. Tendencies of Contemporary Thought. 
Vol. XIII. Sources. 
Vol. XIV. SonrcC!. 
Vol. XV. Sources. 
Vol. XVI. Index. 

The following persons, \\'hose names have been alphabetically 
arranged, tonstitute, among others, the Contributors to the 
series, the asterisk signifying Member of the Editorial Board:- 



* T, Dr. S. K. Belvalkar, M. A. Ph. D., Professor of Sanskrit, 
Deccan College, Poona. 
2. Principal Vi dhushekhara Bhattacharya, Vishva-Bharati 
University, Shantiniketan. 
3. Prof. A. Chakravarti M. A., Professor of Philosophy, Presi- 
dency College, Madras. 
* 4. Prof. S. N. Das Gupta, M. A. Ph. D., Presidency College, 
* 5. Principal A. B. Dhruva, M. A., Professor of Sanslait, 
Hindu University, Benares. 
6. Prof. M. Hiriyanna, M. A., Prpfessor of Sanskrit, Maharaja's 
'. '" 
College, Mysore. 
7. Prof. Krishnaswami Iyengar" M. A., Professor of History, 
University of Madras, Madras. 
8. V. Subramanya Iyer Esqr., B. A., Registrar, University 
of Mysore, Mysore. 
* 9. Dr. Ganganath Jha, M. A. D.Litt.) Vice-Chancellor, Uni- 
versity of Allahabad, Allahabad. 
ro. Prof. K. Subramanyam Pillay, M. A. M. L., Law College, 
*11. Prof.. S. Radhakrishnan, M. A., Professor of Philosophy, 
University of Calcutta, Calcutta. 
*12. Prof. R. D. Ranade, M. A., Director of the Academy 01 Phi. 
losophy and Religion, Poona Branch, Poona. 
*13. Dr. Brajedranath Seal, M. A. Ph. D. D. Se., Vice-Chancellor 
University of Mysore, Mysore, Chairman. 
14. Prof.. Kuppuswami Shastri, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit, 
Presidency College, Madras. 
15. Prof. E. A. Wodehouse, M. A., Professor of English, Dec- 
can College, Poona. 
16. Prof. R. Zimmermann, S. J.., Ph. D., Professor of Sanslait, 
St. Xavier's College, Bombay. 


It has been decided to bring out the Series at as 8Qrly a date as 
possible; but, a period, say, of about ten years, may safely be 
predicted for th
 publication of the entire series. More informa- 
tion about the Encyclopaedic History of Indian Philosophy, or 
about the Academy of Philosophy and Religion, can be had from 
the Director of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion, Poona 
Branch, Poona.